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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role, use and impact of stop and search under the Terrorism Act 
2000, section 44 by combining doctrinal and empirical methods, drawing upon close legal 
analysis of the relevant legislation, jurisprudence and secondary sources intertwined with 
data from forty-two semi-structured interviews, carried out with police officers, community 
representatives and stakeholders. Section 44 is judged against the framework principles of 
accountability, adherence to human rights and to the Government's self-set goals as sct in 
CONTEST.! Section 44 is depicted as a vital tool to disrupt and prevent acts of terrorism, as 
evidenced by its widespread use - there were 197,008 section 44 stops carried out in 
2008/09.2 Concerns have, however, been voiced since its inception that section 44 is being 
over-used and that it is being used inconsistently. Alongside issues raised around its 
deployment, the legality of the power, in terms of adherence to the ECHR, has been 
questioned. In January 2010 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the routine use 
of section 44 violates the right to privacy under Article 8.3 
This thesis first sets out the theoretical framework, research questions and methodology. It 
then considers the historical development of the power to stop and search, in terms of 
'normal' and 'counter-terrorist' policing, identifying trends that highlight areas of perennial 
concern in relation to stop and search. The focus then turns to section 44 itself. The two 
stage authorisation process is examined by reference to the primary legislative sources and 
data from the fieldwork and critiqued against the framework principles before 
recommendations are proposed for ways in which the power could be modified so that it 
adheres to the principles. The deployment of the power is then detailed and critiqued before 
recommendations for improving its adherence to the framework principles are suggested. 
The final substantive chapter looks at the impact of section 44 upon communities and 
groups. This draws upon secondary literature and statistics as well as the fieldwork data. 
The chapter concludes by highlighting the weaknesses in the current system and 
recommending changes. The final chapter concludes by summarising the findings in 
relation to each research question and assessing whether the new power under TACT section 
47 A, implemented recently by the Government as an alternative to section 44, addresses the 
various concerns that section 44 raised. 
I Home Office, CONTEST: the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International 
Terrorism (Cm 7547,2009). 
2 Ministry of Justice 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2008/09' (Ministry 
of Justice, London 2010) table 3.06a. 
3 Gillan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 45 app.no.4158/05. 
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Chapter 1) Introduction 
The Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) was introduced by the Government in December 1999. 
Despite the receding threat from domestic terrorism, following the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement 1998, Irish terrorism remained high on the agenda, the danger being 
underlined by the Omagh bombing in August 1998. The Prime Minister, speaking to the UN 
General Assembly in September 1998, declared that '[t]he fight against terrorism has taken 
on a new urgency', I while the consultation paper introducing the bill stated there was a 
continuing 'clear and present terrorist threat to the UK,.2 The refusal to view the Good 
Friday Agreement as marking an end to the terrorist threat revealed a realism that recognised 
the long history of terrorism, both domestically and internationally.3 In addition, there was 
specific recognition that the growing threat from international terrorism meant that, even 
were there a lasting peace in Northern Ireland, counter-terrorist legislation would continue to 
be required.4 An important factor prompting the new legislation was the desire to cancel the 
derogation under Article 15 ECHR, which had been in place since 1988. s 
TACT was, in sharp contrast to most of its predecessors, a considered piece of legislation 
which to a substantial degree built upon Lord Lloyd's 'Inquiry into Legislation Against 
Terrorism,.6 It was to be a permanent piece of legislation that would 'modernise and 
I Home Office, Legislation Against Terrorism (Cm 4178, 1998) [2]. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Domestic examples include Irish Nationalist movements such as elements of the Fenians 
(see Kee, R, The Green Flag: a History of Irish Nationalism (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London 1972», Guy Fawkes, the Scottish and Cornish National Liberation Armies. 
Internationally terrorism can be traced back at least to the 1 SI century AD with the Sicarii 
(see Richardson, L, What terrorists want: understanding the terrorist threat (John Murray, 
London 2006) Chapter 2) through the French state Terror (Schama, S, Citizens: a chronicle 
of the French revolution (Viking, London 1989)) and the Russian anarchists (Avrich, P, The 
Russian anarchists (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1967» to the various 20th 
and 21 s1 century terrorist movements (see Jones, Sand Libiki, M, How Terrorist Groups 
End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida (RAND, Santa Monica 2008)). 
4 Home Office, 'Legislation Against Terrorism' [6]. 
S The derogation followed the ECtHR's ruling in Brogan v United Kingdom (1988) 11 
E.H.R.R. 117 app.no. 11209/84 that pre-charge detention of four days violated Article 5(3). 
The only aspect of TACT that may require a derogation (although the issue has not been 
litigated to date) is Schedule 8, paragraph 9, whereby a detainee may be permitted access to 
a solicitor only in the sight and hearing of a qualified officer (this would in all likelihood 
violate article 6, see: Brennan v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 18, app.no.39846/98). 
Note that a derogation was lodged in relation to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 
Part IV, but removed following the amendment of the law subsequent to the House of Lords' 
ruling in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
6 (Cm 3420, 1996). 
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streamline' existing legislation.7 Implicitly this was to be the counter-terrorist legislation, 
providing all the tools necessary for the security services to protect the country. The 
argument that permanent special powers are required to counter terrorism is in keeping with 
the, albeit subsequent, UN Resolution 1373, discussed below, and with the approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has implicitly accepted the need for 
emergency laws.8 Despite the acknowledgement of the dangers of international terrorism 
there can be no doubt that the counter-terrorist landscape changed utterly with the attacks of 
9/11. In addition to the reversion to knee-jerk legislation in the form of the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001, passed through Parliament in mere weeks, the exercise of the 
powers granted under TACT increased exponentially.9 In the subsequent years there have 
been more terrorist attacks, including on London in July 2005, more counter-terrorist 
legislation and a further increase in the use of counter-terrorist powers by the police and 
. 10 
executive. 
This thesis looks at the power to stop and search under TACT, sections 44-7. 'Section 44' 
will be used as shorthand to refer to the whole of the authorisation process and the exercise 
of the power except when the contrary is indicated. This thesis argues that the ill-conceived 
drafting ensures scant oversight or accountability over section 44, which provides the police 
with the extraordinary power to stop and search without reasonable suspicion. This 
indulgence has been aggravated by excessive deference by the courts when considering the 
exercise of the power. I I It is, however, possible, if not probable, that without the changing 
counter-terrorist landscape post 9/11 there would be relatively little interest in section 44, for 
it has been the exercise of the power that has highlighted and aggravated the failings in its 
legal base and drawn attention in recent years. Excluding port and border controls, section 
44 is the most common site of interaction, in terms of counter-terrorism, between the police 
and community. Ports and border controls are accepted conditions of travel, and thus 
avoidable if one chooses not to travel, in contrast to section 44 where people are going about 
their daily business. A substantial part of the criticism surrounding this power centres on its 
allegedly disproportionate usage, where it has been cited as an example of the creation of a 
'suspect community' and, while these allegations are contested, there is obvious potential for 
7 Home Office, 'Legislation Against Terrorism'. 
8 See, e.g. Klass v Germany (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 214 app.no.5029171; Ireland v United 
Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25 app.no.53 1017 1. 
9 Constitutional Committee, Fast-track legislation: constitutional implications and 
safeguards (HL 2009,116-1) [77-80]. 
10 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, 
the Terrorism Act 2006, the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 and the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. 
11 See Chapter 4. 
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damaging police-community relations, whether arising from actual or perceived 
d· . l' 12 lsproportlOna lty. 
1.1) Central thesis 
The core thesis of this research is that: 
The power to stop and search must be governed by clearly defined proportionate 
legislation and be authorised and exercised in accordance with human rights, which 
provide for accountability, both legal and democratic. Section 44 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000, as a counter-terrorist power, must additionally be of proven efficiency 
and effectiveness in contributing to CONTEST, the Government's counter-terrorist 
strategy. Failure to adhere to these standards will result in legal action against the 
police and undermine the general counter-terrorist strategy and the community's 
faith in, and cooperation with, the police, both key to successful counter-terrorism, 
with a consequential detrimental effect on other counter-terrorist powers and 
operations. 
The following sections will unpick and develop the following key concepts which fonn the 
ethical framework of this research: human rights, accountability, and effective and efficient 
adherence to CONTEST; explaining why and how they are to be applied in this research. 
The subsequent section sets forth the claims to originality in the research. This is followed 
by a discussion of 'terrorism', including its definition and the relevant international 
obligations which pertain to the United Kingdom. Discussion of the 'new terrorism' leads 
into an analysis of the interface between key approaches in counter-terrorism and risk 
theories and how these in turn interact with the framing concepts of human rights, 
accountability and adherence to CONTEST. This introduction concludes with the research 
questions for this thesis. 
This thesis takes the date of 10 February 2011 as its cut-off point. Given the rapid changes 
in this area a cut-off date had to be chosen, and the day before the introduction of the 
Protection of Freedoms Bill seemed apt. The concluding chapter does, however, discuss the 
forthcoming 'new' power under TACT, section 47 A and that proposed in the Protection of 
Freedoms Bill. 
1.1.1) Human rights 
The positing of human rights as a normative principle relevant to this thesis is relatively 
uncontentious contemporarily, subject to the discussion below regarding the 'new 
12 Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations (IIC 2004-05, 165-1) 
[152-3). 
4 
terrorism,.13 In this research 'human rights' is used as shorthand for the rights governed by 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Their appropriateness as a norm 
within legal research is underpinned by the Human Rights Act 1998, which makes it 
unlawful for any public authority, including the police, to act in a manner incompatible with 
a Convention right, unless their actions are compelled by primary legislation. 14 Although 
the Government may legislate in a manner which is incompatible with Convention rights, 
whether subsequent to a derogation under Article 15 or simply by enacting incompatible 
legislation which will prompt a section 4 declaration of incompatibility, the limitations on 
these practices underline the normative position of human rights. IS The appropriateness of 
human rights as one of the principles framing counter-terrorist legislation is underlined by 
government: 'CONTEST is based on principles that reflect our core values ... we will 
continue to regard the protection of human rights as central to our counter-terrorism work,.16 
Of the ECHR articles, six are relevant to this research: Articles 5, 6, 8, 10,11 and 14. All of 
these articles, their jurisprudence, and (potential) application to the authorisation and/or 
exercise of section 44 are discussed in detail in Chapters 4-6. 
In addition to the substantive rights which section 44 engages, there are a number of 
pervasive issues raised regarding implementation. The requirement that legislation be 
clearly defined is encompassed within the requirement that a measure be 'prescribed by 
law', which coincides with the common law principle of legality and the 'rule of law' .17 To 
be 'prescribed by law' the law governing the measure must be adequately accessible and 
formulated in a manner that is sufficiently foreseeable. IS The requirement of foreseeability 
does not mean that persons must be able to foresee the future actions of the police with such 
precision that they can carry out criminal activities and avoid police action, rather it must be 
\3 Also, c.f. Minogue, K, 'The History of the idea of Human Rights' in W Laquer and B 
Rubin (eds) The Human Rights Reader (Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1979) 11-5; 
Ministry of Justice 'Rights and Responsibilities: DeVeloping our Constitutional Framework' 
(HMSO, London 2009); Clayton, R, 'The Human Rights Act Six Years on: Where are we 
now?' (2007) 11 EHRLR 11, 11-2; Lord Hoffman, 'The Universality of Iluman Rights' 
(2009) 125 LQR 416 (although the criticism therein focussed on the ECtHR rather than the 
concept of human rights itself). Also sce the historical criticism, e.g.: Waldron, J (cd), 
Nonsense on Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Methuen, London 
1987). 
14 Human Rights Act 1998, section 6. 
IS In R v A [2002] 1 AC 45(HL), [44] Lord Steyn stated: '[a] declaration of incompatibility is 
a measure of last resort'. On derogation under Article 15, sce: Lawless v Ireland (No. 3) 
(1979-80) 1 EHRR 15 (Series A, No. 3) app.no.332/57; the 'The Greek Case' [1969] 12 YB 
ECHR. 
16 Home Office, 'CONTEST' [0.18]. 
17 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex. p. Simms [2000] 2 A.C. lIS. 
18 Malone v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EIIRR app.no.8691179. 
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clear under what circumstances the police are empowered to resort to the exercise of the 
relevant measure.!9 
The principle of proportionality is a central tenct of human rights jurisprudence.2o It is also 
a principle of public law?! Within this research the test applied in relation to human rights 
will be used. It requires the courts to inquire "whether: (i) the legislative objective is 
sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to 
meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to 
impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective." 22 
To be proportionate all three limbs must be satisficd. The availability and effectiveness of 
safeguards can assist in determining that a measure is proportionate.23 If a right is 
extinguished by the exercise of the measure it will almost certainly be deemed to be 
disproportionate?4 In addition, the arbitrary exercise of a measure will be considered 
disproportionate?5 Finally, the nature and extcnt of the intcrference with the human right in 
question and the objective of that interference may be 'balanced' against each other.26 In 
relation to the authorisation the first limb is unlikely to be problematic - the objective of 
countering terrorism has been deemed sufficiently important to justify limiting various 
fundamental rights.27 Equally the assertion that stop and search is rationally connected to 
countering terrorism is likely to be accepted without much dissent, however, the final limb 
may prove problematic, particularly where the maximum geographical and temporal limits 
are used for the authorisation. In relation to its exercise, the major problems occur in 
relation to the third limb, particularly given the absence of any requirement of reasonable 
19 Ibid. 
20 It was held as the correct test, as opposed to 'Wednesbury unreasonableness', in R (on the 
application o/Daly) v Secretary a/State/or the Home Department [2001] UKIIL 26. Note 
that it also has application in relation to EU law (Sullivan, R, 'Police Reform Act 2002: a 
radical interpretation' [2002] Crim.LR 468). 
21 R (on the application o/Daly) v Secretary o/State/or the Home Department. See also de 
Freitas v Ministry 0/ Agriculture [1999] 1 AC 69; Hickman, T, 'The substance and structure 
of proportionality' [2008] PL 694. 
22 de Freitas v Mnistry 0/ Agriculture, 80. 
23 Klass v Germany. 
24 Rees v United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56 app.no.9532/81. 
25 W v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 29 app.no.9749/82. 
26 Camp bell v United Kingdom (1993) 15 EHRR 137 app.no.l3590/88. See also: Waldron, 
J, 'Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance' (2003) 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 
191. 
27 E.g. Lawless v Ireland (No. 3) (Article 5); R v DPP (Ex p. Kebeline) [2000] 2 AC 326 
(Article 6); R (Malik) v Manchester Crown Court [2008] EWHC 1362 (Admin) (Article 
10). 
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suspicion, although depending on where the power is exercised there may be difficulties 
with the second limb as well. 
1.1.2) Accountability 
Accountability may be located within the human rights framework, accountability to the 
courts being ensured by ECHR, Articles 5 and 6 as well as references in the preamble to 
'democracy' and 'a democratic society'. The reference to 'democracy' and 'democratic 
society', neither of which is defined, emphasises that while accountability forms part of the 
ECHR it also goes beyond its remit as an integral element of the democratic process. This 
broad scope and the fact that community accountability, which is part of a broadly defined 
democratic accountability not necessarily encompassed by the ECIIR, is a specific focus of 
this research, warrant viewing accountability as an additional normative principle, rather 
than subsuming it within human rights. The Government again provides confirmation of the 
appropriateness of this aspect of the normative framework, albeit relating to a narrower 
terminology than that adopted here, as CONTEST includes 'accountable government' as onc 
of the core values espoused by the strategy.28 
Accountability has been described as a 'chameleon' term whose meaning varies widely.29 
However, at its most basie it is the principle that public authorities and institutions must be 
answerable to the public for their actions and omissions. As Kleinig notes, one can say 
either: 'that [the police] should be answerable (held to account) for what they do, or that they 
are able to answer for what they do.3o The latter, whereby the police 'give an account' ,31 is 
normative and is intrinsically tied to the concept of 'policing by consent': if the police are 
not accountable, they forfeit consent and thus legitimacy.32 The former, structural, form of 
accountability includes the mechanisms by which the police are held to account.33 Both will 
be considered in the following Chapters. 
There are multiple layers of accountability relevant to section 44, the police being 
accountable to the law and to the tri-partite structure of Chief Constable, Home Secretary 
28 Home Office, 'CONTEST'. 
29 Newburn, T (ed), Handbook of Policing (Will an, Cullompton 2003)605. 
30 Kleinig, J, The Ethics of Policing (CUP, Cambridge 1996) 210. 
31 Ericson, R, 'The News Media and Account Ability' in P Stenning (ed) Accountability for 
Criminal Justice: Selected Essays (U Toronto Press, Toronto 1994). 
32 Kleinig, The Ethics of Po/icing Chapter 11. 
33 Also termed 'professional' and 'organisational' accountability. 
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and Police Authority (PA).34 There are aspects of democratic and local accountability 
within the tripartite structure in terms of the Home Secretary and the members of the police 
authorities (the party political members representing national accountability, while 
independent members signify local accountability). There is bureaucratic accountability, in 
the requirement of adherence to various targets in the centrally set Nationally Policing 
Plans,35 and in relation to the monitoring of a wide range of incidents which are either 
mandated by what Ericson and Haggerty term 'external communication rules', such as 
Freedom of Information requests, or specified by the police themselves to preventively 
monitor potential sites of liability and accountability, notably in relation to this thesis, stop 
and search forms.36 In addition, there is national accountability in relation to the 
independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who presents an annual review to Parliament 
and in relation to the statistics on race and the criminal justice system, which include 
statistics on the use of section 44.37 The public nature of these reports implies a degree of 
local and community accountability in addition to parliamentary accountability. Community 
accountability in this research focuses on the lines of communication between the police and 
the community, encompassing some of the structures for local accountability in terms of the 
police authorities but also going beyond that, including, for instance Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams and Independent Advisory Groups. 
1.1.3) CONTEST 
The final normative principle against which section 44 is to be judged is its efficiency and 
effectiveness in implementing the relevant aspects of the CONTEST strategy. This 
utilitarian approach coincides with the 'new public management' focus on cost-effectiveness 
and the achievement of set targets.38 It draws in broad brush strokes the key principles and 
objectives of its four strands, highlighting the major areas for focus or development and is 
useful at the higher levels of the policing hierarchy for composing strategy but of 
considerably less utility in terms of tactical deployment or for front-line officers. The fact 
34 Lustgarten, L, The governance of police (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1986) Chapter 6. 
See also: Neyroud, P and Beckley, A, Policing, Ethics and Human Rights (Willan, Devon 
2001),96-123. 
35 Police Reform Act 2002, section 1. Note this was due for repeal under the Police and 
Justice Act 2006, Schedule IS, although this reform appears to have been outpaced by the 
new proposals under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill 2010/11. 
36 Ericson, Rand Haggerty, K, Policing the Risk Society (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 
428-429. 
37 Originally pursuant to TACT, section 126; now pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2006, 
section 36(1). 
38 For more on 'new public management', also termed 'new managerialism' sec, e.g. 
Crawford, A, The Local Governance of Crime (OUP, Oxford 1997) 181-3; Hughes, G, The 
Politics o/Crime and Community (Pal grave, Basingstoke 2007) 57-63. 
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that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) widely used section 44 prior to the advent of 
CONTEST underlines its role as a strategic rather than operational document. 
CONTEST is divided into four work-streams:39 
• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks; 
• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; 
• Protect: to strengthen the protection against terrorist attack; and 
• Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact. 
Section 44 engages three of these streams. Its objectives, discussed in Chapter 4, correspond 
to aspects of both 'Pursue' and 'Protect'. There are substantial overlaps between the two 
streams. CONTEST reveals 'Pursue' to be more geared towards apprehension and 
prosecution or restrictions through non-prosecution actions such as control orders whereas 
'Protect' focuses on target hardening and safeguarding, in particular of critical national 
infrastructure (CNI), crowded places, transport systems and borders.4o In addition, it is vital 
that in its operation section 44 does not counteract the imperatives of 'Prevent'. 
1.2) Originality 
This research will contribute to the existing body of literature surrounding stop and search 
and counter-terrorist legislation by addressing the highly contested but under-researched 
power under section 44. The in-depth analysis, which adds to the existing doctrinal research 
on section 44, is bolstered by the holistic approach adopted which considers the historical 
antecedents, thereby situating the present power in its socio-political and historical context, 
and assesses not only the impact of the power on the community but also its objectives for 
the police. Alongside these doctrinal inquiries is the qualitative field-work. There has been 
no published empirical work carried out in relation to section 44. The qualitative aspects of 
this thesis enables conclusions to be drawn as to section 44's actual usage, impact and the 
implementation of the related strands of CONTEST. 
1.3) 'Terrorism' 
The previous section outlining the normative principles for this thesis adopted a fiction in 
presenting human rights, accountability and adherence to CONTEST as uncontested norms. 
There are internal tensions between the three and an increasing body of literature that argues 
that human rights ought to be 'balanced' against security in the face of the 'new terrorism,.41 
The use of the term 'balancing' in relation to human rights produces much confusion: it is 
39 Home Office, 'CONTEST'. 
40 Ibid [0.23-0.48]. 
41 Sce, for example, Posner, Rand Vermeule, A, Terror in the balance (OUP, Oxford 2007). 
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legitimate to talk of 'balancing' conflicted rights against each other, such as one person's 
right to free speech against another's right to privacy. However, the common usage in 
relation to terrorism presumes, incorrectly, that there are scales with security on one side and 
human rights on the other whereby an increase on one side is offset by a decrease on the 
other. Human rights cannot be 'balanced' in this sense;42 they represent the bare minimum 
which must be respected, subject to the right to derogate43 and limitations contained within 
the articles.44 Before assessing the internal tensions between the posited norms it is 
necessary to analyse the concept of terrorism. This section does so: it begins with a survey 
of the relevant international obligations, then considers the definition of terrorism, and 
concludes with a discussion of the 'new terrorism', including an analysis of the tensions and 
criticisms relating to the normative principles and a discussion of risk theory which is 
closely intertwined with CONTEST. 
1.3.1) International obligations 
This research focuses on domestic counter-terrorist law, which must be viewed in light of 
the UK's international obligations relating to counter-terrorism. There are three major 
sources of such international obligations: the Council of Europe, the EU and the UN.4s 
To proceed in reverse order, pre-9/11 the international community, particularly the UN, took 
a inductive approach to terrorism, whereby specific instances form the basis of the general 
rule. This avoided the need to define terrorism. Instead the UN passed resolutions banning 
certain forms of conduct which are associated with terrorism, such as hijacking46 and 
hostage taking,47 as well as introducing Conventions aimed at making terrorist operations 
more difficult, such as the suppression of the financing of terrorism48 and the protection of 
nuclear materials.49 The UN General Assembly and Security Council also passed a number 
42 Waldron 'Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance'. 
43 ECHR, Article IS. 
44 E.g. the sub-paragraphs of Article 5(1). 
45 Terrorism is excluded from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 2187 UNTS 90). 
46 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963). 
47 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979). 
48 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). 
49 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuc1ear Materials (1980). The other relevant 
conventions are: the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 
(1971) and its 1988 supplementary Protocol, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishments of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents (1973), the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (1988), the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against 
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988), the Convention on 
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of resolutions relating to terrorism, which were for the most part declaratory. so Since 9/11 
the UN has taken a more deductive approach, imposing obligations through a number of 
Security Council Resolutions (SCR). Although there is still no international definition of 
'terrorism' reference is made to 'terrorism' rather than specific actions which are deemed 
terroristic.sl The first such resolution was SCR 1373 (2001), passed in the wake of 9/11, 
which obliges member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism,52 refrain 
from providing any support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist 
attacks,s3 and calls upon States to intensify and accelerate the sharing of operational 
information and increase cooperation in relation to counter-terrorism.S4 SCR 1456 (2003) 
reiterated the calls for implementation, noting that all measures to combat terrorism must 
comply with the State's international obligations, with particular reference to human rights, 
refugee and humanitarian law.ss SCR 1624 (2005) required States to ensure the legal 
prohibition of incitement to terrorism. 56 A number of additional resolutions, conventions 
and protocols have been passed which address specific terrorist threats, supplement previous 
resolutions, or call for increased cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. 57 
SCR 1373 created the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor member States' 
implementation of their obligations under the Resolution and to strengthen their counter-
terrorism capacity. This was bolstered by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive 
Directorate (CTED), established by SCR 1535 (2004). In order to monitor compliance with 
the human rights aspects of the resolutions and conventions, the Commission on J luman 
the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991), and the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997). 
so E.g. S/RES/1267 (1999), S/RES/l189 (1998), NRES/S4/164 (2000), AlRES/52/165 
(1997), and UN General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII) (1972). 
SI Although see Saul, B, Defining Terrorism in International Law (OUP, Oxford 2006); 
Young, R, 'Defining Terrorism: the Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in 
International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation' (2006) 23 
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 23, who contends that a definition 
is possible by abstracting form the common elements and themes present in the UN 
Resolutions, conventions, treaties and protocols. 
S2 Article 1. Implemented through various legislation, including Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act 2001, Part IV. 
S3 Article 2. 
54 Article 3. 
S5 Article 6. 
S6 Implemented by TACT, sections 59-61 (inciting terrorism overseas); Terrorism Act 2006, 
section 1. 
S7 SEC RES 1456 (2003), SEC/RES 1540 (2004), SEC/RES 1566 (2004) and SECIRES 
1617 (2005). The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
(2005), amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, a 
Protocol to the Marine Convention (2005), and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms (2005). 
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Rights appointed a 'Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism' (Special Rapporteur) for a period of three 
years, extended by a further three years in 2007.58 This was supplemented in 2008 by the 
creation of a working group within the CTED to deal with issues raised in relation to human 
rights by counter-terrorism. 59 It is worth noting the report by the Working Group on 
Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Implementation Task Force (CTITF) 'Basic human rights reference guide: the stopping and 
h· f ,60 searc mg 0 persons. This guide highlights the need for proportionate, non-
discriminatory stop and search practices and cited the Gillan (ECtHR) case. It is particularly 
relevant to this thesis and is cited, where relevant, in Chapters 4-7. The specific aspects of 
these resolutions, conventions and protocols, as well as the work of the Special Rapporteur, 
will be highlighted where relevant in the subsequent chapters. Overall, these resolutions 
make relatively little impact on the UK as its counter-tcrrorist legislation was already 
extensive and, for the most part, already adhered to the minimal requirements laid down. 
The Special Rapporteur has, however, criticised elements of the UK legislation.61 
The EU'S62 counter-terrorism policy dates back to the early 1970s with the formation of the 
European Political Cooperation.63 In 1976 the Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and 
political Violence (TREVI) Group was established, serving operational needs and providing 
a forum for discussion and interchange of intelligence. Its legal base remained opaque until 
the Maastricht Treaty when it was brought within the third pillar of Justice and Home 
Affairs.64 Maastricht specifically recognised the threat of terrorism as 'a matter of common 
interest', calling for cooperation between the State's police, customs officials and Europol, 
58 Commission of Human Rights Resolution 2005/S0. Iluman Rights Council decisions 
2006/102 and 6/2S. There appears to have been no further extension (sce: 
http://www2.ohchr.orglenglishlissues/terrorism!rapporteur/srchr.htm <accessed 24th May 
2011». 
59 SECIRES IS05. 
60 (UN, New York 2010). 
61 Schenin, M, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism' (AIHRC/4/26/ Add.l, 2007); 
Schenin, M, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism' (E/CN.4/2006/98, 2006); 
Schenin 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism'; Schenin 'Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental frcedoms 
while countering terrorism'. 
62 The tcrm the 'EU' is used throughout for simplicity's sake, although the discussion spans 
the EECIEC/EU periods. 
63 Bures, 0, 'EU Countertcrrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?' (2006) 18 Terrorism and Political 
Violence 57, SS. 
64 Ibid, 58-9. 
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itself established under Maastricht.6s In addition to TREVI, the 1979 Dublin Agreement 
aimed to ensure the unifonn application of the Council of Europe's European Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) by applying it without reservations, even though it had 
not been ratified by all members of the EEC.66 TREVI was supplemented by the work of the 
Police Working Group on Terrorism, established in 1979, which includes the 'Club of 
Berne' countries: all EU states plus Norway and Switzerland.67 Two other major 
innovations pre-9/11 were the Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure between the 
Member States of the EU (1995) and the Convention Relating to Extradition between 
Member States of the EU (1996), which supplemented and aimed to improve earlier 
conventions.68 Although TREVI was viewed as a success, being by the late 1980s 'a more 
effective forum than Interpol in matters relating to the security of databank and information 
exchanges on international terrorism',69 overall these approaches suffered from delays in 
ratification and a lack ofimplementation.70 
On the 21st September 2001 the European Council published its 'Plan of Action', outlining 
the EO's policy to combat terrorism. The present governing document is the EU Counter-
terrorism Strategy, adopted by the European Council in 2005.71 It adopts a similar approach 
to CONTEST, with four strands: 'prevent', 'protect', 'pursue' and 'respond'. The Plan of 
Action, which dctails the measures to be pursued under each strand, is reviewed every six 
months by the Pennanent Representatives Committee. The Council has also published its 
Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, adopted in 2005 and 
bolstered by its own Action Plan. The Working Party on Terrorism, situated within the 2nd 
pillar, meets on a monthly basis with bi-annual meetings with Russia and the USA and 
annual meetings with Canada and India. Within Europol a dedicated counter-terrorism unit, 
SC5, was established within Europol's Organised (Serious) Crime Department, alongside 
supporting Programs.72 Outside the EU the Counter Terrorist Group, developed by the 
'Club of Berne' (the EU plus Norway and Switzerland) buttresses the EU initiatives, 
6S Article Kl. 
66 Lowe, V and Warbrick, C (eds), The United Nations and Principles of International Law: 
essays in memory of Michael Akehurst (Routledge, London 1999). 
67 Deflem, M, 'Europol and the Policing ofInternational Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a 
Global Perspective' (2006) 23 Justice Quarterly 336, 341. 
68 The European Convention on Extradition (1957) and the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism (1977). 
69 Lodge, J, 'Terrorism and the European Community: towards 1992' (1989) I Terrorism and 
Political Violence 30, 42. 
70 Bures 'EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?'. 
71 14469/4/05. 
72 The Counter Proliferation Program, Preparedness Program and Training and Education 
Program. 
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providing another interface for Member States' heads of intelligence and security services 
on terrorist matters.73 This complements the high-level political dialogue occurring at 
Council, Parliament and Commission level within the EU.74 Another innovation is the 
European Arrest Warrant,7S which permits quicker, simplified extradition in relation to the 
offences listed in Article 2, which include terrorism. 76 
It is evident from this brief review that the majority of operations at an EU level are 
designed to bolster cooperation and the exchange of intelligence and expertise. In terms of 
law, the EU, like the UN, sets a minimum standard in a number of areas, in addition to 
increased cooperation between Member States on issues such as extradition. However, due 
to limited resources, in terms of both personnel and budget, the EU relics heavily on 
Member States for their implementation and for secondment of experts, which causes a 
'capabilities-expectations' 'gap'. 77 
The Council of Europe, like the UN and the EU, had passed a number of conventions 
relating to terrorism prior to 9/11. The 'European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism' (1977) takes a inductive approach adopting the crimes listed in the UN 
Conventions, above. It deals with extradition in relation to these actions, calling upon 
Member States to 'afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal 
matters' relating thereto.78 This was supplemented in 2005 by the 'Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism', which, again, takes a inductive approach. The 
Convention recognises 'the negative effects [terrorism has] on the full enjoyment of human 
rights, in particular the right to life' ,79 while also insisting that 'all measures taken by the 
state to fight terrorism must respect human rights and the principle of the rule of law, while 
excluding any form of arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory behaviour'. 80 It requires 
73 Deflem 'Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a 
Global Perspective', 341. 
74 European Council 'The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy' (2005) 14469/4/05, 
3. 
7S Decision 2002/584/JHA [2002] OJ L190/1. 
76 The suspect must be returned to the requesting State within 90 days, or if the suspect 
consents to extradition, 10 days (Article 17, Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA 
[2002] OJ L190/1). Sec: Mackarcl, M, 'Surrendering the fugitive: the European Arrest 
Warrant and the United Kingdom' (2007) Journal of Criminal Law 362. 
77 Gregory, F, 'The Ell's Response to 9/11: A Case Study ofInstitutional Roles and Policy 
Processes with Special Reference to Issues of Accountability and Human Rights' (2005) 17 
Terrorism and Political Violence 105, 106. 
78 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977, Article 8. 
79 Article 2. 
80 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1271,24 January 2002. 
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that recruitment, training for and incitement to terrorism be criminalised. 81 In addition, the 
Committee of Experts on Terrorism, which in 2003 replaced the Multidisciplinary Group on 
International Action against Terrorism, identifies best practice, monitors implementation of 
the Council of Europe's Conventions and identifies gaps in international law in relation to 
terrorism, advising how to fill them.82 These activities are in addition to its role in relation 
to the ECHR. 
1.3.2) Defining terrorism 
Despite the variety of international conventions and intra-regional agreements on tcrrorism, 
the term remains problematic and there is no international definition. Before considering the 
definition set forth in TACT, section 1, it is necessary to consider in general terms what are 
the characteristics of terrorism. 
These characteristics may be grouped under three hcadings: actors, methods and aims. The 
'actors' category includes the perpetrators and their victims. Despite the rhetoric of the 
'War on Terror', in particular the categorisation of some States as part of the 'axis-of-evil', 
and the earlier condemnation of States such as Libya for sanctioning terrorists, the issue of 
whether 'terrorism' may encompass State actions remains the major impediment to a 
definition of terrorism at the international level.83 Notwithstanding pragmatic arguments 
that policy makers want to know about sub-state groups and such a focus avoids the 
conceptual difficulties in generalising between two vastly different entities, with different 
resources, incentives and pressures, the definition of 'terrorism' should include both sub-
state and State actors.84 Such an approach is more coherent and if the focus of the particular 
country or policy drive is on sub-state actors the field can be narrowed appropriately. The 
flip-side of this debatc is the question of whether an armed struggle, short of civil war, by 
sub-State actors for political aims can ever be legitimate. While there is somc tension within 
the international Conventions between the right to self-determination and the blanket 
condemnation of terrorism, the answer appears to be no: the ends do not justify the means. 8S 
However, many former terrorist groups, and indeed terrorist sponsoring States, are 
81 Articles 5-7. 
82 CODEXTER (2008) 01. 
83 For further discussion see the discussion of the Non-Aligned Group's proposed definition 
in Levitt, G, 'Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?' (1986) 13 Ohio Northern University LR 97. 
84 Jones and Libiki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons/or Countering al Qa'ida 3. Ibid 3. 
8S The unequivocal condemnation of acts of terrorism has been contained in the General 
Assembly Resolutions on terrorism since NRES/34/145 (1979), although c.f. 
NRES/3034(XXVII) (1972), NRES/3111 02 (1976) and NRES/321 147 (1977) which 
explicitly recognise the legitimacy of national struggles for liberation. 
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eventually welcomed back into the fold, typically after they have decried violence as means 
to political ends.86 
Another issue is whether the label 'terrorist' ought to be reserved for those acting in a group. 
Tied to this issue is the question of repetition.87 Resolution 1373 refers to 'entities or 
persons involved in terrorist acts'; the reference to an entity alongside persons seems to 
imply that the former includes groups and, therefore, the latter may be read as including 
individuals. A central justification for counter-terrorist powers is that terrorist organisations 
pose particular difficulties for the police due to their sophistication and ability to act in a co-
ordinated and sustained manner.88 Given the extraordinary nature of these powers, 
proportionality dictates that they should be used only when necessary and this is unlikely to 
include individuals acting alone or in 'one-off actions. 
The definition of victims is as contested as that of perpetrators. The nub of the debate 
centres on whether it should encompass 'civilians' and/or 'non-combatants'. A combatant is 
defined by the Geneva Convention as a member of the organised armed forces of a Party to a 
conflict or a member of a militia or volunteer corps; both must have a command structure 
and a fixed distinctive sign.89 The combatant must bear arms openly where possible.90 
Therefore a definition of victims which encompasses civilians and 'non-combatants' would 
exclude military personnel killed while on active duty in a conflict, meaning the attack on 
the USS Cole was a terrorist act, but the murders of British army personnel in Northern 
Ireland by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were not. This also touches on the sub/State 
issue as there are occasions when conventional armies deliberately target civilians.91 
However, a problem arises here because the IRA, in common with most terrorist 
organisations, did not enjoy the protection of the Geneva Conventions which applies to the 
traditional mode of inter-state war rather than intra-state conflict. They may enjoy some 
protection under common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 11, which relate to internal 
86 See Jones and Libiki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons/or Countering al Qa'ida. 
87 Badey, T, 'Defining international terrorism: A pragmatic approach' (1998) 10 Terrorism 
and Political Violence 90, 93-95. 
88 Walker, C, 'The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom law and beyond' [2007] 
PL 331, 347. 
89 Article 43, Geneva Convention 1 sI Protocol 1977; Article 4(2) the 3rd Geneva Convention 
1949. 
90 Article 44(3), Geneva Convention 1 sI Protocol 1977. 
91 Examples include the bombing of Dresden, Tokyo, Nagaski and Hiroshima during WWII. 
The fire-bombing of Tokyo left 83,793 Japanese civilians dead, 40,918 injured and over one 
million homeless. The bombers' orders for the raid explicitly listed Japanese civilian 
casualties as an objective (Searle, T, 'lilt made a lot of sense to kill skilled workers": the 
firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945' (2002) 66 The Journal of Military IIistory 103,103, 
115). 
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armed conflict, defined by the ICC as: 'protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State,.92 But any 
such claim is doubtful in this case because the combatant group must have an organised 
command structure and sufficient territorial control to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations.93 While there is no definition of 'combatant' within these provisions, 
'all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities' are 
entitled to humane treatment, including freedom from violence and, specifically, terrorism.94 
This is a more coherent approach which would include on- and off-duty soldiers, and 
appears in line with the US definition of 'non-combatant', which includes military forces 
that are not on the battlefield.95 However, difficulties remain: are the police deemed to take 
'direct part' in hostilities, even those whose role clearly excludes direct engagement with the 
internal combatants? What of politicians who order military or police operations? Do those 
who supply the army or internal combatants take 'direct part'? Walzer has argued that these 
'civilians' should be legitimate targets at their place of work, although this appears to go 
against the basic thrust of the Hague and Geneva conventions which aim to distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants.96 
It would avoid many of the pitfalls if we defined 'terrorism' as using violence to advance a 
political agenda as a form of warfare, and including violations of the rules of war, as set 
forth in the Hague and Geneva Conventions.97 Alternatively, as advocated by Schmid, 
terrorism could be viewed as the 'peacetime equivalent of war crimes', thus underlining 
moral indignation and refusing the possibility of legitimate actions under the rules of war.98 
While this approach is arguably the most conceptually consistent, in addition to the fact that 
many terrorist campaigns fall outside the Geneva Conventions' definition of war, it is a 
political impossibility, as underlined by the post-9/11 consensus in bodies such as the UN, 
which refuse this categorisation.99 The targeting of civilians forms a substantial base of the 
moral repugnance of terrorism, and focusing on civilians 'enables us to set a clear moral 
92 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeals Chamber) [1999] 35 ILM 1028 [70]. 
93 Moir, L, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (CUP, Cambridge 2002) Chapter 3. 
94 Additional Protocol 11, Article 4. 
95 Ganor, B, The counter-terrorism puzzle: a guide for decision makers (Transaction 
Publishers, London 2005) 23. 
96 Walzer, M, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (4th 
edn Basic Books, New York 2006) 146. 
97Silke, A, 'Terrorism and the blind men's elephant' (1996) 8 Terrorism and Political 
Violence 12, 12. 
98 Schmid, AP, 'The response problem as a definition problem' (1992) 4 Terrorism and 
Political Violence 7, 11. 
99 For example, Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) refers to 'terrorist acts ... as serious 
criminal offences' (Article 2(e». 
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threshold that must not be crossed,.loo However, to exclude the deliberate murder of 
military personnel would promote a piecemeal approach whereby some attacks by a given 
group are deemed terroristic while others are not, again, implicitly suggesting some level of 
legitimacy of some of the acts. A preferable approach is to draw upon common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II and view combatants as including military on and off the 
battlefield while 'non-combatants' are those who do not take 'direct part' in hostilities. It 
should, however, be noted both that this goes towards a definition only, and that the 
additional Protocol II has proven 'alarmingly ineffective' in practice in limiting atrocities. 101 
The least contentious requisite element under the 'methods' category is that of actual or 
threatened violence.102 Civil disruption, strikes or protests are a valid method of 
communication within liberal democracies and do not constitute terrorism, although 
concerns have been raised that TACT could be used to target strikes, as discussed below. A 
crucial distinction between crime and terrorism is that a terrorist act is a dramatic 
communication; to use Brian Jenkins' phrase: 'Terrorism is theatre' .103 This is usually 
included in references in legal definitions to terrorists seeking to influence or intimidate the 
population, or a section thereof, or the government. The act communicates different 
messages to different groups: a message of fear designed to intimate their declared 
opponents; a message of inspiration for sympathisers; and, a message aimed at impressing 
and converting non-committed bystanders.104 
Within the 'aims' category there is a consensus that the aims of the action must be political, 
otherwise it is 'mere criminality'. There are differences between some of the legal 
definitions, with, for example TACT referring to 'political, ideological or religious' causes. 
In common with other commentators, I would argue that any distinction between the three is 
ephemeral. IOS It is worth noting that 'political and ideological' causes may engage different 
constitutional or human rights than 'religious' causes, depending on the legal framework. 106 
The preceding discussion has been based upon the premise that there is just one 'terrorism'. 
However, some jurisdictions, such as the USA, contrast 'domestic' with 'international 
100 Ganor, The counter-terrorism puzzle: a guide for decision makers 23. 
101 Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict 119-132. 
102 Walker 'The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom law and beyond'. 
\03 Jenkins, B, 'International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict' in 0 Carlton and C 
Schaerf(eds) International Terrorism and World Security (Croom Helm, London 1975) 16. 
\04 Schmid, AP, 'Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from the United Nations' 
(2005) 17 Terrorism and Political Violence 25, 26. 
105 Walker 'The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom law and beyond' 331. 
106 For example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See: R v Khawaja (2010) 
ONCA862. 
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terrorism' .107 This does not fundamentally alter the characteristics, although naturally it 
excludes some 'domestic' terrorists and requires a transnational dimension. 
Gathering the threads of the discussion together, the following is suggested as the core 
characteristics of terrorists: a group of sub-state or State actors who target non-combatants, 
defined as civilians who do not participate directly in hostilities, with actual or threatened 
violence to further political aims whereby the act of violence is a method of communication. 
It is clear that the narrow international consensus permits a vague definition of terrorism. 
This is deliberate, the concept of terrorism being highly subjective and politically 
influenced, varying not only from country to country but also from year to year within 
countries. \08 Domestically, the broad definition of terrorism provides the police with greater 
freedom of action which is particularly important given the emphasis on preventative 
strategies (discussed below under 'new terrorism'). However, an excessively broad 
definition will fall foul of the human rights and public law requirement that measures be 
prescribed by law (discussed above ).109 
1.3.2.1) The UK's definition of 'terrorism' 
The UK moved from an amalgam of inductive and deductive approaches in the Prevention 
of Terrorism Acts and the Emergency Provisions Acts (see Chapter 3.S), to a deductive 
approach with TACT, section 1.110 In relation to the characteristics discussed above, TACT 
side-steps the issues of sub/State actors and civilians/non-combatants by including no 
reference to either. It corresponds to the other characteristics, explicitly including the 
requirement of actual or threatened violence for political aims, and, by reference to the 
requirement of influencing the public, a section thereof, or the government, includes the 
communication element. 
Section 1 TACT gives the following definition of terrorism: I11 
(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where -
a. The action falls within subsection (2), 
b. the use or threat is designcd to influence the government or an international 
governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public, and 
107 USA PATRIOT Act (2001), Title 18, section 2331 (2), 2331 (S). 
\08 E.g. the UK's approach to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (is proscribed now under 
Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) SI Order 200S/2892). 
109 As to the appropriateness of this, see Chapter 4. 
110 EPA 1973, section 2S(1); PTA 1974, section 9(1). 
III As amended by the Terrorism Act 2006, section 34 and the Counter-Terrorism Act 200S, 
section 7S(2)(a). 
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c. the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, 
racial or ideological cause 
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it-
a. involves serious violence against a person, 
b. involves serious damage to property, 
c. endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the 
action, 
d. creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public,or 
e. is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic 
system. 
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of 
firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (l)(b) is satisfied. 
(4) In this section-
a. "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom, 
b. a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to 
property, wherever situated, 
c. a reference to the public includes a refercnce to the public of a country other 
than the United Kingdom, and 
d. "the government" means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part 
of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. 
(5) In this Act a reference to action takcn for the purposes of terrorism includes a 
reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation. 
This definition, described by Lord Bingham as 'far-reaching',112 was onc of the main points 
of contention during the passage of the Bill through Parliament. lI3 The definition is 
narrower than that in the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 1984 in that 'violence', 
damage, destruction or the creation of risk in section 1(2) must be 'serious' ,114 The 
endangerment of a person's life is implicitly 'serious' ,liS The inclusion of property damage 
112 R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12,333. 
1l311ansard 2nd reading, IIC debs 14th December 1999, vol. 341, col's 152-234; Standinr Committee D, HC debs, 18 th, 20th and 25th January and 1 st, 3rd and 8th February 2000; 3r 
reading, HC debs 15th March 2000, vol. 345, col. 329 through vol. 346, col. 473; Commons 
consideration on-louse of Lords amendments loth July 2000 vol. 353, col's 627-665; 2nd 
reading, HL debs, 6th April 2000, vo!. 611, col's 1427-1490; Committce stage (House of 
Lords), 16th May 2000, vol. 613, col's 214-278 and 23rd May 2000, vo\. 613, col's 641-664 
and 674-762 and 6th June 2000, vo!. 613 col's 1044-1066 and 1076-1103; Report (ilL), HL 
dcbs, 20th June 2000, vo!. 614, col's 159-224; 3rd reading, HL dcbs, 4th July 2000, vo!. 614, 
col's 1442-1459, 
114 PTA 1974, section 9(1). 
lIS TACT, section 1(2)(c). 
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is sensible given the potentially severe economic effects, which may impact on national 
security, as almost happened when the Reinsurers refused to reinsure policies in the city of 
London against terrorism, forcing the Government to pass the Reinsurance (Acts of 
Terrorism) Act 1993.116 The damaged property can be of any value, anywhere in the 
world.117 It is questionable whether the destruction of a non-valuable piece of property 
should be termed a 'terrorist' act. 
It is also narrower in respect of the 'motivation', which must be 'designed to influence the 
government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public', rather than merely putting 
the public or a section thereof 'in fear', l18 which, as noted by Walker, could result from 
'non-political hooliganism or individual acts of aggression'. 119 'Influence' opens the 
possibility of strikes or protests coming within the definition, discussed further below, with 
section 1 (4)(d) meaning that charges of terrorism could be levelled against protesters against 
'odious' foreign regimes. 120 Lord Carlile argued that 'influence' ought to be replaced with 
'intimidate', commonly used in other jurisdictions,l2l and advocated by Lord Lloyd in his 
1996 Report. l22 'Intimidate' sets the bar higher, having a coercive element that ensures the 
section does not interfere with the rights under ECHR Articles 10 and 11. The Government 
rejected this, stating that the current definition did not set the bar too low and that there 'may 
be problems in terms of using the word 'intimidate' in relation to governments and inter-
governmental organisations,.123 The second part of this argument is frankly bizarre but no 
explanation was proffered. Given that the term is currently used in other jurisdictions, the 
Government's argument is weak. In relation to this aspect and the broad category of 
property damage, there is a heavy reliance on the CPS to 'be sensible'. 
Overall, the TACT, section 1 definition is considerably broader than its predecessors. First, 
the scope has been expanded to include threats as well as acts.124 This assists the police in 
pre-empting terrorist attacks. Second, the explicit reference to health risks and damage to 
116 For more, see Stallworthy, M, 'The Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993' (1993) 12 
International Banking and Financial Law 21. 
117 Section 4(b). 
11 g EP A 1973, section 28(1). 
119 Walker 'The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom law and beyond', 339. 
120 HC debs, Standing Committee D, 18th February 2000, pt 7, page 2 (Lidington). 
121 Lord Carlile, The definition o/terrorism (Cm 7052, 2007) [58-9]. 
122 Lord Lloyd, Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (Command 3420, 1996). Lord 
Goodhart also criticised the use of 'influence' (Hansard, 4/7/00, 1443). 
123 Secretary of State for the Home Department, The Government Reply to the Report by 
Lord Carlile o/Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer o/Terrorism Legislation: The 
Definition o/Terrorism (Cm 7058,2007) [1]. 
124 TACT, section 1(1). 
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electronic systems arguably expands on the previous definition of 'use of violence' .12S This 
is a necessary response to technological advances and corresponding threats. Third, section 
1 (3) makes it a terrorist offence to use or threaten any action within section 1 (2) which 
involves the use of firearms or explosives, whether or not section I(b) is engaged. It was 
justified during the passage of the Bill as enabling the police to tackle assassinations 'in 
which the terrorist's motive might be less to put the public in fear, or to influence the 
Government, than to "take out" the individual' .126 This justification leaves a gap, as 
assassination which does not use firearms or explosives, such as plutonimum poisoning, is 
not covered by the section. Moreover, if assassination were the concern then section 1(3) 
should have been limited to the use or threat of any action within section 1(2)(a) and (c). 
The use of the term 'intimidate' instead of 'influence' in section I (1 )(b) would have avoided 
this problem and the needless broadening of the definition by removing the link with 
motivations. 
It is arguable that the expansion from political causes to political, religious and ideological 
causes also broadens the definition, although any distinction between the three is 
ephemeral. 127 Nonetheless, the broad nature of these words in conjunction with the low 
threshold of 'influence' in section 1(1)(b) opens the possibility of the powers being used 
inappropriately. For example, Walker has warned that the inclusion of religious causes 
might blur into personal or family disputes. 128 Of particular concern during the passage of 
the bill was the potential inclusion of industrial disputes, boycotts or protests, although the 
reference to 'actions' would appear to exclude strikes, whieh are properly construed as 
omissions.129 Charles Clarke argued, rather unpersuasively, that disputes by nurses 'would 
be a trade dispute, which is not a political, religious or ideological cause' .130 The use of 
nominally anti-terrorist legislation against a friendly government so as to secure deposits of 
British customers of Lanksbanki gives pause for thought. \31 Lord Goodhart suggested that a 
long running strike by refuse collectors could cause a 'serious risk to the health of the 
\2S TACT, section 1 (2)( d), (e). Walker 'The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom 
law and beyond', 340. 
126 HC debs, 10 July 2000, col. 643 (Charles Clarke, Home Secretary). 
127 This was the view of Ken Maginnis (UUP) (HC debs, 18th January 2000, Standing 
Committee D, pt. 4, page 1) and Simon Hughes, who argued any view could be claimed by 
someone as an ideological view (HC debs, 18th January 2000, Standing Committee D, pt. 2, 
page 3). See also Walker 'The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom law and 
beyond', 331. 
128 Ibid, 340. 
129 Ibid, 341. 
130 HC debs, 18th January 2000, Standing Committee D, pt 8, page 2. 
131 Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008, SI 2008/2668. For more see Lennon, G and Walker, e, 
'Hot Money in a Cold Climate' [2009] PL 37. 
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public' and come within the definition,l32 although the legislation was not used against 
refuse collectors in Leeds during their three months strike in 2009. J33 The explicit exclusion 
of these types of actions, and the use of 'intimidate' rather than 'influence', would improve 
the definition. 
The lack of precision in the definition of terrorism is worrying for its impact on the breadth 
of the powers in TACT and other counter-terrorist statutes, but it is beneficial for the police 
as its vagueness, comparable with that of breach of the peace, provides them with more 
operational choices. The litmus test is whether it is sufficiently defined to be 'prescribed by 
law'. It is clear that, again like breach of the peace,134 the definition of terrorism passes this 
threshold. m While this operational 'wriggle room' may be necessary for the police, the 
imprecision in the definition means that the specific powers bear a greater responsibility to 
have sufficient precision, checks and balances to ensure proportionality. 
1.3.3) The 'new terrorism' 
It has been asserted by some that contemporary terrorism is distinct from previous forms of 
terrorism and therefore warrants a discrete approach which adopts a preventative I pre-
emptive approach and which may also curtail human rights. 136 These arguments are 
consequential to the asserted characteristics of the 'new' terrorism, especially the tendency 
towards mass casualties, and are premised upon theories of risk whereby action is required 
to prevent low-probability high-consequence attacks. This section considers the differences 
between 'old' and 'new' terrorism and the consequences for counter-terrorist policy. 
The first question is who are the 'new terrorists'? The term has largely become synonymous 
with al Qaeda, although defining al Qaeda is itself problematic. Bruce Hoffman asks: 'Is it a 
monolithic, international terrorist organization with an identifiable command and control 
apparatus or is it a broader, more amorphous movement tenuously held together by a loosely 
networked transnational constituency?,137 There is growing consensus within the EU that it 
132 HL debs, 16th Mary 2000, col. 219. 
\33 Wainwright, M, 'Leeds bin strike ends after three months' The Guardian (London,23rd 
November 2009). 
134 Steel v United Kingdom (2005) 41 EHRR 22, app.no.684 I 6/0 I. 
135 Brogan v United Kingdom. 
136 E.g. Ignatieff, M, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age a/Terror (Edinburgh UP, 
Edinburgh 2005); Dershowitz, A, Preemption: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways (Norton, 
London 2006). 
137 Hoffman, B, Al Qaeda. trends in terrorism and/uture potentialities: an assessment 
(RAND, Santa Monica 1999) 3. 
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is the latter, \38 which Burke has likened to an ideology or a venture-capitalist finn.139 In 
addition to al Qaedaesque 'Islamist' terrorism, the Aum Skinrikyo cult is often cited as 
exemplary of the 'new terrorism'. Although the threat from dissident republicans in 
Northern Ireland has been increasing in recent years, the main counter-terrorism focus for 
England and Wales and internationally is 'Islamist' terrorism. Therefore this discussion will 
similarly centre on those groups. It is important to note that the use of tenn 'Islamist' 
terrorism is a shorthand: 'Islamist' terrorism contains many internal conflicts and is by no 
means homogeneous; indeed, Bin Laden and Zawahiri's successful conclusion to one such 
power struggle led to a shift from the previous policy of jihad against the 'near enemy' (the 
relevant domestic governments) towards the 'far enemy' (including the USA and Europe).140 
The major characteristics of 'new terrorism' are: loose networks rather than hierarchical 
organisations; an international dimension; and, a movement away from violence for political 
ends towards religious and/or millenarian objectives. 141 The difference bctween the old and 
new is one of degree, with exemplars of the 'old' terrorism such as the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PlRA) having characteristics of both the 'old' and 'new'. The PIRA 
have a hierarchical structure (old); substantial international links in terms of arms dealing, 
finance and shared training with international terrorist organisations and foreign states, 
ranging from terrorist 'sponsors', like Libya, to the USA,142 and have operated in and from 
several countries (new), although their primary scat of operations are the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland (0Id).143 Their objectives are nationalistic (old). IIowever, while it has 
been official PIRA policy not to target persons on the basis of thcir religion, sectarian 
killings have occurred and there were substantial sectarian undertones to the 'Troubles' 
138 De Vires, G 'Address to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning AI-Qaida and the Taliban' (New York, 2005) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/cmsUploadl06 _24_final_1267 .pdf> accessed 5th 
March 2007. The UK government's reference to 'Islamist' or 'international' terrorism rather 
than 'al Qaeda' reinforces this approach (see, for example, MI5, 'Countering Intcrnational 
Terrorism: the United Kingdom's strategy' <http://www.mi5.gov.uk/outputlPage553.html> 
accessed 4th April 2007. 
139 Burke, J, AI-Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam (Penguin, London 2004) 12-3. 
140 Gerges, F, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (CUP, Cambridge 2005). 
141 Tucker, D, 'What is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?' (2001) 13 
Terrorism and Political Violence 1, 1. 
142 Coogan, TP, The IRA (Harper Collins, London 2000) 589; Taylor, P, Provos: the IRA and 
Sinn Fein (Bloomsbury, London 1998) 61-2, 84-5, 108-9. For morc on the American 
Government's approach to the PIRA sce, for example McElrath, K, Unsafe Haven: the 
United States, the IRA and Political Prisoners (Pluto Press, London 2000). 
143 The PIRA operated in, for example: Gennany, Holland, Belgium (Coogan, The IRA 588-
9); Barmon, C, Terrorism Today (Frank Cass, London 2000) 86-7. 
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(new).144 In addition, their involvement in racketeering, drugs and other 'ordinary' crime 
underlines the fact that terrorist activities may diverge from their stated or overriding 
ideology. 145 
'Islamist' terrorist groups do not necessarily correspond to all the characteristics of 'new 
terrorism'. Their grouping under a loose network may be likened to the assistance provided 
between some of the 'old' terrorist organizations and between them and sympathetic States. 
For example, Libya's provision of arms to the PIRA and the exchange of training between 
the PLO and the PIRA.146 There is even a precedent for Osama Bin Laden's role as wealthy 
patron of terrorist groups' in Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, a wealthy publisher who founded the 
terrorist organisation Gruppi di Azione Patigiani in Italy in 1970.147 However, this loose 
network among the 'old' terrorist groups was bound by a common ideology that was 
secondary to the various groups' localised objectives whereas the 'Islamist' terrorist groups' 
common ideology results in, at least some, shared primary objectives. Also, the individual 
groups within the 'old' networks were typically highly organized hierarchical structures 
whereas some of the attacks perpetrated by 'Islamist' terrorists have been carried out by ad 
hoc groups of individuals unrelated to a larger hierarchical structure. 148 
In terms of 'Islamist' groups' aims, some commentators have asserted that they have no 
demands.149 Ignatieff has gone so far as to characterise al Qacda and Hammas as 'death 
cults', 150 arguing that al Qaeda's 'intentions were apocalyptic, not political' .151 While 
undoubtedly dressed in religious rhetoric there are political objectives, evidenced by 
demands contained in statements by, for example, Osama bin Laden, who calls for, inter 
alia, tax, currency and sanitation reform in Saudi Arabia, ts2 and Mohammad Sidique Khan, 
one of the 717 suicide bombers, who called for an end to 'the bombing, gassing, 
imprisonment and torture of my people', which is extremely vague - perhaps referring to 
144 Coogan, The IRA 379-80. 
145 Dillon, M, The Dirty War (Hutchinson, London 1990) 442-458. 
146 Coogan, The IRA 589. Libya supplied the PlRA with 136 tons of arms between August 
1985 and October 1986 alone (Taylor, Provos: the IRA and Sinn Fein 277). 
147 Tucker 'What is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?' 4. 
148 Burke, AI-Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam 265-7. 
149 See: Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (especially chapter 
5); Simon, Sand Benjamin, D, 'America and the New Terrorism' (2000) 42 Survival 59, 59; 
Burke, Al-Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam 23. See also Sendagorta, F, 'Jihad in 
Europe: the Wider Context' (2005) 3 Survival 63, 65, where he argues that 'Islamist' groups 
do have political agendas but these are inseparable from religion. 
150 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror 126. 
151 Ibid 99 (referring to the perpetrators of9/11). 
152 Burke, AI-Qaeda: the True Story of Radicallslam 23. 
25 
Palestine or Iraq or both - but is nonetheless tangible. 153 It is, however, apparent that 
religion is a characteristic of 'Islamist' terrorism and, whether core or not, it is far more 
elemental than with the PIRA. 
Putting aside these serious shortcomings in the attempted designation of 'new' and 'old' 
terrorism, what are the consequences for counter-terrorism of these allegedly 'new' 
characteristics? International, loose networks raise cross-jurisdictional issues. Given the 
diverse and numerous countries where 'Islamist' groups operate this presents a serious 
challenge: not only the willingness but also the capacity for cooperation will vary widely 
depending on what countries are involved. ls4 Particularly problematic are countries such as 
Somalia, which are arguably non-states or failed states in terms of the effective control their 
governments can exert. As discussed above, there have been some significant moves to 
standardise the international response to terrorism post 9/11, although the issue of capacity 
continues to be problematic. It is notable that, in addition to the fact that an international 
dimension in terrorism is not new, similar problems are posed by organised crime and 
serious fraud which often operate across multiple jurisdictions. 
The major consequence of the 'new terrorism' that is used to justify 'new rules of the 
game,IS5 - is the shift towards religious or millenarian aims and the consequential proclivity 
towards mass casualties, often tied into the phenomena of suicide bombers or chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN).156 The assertion that politically 
motivated terror groups do not espouse violence causing mass casualties is, at best, overly 
simplistic. The attacks carried out by various 'Islamist' terrorists on the World Trade Centre 
in 1993, the Nairobi embassy in 1998, 9/11, the Madrid and 717 bombings all resulted in 
casualties well above the previous 'average' for terrorist attacks. IS7 This may reflect the 
153 Khan, MS, 'London Bomber: text in full' <http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/ukl4206800.stm> 
accessed 28th June 2009. 
154 Such difficulties were presumably what prompted the illegal kidnapping of the PlRA 
member Mullen from Zimbabwe (see R v Mullen [2000] QB 520). 
155 To paraphrase PM T. Blair's statement (Blair, T, 'Prime Minister's press conference, 5 
August 2005' <http://www.number-1O.gov.ukloutputlPage8041.asp> accessed 28th May 
2009). 
156 Sce, e.g. Drell, S, Sofaer, A and Wilson, G, The New Terror (Hoover Institution Press, 
California 1999); Laquer, W, The new terrorism: fanaticism and the arms of mass 
destruction (Phoenix, London 2001). 
IS7 6 died and over a thousand were injured in the World Trade Centre, 1993 (Burke, Al-
Qaeda: the True Story of Radical Islam 101); 291 were killed and 5,000 injured in the 
Nairobi bombing (Tucker 'What is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is 
it?', 6); 3,025 died and hundreds were injured in 9/11'World Marks September 11' 
<http://news. bbc.co. ukll /hi/worldlamericas/2250513 .stm#image> accessed 22nd March 
2007); 191 were killed and 1,755 injured in Madrid ('Madrid train attacks' 
<http://news.bbc.co.ukll/sharedlspllhilguides/457000/457031/htmlldefault.stm> accessed 
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more general trend in international terms whereby terrorist attacks have become lcss 
frequent but more violent since the late 1980s.158 In domestic terms, the Omagh bombing, 
carried out by the Real IRA, constituted the single largest loss of life during the Northern 
Ireland Troubles, resulting in 29 dcad (plus two unborn children) and about 220 injured. 159 
This is less than half as lethal as 717, with the casualties being far lower. 160 However, to 
assess the impact of a terrorist organisation solely in terms of casualties and lcthality is 
overly simplistic; one must also factor in the frequency of the attacks in which it is clear that 
the 'old' terrorism far outstripped the 'new' .161 It is notable that by 2003, the politically 
motivated Tamil Tigers, an 'old' terrorist group, had committcd more acts of 'suicide 
terrorism' than any other single group.162 Nonetheless, the asscrtion that 'new terrorist' 
groups aim towards mass casualties, often tied into the possibility of an attack using CBRNs, 
is a central argumcnt in re-gearing counter-terrorism towards pre-emptive measures and in 
curtailing - or suspending - human rights. When faced with 'catastrophic' tcrrorism thcre is 
no longer 'an acceptable level of violence' .163 
1.3.3.1) Risk, prevention and CONTEST 
There has always been an elcment of prevention within counter-terrorist strategies. The 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism accepted that 'it is undcniable that a successful counter-
terrorism strategy includes a preventative dimension'. 164 The fear of mass-casualty attacks 
has moved this strategy centre stage. This realignment coincides with a broader societal 
22nd March 2007); 52 were killed and 784 injured in 717 (,Timelinc of the 7 July attacks' 
<http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/ukl5032756.stm> accessed 22nd March 2007). For a discussion 
of the average lethality of terrorist incidents from 1969 to 1999 see Tucker 'What is New 
About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?', 5-6. 
158 Lederberg, J (ed), Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat (MIT Press, London 2000), 
290. 
159 'Bomb atrocity rocks Northern Ireland' 
<http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilnorthern_irclandlI51985.stm> accessed 7th March 2007. 
160 See above, footnote 154. 
161 For example, the PIRA killed, on average, one British soldier a week during 1972 
(Taylor, Provos: the IRA and Sinn Fein 109». During the 1970's on average just over 1 00 
were killed by the PIRA per annum, about 55 were killed per annum during the 1980's, and 
just over 24 per annum from 1990-98. In total the PIRA killed at least 1,707 in the UK 
between 1970 and 1998 (McKittrick, D and others, Lost Lives: the stories of the men, women 
and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles (Mainstream Publishing, 
London 2007) table 2). 
162 Pape, R, 'The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism' (2003) 97 American Political Science 
Review 343, 343. 
163 The phrase is that of the then Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Reginald Maulding, 
referring to the PIRA. 
164 Schenin 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering tcrrorism' [11]. 
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shift towards risk management and avoidance, which has become ubiquitous in 
contemporary society. This section will introduce risk theory and consider its implications 
for counter-terrorism. 
Although Ewald mused that 'there is no risk in reality', the concept of 'risk', loosely 
defined, is pervasive within contemporary society and has been the focus of substantial 
inter-disciplinary interest.16s The starting point for delineating these discourses is Beck's 
'risk society'. One of the progenitors of modem 'risk studies' outside economic and 
mathematical theory, Beck contended that society had experienced a sea change, moving 
from an industrial to a risk society. He based his thesis upon three 'pillars' .166 First, modem 
risk is no longer bounded by geographical or temporal limits. 167 'Islamist' terrorism 
exemplifies this: it is a global phenomenon where grievances Or instability in, for example, 
Algeria, Chechnya, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia may find expression through terrorist attacks in 
European capitals. The initial discourse of the 'war on terror', although toned down and 
more nuanced in recent years, implied a Manichean struggle without end, reinforced by the 
refutation of any legitimate grievances as an element motivating international terrorists.168 
Second, there is the advent of 'catastrophic risk', where the harm cannot be remedied. 169 
The 'new' terrorism's apparent tendency towards mass casualty attacks, including the 
potential for a CBRN attack, combined with the zero-sum approach of suicide bombers fits 
this mould neatly.170 Finally, Beck argues that modem risk cannot be managed by 
traditional insurance models. 171 This accords with the British experience in the early 1990s 
when reinsurers refused to cover the City of London against terrorist attacks, forcing the 
Government to pass the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993, by which it underwrote 
165 Ewald, F, 'Insurance and Risk' in a Burchell, C Gordon and P Miller (eds) The Foucau/t 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago UP, Chicago 1991) 199. 
166 I adopt My then's terminology and structure (Mythen, a, V/rich Beck: A Critical 
Introduction to the Risk Society (Pluto, London 2004) 17). 
167 Beck, U, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage, London 2005) 36-44 and 
passim. 
168 For instance, the then PM, Tony Blair stated in 2005: 'the nature of the global threat we 
face in Britain and round the world is real and existential', continuing, 'here were terrorists 
prepared to bring about Armageddon' (Blair, T, 'Speech given by the Prime Minister in 
Sedge field, Justifying Military Action in Iraq and Warning of the Continued Threat of 
Global Terrorism' Guardian (London,S March 2004»; the then President George W Bush 
affirmed that the 'war on terror' is 'not endless', although he added' [w le do not know the 
final day of victory' (Bush, aw, 'Bush Speech: full text' (Speech on board the USS 
Abraham) <http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/worldJamericas/299434S.stm> accessed 19th May 
2009). 
169 Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. 
170 Beck himself originally conceived of events such as global warming and nuclear 
meltdown, inter alia, as examples of catastrophic risk. 
171 Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. 
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the risk. 172 The impact of these three 'pillars' undermines the promise of control and 
gravitates governments away from the provision of 'goods' towards the management or 
avoidance of 'bads'; essentially: risk management. 173 
Despite the confluences of 'Islamist' terrorism with aspects of Beck's thesis, there are also 
discontinuities. Mythen and Walklate note, in relation to the unbounding of geographical 
and temporal risks, that while '[w]e may not be completely surprised if the UK or the USA 
were subjected to future attacks by Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups ... it may puzzle us 
if Slovenia were (sic)' .174 The apparently uninsurable risks posed by 'international 
terrorism' have been addressed through governmental intervention and some mainstream 
insurers have entered the field, viewing the risk as worthwhile given the potentially lucrative 
gains.175 
A more general flaw in Beck's thesis is the lack of deconstruction of the hegemonie 
discourses propounded by dominant institutions, including the government, policing and 
security services and media. The quote by Ewald, citcd at the beginning of this section, 
reads in full: 'there is no risk in reality ... it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, 
considers the event' .176 This emphasises the innately subjective nature of risk. In terms of 
counter-terrorism the construction is heavily dependent on the adequacy of the data I 
intelligence on which it is based, which by its nature cannot be all encompassing. 177 The 
limitations of intelligence have been highlighted by the absence of WMD in Iraq and the 
'dodgy dossier,.178 There is also the example of the attempted car-bombing of Glasgow 
airport, the perpetrators of which were not on the MI5 database. 179 As O'Malley notes, risk 
assessments based on incomplete data may perpetuate a vicious circle of probability wherein 
the assumptions on which the data are based are reinforced because they are tied into the risk 
I . 180 ana YSIS. 
172 See also, in the USA, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 2002. 
173 Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. 
174 My then, G and Walklate, S, 'Terrorism, Risk and International Security' (2008) 39 
Security Dialogue 221, 225-6. 
175 O'Malley, P, Risk, Uncertainty and Government (Glasshouse Press, London 2004) 10. 
176 Ewald, 'Insurance and Risk' 199. 
177 See Chapter 5.3. 
178 Griggs, I and Braddy, B, "'Dodgy Dossier" was wrong its author says' Independent 
(London,17 February 2008). 
17~orton-Taylor, Rand Cobain, I, 'Threat LevcI Lowered as Inquiry Examines Foreign 
Connection' Guardian (London,S July 2007). 
180 O'Malley, P, 'Risks, Ethics and Airport Security' (2006) 48 Canadian Journal of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 414, 414. 
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Another factor undermining the objectivity of the risk assessment is the role of emotions. 
Emotions, including fear and anger/ 81 feed into the construction of the terrorist 'risk' being 
'embedded in relations of power' and may be exploited by governments, especially when 
emotions are running high, for instance following a terrorist attack. 182 Just as in relation to 
'ordinary' crime, the fear of crime may bear scant resemblance to the likelihood of crime, so 
too fear of terrorism may not be commensurate to the probability of a terrorist attack. 
Sunstein argues that when strong emotions are involved the low-probability of the event is 
less important to people than the 'badness' of the outcome, resulting in 'probability neglect' 
which combines with the disproportionate fear displayed in the face of new risks. 183 The 
shift towards high-casualty high-impact targets by 'Islamist' terrorists increases the 
likelihood of 'probability neglect' .184 The impact of these subjective factors - emotions and 
the interpretation of limited data/intelligence - means that the calculations of risk are by 
their nature 'unscientific and value-laden policy choices'.18s 
The tendency towards mass casualty attacks has shifted the emphasis in counter-terrorism to 
risk informed strategies, a major consequence of which is a shift towards prevention. This is 
epitomised by the application of the precautionary principle. The principle is applied when 
there is the potential for serious, often irrevocable, harm but there is uncertainty as to 
whether the outcome is likely or not, requiring that the absence of certainty should not be a 
reason for inaction. 186 As a legal principle, it was first applied in the field of European law 
relating to environmental dangers and has also been applied, inter alia, in relation to GM 
foods. 187 There is no suggestion that it has achieved the status of legal principle in relation 
to counter-terrorism, but it has clearly informed policy and practice. In 2005, in relation to 
WMD, Iraq and international terrorism the then Prime Minister, Tony B1air stated: 'We 
181 Lerner, Jea, 'Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: a National Field 
Experiment' (2003) 14 Psychological Science 144; Furedi, F, Culture o/Fear Revisited: 
Risk-taking and the Morality of Low Expectation (Continuum, London 2007). 
182 Burkitt, I, 'Powerful Emotions: Power, Government and Opposition in the 'War on 
Terror" (2005) 39 Sociology 679. 
183 Sunstein, C, 'Terrorism and Probability Neglect' (2003) 26 J Risk and Uncertainty 121. 
184 Tucker 'What is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?', 3. 
18S Zedner, L, 'Neither Safe nor Sound? The Perils and Possibilities of Risk' (2006) 48 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 423, 428. 
186 Haggerty, K, 'From Risk to Precaution: The Rationalities of Personal Crime Prevention' 
in R Ericson and A Doyle (eds) Risk and Morality (U Toronto Press, Toronto 2003). 
187 Fisher, E, 'Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a 'Common Understanding' of 
the Precautionary Principle in the European Community' (2002) 9 Maastricht JECJ 7; Anker, 
Hand Grossman, M, 'Authorization of Genetically Modified Organisms: Precaution in US 
and EC Law' (2009) 4 EFFLR 3. 
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cannot be certain ... But do we want to take the risk?' 188 The advent of suicide bombers 
further encourages this approach as the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions becomes 
negligible. Section 44 is a clear example of the application of the precautionary principle. 
Excluding cases based on specific intelligence, the uncertainty as to who poses a risk has 
reinforced the logic of 'target hardening', itself grounded in the risk-informed tenets of 
situational criminology,189 and created a presumption of risk: every person becomes a 
potential risk until proven otherwise.190 As such, section 44 is an example of what Walker 
terms 'all-risks' policing. which occurs when 'the risk calculation shifts from persons to 
actions and objects' whereby 'the police will treat anyone and everyone as a risk'. 191 • All-
risks' policing is a pre-emptive approach, which typically arises when there is insufficient 
specific intelligence to 'discern friend from foe' .192 
The fieldwork reveals that section 44 is viewed by the police primarily as a preventative 
power. Indeed, even approaching the power 'blind' it is evident that a substantial clement of 
its operational objectives will go to 'protect', which emphasises risk management. 
However, the focus on prevention raises difficulties regarding how to measure adherence to 
CONTEST's principles: the logic of prevention suggests increasing resources even if the 
consequences (of the problem or reaction) are unknown. The absence of an event may that 
mean the resources were weB placed and did their job or it could be that the event 
(especially when dealing with low-probability occurrences) would not have come to pass in 
any case. Similar issues are raised in terms of accountability, where there is an obvious 
difficultly in ensuring accountability for actions taken in anticipation of future events. 
Again, the absence of the event may mean the actions were necessary or it may be that the 
event would not have come pass in any event. These potential deficiencies are aggravated in 
the field of counter-terrorism by the fact that action is often taken on the basis of closed 
information. The mere failure of those events transpiring does not necessarily warrant 
censure, but care must be taken to ensure that decision-makers are held accountable for 
decisions made when events have, or have not, transpired. There are also tensions between 
human rights and preventative strategies, which will now be considered. 
188 Blair 'Speech given by the Prime Minister in Sedge field, Justifying Military Action in 
Iraq and Warning of the Continued Threat of Global Terrorism'. 
189 See: Clarke, RVG, Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (2nd edn 
Harrow and Heston, New York 1997). 
190 MPSSNRO 1. 
191 Walker, C, '''Know thine enemy as Thyself': Discerning Friend from Foe under Anti-
Terrorism Laws' (2008) 32 Melbourne Law Review 275,277. 
192 Ibid. 
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1.3.3.2) Human rights and the 'new terrorism' 
The assertion that human rights are a luxury that one cannot afford while facing 'nihilistic' 
terrorists whose only aim is to bring on apocalypse is best exemplified by the debates 
surrounding torture and in particular the 'ticking bomb'. Although the prohibition on torture 
is not engaged by the routine exercise of section 44, the critique of the thesis that human 
rights are inappropriate as a normative principle in counter-terrorism will centre around the 
prohibition on torture as it is a non-derogable and non-qualified right; if it is permissible to 
violate this right then derogable and qualified rights must surely also be open to compromise 
or contravention. This will be followed by an overview of the rights relevant to section 44 
and possible grounds for their qualification, which are discussed in-depth in Chapters 4 - 6. 
An increasing number of academics maintain that torture is justified, or even required, in 
certain 'extraordinary' circumstances. 193 The proposition is underpinned by a Benthamic 
act-utilitarian calculus: the harm done to the person who is tortured is outweighed by the 
consequential prevention of harm to a greater number of persons. Typically the arguments 
are framed in terms of 'ticking bomb' scenarios, when the outcome would be of 
'catastrophic proportions' .194 The underlying justification of torturing a suspect to locate the 
'ticking bomb' is one of necessity. However, to underpin a general exception by using 
necessity is contradictory: necessity is pleaded successfully as a defence because a given 
situation is 'unique, isolated and extraordinary'. 195 Nonetheless, the option to plead this 
defence in 'ticking bomb' cases has been left open by the Israeli Supreme Court and, 
although nominally refuting a defence of necessity in realtion to torture in what was thought 
to be a life or death situation,196 the German Constitutional Court withheld punishment in 
that case, thus providing a similar outcome in practice if not in theory.197 However, when 
the claimant who had been threatened with torture in the German case appealed to the 
ECtHR, the court held that the police had violated his rights under Article 3, reiterating that 
193 E.g. Gross, 0, 'Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official 
Disobedience' (2004) 88 Minnesota LR 1481; Dershowitz, A, Why Terrorism Works (YUP, 
London 2002); Bagaric, M and Clarke, J, 'Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The 
Circumstances in Which Torture is Morally Justifiable' (2005) 39 USF L Rev 581. 
194 Gross 'Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official 
Disobedience'. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works, Chapter 4. 
195 Kremnitzer, M, 'The Landau Commission report: was the security service subordinated to 
the law, or the law to the "needs" of the security service?' (1989) 24 ILR 216, 237. Sce also 
Morgan, R, 'The utilitarian justification of torture: denial, desert and disinformation' (2000) 
2 Punishment & Society 181. 
196 The case concerned a kidnapped child whom the police believed to be alive at the time, 
although he was in fact dead. 
197 See: Jessberger, F, 'Bad Torture-Good Torture? What International Criminal Lawyers 
Learn from the Recent Trial of Police Officers in Germany' (2005) 3 Journal oflntcrnational 
Criminal Justice 1059. 
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'the absolute nature of the right under Article 3 does not allow for any exceptions or 
justifying factors or balancing of interests, irrespective of the conduct of the person 
concerned and the nature of the offence at issue' .198 
The apparent necessity in the 'ticking bomb' scenario rests on an 'intellectual fraud': 199 that 
infallible intelligence exists that the suspect is guilty, that there is a bomb and that it will kill 
many people. History has proven again and again that seemingly irrefutable evidence is 
often incorrect;200 the high pressure scenario of an imminent 'ticking bomb' is likely to 
increase rather than reduce this possibility. A more realistic scenario would entail a suspect 
who is highly likely to, rather than certainly does, have knowledge of a 'ticking bomb'. This 
is far more cloudy moral ground where the question becomes whether it is legitimate to 
torture someone suspected of being guilty (thus possibly innocent) to protect the lives of 
others. This risks descending into quantitative madness: what percentage of certainty is 
needed to torture someone? How many people need be at risk? If the justi fieation is framed 
in terms of necessity then why not torture the suspect's family? This may be a more 
effective way of gaining knowledge and they are no less innocent than those who are 
incorrectly presumed to be guilty and tortured.201 There are also potential problems with the 
assertion of the 'innocents' to be killed - is this to be judged objectively? If so, how?202 
Another objection concerns the effectiveness of torture in obtaining accurate information. 
The unreliability of the information thus gained was cited by Lords Bingham and Carswell 
in their majority decisions in A v Secretary o/State/or the Home Department, which upheld 
the exclusionary rule against information procured under torture.203 However, it must be 
acknowledged that sometimes torture will elicit useful and accurate information.204 
The broader impact on counter-terrorism from the publicising of torture and degradation, as 
occurred, for example, in Abu Ghraib prison, is more difficult to quantify but surely is likely 
198 Gii/gen v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 1 app.no.22978/05 [107] 
199 Luban, D, 'Liberalism, torture and the ticking bomb' (2005) 91 Virginia LR 1425, 1452. 
200 The various miscarriages of justice in the UK centred around suspected terrorists are 
obvious examples (see Walker, C. & Starmer, K. (eds) Miscarriages of justice: a review of 
justice in error (Blackstone, London 1999). 
201 Luban 'Liberalism, torture and the ticking bomb', 1444. 
202 Gross 'Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official 
Disobedience', 1498. 
203 A v Secretary 0/ State for the Home Department (No. 2) [2005] UKIIL 71, paras. 11, 17, 
28,39,52 (Lord Bingham) and 147 (Lord Carswell). 
204 Rurnney, P, 'The Effectiveness of Coercive Interrogation: Scholarly and judicial 
responses' (2005) 44 Crime, Law & Social Change 465. See also Lord Roger's comments in 
A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [130]. 
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also to act as a recruiting call for terrorists.205 Torture, whether carried out on the 'guilty' or 
'innocent', is likely to encourage that person's radicalization and militancy.206 The use of 
torture may even result in a pyrrhic victory, as occurred in the Algerian War of 
Independence where, when French military victory was within reach, it became politically 
impossible to impose because of domestic opposition which was, to a degree, galvanised 
around opposition to the use of torture by the French army.207 There are too many grey 
areas, too many unproven presumptions and, potentially, virulent consequences which would 
undermine counter-terrorist strategies to countenance torture, in any circumstances, whether 
sanctioned ex ante or ex post facto, judicially or by the executive. The fact that, in addition 
to internal incoherence, the arguments for 'torture' are contrary to the overall counter-
terrorist strategies emphasises that there is no tradc-off bctween human rights and security. 
Rather, as acknowledged in CONTEST, human rights must be at the centre of countcr-
terrorist strategies. 
All human rights, except the prohibitions on torture, slavery and punishment without law, 
may be derogated from or are subject to 'internal limitations', in the form of qualifying 
(sub-) paragraphs.208 In relation to the ECIIR articles relevant to this research, all are 
potentially open to derogation under Article 15. There are limitations in relation to 
derogation from Article 6 as there must be continuing availability of judicial review for all 
non-derogated rights.209 In terms of internal limitations, Article 5 is subject to the 
exceptions in the sub-paragraphs in Article 5(1). Articles 8, lO and 11 have 'qualifying 
paragraphs' whereby an interference with those rights may be justified if it is 'in accordance 
with the law and necessary in a dcmocratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety, or for the prevention of crime, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others'. Counter-terrorist related activities are likely to engage the national security and 
public safety aspects of these paragraphs, in addition to the prevention of crime and the 
protection of the rights (typically to life) and frcedoms of others. Claims under these rights 
are likely to stand or fall depending on whether the procedure can be proven to be in 
accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. There are no 'internal 
205 On Abu Ghraib see Hersh, S, Chain a/command: the road/rom 9111 to Abu Ghraib 
(Alien Lane, London 2004); Greenberg, K. & Dratel, 1. The torture papers: the road to Abu 
Ghraib (CUP, Cambridge 2005). 
206 Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, 9. 
207 This is, of course, a hugely simplistic reading of a complicated war, for more see: Home, 
A, A savage war a/peace: Algeria 1954-62 (NY Review Books, New York 2006). Henri 
Alleg's La Question (Alleg, H, La Question (Editions de Minuit, Paris 1961 », originally 
published in 1958 and then banned by the French government brought the use of torture 
centre stage. 
208 ECHR, Article 15; ICCPR, Article 4. 
209 The prohibition of torture and slavery respectively. 
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limitations' on Article 14 and the case-law has taken a robust approach, discounting as 
irrelevant the motivation -including the accuracy or not of the underlying factors - although 
this right does not 'stand alone' but is parasitic upon another right also being alleged to be 
violated.21o In addition to these self-contained limitations, the application of the margin of 
appreciation and the domestic principle of deference may exert further, substantial 
limitations on all of these rights, albeit to a greater or lesser degree. These issues are 
analysed in depth in Chapters 4-6. 
1.4) Research questions and chapter outline 
Having outlined and justified the normative principles which frame this research and having 
explored the concept of terrorism, it is time to turn to the specific research questions of this 
thesis and to outline its contents in response to those questions. The first part of this thesis, 
Chapter 2, sets forth the methodology that was employed in relation to the empirical aspects 
of the thesis. 
The second part, Chapter 3, addresses the research question: 
• How did the powers of stop and search develop historically? 
The development of the power to stop and search is analysed, in terms of both 'ordinary' and 
counter-terrorist powers. The historical review of the 'ordinary' stop and search powers 
ranges from the vagrancy acts through to the contemporary powers under PACE and the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPO), section 60. Counter-terrorist powers 
are assessed from their origins in Northern Ireland through to the Prcvention of Terrorism 
(Additional Powers) Act 1996. The political, social and historical contextualisation permits 
an examination of the trends and discontinuities, focusing on the objectives, necessity, 
limitations and consequences. The conclusions enable a nuanced approach to section 44, 
whereby the lessons of the past may assist in predicting future impacts and trends. 
The third part of the thesis examines section 44 itself. Chapters 4 and 5 address the research 
questions: 
• How is section 44 used? 
• How ought section 44 be used? 
Chapter 4 concerns the authorisation process for section 4. It opens by setting police 
perspectives on the policy objectives of section 44 and how it is used by the MPS and British 
Transport Police (BTP). It then analyses the legislation and safeguards and limitations 
placed on the process by TACT and the accompanying regulations before assessing the 
210 R (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport 
[2004] UKHL 55. 
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adherence of the authorisation in terms of the framework principles. Chapter 5 considers the 
deployment of section 44. It begins with an examination of the legislation, relevant 
jurisprudence and practice among the MPS and BTP before critiquing the systems of 
accountability and recommending changes which would ensure compliance with the 
normative principles framing this thesis. 
The penultimate research question asks: 
• How does section 44 impact upon the community? 
This is the subject of Chapter 6. This Chapter draws upon doctrinal studies of 
discrimination in the criminal justice system, an analysis of the statistics on the use of 
section 44 and the experiences of the community representatives interviewed to highlight the 
areas where section 44 appears to impact detrimentally upon sections of the community. 
Throughout, the normative principles form the framework within which the impact on the 
community is assessed. 
The final research question is addressed in the conclusion: 
• Is it possible to reform section 44 so as to comply with the normative principles? 
This draws upon the previous questions, tying together the usage of the power and the 
historical difficulties in controlling stop and search to determine whether it is possible to 
control the discretion under section 44 so as to bring it within the framework principles or 
whether the problems arise due to flaws inherent in the design of stop and search powers. 
1.5) Conclusion 
This introduction has outlined the main thesis of this research - that section 44 ought to be 
contained in clearly defined, proportionate legislation and be authorised and exercised in a 
manner that is proportionate and in compliance with human rights, ensures accountability 
and advances the aims of CONTEST. Adherence to these normative principles would mean 
that this extraordinary power is bounded by common values which would ensure its 
appropriate usage and minimise the detrimental consequences on the community, even 
though, as discussed above, these principles operate at times in tension with each other and 
with some of the strategies underpinning CONTEST. The next chapter explains the 
methodologies used in this research. 
Chapter 2) Methodology 
2.1) General methodology 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, the theoretical framework adopted is shaped by risk theories, 
bounded by the normative principles which require adherence to human rights, 
accountability and the CONTEST strategy. This thesis uses mixed methods, combining 
empirical and doctrinal research to determine not only how section 44 ought to and is 
perceived to operate but also how it does in fact operate. As such, the research is located 
within the field of socio-Iegal studies. This is not to say that the academic discipline of 
sociology is to be privileged whcn assessing the use and impact of section 44 or the 
processes of the law at the expense of consideration of the substantive law; all will be 
addressed. Rather it is to posit that law is a social, or perhaps more accurately a socio-
political, phenomenon that benefits from a systematic, empirically grounded study drawing 
upon sociological methodology and socio-political theory as well as legal theory and 
doctrinal methods. I In this way the conclusions from the empirical research can inform 
those from the doctrinal research, strengthening both. This approach is particularly suitable 
given the interdisciplinary nature of counter-terrorism, which encompasses (at least) political 
science, sociology and law. To remove counter-terrorist law from its socio-political context 
would be to weaken the results irrevocably. 
This Chapter begins by outlining the approach taken towards the doctrinal research before 
discussing the general approach taken in relation to the empirical aspects of this research. 
The sample criteria will then be explained, with details of the groups being included. The 
specific methodologies to be used when addressing each fieldwork question will be detailed, 
before concluding with an assessment of issues arising in relation to ethics and risks. 
2.2) Doctrinal methods 
This thesis draws upon a wide range of documentary sources. Primary sources include 
domestic, ECtHR and international case-law, legislation, treaties and conventions. A wide 
range of secondary sources have been examined on the major themes of this thesis, 
including: counter-terrorism; policing; race and the criminal justice system. These include 
journals, books, conference papers and official reports, from government or governmental 
bodies in the UK, ROI and USA, in addition to reports from institutions such as the UN and 
Council of Europe and from non-governmental organisations such as Liberty and the ACLU. 
These were accessible online, in the library at the University of Leeds, or through inter-
I Cotterrell, R, 'Why Must Legal Ideas be Interpreted Sociologically?' (1998) 25 Journal of 
Law and Society 171. 
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library loans. These sources are integrated into the body of this thesis rathcr than being 
considered in a separate literature review. 
2.3) Empirical methods 
The overall approach to the fieldwork questions was qualitative, using semi-structured 
interviews, with secondary quantitative and doctrinal data also used to provide wider 
settings. This 'mixed method' approach is appropriate given the socio-legal nature of the 
research. The paucity of research and data on section 44, with the exception of doctrinal 
analysis of the case-law and the legal implications of racial profiling, made a qualitative 
approach particularly suitable as the primary fieldwork methodology as it provided the 
flexibility needed to respond to the data as it emerged. The need for flexibility dictated that 
semi-structured interviews would be more appropriate than fully structured interviews. 
Unstructured interviews were not used as it was necessary to ensure a degree of consistency 
within and across the sample groups to ensure comparability.2 The semi-structured 
interview also provided a better method for probing depth, nuance and complexity than 
quantitative methods which compensates for the comparative weakness in terms of lack of 
breadth.3 This approach is consistent with other research into the use and impact of non-
counter terrorist stop and search powers, which have found that semi-structured interviews 
facilitate people speaking more freely on sensitive issues.4 Previous research has found that 
quantitative surveys of people who had been stopped and searched under 'ordinary' laws 
have had 'prohibitively low response rates'.s 
2.4) Sampling criteria 
Thirty-eight full length and five 'short' interviews were carried out with interviewees from 
three sample groups: the police, stakcholders and 'community representatives'. A purposive 
approach was taken because a randomised sample was neithcr appropriate to address the 
fieldwork questions, many of which required particular expertise, nor was it practical, given 
the restraints on time and resources inherent in a PhD thesis. A case-study approach was 
taken, which aims to generalise the theories posited rather than generalise to the entire 
population.6 The police were the central sample as they had the expertise to address the 
questions regarding the authorisation and deployment of section 44. Gate-keepers to the 
police were approached initially, and once some access was secured a 'snow-balling 
2 Brewerton, P and Millward, L, Organizational Research Methods: A Guide for Students 
and Researchers (Sage, London 2001) 70. 
3 Mason, J, Qualitative Researching (2nd edn Sage, London 2002). 
4 Stone, V and Pettigrew, N, 'The views ofthe public on stops and searches' (Home Office 
(PRS 129), London 2000) 3-4. See, e.g. the Police Research Series 127-132. 
S Ibid. 
6 Mitchel1, T, 'Case and situation analysis' (1983) 31 Sociological Review 186,207. 
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strategy' was adopted which generated further police, stakeholder and 'community 
representative' interviewees.7 
2.4.1) The police 
The case-study approach focused on two police forces, the MPS and the BTP.8 This 
methodology is justified for two reasons. First, the PhD is carried out by one researcher 
over a finite period, which necessitates limiting the fieldwork according to these resources. 
Second, while each police force will exhibit discrepancies when compared with another, 
arising from local variances and the fact that each force is independent, stop and search 
powers have been increasingly standardised. 
The MPS were selected as their usage accounts for 67% of the total usage of section 44 
among the Home Office forces in England and Wales, with 194,984 stops and searches 
having been carried out between 2001 and 2007/08.9 The MPS had a rolling authorisation in 
place for section 44 from February 2001 to July 2009. to The force area is a high risk one 
that has already suffered an international terrorist attack, as well as its long history of attacks 
from Irish Republican terrorist groups. It is also the most substantial urban centre in the UK 
in terms of geography and demographics, having a population of 7,172,091 people and a 
force of 31,128 full time officers.)) 
In addition, the use of section 44 by the MPS has been the subject of criticism, legal action 
and reform. The MPS Commissioner was the defendant in the GiIlan case. 12 In reaction to 
criticism by Lord Carlile and new National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) guidelines, 
partially prompted by the GilIan case, the MPS ran a pilot scheme for a 'patchwork' 
authorisation in four boroughs in the summer of 2009, which was rolled out force wide in 
7 Bryman, A, Social research methods (OUP, Oxford 2008) 184-5. 
8 Mitchell'Case and situation analysis' 207. 
9 Home Office 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System: 2002' (Home Office, 
London 2003); Home Office 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2003' 
(Home Office, London 2004); Home Office 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System - 2004' (Home Office, London 2005); Home Office 'Statistics on Race and the 
Criminal Justice System - 2005' (Home Office, London 2006); Ministry of Justice 'Statistics 
on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2006' (Ministry of Justice, London 2007); 
Ministry of Justice 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2006/07' (Ministry of 
Justice, London 2008); Ministry of Justice 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System - 2007/08' (Ministry of Justice, London 2009). 
10 MPS 'MPS Use of section 44 TACT in London - 2009 Update' (MPS, London 2009). 
11 Office for National Statistics 'Census 2001: key statistics for local authorities in England 
and Wales' (HMSO, London 2003) 72. Note that this includes the population of the City of 
London, which has its own police force. Home Office 'Police Service Strength' (Home 
Office (Statistical Bulletin 13/07), London 2007) 14. 
12 R (Gill an) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKIIL 12 .. 
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July 2009.13 The fieldwork was carried shortly after the pilot scheme and could therefore 
inquire into officers' opinions of the two approaches. The borough in which the fieldwork 
was carried out will not be named and full citations will not be given for borough specific 
publications in order to ensure anonymity. The particular borough was chosen because it 
has high risk areas, it is one where section 44 is likely to be used, and it has a highly diverse 
population, which enables testing of the thesis that section 44 disproportionately targets 
ethnic minorities. 
The British Transport Police was chosen as the second force for a number of reasons. They 
are the second 'heaviest' users of section 44, having carricd out some 198,000 section 44 
stops and searches between 2005/06 and 2008/09. 14 They are significant in terms of the 
CONTEST strategy, railway lines being a part of the critical national infrastructure (CNI) 
and one that has been targeted, on 717 and previously, by the PIRA. The BTP also 
responded to the new NPIA guidelines and to the general criticism about the use of scction 
44 by introducing a new approach in deploying section 44. The fieldwork was again carried 
out shortly after the new approach was introduced and could therefore use the semi-
structured interviews to probe officers' opinions of the two approaches. The sample 
included officers from two diffcrent force-areas within the BTP, which will not be named. 
Due to the nature of the BTP, the officers worked in both rural and metropolitan areas, 
although most of their work was focused on the latter. 
The police samples were drawn from across the ranks and experience levels. This is in 
keeping with previous research, the range ensuring a cross-section of the police. ls In the 
MPS borough and in one of the BTP areas, the officers interviewed were part of dedicated 
teams who routinely carried out section 44 stops. Thcre were a total of eleven MPS officers 
interviewed, comprising three sergeants, two police constables and two PCSOs from the 
borough, in addition to a detective inspector and an inspector involved in section 44 I CTU 
operations centrally, and two officers involved in the preparation of the section 44 
authorisations. A program manager for the data-quality programme in the MPS was also 
interviewed. There were twelve BTP officers interviewed, comprising three sergeants, six 
police constables and one PCSO from the two police areas and an Assistant Chief Constable 
and a superintendent. There was only onc PCSO interviewed within the BTP sample as they 
13 MPS, 'MPS Use of section 44 TACT in London - 2009 Update'. 
14 BTP 'Annual Report: 2005-06' (BTP, 2006); BTP 'Annual Report: 2006-07' (BTP, 2007); 
BTP 'Annual Report: 2007-08' (BTP, 2008); BTP 'Annual Report: 2008-09' (BTP, 2009). 
IS Willis, C, 'The use, effectiveness and impact of police stop and search powers' (Home 
Office (RPU 15), London 1983); Quinton, P, Bland, N and Miller, J, 'Police Stops, Decision-
making and Practice' (Home Office (PRS l30), London 2000). 
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were deployed in relation to section 44 in only one of the areas. A group of BTP officers 
was observed for an afternoon while exercising section 44. 
In the following chapters the police interviews are cited by reference to their force 
(MPS/BTP) and whether they are 'senior' (SNR) or 'front-line' (FL) officers and a randomly 
assigned number (e.g. MPSSNR05). To ensure anonymity the gender of the interviewees 
may be changed. Officers ranked sergeant or over or who are involved in the authorisation 
process are categorised as senior officers, although some of the sergeants also carried out 
section 44s. The MPS data quality manager is cited as 'MPSDQ'. 
2.4.2) Stakeholders 
The stakeholder sample was purposively selected as being non-police officers who were 
professionally engaged with section 44 and could address, from their professional viewpoint, 
one or more of the field-work questions. Five people were interviewed in this category: 
Lord Carlile, the Government's Independent Reviewer of Counter-terrorist legislation; Mike 
Franklin, who is the Independent Police Complaints Commission (lPCC) chair for London 
and the South East, with responsibility for stop and search; a member of the Association of 
Police Authorities; a senior professional member of a Police Authority (PA) and a civil 
servant who worked with the Ministry of Defence in relation to their Police Committee, 
which performs a similar function to a PA. Members of Police Authorities also feature in 
the 'community' sample. However, the preceding members are included in the stakeholder 
category as they are employed full-time by the APA and a PA respectively rather than being 
'community' members. Lord Carlile and Mike Franklin will be cited by name, the Ministry 
of Defence Police Committee interviewee will be cited as 'MDPC', while the others will be 
referred to as 'PAOI' and 'PA02'. 
2.4.3) Community sample 
A purposive approach was again adopted for the 'community' representatives. There were 
several reasons for this approach which are specific to this sample group. First, the 
'professional' sample was larger than originally anticipated because access was forthcoming 
and therefore took more time and also provided sufficient new material to ensure originality. 
Second, all bar two of the 'community' interviewees were contacted through snow-balling 
from police interviewees. Attempts were made to gain access beyond police contacts, 
through contacts made personally at conferences and other events and through 'cold calling' 
relevant community organisations, local politicians etc. Virtually all these attempts failed. 
This is likely to be in part due to the research saturation of some of these communities who 
have, since, since 9/11, been the subject of various studies. Third, it would not have been 
possible to use a probability sample that claimed to represent the impact of section 44 on 
'communities' in a broad sense within this thesis in terms of time or word limits. While the 
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impact on the 'Muslim community' is the focus of much of the criticism regarding the 
exercise of section 44, the fieldwork revealed at least three additional 'communities' or 
groups who perceive themselves to be discriminated against through the exercise of section 
44. It seems highly likely that other 'communities', such as 'Black' youths, also feel 
disproportionately targeted by the power. To research the impact of section 44 on 'Muslim 
communities' alone is a task sufficient for a PhD in its own right, requiring interviews with 
members of the various sub-groups among 'British Muslims'. Finally, and following from 
the last point, there is a considerable and growing body of published secondary literature 
dealing with the impact of anti-terrorists laws on communities, in particular on Muslims. 
The Home Office report, 'What perceptions do the UK public have concerning the impact of 
counter-terrorist legislation implemented since 2000?', surveyed much of this literature and 
found that only a small amount adopted sufficiently rigorous methods to be classed as 'high 
quality research' .16 Many of these outputs had greater resources in terms of time, money 
and personnel. It would not have been possible to meaningfully add to this body of research 
unless the community impact of section 44 was the sole foeus of this PhD. 
Since it was not possible to accurately reflect the multiple 'communities' within each police 
force, the sample consists of 'community representatives'. Of the eight full length 
interview, six were or had until recently been community representatives on police-
community forums, who were contacted through snow-balling from police interviewees. 
Two others were persons who had publicly criticised the exercise of section 44 in relation to 
specific groups, through the media and in submissions to a Government Committee. These 
were contacted directly. Of the former, one had until recently been a member of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), three were involved in MPS/community forums; and, 
two were involved in BTP/community forums at a national level. In addition to representing 
the 'community' generally, one of the interviewees spoke primarily for 'business', another 
was a Pakistani Muslim and particularly interested in Pakistani and Muslim police-
community relations, while a third was involved in issues between the police and the LGBT 
communities. This sample is not and does not claim to be indicative of the 'public', but in 
conjunction with doctrinal analysis the sample serves to highlight areas of concern. 
In addition to these long interviews, short interviews were carried out with five interviewees. 
These occurred during an observation of one of the BTP forces exercising section 44. After 
stopping the person under section 44 the officer asked whether he or she would be interested 
16 Home Office 'What perceptions do the UK public have concerning the impact of counter-
terrorist legislation implemented since 2000?' (Home Office (Occasional Paper 88), London 
2010). 
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in participating in research on section 44 and handed him or her a piece of paper which 
briefly outlined the research.17 
The long interviews will be cited in the following Chapters as 'COMM' with randomly 
assigned letters (e.g. COMMB). The short interviews will be cited as 'COMM' with 
randomly assigned numbers prefaced by'S' (e.g. COMMS3). To ensure anonymity the 
gender of the interviewees may be changed. 
2.4.4) Summary of sample groups 
The table below summarises the interviewees by sample group. 
Table 2. t: Summary of interviewees 
Category Sub-categories Label Number of 
Interviewees 
Police MPS: front-line officers MPSFL (and randomly assigned 7 
number) 
MPS: senior officers MPSSNR (and randomly assigned 4 
number) 
MPS: data quality manager DQM 1 
BTP: front-line officers BTPFL (and randomly assigned 7 
number) 
BTP: senior officers BTPSNR (and randomly assigned 5 
number) 
Stakeholders PAOl; PA02; MDPC; Lord Carlile; 5 
Mike Franklin 
Community Long interviews COMM (and randomly assigned 8 
Representatives letter) 
Short interviews COMMS (and randomly assigned 5 
number) 
2.4.5) Interview Schedule 
The interview schedule for each sample, with separate oncs for senior and front-line officers, 
are provided in Appendix A. All interviewees were given the interview schedule 
beforehand, with the proviso that it was only a guide and some questions might be skipped 
and others added. This was done to facilitate access. Some of the interviewees went over 
17 See Appendix A. 
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the guide before the interview and prepared short notes. This provided interesting responses. 
For instance, one front-line officer went over CONTEST and the lIRA; while this 
preparation did not limit the scope of the discussion it provided an interesting context as he 
had recently spent a half hour or so considering the issues around section 44. There was no 
opportunity to do a pilot interview, but the semi-structured format allowed the interviews to 
develop 'on-the-spot' and the schedules were modified after the first few interviews. This is 
in keeping with a grounded theory approach which utilises open coding, building a theory 
around the data after it has been collected and coded. ls The schedule for the Data Quality 
Manager, for example, focused on stop forms, while the actual interview focused more on 
the importance of data quality to intelligence. The 'headline' questions were asked in all 
interviews, but not necessarily in the same order, nor were the same 'sub-questions' asked of 
all interviewees. Rather the responses of the interviewees dictated the time spent on 
particular themes. This reflexive approach to interviewing is possible because of the semi-
structured approach and enabled far greater depth within the interviews and for the particular 
experiences and expertise of the interviewees to come to the fore. 
All interviews started with an explanation of the thesis and what would be done with the 
material gathered and then a consent form was signed, as is discussed below. This was 
followed by some biographical and general questions as to the purpose of section 44 is and 
how it fits into CONTEST. The next sections varied depending on the sample group and the 
research questions that they addressed. Thus, the schedule for front-line officers focused on 
the deployment of section 44, while the schedule for senior officers included some questions 
on the deployment but few on the encounter, instead focusing on the authorisation process 
and how the community was engaged in relation to the power. The full-length community 
interviews focused on the encounter and police-community accountability, while the short 
interviews focused solely on the encounter. The stakeholder interviews varied somewhat 
depending on the expertise of the interviewee. Thus the interview with Mike Franklin 
focused on the encounter and police-community accountability, in particular complaints, 
while the interview with Lord Carlile included discussion of the deployment and 
authorisation of section 44. The schedules for the APA, PA and MDPC interviewees 
focused on police-community accountability and touched on issues around deployment and 
the encounter. The DQM interview was the least structured of the interviews as least was 
known about the subject before the interview. The schedule included questions around stop 
forms, PDAs and general data-quality. 
2.4.6) Analysis 
All interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder and transcribed. The transcripts 
18 Glaser, Band Strauss, A, The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative 
research (Aldine Publishing, New York 1967). 
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were open coded using NVivo 7.19 A grounded theory approach was taken in relation to the 
analysis of the fieldwork data, in general and specifically in relation to the analysis in 
NVivo, using an iterative approach whereby the data from the interviews was analysed and 
fed back into the later interviews.2o For example, the 'community representative' interviews 
led to new codes and the police interviews were then re-read and re-coded to include these. 
The use of coding allows all information under that heading to be retrieved easily so that the 
responses from the various interviewees could be compared and assisted in ensuring 
rigorous analysis of the data.21 This method was necessary to ensure that no data was over-
looked, given the number of interviews and the substantial transcripts. In addition, the use 
of tree-nodes underlined the key themes as they emerged. A node in Nvivo is the equivalent 
of a code or topic heading. A tree-node is one which can be organised into a hierarchy, as 
opposed to a free node which is unconnected to the other nodes. In NVivo tree-nodes are 
divided into parent and child nodes, corresponding to 'topic' and 'sub-topic'. A sample of 
the codes used is produced in Appendix A. 
2.5) Quantitative Sources 
Two main quantitative sources are used in this thesis relating to the exercise of section 44. 
The first is the Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System, produced under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991, section 95 (Section 95 statistics).22 These record the number of 
section 44 stops carried out per Home Office police force, in England and Wales, broken 
down by ethnicity. The 'hit rate', that is the number of stops and searches which result in an 
arrest, are also recorded in terms of those resulting in arrests for terrorist related offences and 
non-terrorist related offences. The second major source is the MPS' borough stop data, 
published since November 2008, which breaks down the number of section 44 stops by 
ethnicity, gender and age. 
These statistics provide important data on the usage of section 44. Ilowever, as discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 3 and 6, there are perennial difficulties in drawing firm conclusions 
relying solely on such statistics. One issue is the under-reporting of stops by police, which 
19 Strauss, A and Corbin, J, Basics of qualitative research: techniques and procedures for 
developing grounded theory (Sage, London 1990) 61. 
20 Glaser and Strauss, The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative research. 
21 Silverman, D, Doing Qualitative Research (3rd edn Sage, London 2010) 255-6. 
22 Ilome Office, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System: 2002'; Home Office, 
'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2003'; Home Office, 'Statistics on Race 
and the Criminal Justice System - 2004'; Home Office, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal 
Justice System - 2005'; Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System - 2006'; Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 
2006/07'; Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2007/08'. 
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has been identified in relation to the reporting of 'ordinary' stop and search.23 Observational 
methods could identify whether under-reporting occurs in relation to section 44. This would 
require more than one researcher observing a force over extended periods of time and was 
not feasible for this thesis. The observational work that was carried out with the BTP was 
not of a sufficient scale to determine whether there was under-reporting or not. However, 
the interviews provided an opportunity to probe the issue, with the police and 'community' 
samples. 
Difficulties also arise around the issue of the disproportionate use of section 44 against 
particular 'communities'. Both data sets reveal that 'Black' and' Asian' people are stopped 
more often per head of population than 'white' people. However, this bare data broken 
down by crude ethnic labels does little to address the question of whether particular 
'communities' are targeted, be they communities which transverse ethnicities, such as 
Muslims, or which are a sub-group of one ethnicity, such as Pakistanis. In addition, 
disproportionality is identified by comparing the proportion of stops of each ethnicity to the 
overall population, based on the last census which was out of date at the time of writing. If 
minority ethnic communities are undcrrepresented in comparison to the census then any 
disproportionality in the statistics will be exaggerated, and vice versa.24 Another issue is 
whether disproportionality should be judged against the 'available' or 'resident' 
population?S Equally contested is what significance can be placed on the 'hit rate' and 
whether statistical analysis based on the 'hit rate', such as the 'outcome test', discussed 
further in Chapter 6, can adduce the existence, or not, of discriminatory behaviour.26 
Doctrinal analysis of these difficulties will contextualise the use of the statistical sources. 
All these issues are discussed in depth in Chapters 3 and 6. 
23 N Bland et a1. 'Upping the PACE? An evaluation of the recommendations of the Stcphen 
Lawrence Inquiry on stops and searchcs' (Home Office (PRS 128), London 2000). 
24 Delsol, R and Shiner, M, 'Regulating stop and search: a challenge for police and 
community relations in England and Wales' (2006) 14 Critical Criminology 241,249. 
25 FitzGerald, M and Sibbitt, R, 'Ethnic monitoring in police forces: a beginning' (Home 
Office (HORS 173), London 1997); Miller, J, 'Profiling populations available for stops and 
searches' (Home Office (PRS 131), London 2000). 
26 Ayres, I, 'Outcome tests of racial disparities in police practices' (2002) 4 Justice Research 
and Policy 132; N Persico and PE Todd, 'The Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Motor-
Vehicle Searches' (2008) 25 Justice Quarterly 37; e.f. Engcl, R, 'A Critique of the "Outcome 
Test" in Racial Profiling Research' (2008) 1 Justice Quarterly 25; Engel, Rand Tillyer, R, 
'Searching for Equilibrium: The Tenuous Nature of the Outcome Test' (2008) 25 Justice 
Quarterly 54; Engel, R, Calnon, J and Bemard, T, 'Theory and racial profiling: shortcomings 
and future directions in research' (2002) 19 Justice Quarterly 249; Anwar, S and Fang, H, 
'An alternative test of racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches: theory and evidence' (2006) 
96 The American Economic Review 127. 
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2.6) Ethics 
Ethical concerns in socio-Iegal research have been underlined by the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 1998.27 Although this research touches 
on sensitive areas such as terrorism, the use of counter-terrorism powers, police I community 
relations and actual or perceived disproportionality, the fieldwork does not raise ethical 
concerns over and above those normally occurring with fieldwork. All the fieldwork was 
conducted in adherence to the British Society of Criminology's code of ethics and the 
research was approved by the Research Ethics Review process required by the Faculty of 
Education, Social Science and Law. The key ethical concerns are: informed consent; data-
protection and confidentiality; potential risks to the participants and/or the interviewer. 
These will be considered in turn. 
Informed consent is the foundation of an ethical approach to field-work. All the full-length 
interviewees were competent adults who were in a position to give consent. One of the 
interviewees for the 'short' interviews was a sixteen year old and particular care was taken 
to explain the thesis and ensure informed consent. To ensure that fully informed consent 
was obtained the participants were provided in advance with an abbreviated methodology 
and outline of the research, as well as the interview schedule.28 At the beginning of the 
interview the nature of the research, the research questions and the plans for dissemination 
were outlined to ensure that the participants had full and open information on all aspects of 
the work.29 Interviewees were asked permission for the interviews to be recorded and were 
reminded that their involvement was on a strictly voluntary basis and that they could rescind 
their consent at any stage during the interview and were not obliged to answer any questions. 
Each interviewee then read and signed the consent fonn, which is reproduced in Appendix 
A. 
In relation to data-protection and confidentiality, the research adheres to the data protection 
principles set forth in the Data Protection Act 1998. All personal data was kept in a secure 
location, separate from the transcripts and recordings of the interviews, with password 
protection, where relevant, to guard against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to 
the data.30 The transcripts and recordings were also secured with password protection and 
kept in a secure location. The individual participants in the police and community groups 
have been accorded anonymity, being referred to by the abbreviations detailed above. It 
would be difficult to discuss sensibly the findings of the fieldwork without acknowledging 
27 Noaks, Land Wincup, E, Criminological research: understanding qualitative methods 
(London, Sage 2004). 
28 See Appendix A. 
29 Principle 2 (Data Protection Act 1998 Schedule 1, part I, paragraph 2). 
30 Principle 7 (Data Protection Act 1998 Schedule 1, part I, paragraph 7). 
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the particular circumstances which exist in the two police forces. Therefore the MPS and 
BTP have been identified, although the borough and force areas which are the subject of the 
fieldwork have been kept anonymous. Lord Carlile and Mike Franklin were named as their 
comments must be understood in the light of their professional roles. Both consented to 
being named in the research. The other members of the stakeholders group were 
interviewed due to their professional interest in section 44 and were therefore identified by 
organisation. All participants will be offered a copy of the completed research or a summary 
thereof. All data and records will be destroyed after the completion of this PhD. 
Despite the sensitive nature of the topic under research, there were no additional risks over 
and above those normally occurring with fieldwork. As noted already, all the full-length 
interviews were with competent adults who gave their informed consent to participate. 
There are no concerns in this research regarding full disclosure of the object of the research 
and no deception or monetary inducements were used.3) The interviews were carried out 
mainly at the interviewee's place of work or at the University of Leeds, with two interviews 
carried out at the interviewees' home. To ensure the interviewer's safety, for all interviews 
carried out off campus another individual was informed of the location of the interview and 
expected time of return and was called when the interview was concluded. 
2.7) Conclusion 
The fieldwork methodology is informed by the general methodology and location of the 
work within socio-Iegal studies, primarily using the qualitative methods of semi-structured 
interviews. Although this sacrifices breadth it has been argued that the added depth 
compensates for this and that in addition the novel nature of this research, and its use of 
grounded theory requires the flexibility inherent in the approach. This chapter has outlined 
the rationale behind the methodological choices and their weaknesses and strengths, arguing 
that where the weaknesses cannot be avoided awareness of them will ensure that the data is 
used in an appropriate manner and that on the whole the strengths outweigh the weaknesses. 
31 Punch, M, 'Politics and ethics in qualitative research' in N Denzin and Y Lincoln (eds) 
Handbook of qualitative research (Sage, London 1994). 
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Chapter 3) The History of Stop and Search 
This Chapter charts the legal development of the power to stop and search, contemporarily 
scattered across nearly thirty different statutes, contextualising the powers historically, 
socially and politically.) In doing so it addresses the first research question: how did the 
powers of stop and search develop historically? By examining these powers as they existed 
historically it is possible, aided by hindsight, to draw important conclusions regarding their 
necessity, limitations and consequences, both beneficial and detrimental. These lessons can 
then be applied when analysing section 44. 
The Chapter begins with the non-counter terrorist powers, detailing their evolution from the 
Vagrancy Acts through to PACE, and their various contemporary manifestations. The 
subsequent section considers counter-terrorist-powers of stop and search, from the Special 
Powers Acts through to the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. This division reflects the 
differing motivations and purposes of the powers. The analysis will focus on the extent and 
usage of these powers, their evolution, the nominal reasons behind them, the motivations 
determinable from the patterns of usage and their impact upon the targeted communities. 
3.1) Stop and Search pre-PACE 
The Vagrancy Act 1824, section 4, is regarded as onc of two predecessors to the post-PACE 
stop and search powers, the other being the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, section 66. This 
section charts the historical development of the vagrancy statutes, from the Statute of 
Labourers 1349 to the Vagrancy Act 1824, highlighting the changes in focus over the 
centuries. The powers are then assessed in terms of their legality, focusing on section 4, 
before considering the impact of the discriminatory exercise of section 4 and section 66 in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s and how the power to stop and search was reformed under the 
Royal Commission for Criminal Procedure (RCCP). 
) See table 3.1, below at 3.4. 
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It must be emphasised at the outset that the powers under the Vagrancy Acts are not stop and 
search powers but powers to arrest, with some ancillary stop and search powers.2 Analysis 
of these powers are pertinent for two reasons. First, section 4, specifically the 'sus' law 
component, is commonly cited as progenitor of post-PACE stop and search powers and has 
been compared with TACT, section 44? This may be attributed mainly to the confluence 
among sections of the public between 'street' police powers, such as the Metropolitan Act 
1839, section 66, and 'sus' and in part to its (illegal) use as a de facto stop and search 
power.4 This public perception arguably continues today, as evidenced by the convergence 
of 'sus' and stop and search in the writings of commentators,S which makes it extremely 
difficult to disentangle the use and impact of 'sus' from that of section 66 and similar stop 
and search powers. It is notable that section 4 continues to be used as a comparator against 
stop and search powers. For example, Fraser Sampson of the West Yorkshire APA, stated 
that TACT, section 44 'is plainly not a sort of21 s1 century 'sus' law,.6 The second reason 
for the relevance of 'sus' to this thesis is that the use of 'sus' to 'control the streets' bears 
close resemblance to aspects of post-PACE stop and search powers.7 Both PACE, section I 
and 'sus' are 'street powers', which, as noted by Demeuth, require 'the exercise of an 
officer's discretion in assessing a person's motive or intent...; both have been put forward 
2 For example, the Vagrancy Act 1824, section 8 permitted a Justice of the Peace to search 
any person convicted of an offence under sections 3 - 4 or their property. 
3 Walker, C, 'Stop and Search' [2005] CrimLR414, 418; Bowling, Band Phillips, C, 
Racism, crime andjustice (Longman, lIarlow 2002) 139; Smith, R, 'Rights & wrongs: the 
future of policing?' (2008) LS Gaz 11; Sampson, F, 'Powers of scrutiny' [2009] Police 
Professional 16; Edwards, R, 'Stop and search, terrorism and the human rights deficit' (2008) 
37 Common Law World Review 211; Brogden, A, "Sus' is dead: but what about 'Sas'?' 
(1981) IX New Community 44. 
4 Williams, K and Ryan, C, 'Police Discretion' [1986] PL 285,290; [8]. 
S See above, footnote 3. 
6 Sampson 'Powers of scrutiny' 17. 
7 Demuth, C, "Sus': a report on the Vagrancy Act 1824' (Runnymede Trust, London 1978) 
51. 
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by the police as important for the prevention and detection of offences ... ; and both have 
been identified as a source of friction between the community and its police officers'. 8 
3.1.1) Rogues and vagabonds 
The first vagrancy statute, the Statute of Labourers 1349, prohibited begging and required all 
able bodied persons to work, on pain of imprisonment.9 This narrow focus on vagrants 
('destitute wanderer[s]')lo reflected the anti-migratory policy behind the legislation that 
aimed to ensure a sufficient supply of cheap labour for the feudal lords, which had never 
fully recovered from the Crusades and had been severely depleted by the Black Death. 11 
Sixteenth-century statutes broadened the class to include criminal types, such as 
counterfeiters and fraudsters. 12 Punishments became more severe, with those for the 
'criminal' types exceeding the severity accorded to the merely 'idle'. \3 This dichotomy 
between the 'impotent beggar' and the 'sturdy tramp', 14 whereby able-bodied vagrants were 
viewed as a nuisance or potential criminals and accordingly subjected to more severe 
punishment was reinforced in 1530 when licences were issued to permit the impotent to bcg, 
although the system was soon superseded by the Poor Law. ls 
8lbid 1-2. 
935 Ed. I 1307 ( cl). 
10 Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences 'Working Party on Vagrancy and Street 
Offences working paper' (HMSO, London 1974). 
11 Foote, C, 'Vagrancy Type Law and Its Administration' (1956) 104 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 615; Chambliss, W, 'A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy' 
(1964) 12 Social Problems 67, 70. Sce also Papachristou vlacksonville 405 US 156 (1972), 
161. 
12 See 22 Hen. VIII 1530 (c 12), I Ed. VI 1547 (c 3), 14 El. 1571 (c 5). 
\3 For example, 22 Hen. VIII. 1530 (c 12) provided that a idler who gave no account of his 
living be tied cart naked and whipped through the town until bloody while those using 'subtil 
crafty and unlawful games' were to be whipped for two days then put in the pillory for the 
third day. 
14 Cunningham, W, The growth of English commerce and industry during the Early and 
Middle Ages (CUP, Cambridge 1915) 408. 
IS 22 Hen. VIII 1531 (c 12). 
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The Poor Law 1563, placed responsibility for the destitute upon the members of the parish, 
who supported them through their taxes, in addition to the inter-generational support 
provided by next-of-kin. 16 It responded in part to the additional burden of the poor upon 
society that followed the dissolution of the monasteries, which had previously provided 
relief.17 The Poor Law emphasised the community relationships, in particular the vertical 
ones between the labourer or small farmer and the landlord and gentry, which were 
characterised by paternalism and condescension on the part of landlords and gentry and 
reciprocated through deference on the part of the small farmers and labourers. 18 These were 
central to early modem British society.19 This web of authority and deference was a crucial 
method of control whereby 'the gentry and the employing farmers held a total control over 
the life of the labourer and his family', including dictating to a significant degree whether 
and with what severity the criminal law would be enforced.20 
Making the parish responsible for the destitute provided an extra impetus to designate non-
local vagrants as, in the terminology of the day, 'strangers' because they placed an added 
burden upon the finances of the parish.21 This division into 'strangers' as opposed to local 
vagrants reflects the aspects of social control that were central to the later Vagrancy Acts. 
16 Lees, L, The solidarities ofstrangers: the English Poor Laws and the people. 1700-1948 
(CUP, Cambridge 1998) 169-70. 
1727 Hen. VIII 1536 (c28) and 31 Hen. VIII 1539 (cB). Cunningham, The growth of 
English commerce and industry during the Early and Middle Ages 538-9; Ribton-Turner, C, 
A history of vagrants and vagrancy and beggars and begging (Chapman and Hall, London 
1887) 84-5. 
18 Hay, D, 'Property, authority and the criminal law' in D Hay and others (eds) Albion'sfatal 
tree: crime and society in eighteenth-century England (Penguin, London 1975). 
19 Ibid. I take Giddens' definition of modernity as relating to post-feudal European society 
(Giddens, A, Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age (Stanford 
UP, Palo Alto 1991) 14-5). 
20 Thompson, E, 'The crime of anonymity' in D Hay and others (eds) Albion'sfatal tree: 
crime and society in eighteenth-century England (Penguin, London 1975) 277. On the 
influence that the gentry and employing farmers held in terms of the implementation of the 
criminal law see generally Hay, D and others, Albionsfatal tree: crime and society in 
eighteenth-century England (Penguin, London 1975). 
21 Feldman, D, 'Migrants, immigrants and welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare 
State' (2003) 13 Transactions of the RHS 79, 84. This resulted in, for example, the 
Vagrancy Act 1782, section 25 permitting the public Whipping of any female vagrant who 
gave birth in a parish to which she did not belong. 
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Settlement Laws, which allowed parishes to refuse relief to, and in some cases forcibly 
remove, vagrants to their home parish reinforced the distinction between 'strangers' and 
local vagrants.22 By 1692 'strangers' were forced to announce their presence in church, with 
residence, even temporary, only granted if they were deemed to be of 'good character' and 
could produce a certificate of future support.23 Due to the fact that, from Elizabethan times, 
British society was highly mobile, the effects of the Settlement laws on migrants were 
··fi 24 Slgm lcant. 
A series of events conflatcd to increase the pressure on labourers and subsistence farmers in 
the 18th century, resulting in destitution and mass migration to the burgeoning cities and 
rupturing the tics of kinship and community. These included the enclosure of land,H rising 
grain prices caused by the Napoleonic Wars/6 mechanical advances and the lure of greater 
wages and opportunities in the cities.27 The ever increasing number of vagrants had to 
confront the mainstream belief that poverty was indicative of - and resulted from - moral 
decay.28 Some commentators developed the earlier dichotomy between the 'impotent' poor 
and 'able-bodied' vagrants, distinguishing between the indigent, who were destitute as a 
result of their (innate) immorality and idleness, and the 'poor', who were afflicted by external 
22 For example, 13 & 14 Charles II 1662 (el2) permitted removal of persons who had lived 
without legal grounds in a parish for less than forty days. These were eased in the mid-
nineteenth century with the Poor Removal Act 1846 providing that those resident in a parish 
for five years could not be removed. This was reduced to one year by 24 & 25 Victoria 
1861 (c 76). 
23 3 & 4 William and Mary 1692 (c 11). Lees, The solidarities of strangers: the English Poor 
Laws and the people, 1700-194829,47-50. 
24 Feldman 'Migrants, immigrants and welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State' 
83. Beier, A, Masterless men: the vagrancy problem in England 1560-1640 (Methuen, 
London 1985) chapter 3. 
2S Neeson, J, Commoners: common right, enclosure and social change in England, 1700-
1820 (CUP, Cambridge 1993). 
26 Rose, M, The English Poor Law, 1780-1930 (David & Charles, Newton Abbot 1971) 19. 
27 Lees, The solidarities of strangers: the English Poor Laws and the people, 1700-1948 86; 
EP Thompson, The making of the English working class (Penguin, Harmondsworth 1981). 
28 This was occasionally challenged, see Lees, The solidarities of strangers: the English 
Poor Laws and the people, 1700-1948 passim. 
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occurrences beyond their control.29 The work-less became, in the public mind, the work-
shy.30 The belief that the 'idle' poor were merely a step - if that - away from succumbing to 
criminality became increasingly common.3) Correspondingly, the policy focus behind the 
vagrancy laws had, by this stage, moved from the provisions of cheap labour to the 
protection of goods, reflecting Britain's predominantly mercantile society.32 This is evident 
in the alteration of the Poor Law's focus from domiciliary support or temporary lodgings to 
the introduction of work based relief, which forbade the provision of relief to able-bodied 
men outside the workhouse except in exchange for work.33 The total effect was to shunt 
even the local destitute towards the edge of society, where the vagrant 'strangers' had 
already been confined. 
3.1.2) 'Sus' and the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, section 66 
These public perceptions regarding the vagrants and able-bodied poor are reflected in 
criminalisation of sub-criminal behaviour in the Vagrancy Act 1824. The Act repealed all 
earlier vagrancy statutes, aiming to simplify the law which by then had spread across 
twenty-seven statutes.34 Section 4 was a mishmash of various types of offences including 
the traditional vagrancy offences, offences against the Poor Law, offences against public 
decency and morality, and the infamous offence whereby a 'reputed thier or 'suspected 
person' loitering with intent to commit a felony in a public place could be arrested without 
warrant. This latter offence gave section 4 its colloquial name: the 'sus' law, and gained 
particular notoriety from the 1960s amid increasingly fraught police-community relations. 
29 Colquhoun, P, A treatise on the police o/the metropolis (Patters on Smith, New Jersey 
1806) 365-6. 
30 Lees, The solidarities o/strangers: the English Poor Laws and the people, 1700-1948 
111. 
31 Sir Thomas More made this connection between unemployment and crime as early as 
1516 (Sir Thomas More, Utopia: edited with an introduction (BedfordlSt. Martin's, Boston 
1999) 103-4). 
32 Chambliss 'A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy' 72. 
33 For example, 9 Geo I 1722 (c7) empowered parishes to buy or rent workhouses and refuse 
relief to any who refused to work there. See also the Outdoor Labour Test Order (1842) and 
the Outdoor Relief Regulation Order (1852). 
34 HC debs. Ith March 1822 vol. VI, col. 1047 (Mr Chetwyn). 
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The Earl of Halsbury, writing in 1912, noted that the law bore 'little or no relation to the 
subject of poor relief, but [was] more properly directed towards the prevention of crime and 
the preservation of good order, and the promotion of social economy,.35 
Persons committing offences under section 4 were punished as either 'idle and disorderly 
persons', 'rogues and vagabonds' or 'incorrigible rogues,.36 The potential breadth of the class 
of 'rogues and vagabonds' is staggering. It included the offences of being armed with an 
offensive weapon, being found on enclosed premises for any unlawful purpose,37 telling 
fortunes, sleeping rough/8 and indecent exposure/9 in addition to all 'suspected persons' 
and those facing a second conviction for being 'idle and disorderly' .40 
The 'sus' offence itself had three elements. Firstly, the person had to be a 'reputed thief or 
'suspected person'. The former required proof of a 'recent, relevant conviction of an offence 
35 Earl of Halsbury, The Law o/England (Butterworths & Co., London 1912) 606-7 quoted 
in Chambliss 'A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy' 74. 
36 An incorrigible rogue was any convicted of an offence under the Vagrancy Act who had 
already been convicted as a rogue and vagabond, or who escaped from prison, or who was 
apprehended as a rogue and vagabond and violently resisted arrest (Vagrancy Act 1824, 
section 5). 
37 The accused must be found on the premises but need not be apprehended there (Moran v 
Jones [1911] 75 JP 411). Being 'found' includes being 'discovered or secn' (L v DPP [2007] 
EWHC 1843 (Admin». The unlawful purpose must be criminal; an act of immorality will 
not suffice, however, it is not necessary to prove intent to commit a crime at the time or 
place where D was found (Hayes v Stevenson [1860] 3 LT 296; Re Joy [1853] 22 LT Jo 80). 
38 The offence of sleeping rough required proof that the person: a) had been directed to 
accommodation usually provided free and failed or refused to apply; b) persistently wanders 
abroad; or c) causes, or appears likely to cause, damage to property, infection with vermin or 
any other offensive consequence (Vagrancy Act 1824, section 1). Of note, the Metropolitan 
Police Act 1839, section 64 gave the Metropolitan police the power to arrest anyone lying or 
loitering in public place between sunset and 8 am who cannot give a satisfactory account of 
themselves. 
39 Vagrancy Act 1824, section 4. 
40 The 'idle and disorderly' were defined by section 3 as: 'every petty chapman or pedlar 
wandering abroad, and trading without being duly licensed, or otherwise authorised by law; 
every common prostitute wandering in the public streets or public highways, or in any place 
of public resort, and behaving in a riotous or indecent manner; and every person wandering 
abroad, or placing himself or herself in any public place, street, highway, court, or passage, 
to beg or gather alms, or causing or procuring or encouraging any child or children so to do'. 
For a detailed commentary on each of these offences, excepting the last two, see Working 
Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences, 'Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences 
working paper' 13-184. 
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of dishonesty' .41 The classification of persons as 'suspected' persons was based upon their 
antecedent behaviour, with or without convictions.42 In common with 'reputed thieves', the 
convictions did not need to be known to the officer at the time.43 As explained in Hartley v 
El/nor, a 'person may be a suspected person on a particular day, even though he has not been 
previously convicted, or even though he has not had a reputation for bad character in the 
past' .44 In practice it often involved the person being observed acting in a suspicious 
manner twice, the second occasion constituting the offcnce.4s During the height of its 
notoriety, this typically consisted of checking car doors or acting in a way that appeared 
preparatory to pick-pocketing or similar. The typical 'sus' case consisted of testimony from 
one or more policemen against that of the claimant.46 By 1974, the MPS only charged 
people in relation to being a 'suspected person' and not a 'reputed thief. The second 
requirement was that the suspicious behaviour occurred in or while frequenting47 one of the 
places prescribed in the Act - a broad definition covering most public areas.48 Finally, the 
'suspected person' or 'reputed thief had to intend to commit an arrestable offence.49 
Although mere suspicion of intent was insufficient it was not necessary to show the 
defendant was guilty of intending to commit any particular act(s). It merely needed to 
41 Home Affairs Committee, Race relations and the "Sus" law: 2nd Report (IIC 1979-80, 
559) 47. 
42 !bid 47; Ledwith v Roberts [1937] KB 232, 245. 
43 R v Clarke [1950] 1 KB 523; R v Fairbairn [1949] 2 KB 690. 
44 Hartley v Ellnor [1917] 117 LT 304, 262. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Demuth "Sus': a report on the Vagrancy Act 1824' 18-28; Working Party on Vagrancy and 
Street Offences, 'Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences working paper' 114-5. 
47 'Frequenting' means being in a place long enough for the purposes aimed at (Clark v 
Taylor (1948) 112 JP 439. 
48 These were: any river, canal, or navigable stream, dock or basin or any quay, wharf or 
warehouse near or adjoining thereto, or any street, highway or avenue leading thereto, or any 
place of public resort, or any avenue leading thereto, or any street, highway or any place 
adjacent to a street or highway' (section 4). A 'public resort' was held not to include a 
pleasure steamboat (R v Taylor and lanes (1857) 21 JP 488), but included a railway 
platform (R v Davis [2008] UKHL 36), a place to which the public are invited (Glynn v 
Simmonds [1952] 2 All ER47 and Russellv Thompson [1953] NI 5I(CA». 
49 Rv Pavitt (1911) 75 JP 432 and Ledwith v Roberts. 
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appear to the magistrate, from circumstances and the person's known character, that he did 
so intend. 50 
The other major progenitor of modern stop and search powers was the Metropolitan Police 
Act 1839, section 66. It was mirrored by local Acts in some other metropolitan areas such as 
Manchester, Liverpool and Rochdale.sl It permitted the police to 'stop, search and detain' 
any persons, 'vessel, boat, cart or carriage' which were reasonably suspected of 'having or 
conveying' stolen or unlawfully obtained items.52 This included the power to detain a person 
for the purposes of questioning.53 Reasonable suspicion was held to be 'essentially a 
question of fact' which 'hard] to be looked at in a general objective context' ,54 If the 
stop/search progressed to an arrest the officer had to inform detainees of the charge against 
them.55 Originally section 66 was linked to the Metropolitan Police Courts Act 1839, section 
24 whereby it was an offence to be unable to account for unlawful possession of an article. 
This reversed burden of proof was deemed unacceptable and section 24, along with similar 
provisions in other statutes, was repealed by the Criminal Law Act 1977. Thereafter 
prosecutions subsequent to a section 66 stop and search had to come within the ambit of the 
Theft Act 1968.56 There are similarities in the use of section 66 when compared with 'sus', 
although the latter created an offence while the former did not. This distinction was, 
50 Prevention of Crimes Act (1871), section 15. 
SI Manchester Police Act 1844, section 218; Liverpool Corporation Act 1922, sections 551, 
553; Rochdale Corporation Act 1948, section 115. Similar provisions include the following: 
Birkenhead Corporation Act 1881, section 99 (as amended by Birkenhead Corporation Act 
1923, section 104); Birmingham Corporation (Consolidation) Act 1883, section 137(2); 
Bumley Borough Improvement Act 1871, section 342; Hertfordshire County Council Act 
1935, section l30; Newcastle-upon-Tyne Improvement Act 1841, section 39; Oldham 
Borough improvement Act 1865, section 204; St Helens Borough Improvement Act 1869, 
section 257 and Salford Improvement Act 1869, section 242. 
52 Metropolitan Police Act, section 66. Note that a 'carriage' is to be construed as including 
reference to a motor vehicle or trailer (Road Traffic Act 1972, section 195). 
S3 Daniel v Morrison (1980) 70 Cr AppR 142. 
54 King v Gardner (1980) 71 CrAppR 13,14. See also Ware v Matthews 11th February 1981 
QB and Bailey, SH and Birch, DJ, 'Recent developments in the law of police powers' [1982] 
CrimLR 475, 476-477. 
ss Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 543; R v Hamilton [1986] CrimLR 187. 
56 Sir C Philips, Report o/the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Cmnd 8092, 1981) 
[23]. 
57 
however, blurred in practice, in particular by the difficulty in distinguishing between the 
suspicion required to arrest (necessary for 'sus') and that required for a stop.57 
3.1.3) Assessment 
In assessing the vagrancy statutes, in particular Vagrancy Act 1824, section 4, it is 
interesting to compare the approach that was taken in Ireland in respect of aspects of section 
4,58 and in the US in relation to analogous vagrancy ordinances, which were respectively 
held to be unconstitutional. While there are different constitutional considerations in the 
three jurisdictions the main points of argumentation concerned the rule of law and are 
applicable to the UK. The leading cases are King v Attorney General,59 in Ireland, and 
Papachristou v City of Jacksonville,60 in the USA, both heard by the respective Suprcme 
Courts. 
King and Papachristou focused on the vagueness of the relevant law. In Papachristou, the 
plaintiffs were charged with various counts of vagrancy, specifically 'prowling by auto', 
'loitering', being 'vagabonds' and being 'common thieves' .61 While some of the terms 
differ from those in the Vagrancy Act 1824, section 4, the difference is not substantial.62 
The US Supreme Court held the lacksonville ordinance to be 'plainly unconstitutional' for 
57 Willis 'The use, effectiveness and impact of police stop and search powers'. See below, 
Section 3.2, for further discussion on the standard of suspicion required for stop and search. 
58 The application ofthe Vagrancy Act 1824, section 4 was extended to Ireland and Scotland 
under the Prevention of Crimes Act 1871, section 15. See also The Law Reform 
Commission 'Report on vagrancy and related offences' (Law Reform Commission, Dublin 
1985). 
59 King v Attorney General and DPP [1981] IR 233. 
60 Papachristou v Jacksonville (1972). 
61 Ibid. 
62 The relevant section of the lacksonville Ordinance Code § 26-57 read as follows: 'Rogues 
and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, persons who 
use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, 
thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious 
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railcrs and brawlers, persons wandering or 
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, 
disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time 
by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are 
sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or 
minor children shall be deemed vagrants'. 
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'vagueness' because it failed to give fair notice to persons that their conduct would be 
illega1.63 In King, the Irish Supreme Court considered solely the 'sus' offence. Henchy, J, 
with whom the other Justices agreed, criticised the ingredients of the offence and the method 
by which it was proved for being 'so arbitrary, so vague, so difficult to rebut, [and] so 
related to rumour or ill-repute or past conduct...that it is not so much a question of ruling 
unconstitutional the type of offence we are now considering as identifying the particular 
constitutional provisions with which such an offence is at variance' .64 
In the leading OK case of Ledwith v Roberts, Scott, LJ strongly criticised the terms 
'suspected person' and 'reputed thief as 'old phrases [which] have to-day lost their 
meaning' and remain on the Statute Book 'as vague and indefinite words ofreproach,.6S lie 
argued that to retain such laws seems 'inconsistent with our national sense of personal 
liberty or our respect for the rule of law' .66 lie was, however, alone in this criticism. Greer, 
LJ acknowledged that the words of the 'sus' provision 'are not very clear' but did not 
suggest that they were so vague as to violate the rule of law, while Greene, LJ did not refer 
to any ambiguity.67 Both the Home Office Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences 
(Working Party), set up to investigate the law on vagrancy and other street offences, and the 
Home Affairs Committee's (HAC) Report on 'Race Relations and the "Sus" Law' failed to 
comment on the vagueness of the provisions.68 Despite the near silence of the judiciary on 
the matter, it is apparent that the 'sus' provision was too vague to give fair notice to persons 
that their behaviour would be criminalised and thus violated the rule of law. To quote 
Kenny, J in King: 'both governing phrases "suspected person" and "reputed thief' are so 
63 Papachristou v Jacksonville (1972) 162, 171. 
64 King v AG & DPP [1 981J 257. 
6S Ledwith v Roberts, 277. 
66 Ibid, 277. 
67 Ibid, 244. 
68 Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences, Working Party on Vagrancy and Street 
Offences working paper'; Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences 'Report of the 
Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences' (HMSO, London 1976); Home Affairs 
Committee, Race relations and the "Sus" law: 2nd Report. 
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uncertain that they cannot form the foundation for a criminal offence' .69 It is notable that 
the ECtHR held TACT, section 44 not to be 'in accordance with the law', due in large part 
to its vagueness and the consequentially unfettered discretion it affords officers.70 
Lacey, discussing US vagrancy offences generally, described them as criminalising a 
'personal condition', in so far as it is not the person's actions that are being punished but 
their being a member of a prohibited class, such as a vagrant or reputed thief.71 This 
designation applies equally to the earlier vagrancy statutes in so far as they presumed 
criminality in, firstly, 'strangers' and then 'able-bodied vagrants'. This criminalisation of a 
'personal condition' is also evident in 'sus' in so far as the antecedent character of the 
person was admissible as evidence towards the offence. This reveals a clear pre-emptive 
motivation in the law which goes hand in hand with a presumptive allocation of risk to entire 
classes of people such as 'strangers', 'indigents', 'reputed thieves', and 'suspected persons'. 
The pre-emptive motivation in the Vagrancy Act 1824, section 4 was acknowledged in 
evidence to the HAC by the Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police Force who stated 
that section 4 is 'a control which works on people's minds, which means they are less likely 
to be lurking around,.72 
This presumption of criminality may be distinguished from 'all-risks' policing in so far as 
the risk allocation has not moved from persons to places but rather from specific people to a 
class of people, although the requirement in 'sus' that the behaviour occurs in a designated 
area is clearly comparable to the geographical risk allocation evident in section 44. More 
broadly, however, parallels can be drawn with the movement from specific to generalised 
risk. In relation to section 4, aspects of it stand on all fours with 'all-risks' policing, given 
the requirement that the 'suspicious' behaviour occurs in one of the designated areas. The 
69 King v AG & DPP [1981J 263. 
70 Discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
71 Lacey, F, 'Vagrancy and other crimes of personal condition' (1952-53) 66 Harvard LR 
1203. 
72 Home Affairs Committee, Race relations and the "Sus" law: 2nd Report Q.64 (Sir Philip 
Knights). 
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HAC recognised and accepted the need for deterrence and the prevention of crime but 
argued that this could be equally well served by increased police presence on the streets.73 
In Papachristou, Justice Douglas was dismissive of any pretence towards the vagrancy 
ordinance's usefulness in preventing future criminality, stating '[t]he implicit presumption in 
these generalized vagrancy standards - that crime is being nipped in the bud - is too 
extravagant to deserve extended treatment' .74 
One of the consequences of permitting police powers in anticipation of crime, indeed, before 
even an inchoate crime has occurred, is that it necessitates vagueness in the statute so as to 
accommodate the broad discretion required by officers. This holds equally true of TACT, 
section 44, as discussed in later Chapters. This broad discretion carries the danger of 
enabling the discriminatory application of the power. This point was noted by both thc US 
and Irish Supreme Courts. In Papachristou, Justice Douglas criticiscd thc Jacksonvillc 
ordinance for 'encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law' through thc 
'unfettered discretion' it affords the police and for criminalising activities that arc 'normally 
innocent,.75 In King, it was held that thc 'sus' provision 'in its arbitrariness and its 
unjustifiablc discrimination ... fails to hold ... all citizens to be equal beforc thc law' and was 
. . 176 therefore unconstltutlona . 
By contrast, in Ledwith Greer, LJ rejected thc interpretation of 'sus' as applying to anyone 
whom an officer thinks has been acting suspiciously as this would havc 'given [the police] a 
power extremely dangerous to any well-behaved person who may have good reason for 
frequenting or loitering in the places mentioned,.77 His acceptance of the power when 
limited to the classes of 'suspected persons' and 'reputed thieves' without criticism implies 
that, when limited to thosc classes, thc power was not 'cxtremely dangerous'. ScoU, LJ's 
73 Ibid [35,45]. 
74 Papachristou vlacksonville (1972) 171. 
75 Ibid 163, 170. Sce also Thornhill v Alabama 310 US 88 (1940). 
76 King v AG & DPP [1981J 255; Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 40, scctions 1,3. 
77 Ledwith v Roberts, 251-2. 
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condemnation of the power's vagueness has been noted. However, he does not connect that 
with its potential for arbitrary and discriminatory use. He argues instead that the 'class 
against which the legislation was directed has ceased to exist' because of social reforms such 
as unemployment benefit.78 In his earlier recitation of the history of the Vagrancy Acts, he 
speaks of the 'class ... ofthe hordes of unemployed persons ... wandering over the face ofthe 
country', asserting them to have been 'a definite and serious menace to the countryside'. 79 It 
is not entirely clear whether, if the class continued to exist, he would have objected as 
strenuously to the power. The Working Party admitted that much of the criticism of 'sus' 
arose from the view that the power was 'open to abuse, and lays the police open to 
allegations of abuse when they invoke it' but neither commented further on the matter nor 
advocated any safeguards to reduce the potential for abuse. so The HAC acknowledged that 
any offence which left a 'significant proportion of those convicted with a sense that their 
conviction was unjust' was contrary to the public interest.81 They rejected the accusation 
that the MPS acted 'with a deliberate racial bias', but conceded that 'selective perception of 
potential offenders is inherent in "sus"'. 82 
Tied into this potential for discriminatory application is the criminalisation of sub-criminal 
behaviour under section 4. In King, Henchy,] criticised in particular the fact that 'sus' made 
ordinarily legal behaviour unlawful and 'indiscriminately contrived to mark as criminal 
conduct committed by one person in certain circumstances when the same conduct, when 
engaged in by another person in similar circumstances, would be free of the taint of 
criminality,.83 Domestically, in R v Dean, Shearman, LC] commented that 'it would be in 
the highest degree unfortunate' if the police relied on the Vagrancy Act 1824 to obtain a 
conviction where there was insufficient evidence to charge the suspect with a criminal 
78 Ibid, 276. 
79 Ibid 271. 
80 Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences, 'Report of the Working Party on 
Vagrancy and Street Offences' [68]. 
81 Home Affairs Committee, Race relations and the "Sus" law: 2nd Report [27]. 
82 Ibid [27, 33]. 
83 King v AG & DPP [1981J 257. 
62 
attempt. 84 Despite this criticism, the police continued to use the Vagrancy Act 1824 for 
precisely those purposes, as the statute permitted.85 The HAC quoted with approval from R 
v Dean and criticised the criminalisation of behaviour which could reveal criminal intent or 
innocent behaviour as 'not in the public interest'. 86 The Working Party did note that the 
'sus' element was 'peculiar' in so far as it criminalised behaviour that of itself constituted 
neither a substantive nor an attempted offence but concluded that 'sus' had a 'substantial 
deterrent value' and a similar offence was still required.8? 
Despite the occasional judicial criticism, 'sus' was never subject to sustained judicial 
criticism nor limited as a consequence thereof. The Working Party's final recommcndation 
was to retain the 'suspected person' provision and repeal that relating to 'reputed thieves'. 
Their proposed new offence discarded the term 'suspected person', being limited instead to 
any person 'whose antecedent conduct in a public place reveals his intent to commit an 
arrestable ofIence,.88 In contrast the HAC advocated the immediate repeal of 'sus' without 
replacement, stating that 'the gap created by the repeal of "sus" is [not] one which a civilised 
community would wish to fill' .89 Both proposals were out-paced by the Law Commission's 
report into the law of attempts, which led to the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 and the repeal 
of'sus,.90 
3.1.4) Riots and a Report 
From the late 1960s the police increasingly found themselves in opposition to the society 
they policed, or sections of the society, from the 'counter-culture', through the 'talking 
84 R v Dean (1925) 18 CrAppR 133, 134. See also: R v Cadwell (1928) 20 CrAppR 60. 
85 Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences, 'Working Party on Vagrancy and Street 
Offences working paper' [196]. 
86110me Affairs Committee, Race relations and the "Sus" law: 2nd Report [24). 
87 Working Party on Vagrancy and Street Offences, 'Working Party on Vagrancy and Street 
Offences working paper' [195-7]. 
88 Ibid 25. 
89 Home Affairs Committee, Race relations and the "Sus" law: 2nd Report [44-47]. 
90 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, section 8. 
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classes' to the working classes at the picket lines.91 'Street' policing powers, such as 'sus' 
and stop and search under the Metropolitan Act 1839, section 66 and similar statutes 
contributed significantly to the deteriorating relations. 'Sus' and stop and search powers 
were used by the police as a means of 'assert[ing] control of the streets' and 'controlling 'the 
problem population' , continuing the trend set by earlier anti-vagrancy statutes of pushing the 
unwanted or 'strangers' to the fringes of society, including now not only the local and 
migrant poor but also the 'suspect' .92 These groups were 'police propcrty': viewed, at best, 
as being on the cusp of criminality; they were denied 'full 'citizenship' and [bore] the brunt 
of policing,.93 The 'suspects' were predominantly young 'Black' males from immigrant 
communities who,like the unemployed and vagrant, tended to live their lives predominantly 
. bl· I 94 m pu IC paces. 
Crime and immigration had long becn associated in many policy discourses. 9s The 
Vagrancy Acts themselves had previously targeted immigrant communities, many of the 
'strangers' having been immigrants, in particular from Ircland.96 However, the fact of the 
increasing size of the class of 'suspects', which expanded rapidly in the economic downturn 
of the 1970s, combined with an increased 'consciousness of antagonism towards (and from) 
the police' among the communities politiciscd the relationship bctwecn thcm and the 
91 Reincr, R, 'A watershed in policing' (1985) 56 the Political Quarterly 122, 126-7. 
92 Demuth "Sus'; a report on the Vagrancy Act 1824' 51; Brogdcn "Sus' is dead: but what 
about 'Sas'?' 49. 
93 Reincr, R, The polities o/the police (OUP, Oxford 2000) 78. Sce also Waddington, P, 
Policing citizens: authority and rights (Routlcdge, London 1998). 
94 Blacks were 14 or 15 times more likely to be stopped under 'sus' than whites (Stevens, P 
and Willis, C, 'Race, crime and arrests' (Home Office HORS (Paper 58), London 1979) 41. 
Sce also: Home Affairs Committce, Race relations and the "Sus" law: 2nd Report 151. 
Reiner, The politics of the police 78. 
9S Solomos, J, Race and racism in Britain (Pal grave & Macmillan, Basingstoke 2003) 118. 
Thcse discourses were based on false perception not fact, sec, for example, the findings of 
the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, Police/immigrant relations (HC 
1972, 471) 71. See also Hunte, J, Nigger-hunting in England? (West Indian Standing 
Conference, London 1966). 
96 Feldman 'Migrants, immigrants and welfare from the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State'; 
Ribton-Turner, A history of vagrants and vagrancy and beggars and begging 64; 148-150; 
214; 269-283 passim; 305-306. 
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police.97 There was also increasing politicisation surrounding ethnic minorities - in 
particular 'Black' communities - and crime, epitomised by the construction of 'mugging' as 
symptomatic of the disenfranchised, out of control 'Black' youth.98 The police were 
involved in this politicisation, with, in a reversal of earlier statements, the Metropolitan 
Commissioner stating in 1977 that there was a problem of crime among ethnic minorities.99 
'Sus' 'acquired a symbolic significance', becoming short-hand for all policing that was 
perceived to be motived by discrimination. 1 00 Among 'Black' and minority ethnic 
communities there was rising resentment against 'sus' and stop and search, which they 
perceived to be police harassment of their youth motivated by racism which resulted in 
haemorrhaging levels of confidence in and respect for the police. lOl The sporadic urban 
unrest of the late 1970s intensified in 1981 with a number of riots, including, from 10-12 
April, the Brixton riots, which were triggered by stop and search powers. I02 
The Scarman Report into the Brixton riots attributed the high potential for collective 
violence in Brixton to a conjunction of factors. First, the population had a disproportionate 
amount of society's vulnerable and deprived. 103 Second, Brixton was in an advanced stage 
of social and economic decay resulting in high unemployment, a depressing environment, 
pressure on the housing supply and a lack of recreational facilities. 104 Third, these 
97 Reiner, The politics o/the police 78. 
98 Hall, S, Policing the crisis: mugging. the state and law and order (Macmillan, London 
1978). 
99 Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, Report on the West Indian 
community (HC 1976-7, 180), 182 c.f. Select Committee on Race Relations and 
Immigration, Police/immigrant relations. 
lOO Home Affairs Committee, Race relations and the "Sus" law: 2nd Report [46]. 
101 For acknowledgment that harassment did occur see: Lord Scarman, Brixton disorders 10-
12 April 1981 (Cmnd 8427, 1981) [4.3]. Regarding the low levels of confidence in the 
police see the evidence given to the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, 
Report on the West Indian community; Home Affairs Committee, Race relations and the 
"Sus" law: 2nd Report; and Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [4.65-4.68]. 
102 Riots also occurred in London, Liverpool, Manchester and, again, in Brixton (Benyon, J, 
Scarman and after: essays reflecting on Lord Scarman's report. the riots and their aftermath 
(Pergamon, Oxford 1984) 3. 
103 Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [2.13]. 
104 !bid [2.1-2.20]. 
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deprivations fell most acutely upon the substantial ethnic minority communities due to 
issues arising from within the communities themselves, for example difficulty in adapting to 
life in Britain, and from without through racial discrimination. lOs The final factor was the 
high local incidence of crime and poor police-community relations which had been 
deteriorating for some time before the riots. 106 These factors combined to ensure that the 
youth, in particular the 'Black' youths, were 'a people of the street', prime targets under 
'sus' and section 66.107 The catalyst which moved this potential for collective violence to 
actuality was 'Operation Swamp'. 
The police launched 'Operation Swamp' in response to rising street crime, specifically 
'mugging' .108 The streets were flooded with 120 plain-clothes officers who were to carry 
out stop and searches under section 66.109 There was no previous discussion or 
communication with the community nor even with the 'home beat officers' .110 Not only 
was there a high proportion of ethnic minorities in Brixton - about 36% - but the police were 
targeting 'Black' youths who were viewed as being disproportionately involved in street 
crime. I11 The result was a powder key waiting to go off. Onc commentator reported that 
'[ d]uring the week before the riots, 943 people were stopped and searched, 118 people 
were arrested, 75 charges were made. The result would seem to be 43 people wrongly 
arrested and 800 indignant citizens frisked - which adds up to one riot.' 112 
10S Ibid [2.21-2.22]. 
106 Ibid [4.43]. 
107 Ibid [2.23]. 
108 Recorded robbery and other violent theft had increased 138% in Brixton between 1976 -
1980 (ibid [4.12]). 
109lbid [4.37-4.42]. 
110 Ibid [4.41]. 
I11 Just over half of those stopped were 'Black' while over two-thirds were under 21 (ibid 
[4.40]). Scarman includes West Indians, Africans, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
within the 'Black' community (ibid [2.15]). 
112 Mount, F, 'From Swing to Scarman' The Spectator (London) 4. 
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The spark came when police attempts to help an injured 'Black' youth were misinterpreted, 
conflict developed, police reinforcements were called in and the violence escalated. I 13 The 
rioting, which saw bricks, bottles and - for the first time in Britain - petrol bombs thrown, 
resulted in one day alone in 279 policemen and at least 45 members of the public being 
injured, 82 people arrested, 61 private and 56 police vehicles destroyed and 145 premises 
damaged. I 14 
By the time the Scarman Report was published in November 1981, the Criminal Attempts 
Act 1981 had been passed, repealing 'sus' in England and Wales and partially substituting it 
with the summary offence of vehicle interference. whereby it became an offence to 'interfere' 
with a motor vehicle with the intention of theft of the vehicle or anything in it or taking and 
driving it without consent. IIS Given the recent nature of the legislative changes Scarman, 
while acknowledging that a 'risk does exist that the new offence may prove no better than 
that which it replaces', advocated a hesitant 'wait and sce' policy.116 In relation to the 
Metropolitan Police Act, section 66 he was again surpassed by events as the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP), headed by Philips and discussed below, had 
reported on section 66 in January 1981.117 Scarman was convinced of the necessity of stop 
and search powers, but concurred with the RCCP that 'the state of the law". was 'a mess". 
agreeing with their proposals for rationalisation. I 18 
More generally, Scarman called for greater police training, particularly in the areas of 
community relations and public disorder, increased recruitment from ethnic minorities, more 
consultation between the police and the community and for increased police 
\13 Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [3.4]. 
114 Ibid [1.2.3.74]. 
11 S Criminal Attempts Act 1981, section 9. It was repealed in Ire land (Criminal Justice 
(Public Order) Act 1994, Schcdule 3. para. 16. Section 4 was repealed in Scotland by the 
Civie Government Act 1982 (Commencement Order) 1983, SI 1983/201. 
116 Lord Scarman, 'The Searman Report' [7.5]. 
117 Sir C Phi lips, 'The RCCP' [3.12-3.33]. 
118 Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [7.3]. 
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accountability. \19 He observed that the lack of accountability aggravated perceptions of 
harassment and racism, noting in particular the detrimental effect caused by the abject lack 
of public faith in the police complaints system. 120 He emphasised that the perceptions of the 
community cim have as devastating an effect as the reality.121 Scarman accepted that 
harassment and 'racial prejudice does manifest itself occasionally in the behaviour of a few 
officers on the streets' but firmly rejected the accusations of racism in the MPS as an 
organisation, or in its policies: there were a 'few bad apples' but no institutional racism. 122 
These categorisations, and discrimination and the criminal justice system more generally, are 
discussed further in Chapter 6.2. 
Although the Scarman Report was broadly welcomed, it has been criticised for failing to 
'grasp the nettle' of stop and search.123 In particular his conclusion that the requirement of 
objective reasonable suspicion was a sufficient safeguard against abuse failed to address the 
fact that the broad discretion inherent in stop and search powers provided a vehicle for 
racism - unwitting or not - which was little curbed by the need for reasonable suspicion, 
itself a slippery concept involving another layer of discretion. 124 Given this, it is not 
surprising to find the issues of racism and discrimination in relation to stop and search 
recurring, as discussed below. The Report has also been criticised for failing to address the 
reason why the youths were so angry with the police. m Scarman's argument that when 
faced with a choice between 'the maintenance of public tranquillity' and law enforcement the 
former should always come first appears to address this issue, albeit obliquely, by arguing 
against aggressive law enforcement which may bring marginal gains in law enforcement at 
119 Ibid [5.16, 5.55-5.71]. 
120 [4.68, 5.43]. 
121 Scarman noted in regard to allegations of harassment that '[t]he belief here is as important 
as the fact' (Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Rcport' [4.67]). 
122 Ibid [4.62-4.68]. 
\23 Bowling, Band Phillips, C, 'Policing ethnic minority communities' in T Newbum (ed) 
Handbook o/policing (Willan, Cullompton 2003) 532. 
124 Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [7.2, 7.3]. 
12S Gilroy cited in Bowling and Phillips, 'Policing ethnic minority communities' 532; Reiner, 
The politics o/the police 122. 
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the cost of public tranquillity.126 That his advice was ignored is evident from the fact that, in 
1997, Bernie Grant, MP could write that 'nothing has been more damaging to the 
relationship between the police and the 'Black' community than the ill judged use of stop 
and search powers' .127 
3.2) PACE 
3.2.1) The RCCP and the genesis of PACE 
Against this background of increased police-community tension the RCCP reported, 
advocating major changes to the criminal justice system, and providing the genesis of 
PACE. 12S Its terms of reference were: 'to examine, having rcgard both to the interests of the 
community in bringing offenders to justice and to the rights and liberties of persons 
suspected or accused of crime, and taking into account also the need for the efficient and 
economical use of resources, whether changes are needed' in relation to the powers and 
duties of the police and rights and duties of suspects and accused persons in England and 
Wales, among other criteria, the rest of which are beyond the scope of this thesis. 129 This 
concept of a 'fundamental balance' continues to underpin discussions of the criminal justice 
system, although its fulcrum has shifted position throughout the intervening years. 130 
The RCCP condemned the powers of stop and search as having 'no common rationale,.131 
Two major problems emerged: first, the reliance on local powers to stop and search for 
stolen goods, which only existed in some areas; \32 and, second, that the police lacked the 
powers they needed in some regards, such as searching football supporters for offensive 
126 Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [4.57]. 
127 NACRO, Policing local communities: the Tottenham experiment (NACRO, London 
1997). 
128 Sir C Philips, 'The RCCP'. 
129 Ibid [1.11]. 
130 Ibid. Sec, for example, Home Office 'Rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour 
of the law-abiding majority' (IIMSO, London 2006). For criticism of the 'false dichotomy' 
in the 'fundamental balance' see Sanders, A and Young, R, Crimina/justice (Butterworths, 
London 2000) Chapter 2. 
131 Sir C Phi lips, 'The RCCP' [34.12]. 
\32 See above, footnote 51. 
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weapons.133 The Commission was split on what reforms should be implemented, with the 
majority advocating that the plethora of powers be subsumed within one power which would 
allow the police to search for stolen goods or prohibited articles with safeguards to avoid any 
discriminatory use, while the dissentients argued that extending stop and search powers 
would aggravate social tensions, especially with regard to ethnie minorities. \34 The majority 
conceded that the diversity of situations in which the police must exercise their discretion 
made it impractical, if not impossible, to develop an agreed set of standards of 'reasonable 
suspicion' but argued that requiring the officer to notify the suspect of the reason for their 
search, in writing if requested after the incident, and requiring them to record the search, 
which should be monitored by supervising officers, would be sufficient. 135 It is surprising, 
given the social context, that the RCCP failed to address in greater depth the issue of the 
discriminatory use of stop and search powers to target minority ethnic communities. 
3.2.2) PACE 
When PACE was finally introduced, it was 'well received well by the police and tolerably 
well' by the legal profession although many academics viewed it as vastly expanding police 
powers.136 Most of the RCCP's suggestions were adopted, and they succeeded in ending the 
nation-wide variation in the power to stop and search for stolen goods. However, they failed 
to unify the stop and search powers (see tables at 3.4 below), and their suggested safeguard 
of informing the suspect of the reason for the search was not adopted until after the 
133 Sir C Philips, 'The RCCP' [3.51]. 
134 Ibid [3.20-3.21]. The dissenters were Jack Jones, former General Secretary of the 
transport and General Workers Union and Canon Wilfred Wood, a 'Black' magistrate 
(Zander, M, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1995) 
4. 
13S Sir C Philips, 'The RCCP' [3.25-3.26]. Similarly the earlier Baron J Hunt, Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland (Cmd 535, 1969) failed to define what 
constituted reasonable suspicion for a stop. For a concurring contemporary argument that it 
is futile to attempt to define 'reasonable suspicion' see Wilding, B, 'Tipping the scales of 
justice? A review of the impact of PACE on the police, due process and the search for truth, 
1984-2006' in E Cape and R Young (eds) Regulating policing: the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act J 984: Past, present and future (Hart, Oxford 2008) 45. 
136 Zander, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 xiii. C. f Dixon, D, 'Authorize and 
regulate: a comparative perspective on the rise and fall of a regulatory strategy' in E Cape 
and R Young (eds) Regulating policing: the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Past, 
present andfuture (Hart, Oxford 2008) 1. See also: Reiner 'A watershed in policing'. 
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Macpherson Report, discussed below. The majority's faith in reasonable suspicion and the 
accompanying safeguards in guarding against discrimination also proved to be misplaced. 
Under PACE, section 1 the police have the power to search persons or vehicles for stolen 
items or prohibited articles. The latter are defined as offensive weapons,m fireworks held in 
contravention of the Fireworks Act 2003 or any articles for use in the course of or in 
connection with the offence of burglary, theft - including that of a vehicle or other 
conveyance - or fraud. 138 In order to combat 'perceived risks of anti-social behaviour in the 
form of criminal damage', the Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 1 added to the prohibited 
articles under PACE section I any article made or adapted for use in criminal damage or 
intended by the person who has the article for use for criminal damage,tJ9 However, neither 
threatening nor going equipped for criminal damage were added.140 
The key safeguards in relation to section 1 are the requirement of reasonable suspicion, 
PACE, Code A, discussed below, and PACE, sections 2 - 3. Section 2 applies to stop and 
searches, not to stops alone. Section 2(2) and section 2(3) requires officers to identify 
themselves, with documentary evidence if not in uniform, give their names and the name of 
their station,141 the object of the search and their grounds for carrying it out. If this 
information is not given evidence procured in the course of the search may be excluded.142 
This is illustrated by the case of 0 (a juvenile) v DPP, where 0 successfully appealed 
137 The Criminal Justice Act (1988), section 140 expanded the definition of 'offensive 
weapon' to include any article with a blade or point in public, except for a folding 
pocketknife with a blade of less than 3 inches. It is an offence to carry such an article unless 
the person can provide a good reason or lawful authority (Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 
139). 
138 Inserted by the Fraud Act (2006), schedule 1 [21]. 
139 Qureshi, F, 'The Impact of Extended Police Stop and Search Powers under the UK 
Criminal Justice Act 2003' (2007) 30 Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies 
and Management 466, 467. See also: Qureshi, F and Farrell, G, 'Stop and Search in 2004: A 
Survey of Police Officers Views and Experiences' (2006) 8 International Journal of Police 
Science and Management 83 c.f. Taylor, R, Wasik, M and Leng, R, Blackstone's guide to the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (OUP, Oxford 2004) 2. 
140 PACE, sections 7-8 (inserted by the Criminal Justice Act (2003), section 1). 
141 This is not applicable to TACT, section 44. See Chapter 5.2.1. 
142 Rv Fennelley [1989] Crim L.R. 142. 
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against a verdict of assaulting police officers in the execution of their duty on the basis that 
the search was unlawful as the officers failed to identify themselves or their station. 143 All 
searches must be recorded, detailing the name of the officer involved, the person searched (if 
known), the grounds for and object(s) of the search, the date, time and place it occurred, 
what, if anything, was found and any damage that occurred in the course of the search. l44 
This must be done on the spot or as soon as practicable.14s 
The regulations in PACE Code A govern all stop and search powers, not just those under 
PACE, albeit with some variation for TACT, sections 43 and 44. They have undergone over 
twenty revisions to date. One significant change concerned 'voluntary' stops and searches, 
carried out without recourse to statutory power and therefore outside the PACE Code 
safeguards. Policing by consent is desirable, but a difficulty arises in defining the level of 
consent required. While the relationship between the police and suspect in a consensual stop 
and search is technically one of two (or more) 'private citizens', the lack of knowledge and 
power on the part of the person stopped, combined with the police reluctance to provide 
information and their tendency to 'bamboozle' the suspect means that 'consent' in this context 
is a very relative concept that 'frequently consists of acquiescence based on ignorance' 
against a background of 'contextual irrelevance of rights and legal provisions'. 146 After 
'voluntary' stops were highlighted as problematic by research carried out in the late 1980s 
Code A was amended to prohibit stop/search by consent for juveniles,147 persons suffering 
from a mental disability or persons who in some way seem incapable of giving informed 
consent.148 Since 2003, strongly influenced by the Macpherson Report, it is no longer 
143 (1999) 163 IP. 725. See also R v Bristol (Christopher) [2007] EWCA Crim 3214. 
144 Section 3. 
145 Section 3(2). 
146 Dixon, D, Coleman, D and Bottomley, K, 'Consent and the legal regulation of policing' 
(1990) Journal of Law and Society 345, 346-348. 
141 Dixon, 'Authorize and regulate: a comparative perspective on the rise and fall of a 
regulatory strategy' 2; Zander, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; Dixon, Coleman 
and Bottomley 'Consent and the legal regulation of policing', 347-52. 
148 Code A, 15[IE] as inserted by Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of 
Practice) (No. 2) Order 1990, SI 1990/2580. 
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possible to stop and search with consent, save for searches of persons entering sports 
grounds or other premises where consent is given as a condition of entry. 149 
In Code A reasonable suspicion, 'in contrast to mere suspicion, must be founded on fact' and 
be objective. lso Annex B of Code A originally stated that reasonable suspicion for the 
purpose of stop and search 'is no less than the degree or level of suspicion required to effect 
an arrest without warrant'.15I This was viewed as contradictory and confusing: if the officer 
had a sufficient level of suspicion to arrest the suspect then why not avail of this option and 
search the suspect at the police station?IS2 However, it reflected the divide between the 
authority of the police, limited to investigation up to the point where sufficient evidence was 
obtained for an arrest, and that of the court, which controls all investigation occurring 
thereafter, including, traditionally, all questioning. ls3 This section was removed in the 1991 
Code. 
The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 expanded the definition of 'reasonable 
suspicion' in Code A. Personal factors alone, such as 'a person's colour, age, hairstyle or 
manner of dress' or previous convictions, cannot be used alone or in conjunction as the basis 
for a stop or to stop and search without supporting intelligence or information nor can 
stereotypes relating to the criminal propensity of persons or groups, although gang insignia 
can provide reasonable suspicion if there is reliable intelligence that the gang habitually 
carry drugs or knives. ls4 
Despite Code A, reasonable suspicion remains a slippery concept and one that is subject to 
substantial variations of interpretation, largely because it involves multiple layers of 
149 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Statutory Powers of Stop 
and Search) Order 2002, SI 2002/3075. See now PACE, Code A [1.5]. 
ISO Code A [2.2]. 
151 Code A, Annex B [4]. 
152 Wilding, 'Tipping the scales of justice? A review of the impact of PACE on the police, 
due process and the search for truth, 1984-2006' 45. 
153 Walker, C, 'Post-charge questioning of suspects' [2008] CrimLR 509. 
154 Code A [2.2, 2.6]. 
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discretion.155 First, the officer's discretion as to whether given facts amount to reasonable 
suspicion; second, the discretion whether to proceed against the person or not, given 
reasonable suspicion; and, third, the discretion afforded by broad definitions of the base 
crime to which PACE, section 1 refers. 156 Criminal damage provides an example of this 
final discretion, the definition of which ranges from soiling something in a non-permanent 
manner so that it requires cleaning,157 through unlawfully altering data on a computer,158 to 
writing graffiti on pavements or walls.159 Research consistently finds that factors are taken 
into account that ought to be superfluous according to the Codes, such as whether the person 
cooperates, whether they are known to the police, or are members of a given class that is 
viewed as having a high proportion of criminal involvement. 160 
The exercise of these discretions are further complicated by the fact that stop and search is 
part of street policing, which is of 'low visibility', typically characterised by a high level of 
discretion and low levels of accountability, beyond the review of supervisors where the 
'norms and practices of the street level police officer take priority over outside 
regulation' .161 The final factors in the mix are the under-reporting of stops 162 and the use of 
stop and search processes as an informal summary justice whereby 'the process becomes the 
155 N Bland et al., 'Upping the PACE? An evaluation of the recommendations of the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry on stops and searches'. 
156 For a discussion of the first two limbs of discretion see: WilIiams and Ryan 'Police 
Discretion'. 
157 Roe v Kingerlee [1986] CrimLR 735. 
158 R v Whitely [1991] CrAppR 25. 
159 Hardman v CC of Avon and Somerset [1986] CrimLR 330. 
160 Bottomley, K, The impace of PACE: policing in a northernforce (Centre for 
Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of I lull, Hull 1991); Brown, D, 'PACE ten 
years on: a review of the research' (Home Office (J IORS 155), London 1997) 16. 
161 Sanders, A and Young, R, 'Police powers' in T Newbum (ed) Handbook of policing 
(WilIan, Cullompton 2003) 229; Young, J, Policing the streets: stops and search in North 
London (Centre for Criminology, Middlesex 1994) 14. 
162 This has been attested since at least the RCCP, see above, through the 1990s, sce, for 
example, Skogan, W, 'Contacts between police and public: findings from the 1992 British 
Crime Survey' (Home Office (HORS 134), London 1994) through to today, see, for 
example, R v DPP (Ex p. Kebelene). 
74 
punishment'. 163 Critics have argued that stop and search cannot be controlled legally 
because, while these discretions pennit excessive leeway, they are nonetheless integral to the 
functioning of the police. l64 The post-Macpherson 'dip' in stops and searches (discussed 
below) and the corresponding rise in arrest rates, especially within the MPS, suggests that 
the problem is not wholly intractable, although how much of the 'dip' was due to under-
. f d h' I 165 reportmg 0 stops an searc es IS unc car. 
3.2.3) The Macpherson Report 
The Macpherson Report into the Stephen Lawrence murder inquiry was deeply critical of 
stop and search powers, which were identified as one of four factors indicating the existence 
of institutional racism within the MPS. 166 Institutional racism, discussed further in Chapter 
6.2, was defined by Macpherson as 
'the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional 
service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or 
detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination 
through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping 
which disadvantage minority ethnic people' .167 
Macpherson found that stop and search was an 'area of complaint which was univcrsal'.168 
This criticism rested predominantly upon the disproportionate numbers of ethnic minorities 
against whom stop and search was used.169 
Macpherson's main recommendation in relation to stop and search was that all encounters, 
163 Young, R, 'Street Policing after PACE' in E Cape and R Young (cds) Regulating 
policing: the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Past, present and/uture (IIart, Oxford 
2008) 151. 
164 Smith, 0 and Gray, J, Police and people in London: the PSI Report (Gower, Aldershot 
1985). 
16S A Sanders and R Young 'Police Powers' 237. On the under-recording of stop and 
searches during the pilot study see: N Bland et al., 'Upping the PACE?' 32-7. 
166 Sir W Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Cm 4262, 1999) [6.45]. 
167 ibid [6.34]. 
168 ibid [6.45], [45.8]. 
169 ibid [45.8-45.10]. 
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including 'voluntary' ones, be recorded. 170 The record was to include the reason for the stop, 
the outcome and the self-defined ethnic identity of the person stopped. 171 A series of pilot 
schemes were subsequently run by the Home Office alongside research into the use of stop 
and search and views of the public on it. l72 The outcome of these studies were mixed, with 
Bland et a1. suggesting that while the recording might have a 'symbolic value' it did not 
significantly improve the recording of searches, while Stone and Pettigrew recorded mixed 
views among the communities to the new form. 173 Despite the equivocal tone of the reports, 
PACE was amended in 2004 to require that stop and search forms be completed for all stops 
and searches, although not stop and account encounters. 174 
Figure 3.1 below highlights the 'Macpherson dip', whereby the number of stops and 
searches under PACE reduced significantly after the publication of the Macpherson Report. 
However, the resumption of the upward trend in overall stops and searches is also evident. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 reveal the continuing discrepancy in terms of ethnic minorities stopped 
relative to 1,000 of the population, with Black persons being substantially more likely to be 
stopped than any other ethnic group, followed by Asians and finally Whites. Again, the 
'Macpherson dip' is notable. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the percentage of stops which end in 
arrest. The overall total is low, currently around 10% for England and Wales and slightly 
lowcr for the MPS. It has been falling since 2001102. The most notable discrepancy in 
terms of ethnicity relates to Asians who are less likely to be arrested following a stop and 
search since 2001/02. Black people are also slightly less likely to be arrested across England 
and Wales, although the difference is negligible for the MPS. 
170 ibid Recommendation 61. See Appendix A for an example ofa stop and search form 
used in the pilot study. 
171 ibid. 
172 N Bland, J Miller and P Quinton 'The impact of stops and searches on crime and the 
community' (Home Office (PRS 127) London 2000); N Bland et al., 'Upping the PACE?'; 
V Stone and N Pettigrew 'The views of the public on stops and searches'; P Quinton, N 
Bland and J Miller 'Police stops, decision making and practice'; Miller 'Profiling 
populations available for stop and searches'; N Bland, J Miller and P Quinton 'Managing the 
impact of searches: a review of force interventions' (llome Office (PRS 132) London 2000). 
173 N Bland et al., 'Upping the PACE?'; V Stone and N Pettigrew 'The views of the public 
on stops and searches'. 
174 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) Order 2004, SI 2004/1887. 
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Figure 3.1: Stop and searches under PACE, section 1 and other powers: England and 
Wales and the MPS,175 1997/98 - 2008/09 
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Figure 3.2: Stop and searches under PACE, section 1 and other powers, per 1000 
population, by self-defined ethnicity: England and Wales 1997/98 - 2008/09 171\ 
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175 Thi s includes all other stop and search powers except JPO, secti on 60 and TACT, 
section 44. Source: Ministry of Justice, 'S tati stics on Race and the riminal Justice System -
2008/09'; Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the riminal Justice System - 2007/08'; 
Ministry of Justice, 'Stati sti cs on Race and the riminal Justice System 2006/07' ; Mini stry of 
Justice, 'Stati stics on Race and the Criminal Justi ce System - 2006'; Home Offi ce, 'Statistics 
on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2005'; Home Office, 'Statistics on Race and the 
Criminal Justice System - 2004'; Home Offi ce, 'Stati sti cs on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System - 2003'; Home Offi ce, 'Stati sti cs on Raee and the Criminal Justice System: 2002'; 
Home Office 'S tati stics on Race and the Criminal Ju tice Sy tem: 1999/00' (Home Office, 
London 200 I); Home Office 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice ystem: 1999' 
(Home Office , London 2000); I-Iome Office 'Stati stics on Race and the riminal Justice 
System: 1998' (Home Office , London 1999). 
176 Note that a 'Mixed' was added to the 2008/09 statistics, whi ch may explain the dip in the 
'Other' category for that year (See: Ministry of Justice, 'S tati stics on Race and the Criminal 
Justice System - 2008/09' Table 3.02b). 
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Figure 3.3: Stop and searches under PACE, section I and other powers, per 1000 
population, by self-defined ethnicity: MPS, 1997/98 - 2007/08 177 
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of stop and searches under PACE, section I resulting in an 
178 
arrest: England and Wales 
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177 No breakdown for the MPS is provided in the 2008/09 statistics (Sce: ibid Table 3.02b). 
178 Source: ibid. 
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of stop and searches under PACE, section 1 resulting in an 
arrest: MPSI7,) 
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3.2.4) PACE since the Macpherson Report 
Despite Macpherson 's waming that ' it is pointless for the poliee servIce to justify the 
di spari ty in these figures', the debates around di scrimination attempt just that, including 
efforts to counter conclusions of di scrimination on the bas is of the 'ava il able population' 
h · d h ' , 180 t eSls an t e outcome test . These approaches seek to justify apparent statistical 
di scrimination on the bas is of the difference between the population 'available' to the police 
at the time of the stop compared with the ' resident ' population against whom the stati stics 
are ordinarily judged or on the bas is that the ' hit rate', that is, the number of searehes that 
lead to an arrest, is comparable across ethnicities. These approaches have in tum been 
criticised, with commentators suggesting that the avail able statistics fail to capture fully the 
di scrimination imposed by the exerci se of stop and search, pointing to the fact that national 
statistics do not di stinguish multiple stops of one person, nor do they indicate the numbers 
searched after a stop - indeed, the quantity of 'stops' is notoriously difficult to ascerta in, 
though research in the 1990s suggested that ethni c minorities were di sproportionately 
179 Source: ibid. 
180 C.f. Sir W Macpherson, 'The Macpherson Report' [45.10]. 
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targeted. l8I The merit of these theses is assessed in Chapter 6. What is clear, however, is 
that the perception of discrimination among those stopped and search has alienated them 
from the police, reduced trust and increased feelings of antagonism. 182 
In terms of discretion, the most significant development since Macpherson has been the 
move by successive Governments, and some academics, towards the view that policing in 
general is over-burdened by bureaucracy and that stop and search is prime example of 
this. 183 Wilding, then Chief Constable of South Wales, argued that Code A creates 'a hugely 
bureaucratic process almost designed to deter police from using the stop account/stop search 
power at all,:84 Referring to the period after the Macpherson Report, she stated that 
'[a]lmost overnight stop and search practically ceased, we lost the streets and crime shot 
Up,.185 The Flanagan Report advocated replacing the current 'stop and account' forms with a 
receipt, such as a business card, combined with the recording of the event on 'Airwave', the 
intra-police radio communications systems, that was to be 'dip-sampled' by supervisors.186 
This was implemented on a trial basis and then rolled out nationally.187 The Home 
Secretary, Teresa May, told the Police Federation in the summer of 2010 that she would 
scrap 'stop forms' and 'reduce the burden of 'stop and search' procedures' .188 This reflects, 
in part, the societal movement from an individual-focused liberal democracy, with its 
181 Bland, N, Miller, J and Quinton, P, 'The impact of stops and searches on crime and the 
community' (Home Office (PRS 127), London 2000) 46-7. 
182 Skogan 'Contacts between police and public: findings from the 1992 British Crime 
Survey' 251, Waddington, Policing citizens: authority and rights 892. 
183 Home Office, 'Rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour of the law-abiding 
majority'; Home Office 'PACE Review: Summary of responses to the public consultation on 
the Review of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984' (Policing and Protection Unit, 
London 2010); Home Office, Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting police and the 
people (Cm 7925, 2010). See also: Cape, E and Young, R, Regulating policing: the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Past, present andfuture (Hart, Oxford 2008). 
184 Wilding, 'Tipping the scales of justice? A review of the impact of PACE on the police, 
due process and the search for truth, 1984-2006' 48-9. 
185 ibid. 
186 Sir R Flanagan 'Independent Review of Policing' (Home Office, London 2008) 
Recommendation 24. 
187 PACE, Code A, paragraphs 4.12 - 4.12A. 
188 May, T 'Speech to the Police Federation' (Police Federation, Bournemouth, 19 May 2010) 
80 
emphasis on rights and safeguards, towards a risk society with its acceptance of crime as 
normal and with a focus on pre-emption.189 
3.3) Non-PACE stop and search powers 
This section will analyse the powers to stop and search which are not found in PACE. 
3.3.1) Public order 
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, section 60 is the only non-counter-terrorist 
power that permits stop and search without any requirement of reasonable suspicion. 190 It is 
similar to TACT, section 44 in so far as it applies in a geographical area following an 
authorisation.191 Initially an officer of the rank of superintendent or higher had to make the 
authorisation, with an inspector or chief inspector permitted to give the authorisation if he 
believed violence to be imminent and no superintendent was available. 192 The Knives Act 
1997, section 8(2) amended this so that an inspector could give the authorisation, although 
he must tell an officer of the rank of superintendent or above as soon as practicable. 193 This 
change was justified on the basis of operational necessity, the superintendents being 
involved more at divisional rather than operational level. 194 The authorisation must be given 
in writing, as soon as practicable, specifying the grounds on which it was given. 195 The 
period authorised should be no longer than necessary to prevent incidents of serious violence 
up to a maximum of twenty-four hours. 196 If the officer who gave the authorisation or a 
chief inspector reasonably believes it to be expedient the authorisation may be extended by a 
189 Dixon, 'Authorize and regulate: a comparative perspective on the rise and fall of a 
regulatory strategy' 11-13. 
190 The Serious Crime Act 2007, sections 87 amends section 60. 
191 See TACT sections 44-6. 
192 CJPO, section 60(2). 
193 Section 60( 1), (3A). 
194 Jason-Lloyd, L, 'Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: Its 
Current Pro visions and Future Changes' (1998) 162 Justice of the Peace 837. 
19S CJPO, sections 60(5)-(6),(9). 
196 CJPO, sections 60(1), (4). Initially they could be extended by only six hours (amended 
by Knives Act 1997, section 8(4)(c». 
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further twenty-four hours. 197 
Initially the trigger for authorisation was the reasonable belief that serious violence may 
occur in the locality.198 The Knives Act 1997, section 8(2) substantially extended this to 
include the reasonable belief 'that persons are carrying dangerous instruments or offensive 
weapons in any locality in his police area without good reason',199 to facilitate dealing with 
persons carrying offensive weapons who were planning violence in a different police area, 
for instance football hooligans en route to a mateh.20o The grounds were further extended by 
section 87( 1) to include the reasonable belief that an incident involving serious violence has 
occurred in the police area and that a dangerous instrument or offensive weapon used in the 
incident is being carried in the police area and that it is expedient to give an authorisation in 
order to find the weapon?OI This is repetitious: such conduct would come already within the 
grounds of section 60( 1 )(b). It is also questionable whether the use of stop and search 
without reasonable suspicion should be permitted to search for weapons or instruments used 
in a violent crime. This moves away from the pre-emptive motivations evident initially in 
section 60 which are at least rationally linked to the justification for no reasonable suspicion: 
there is a likelihood of serious violence in an area but the police are uncertain of where it 
will come from so the risk is moved from people to the location. 
Following authorisation uniformed officers may stop and search any persons or vehicles for 
offensive weapons.202 They may remove any item believed to be worn wholly or partially to 
conceal the person's identity.203 This targets persons who seek to conceal their identity from 
CCTV cameras and the like. Failure to stop or remove an item that is worn is an offence 
197 CJPO, section 60(3). 
198 CJPO, section 60(1)(a). 
199 CJPO, section 60(l)(b). 
200 Jason-Lloyd 'Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: Its Current 
Pro visions and Future Changes', 837. 
201 CJPO, section 60(l)(aa). 
202 CJPO, section 60(4). 
203 CJPO, section 60( 4A), 60(5) (inserted by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, sections 
25(1)-(2». 
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punishable by up to one month imprisonment and/or a fine of up to £1,000.204 Searches 
under section 60 are governed by PACE, s2(2)(b) and (3).205 
There has been a development in the use of section 60 in the MPS where it has been used to 
target knife crime under Operations Blunt and Blunt II.206 There are mixed reports as to its 
efficiency. However, it is questionable whether section 60 is an appropriate power for 
Operations which originally started in 2004.207 The temporal limit to the authorisation 
suggests that this power was not envisaged as one which should be constantly renewed, even 
in specific areas, over such an extended period of time. As will be discussed in Chapter 4.1, 
the MPS's approach to section 44 is quite similar, with a rolling authorisation in place from 
2001 until 2009. 
Figure 3.6 below shows the total number of stops and searches carried out under section 60 
since 1998/99. These have increased rapidly since 2006/07. In 2008/09 there were 149,995 
section 60 stops, a 280% increase from 2007/08?08 In 2008/09 the MPS accounted for 76% 
of all section 60 stops while the MPS and Merseyside accounted for 91 % of the total. 209 As 
with the other stop and search powers, ethnic minorities are disproportionately targeted by 
section 60. This disproportionality has, in general, been increasing since the introduction of 
the power, as evidenced in Figures 3.7 and 3.8 below. Note that these Figures depict the 
total number of stops per ethnic group, rather than the number per 1,000 of the popUlation as 
given for PACE, section 1 above as this is how they are broken down in the 'Section 95' 
statistics. The MPS statistics reveal a notable spike in the numbers of ctlmic minorities 
stopped since 2007/08, with a 160% increase in the number of Asians stopped and a 169% 
204 CJPO, section 60(8). 
205 Osman v DPP (1999) 163 JP 725. 
206 Metropolitan Police Service MPS, 'We launch the next phase of Operation Blunt' (2006). 
207 ibid. 
208 Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2008/09' tables 
3.05b. 
209 ibid. 
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increase in the number of ' Black' persons stopped.2 lO Thi s is likely to co incide, at least in 
part, with Operation Blunt I and II . 
Figure 3.6: Number of stops and searches under section 60 : England and Wales and 
the MPS2 11 
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Figure 3.7: Number of stops and searches under section 60, broken down by ethnic 
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Figure 3.8: Stops and searches under section 60, breakdown by ethnic group: MPS2 13 
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Statewateh publi shed an analys is of stop and search under section 60 and sec tion 44, TACT, 
in which it concluded that some police fo rces 'arc recording "anti -terrori st" stops and 
searches of pedestrians and vehicles using the 94 Ac t' rather than TACT.214 ]t poin ted to the 
sharp increase in the number of section 60 stops since 200 I among fo rces who had a 
con'espondingly low number of section 44 stops, c iting stop and search sta ti sti cs for the West 
Midlands and Greater Manchester police fo rces, among others, as evidence of its 
conclusions. The number of section 60 stops carried out by the West Midlands police 
increased from 4,7 18 sec tion 60 stops in 200010 I to 19,036 in 2002/03, while it recorded 
only 36 section 44 stops in 2002/03. The Greater M anches ter police carried out 7,878 
section 60 stops in 2002/03 compared with 1,9 10 in 200010 I, and 509 section 44 stops in 
2002/03.215 It is not poss ible to conclude definiti vely that these forces were using section 60 
'in place o f' section 44 on the bas is of these stati sti cs alone. Moreover, the trend over the 
past seven years seems less anomalous than for the yea rs Sta tewateh foc used on, particularl y 
in relation to Grea ter Manchester, as shown in Figures 3. 10 and 3. 11 below. While both 
forces have particularl y high usages of section 60, which may justify concerns over the 
213 Source: see above, footnote 4 15. 
214 Statewatch, 'Anti -terrori st stops & searches target Muslim communities , but few arrests' 
(S tatewatch) <http ://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-23-uk-stop-and-search.pdf> accessed 
10 June 2009 . 
215 ibid. 
.. 
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usage of the power and walTant a detailed explanati on by the forces , it is simply not possible 
to assert on the mere bas is of the statistics that one power is being used in place of the other. 
If properly used, the powers speak to di ffe rent needs. For example, both citi es have a 
number of major football clubs, the poli cing of which , in certain circumstances, may warrant 
a section 60 authorisation, although it should be noted that section 44 authorisations have 
been given fo r football grounds in London?1 6 
Figure 3.9: West Midlands section 44 and section 60 totals217 
25,000 
20,000 
15,000 
10,000 
5,000 
o 
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218 Source: see above, footnote 415 . 
- Section 44 
- Section 60 
- Secti on 44 
- Section 60 
• 
86 
3.3.2) Breach of the peace 
The powers governing breach of the peace are a mixture of common law and statue which 
enable the police to take various actions, including the powers to stop, search and arrest to 
prevent a breach of the peace.2l9 They may intersect with other powers, such as a section 30 
dispersal order under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003.220 Breach of the peace was 
defined in Howell as 'an act done or threatened to be done which either actually harms a 
person, or in his presence his property, or is likely to cause such harm, or which puts 
someone in fear of such harm being done' ,221 although there is no requirement of a public 
element to the disturbance.m The ECtHR has held that 'breach of the peace' is sufficiently 
defined for the purposes of ECHR, Article 5(1)(c).223 
The House of Lords in R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary held 
that the breach of the peace must be imminent.224 This clarified the law, which had become 
somewhat muddied following a number of 'miners cases', in particular Moss v McLachlan, 
which seemed to indicate that imminence was not a requirement. 22S In Moss Justice Skinner 
argued that there was no difference between the requirement that the officer believes there is 
'a real, not a remote, possibility' of a breach of the peace and that the officer believes that a 
breach of the peace will occur in the 'immediate future' and that if there was a difference 
between the two the former was to be preferred. 226 Laporte also clarified that the Human 
Rights Act 1998 had introduced the 'constitutional shift' foreshadowed in Redmond-Bate v 
DPP,227 so that, in contrast to the previous law,m the right to freedom of speech and 
219 PACE, section 17(6); Card, R, Public order law (Jordans, Bristol 2000). 
220 Sce R (on the application of Sing h) v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2006] 1 
WLR3374. 
221 [1982] QB 416, 426. 
222 Bowling and Phillips, Racism. crime andjustice. 
223 Steel v United Kingdom. 
224 [2006] UKHL 55. 
225 [1985] IRLR 76. Moss was disapproved but not overruled by Laporte. 
226 Moss v McLachlan [1985] IRLR 76, 78-9. 
227 Redmond-Bate v DPP (1999) 163 JP 789. 
228 See, for example, Duncan v lanes [1936] 1 KB 218. 
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peaceful assembly were now recognised, although these may still be restricted if the activity 
is illegal or the conduct disturbs public order.229 There is a continuing willingness on the 
part of the court to accept the interpretation of the officer on the ground, as evident in Lord 
Rodger's speech.230 
3.3.3) Offensive weapons 
In addition to the power to search for offensive weapons in PACE, section 1 there are a 
number of statutes that permit stop and search for specific weapons. 
The Firearms Act 1968, section 47(3) provides that the police may stop and search anyone in 
a public place whom they reasonably believe to be have a firearm, with or without 
ammunition, or anyone elsewhere than a public place whom they reasonably suspect to be 
committing or about to commit an offence under sections 18(1), 18(2) or section 20. The 
offences under sections 18(1), 18(2) and 20 are: carrying a firearm (real or imitation) with 
criminal intent or trespassing with a (real or imitation) firearm. An offence will also be 
committed ifthe person does not hand over the firearm when required.23l As well, the police 
have the power to search any vehicle they reasonably suspect contains a firearm or will be 
used in connection with the commission of an offence under section 18( 1 )-(2) or section 
If the police reasonably suspect that a person under the age of eighteen, and not under the 
supervision of someone over twenty-one, has a crossbow capable of discharging a missile or 
parts of a crossbow which can be assembled to form a crossbow capable of discharging a 
missile they may stop and search that person or any vehicle they reasonably suspect to be 
229 [2006] UKHL 55 [34-37]; see also Chorherr v Austria (1993) 17 EHRR 358, 
app.no.1330S/87; Ezelin v France (1991) 14 E.H.R.R 362 app.no.11800/85. 
230 R (on the application of Laporte) v Chief Constable o/Gloucestershire Constabulary 
[2006] UKHL 55 [71]. See also Piddington v Bates [1961] 1 WLR 162. 
231 Section 47(2). The requirement to hand over the firearm is contained in section 47(1). 
232 Section 47(4). 
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connected with the offence.m Any article suspected of being a crossbow, or part of one, 
may be retained.234 This power applies in all areas except in a dwelling house.m 
The police may enter school premises and search any person on those premises for articles 
with a blade or point or any offensive weapon236 if they have reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that a person has such an article.237 Folding pocketknives with a blade of up to 
three inches are excluded from this power.238 It will be a defence for the person to have the 
article with a blade or point for the purposes of work, religious reasons or as part of a 
national costume.m Any person found guilty of having an article with a blade or point is 
liable upon summary conviction for up to six months imprisonment and/or a fine. 240 Any 
person found guilty of having an offensive weapon is liable upon conviction on indictment 
for up to four years imprisonment and/or a fine. 241 
The headmaster of a school or a member of staff authorised by the headmaster who has 
reasonable grounds for suspecting pupils have an article with a blade or point, any offensive 
weapon, alcohol, controlled drugs, stolen articles or articles of a kind specified by in 
regulations may search pupils and their possessions and seize any of the aforementioned 
items.242 The pupils and member of staff must be on school premises or somewhere the 
member of staff has lawful control over the pupils?43 There arc a number of safeguards on 
this power, reflecting the fact that it is not a member of the police who carries out the 
233 Crossbows Act 1987, section 4. 
234 Section 4(3). 
23S Section 4(4). 
236 Defined by the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, section I. 
237 Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 139B. 
238 Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 139(3). 
239 Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 139(5). 
240 Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 1398(5)(a). 
241 Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 1398(5)(b). 
242 Education Act 1996, section 550ZA, 550Z8 500ZC. 
243 Education Act 1996, section 550Z8(4). 
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search.244 A similar power is available to members of staff at further education institutions 
under the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, section 85AA and members of staff at 
attendance centres/45 under the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, section 47. The 
Education Bill 2010-2011 details some changes to these powers.246 
3.3.4) Miscellaneous statutes 
The police may search any person attending a designated sporting event whom they 
reasonably suspect to have a firework or flare, alcohol, be drunk, or be carrying a container 
for liquid which is capable of causing injury to another person.247 The power also extends to 
entering a public service vehicle or train when police reasonably suspect it is carrying 
passengers who have alcohol in their possession, are drunk or have permitted alcohol to be 
carried on the vehicle.248 An officer who reasonably suspects persons are consuming, or 
intend to consume alcohol in a designated public place may stop and search them for 
alcoho1.249 
There is a plethora of statutes which permit the poliee to stop and search for endangered or 
protected birds, animals, fauna or flora. These follow the format of permitting the police to 
stop and search persons or vehicles if they reasonably suspect an offence under the particular 
statute is being or is about to be eommitted.250 The relevant animals thus protected are: 
244 See Education Act 1996, section 550ZB(5)-(8). 
245 Defined by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 221 as 'a place at which offenders aged 
under 25 may be required to attend and be given under supervision appropriate occupation 
or instruction in pursuance of...relevant orders, or ... under section 60 of the Sentencing Act'. 
246 The Education Bill 2010-2011, sections 2-3. 
247 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985, sections 2, 2A, 7. 
248 'Public service vehicle' is defined by Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981, section 1 as a 
vehicle which carries passengers for hire or reward. Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol 
etc.) Act 1985, section 1. 
249 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, section 12. A designated public place is one so 
identified by a local authority in an order under section 13(2) of the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001. 
250 Deer Act 1991, section 12( 1), Marine (Scotland) Act 2010, section 126, Protection of 
Badgers Act 1992, section 11 (a), Poaching Prevention Act 1862, section 2, Wildlife and 
Countryside Act 1981, section 19. 
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deer/51 seals,252 badgers/53 game/54 and a variety of birds, plants and other animals under 
the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981.255 The offences include poaching/56 killing, 
including killing or taking off season,257 killing by a prohibited method/58 cruelty to the 
animal,259 interfering with habitats/6o and selling or buying live or dead animals or birds.261 
3.4) Summary of non-counter terrorist stop and search powers 
Below is a table detailing the non-counter terrorist stop and search powers currently in force, 
divided into those that require reasonable suspicion and those that do not.. 
Table 3.1: Non-counter terrorist stop and search powers which require reasonable 
suspicion 
Object of search Extent of Where Power 
search exercisable 
Stolen goods, articles for the use in 
certain Theft Act offences; 
PACE, section 
offensive weapons, including blades 
1 (as amended or sharply-pointed articles (except Persons and Where there is folding pocket knives with a bladed 
by CJA 2003, 
cutting edge not exceeding 3 vehicles public access 
section 1(2)) inches), articles for the use in the 
offence of criminal damage. 
251 Deer Act 1991. 
252 Marine (Scotland) Act 2010. 
253 Protection of Badgers Act 1992. 
254 Defined by the Poaching Prevention Act 1862, section 1 as: hares, pheasants or pheasants 
or their eggs, woodcocks, snipes, rabbits, grouse, black or moor game, or the eggs of grouse, 
black or moor game. Rabbits and hares also enjoy certain protections under the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act 1981, schedule 8. 
255 See Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, schedules 1 - 9 for the extensive lists of 
protected species. 
256 Deer Act 1991, section 1, Poaching Prevention Act 1862, section 1. 
257 Deer Act 1991, section 2; Conservation of Seals Act 1970, section 3; Protection of 
Badgers Act 1992, section 1, Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, section 1. 
258 Conservation of Seals Act 1970, section 1, Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, sections 
5, 11. 
259 Protection of Badgers Act 1992, section 2. 
260 Protection of Badgers Act 1992, seetion 3, Wildlife and Countryside Aet 1981, section 1. 
261 Protection of Badgers Act 1992, section 4, Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, section 6. 
91 
Object of search Extent of Where Power 
search exercisable 
A public place 
or anywhere in 
the case of 
reasonable 
suspicion of 
Firearms Act 
Persons and offences of 1968, Section Firearms 
vehicles carrying 47 firearms with 
criminal intent 
or trespassing 
with firearms 
Misuse of 
Drugs Act 
Controlled drugs Persons and Anywhere 1971, Section vehicle 
23 
Airport 
employees 
and vehicles 
carrying 
Aviation airport 
Security Act 
Stolen or unlawfully obtained goods employees or Any designated 1982, Section any vehicle airport 
27 (I) in a cargo 
area whether 
or not 
carrying an 
employee 
Sporting Designated 
sports grounds Events 
Persons, or coaches and (Control of 
Intoxicating liquor coaches and trains travelling Alcohol etc.) 
trains to or from a Act 1985, 
designated Section 7 
sporting event 
Crossbows Crossbows or parts of crossbows 
Persons and Anywhere Act 1987, (except crossbows with a draw 
Vehicles except Section 4 weight of less than l.4kgs) dwellings 
Public Stores 
Persons, Act 1875, 
vessels, boats Public places (c.25) section Stolen goods belonging to Her 
and vehicles 6 Majesty's Stores[2] 
The Vagrancy 
'Rogues and vagabonds' Persons and Public places Act 1824 vehicles 
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Object of search Extent of Where Power 
search exercisable 
Poaching 
Prevention Poached game, guns, nets or Persons and Highway, street 
Act 1862, engines. vehicles or public place 
section 2 
Evidence of an offence under the 
Wildlife and Act (killing, injuring or taking a 
Countryside wild bird or its eggs, or wild animal Persons and Anywhere 
listed in Schedule 5, mammal listed their except Act 1981, in Schedule 7, or plant listed in possessions dwellings 
section 19 Schedule 8) 
Customs and Goods: (a) on which duty has not 
Excise been paid; (b) being unlawfully 
Vehicles and Anywhere Management imported, exported or removed; (c) 
vessels except Act 1979, otherwise liable to forfeiture to dwellings 
s.163 HMS Customs and Excise 
Criminal 
Justice Act 
1988, section Offensive weapons, including blades School 
139B or sharply-pointed articles Persons premises 
Articles with a blade or point, any 
Education Act offensive weapon, alcohol, School 
1996, sections controlled drugs, stolen articles or Persons Prcmises262 
550ZA-550ZC articles of a kind specified by in 
regulations 
Anywhere 
Deer Act Evidence of an offence under the except 
1991, section Act Persons and dwellings 
12(1) vehicles 
Criminal 
Justice and Public service 
Police Act Passengers who are drunk, or have vehicles or 
2001, section alcohol in their possession, or have Persons trains 
12 permitted alcohol to be carried on 
board 
Protection of Anywhere 
Badgers Act Evidence of an offence under the Persons and except 
1992, section Act vehicles dwellings 
11 (a) 
262 Note this search must be carried out by a headmaster or authorised member of staff. 
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Table 3.2: Non-counter terrorist stop and search powers which do not require 
reasonable suspicion 
Criminal Offensive weapons or dangerous Persons and Anywhere within a 
Justice and instruments to prevent incidents of Vehicles locality authorised 
Public Order serious violence or to deal with the 
Act 1994, carrying of such items 
section 60 
3.5) Stop and Search under counter-terrorist legislation 
This section will detail the history of stop and search powers under 'emergency' legislation, 
relating to Northern Irish-related terrorism. This thesis is on the practice of TACT, section 
44 in England. However, it is necessary to consider the development of 'emergency' powers 
in Northern Ireland as these strongly influenced the shape that counter-terrorist powers took 
in England. 
The Northern Ireland situation made 'normal' policing, based on the 'citizen in uniform' 
model, impossible due to three key factors: first, the virtual non-existence of police-
community relations, primarily in relation to the nationalist community; second, the 
militarization of the police; and, third, the security situation. These will be explained and 
then the counter-terrorist powers to stop and search will be critically assessed. The security 
situation will be woven into the discussion of the first two factors and into the analysis of the 
powers. In the following the terms 'nationalist' and 'unionist' will be used to describe the 
minority and majority populations in Northern Ireland. The usage is not meant to imply two 
homogeneous communities but is simply short hand for ease of reference. Similarly, the 
terms 'republican' and 'loyalist' will be used to refer to the militant groups within each 
community, while again recognising the limitations of these terms. 
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3.5.1) Police and Community Relations in Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland came into being on the 7th December 1921 when the Northern Irish 
bicameral Parliament at Stormont seceded from the Free State under the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
1921, Article 11. The Stormont Government and the majority unionist community it 
represented faced opposition towards partition from the Free State, the Liberal Party and a 
substantial nationalist minority within their borders who aspired to a united Ircland.263 The 
nationalist community feared discrimination and were largely excluded from Government 
and public employment.264 
The fact that the vast majority of unionists were Protestant and the vast majority of 
nationalists were Catholic aggravated these political cleavages and contributed to the 
communities' separate identities. Given the fears of subversion and invasion on the onc side 
and of expulsion and persecution on the other, coupled with diametrically opposed political 
objectives - union or unity - it is not surprising that from its inception Northern Ireland was 
. d' . d I" I . I 265 mIre to sectanan an po Ittca VIO ence. 
The socio-political background of a divided society wherein State institutions lacked 
legitimacy in the eyes of the nationalist community made it almost inevitable that 
nationalist-police community relations would be contentious. Ilowever, the composition of 
the police forces, the fact that the Inspector-General (latter termed the Chief Constable) was 
accountable to the (Unionist) Minister for Home Affairs and the uneven application of the 
law ensured that the security forces were viewed with suspicion by members of the 
nationalist community. 
263 Ewing, K and Gearty, C, The struggle for civil liberties: political freedom and the rule of 
law in Britain, 1914-1945 (Clarendon, Oxford 2000) 370. For a general history of Northern 
Ireland see Hennessey, T, A history of Northern Ireland, 1920-1996 (Palgrave, Basingstoke 
1997). 
264 Whyte, J, 'How much discrimination was there under the unionist regime, 1921-68?' in T 
Gallagher and J O'Connell (eds) Contemporary Irish Studies (M UP, Manchester 1983). 
265 Buckland, P, Thefactory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland, 1921-
39 (Gill & Macmillan, Dublin 1979) 196. 
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In terms of composition, Catholics were initially meant to constitute one-third of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC).266 Their numbers peaked at between 19 and 21 per cent in 
1922-3/67 declining to 11 % by 1969 and 7% by the late 1980s.268 The 'Ulster Special 
Constabulary', an auxiliary force, were initially drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of 
the UVF - a loyalist paramilitary groups which sprang up in opposition to the Home Rule 
movement,269 and in 1969 were (still) drawn exclusively from the Protestant population.270 
The Ulster Special Constabulary, originally comprised the 'A', 'B' and 'C' 'Specials,.27I 
The 'A' and 'C' 'Specials' were disbanded in 1925.272 
Another source of friction with the nationalist eommunity was the uneven application 
emergency powers with, for example, the Special Powers Act 1922, discussed below, being 
enforced virtually exclusively against Catholics.273 This resulted in the RUC being 
perceived by nationalists as a partisan force who carried out the commands of their 
(Protestant) masters in Stormont. The application of, in particular, the Flags and Emblems 
Act 1954 and the Special Powers Act 1922, Regulation 3, which permitted the banning of 
266 Guclke, A, 'Policing in Northern Ireland' in B Hadfic\d (ed) Northern Ireland: politics 
and the constitution (OUP, Buckingham 1992) 95. 
267 GuC\ke gives a peak of 21.1 % in 1923 (ibid 95) while Farrell gives a peak of 19.2% in 
1923 (Farrell, M, Arming the Protestants: the formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary 
and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 1920-7 (Pluto Press, London 1983) 234}. 
268 Baron J Hunt, 'The Hunt Report' 29; Rydcr, C, The RUC 1922-2000: aforce under fire 
(Arrow, London 2000) 368. 
269 Ryder, The RUC 1922-2000: aforce under fire 39. See also: Farrcll, Arming the 
Protestants: the formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, 1920-71-54. 
270 Baron J Hunt, 'The Hunt Report' 40. 
271 For more see: Farrcll, Arming the Protestants: the formation of the Ulster Special 
Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1920-7. 
272 Buckland, Thefactory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland, 1921-39 
181. 
273 ibid 215-220. 
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processions and marches, was noted by some Republicans as a source of their 
. 274 
antagonIsm. 
The relationship between the nationalist community on the one hand and the RUC and the B 
Specials on the other was further aggravated by accusations of criminality, collusion and 
kill I·· 275 shoot-to- po lCles. The abolition of the 'Specials' was one of the civil rights 
movement's objectives from the start, although it was not until the violence of 1968 that 
reform of the RUC became an objective.276 The mistreatment of prisoners, both Republican 
and Loyalist, in particular in the 1970s, also reinforced communities' distrust of the 
1· 277 po Ice. 
Aggravating these factors was the perennially ineffective systems of accountability over the 
police which ensured that the suspicion with which the police were held by parts of the 
community festered, in turn lowering morale among the police.278 Initially, the Governor of 
Northern Ireland could remove or appoint any officer but the Inspector-General of the RUC 
had control over day-to-day operations and the issuance of regulations, subject to approval 
274 For example, Gerry Adams cited the riots subsequent to the removal of tricolour from 
Divis Street by the RUC as a catalyst in his politicalisation (Adams, G, The politics of Irish 
freedom (Brandon, Dingle 1986) 30-32). Boyle, K, lIadden, T and IIillyard, P, Law and 
state: the case of Northern Ireland (Robertson, London 1975) 29. 
275 Ryder, The RUC 1922-2000: aforce under jire55; Farrell, Arming the Protestants: the 
formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 1920-751-
2, 114. On collusion see: Judge Cory 'The Cory Collusion Inquiry: Lord Justice Gibson and 
Lady Gibson; Chief Superintendent Breen and Superintendent Buchanan; Billy Wright; 
Patrick Finucane; Rosemary Nelson and Robcrt Hamill' (HMSO, London 2003-04). On 
shoot-to-kill see Stalker, J, Ireland, 'Shoot to kill' and the 'Affair I (Penguin, J larmondsworth 
1988); Punch, M, Police corruption: deviance. accountability and reform in policing 
(Willan, Cullompton 2009) 143-9; Punch, M, Shoot to kill: Exploring police use offirearms 
(Policy Press, Bristol 2010). 
276 6'Dochartaigh, N, From civil rights to Armalites: Derry and the birth of the Irish 
Troubles (Pal grave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2005) 292; Lord Scarman, Violence and civil 
disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969: report of tribunal of inquiry (Cmd 566, 1972). 
277 On the mistreatment of prisoners see: Ireland v United Kingdom; Lord Parker, Report of 
the Committee of Privy Counsel/ors appointed to Consider Authorised Procedures for the 
Interrogation of Persons Suspected of Terrorism (Cmd 4901, 1972); Amnesty Intcrnational 
'Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Northern Ireland (28 November 1977 - 6 
December 1977)' (Amnesty, London 1978). 
278 Dickson, B, 'The police authority for Northern Ireland' (1988) 39 NILQ 277,277; 
Dickson, B, 'The Administration of Justice in Northern Ireland' (1986) 75 Studies: An Irish 
Quarterly Review 56, 59-60. 
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by the Minister for Home Affairs.279 The Hunt Report (1969), discussed further below, 
recognised the damaging impact of the lack of independent oversight over the police on 
community relations?80 Baron John Hunt recommended the creation of a Police Authority 
and that the RUC be subject to inspection by HMIC.281 This recommendation was 
implemented but the Police Authority for Northern Ireland failed to carve out a role for itself 
as an independent body providing effective oversight of the police, failing to 'acquire the 
respect any such body needs ifit is to be influential on the RUC' .282 
In addition, Hunt singled out changing the complaints procedure as the 'one essential 
condition to the improvement of relations between the R.U.C. and the publie,.283 At the time 
the complaints system consisted of the right of the Inspector-General, or any person 
nominated by the Minister for Home Affairs, to investigate any complaint against an officer. 
Hunt advocated the introduction of a system similar to that of Britain, a system, which as 
discussed in the first part of this Chapter, was itself flawed and subjected to strong criticism 
by Lord Scarman following the Brixton riots.284 It is telling that the Northern Irish system 
was reformed in 1970,285 reformed again in 1977,286 was criticised by the Bennett Inquiry in 
1979,287 reformed again in 1987,288 criticised by the lIaycs Report in 1997,289 bcfore the 
279 Constabulary Act 1922, section 1 (2). Dickson 'The police authority for Northern Ireland', 
277. 
280 Baron J Hunt, 'The Hunt Report' [84-86]. 
281 ibid [87-94]. 
282 Dickson 'The Administration of Justice in Northern Ireland' 59. Sec also: Smyth, J and 
Ellison, G, The crowned harp: policing in Northern Ireland (Pluto Press, London 2000). 
283 Baron J Hunt, 'The Hunt Report' [139-40]. 
284 Above Chapter 3.1.4. 
285 Police Act (NI) 1970. 
286 Police (NI) Order 1977, SI 1977/531. 
287 H.G. Bennett, QC, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation 
Procedures in Northern Ireland (Crnnd. 7497, 1979) [66]. 
288 Police (NI) Order 1987, SI 1987/938. See further Dickson 'The police authority for 
Northern Ireland', 277; CAJ, 'Complaints against the police: a working party report' (CAl, 
Belfast 1982); CAJ, 'Procedures for handling complaints against the police' (CAJ, Belfast 
1983); CAJ, 'Cause for Complaint: the system for dealing with complaints against the police 
in Northern Ireland' (CAJ, Belfast 1990); CAJ, 'A fresh look at complaints against the police' 
(CAJ, Belfast 1993). 
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entire force was overhauled in 2000 following the Patten Report.290 
A final point on community-police relations is to note the distinction betwecn 'ordinary' and 
public order and counter-terrorist policing. Surveys in 1987 and through the 1990s revcaled 
relatively high public satisfaction with the police in Northern Ireland.291 Indeed, the later 
surveys indicated a higher level of satisfaction than in Britain.292 Similarly, while there are 
differences between each community's trust in the police, indicatcd by thcir Willingness to 
report a crime, only 5% of Catholics (and 2% ofProtcstants) would not report a crime to the 
I· 293 po Ice. 
3.5.2) Northern Ireland: militarization 
Both the RUC and the 'Specials' were armed from the outset.294 The lattcr wcre essentially 
an armed militia raised to protect the interests of the Stormont Government which had no 
compctence over military matters. A 1922 memo to thc British Cabinct noted that the 
'Specials' had 'assumed the military functions spccifically reserved to the British 
govcrnment simply by calling their forces police'.29S This was in response to Unionist fears 
that the British army, undcr the control of, initially, Dublin Castle, and, latterly Westminster, 
289 Hayes, M, 'A police ombudsman for Northern Ireland?' (NIO, Belfast 1997). 
290 Police (NI) Act 2000; Pattcn, C, A new beginning: policing in Northern Ireland (I IMSO, 
London 1999). 
291 72% satisfaction with police performance was recorded in 1987 (Walker, C, 'Police and 
community in Northern Ireland' (1990) 40 NILQ 105, 106). 
292 25% satisfaction in Northcrn Ireland comparcd with 19% in Britain (Stringer, P and 
Robinson, G, Social attitudes in Northern Ireland: the second report 1991-1992 (Blackstaff 
Press, Belfast 1992)). See also Pattcn Chapter 3. 
293 Stringer and Robinson, Social altitudes in Northern Ireland: the second report 1991-
1992. 
294 Smyth and Ellison, The crowned harp: policing in Northern IrelandlO; Ryder, The RUC 
1922-2000: aforce under fire 39. 
295 Memo from Assistant Cabinet Secrctary cited in Farrell, Arming the Protestants: the 
formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1920-7, 
97-8. 
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would be withdrawn leaving them to fend for themselves against militants inside and outside 
their borders.296 
There was, in addition to the police forces, the British army which was occasionally called to 
assist in quelling serious disorder, for example in 1935 and 1957, before becoming a 
permanent fixture following their entry into Londonderry in August 1969?97 Their numbers 
peaked at 21,800 in 1972, gradually reducing to between 10,000 and 11,900 through the 
1980s?98 Several characteristics make the army ill-suited for extended civil duties: their 
aggressive training and lack of community policing experience made friction with the 
community almost inevitable and Walker has argued that their lack of experience in forensic 
evidence collection contributed to the introduction of intemment.299 Their presence also led 
to conflicts over jurisdiction between the police and the army especially over reluctance to 
share intelligence, although relationships improved rapidly under Sir John llermon, who 
became Chief Constable of the RUC in 1980.300 
In the light of their inability to control the escalating civil disorder a review of the Northern 
Irish police was carried out by the Hunt Committee in 1969.301 Hunt made a series of 
recommendations, most of which were implemented by the Joint Security Committee, 
comprising the NI Prime Minister and various colleagues, the army GOC, RUC Chief 
Constable and a number of civil servants.302 On the whole he ignored or refuted allegations 
of discrimination within the forces, although noting the large discrepancy in community 
296 ibid. 
297 O'Dochartaigh, From civil rights to Armalites: Derry and the birth of the Irish Troubles; 
Walker, C, 'The role and powers of the Army' in B lIadficld (ed) Northern Ireland: politics 
and the constitution (OUP, Oxford 1992). 
298 Walker, 'The role and powers of the Army' 112. 
299 ibid 112. 
300 Taylor, Provos: the IRA and Sinn Fein 129,255. 
301 Baron J Hunt, 'The Hunt Report'. 
302 Donohue, L, Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom. 1922-
2000 (Irish Academic Press, Dublin 2001) 117. 
100 
. . h fi 303 representatIOn In t e orces. Hunt focused on the need for 'normalisation' of the forces, 
moving them from a quasi-military footing to a civil onc, arguing that 'any police force, 
military in appearance and equipment, is less acceptable to minority and moderate opinion 
than if it is clearly civilian in character,.304 lie advocated a police force which served the 
community and was free from political influenee.30s This was to prove an impossible task 
and the RUC were destined to be one of the political footballs tossed between the various 
parties. The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 is a case in point: Article 7(c) called for reform of 
the RUC to make it more acceptable to the nationalist community while providing for input 
from the Irish Government, which was clearly at odds with RUC autonomy from political 
interference. 
Hunt's central recommendation was to remove all military duties from the RUC while 
abolishing the 'Specials', replacing them with the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), a new 
locally-raised regiment, which would form a reserve force for the army, under the command 
of General Officer Commanding - and Westminster - rather than the RUC and Stormont. 
The sole contribution towards State security by the police would be the gathering of 
intelligence and maintenance of the law.306 This recommendation was implemented by the 
Ulster Defence Regiment Act 1969. Hunt also recommended that the RUC be disarmed, 
with the exception of small calibre revolvers and rifles,307 which were to be kept 'under strict 
security conditions at selected police stations for issue as required,.308 This 
303 Baron J Hunt, 'The Hunt Report' 35. 
304 ibid 21. 
30S ibid 43. 
306 ibid 21. 
307 No larger than .38 mm revolvers or .303mm rifles. 
308 Baron J Hunt, 'The Hunt Report' 25. 
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recommendation, echoed within the RUC ranks, was implemented but was short_lived.309 
The RUC were rearmed in 1971 due to the on-going violence and a rise in RUC fatalities.3lo 
In 1976 the Ministerial working party paper, 'The Way Ahead', called for the normalisation 
of the criminal-justice system, advocating a policy of 'criminalization', 'normalisation' and 
'Ulsterization,.311 The policy, often termed simply 'Ulsterization', was implemented by a 
Joint Directive issued in 1977. 'Criminalization' referred to the policy of dc-politicising 
insurgent activity by treating political violence as a matter of law and order and included the 
removal of political status from prisoners. Ideologically this was an attempt to present 
Northern Ireland as a normal part of the UK and those who opposed its legitimacy as 
common criminals. It was a policy which would inevitably be opposed by violent 
Republicans who were never going to accept a designation of themselves as criminals. The 
policy led directly to the dirty protests and hunger strikes in 1980-1981, contributing to the 
rise of Sinn Fein as a political force. 312 'Normalisation' referred to the desire to 'normalise' 
the criminal-justice system, with a re-emphasis on criminal prosecutions. 'Ulsterization' 
denoted shifting the security burden from the British army to the Ulster security forces, both 
the RUC and UDR, which perforce involved the re-militarization of the RUC. Onc outcome 
was less British Army (excluding the UDR) deaths which reduced the political impact of the 
Troubles within Britain since most of the soldiers who had previously died had come from 
the mainland.313 Ulsterisation also led to an increase in the size of the RUC to a peak of 
8,259, with an average of just below 8,000 throughout the 1980s,314 while the UDR, full and 
309 Weitzer, R, 'Policing a divided society: obstacles to normalization in Northern Ireland' 
(1985) 33 Social Problems 41,49-55. 
310 Walker 'Police and community in Northern Ireland', 113. 
311 Ryder, The RUC 1922-2000: aforce under fire 140-142. 
312 Coogan, The IRA 486-512. 
313 On average 15 soldiers were killed each year between 1976 - 1986, compared with an 
average of 27 a year between 1969 - 1975 (McKittrick and others, Lost Lives: the stories of 
the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles table 1). 
314 Guclke, 'Policing in Northern Ireland' 99. 
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part-time, peaked at 6,531 in 1987 and averaged just over 3,000 between 1985 and 1994? I 5 
There is an evident tension between 'Ulsterization' on the one hand and Hunt's 
recommendations and 'normal' policing where the force is 'publicly acceptable, accountable, 
politically neutral, ethnically representative, impartial, demilitarized, committed to the use of 
minimum force, and primarily concerned with enforcing the ordinary criminal law' on the 
other.316 It is difficult to impose perceptions of normality when the police wear flak jackets, 
carry automatic guns, travel in armoured cars and routinely use CS gas and plastic bullets.317 
The shift of responsibility over security matters away from the army meant that through the 
mid-1980s the RUC dedicated about 80% of their time to 'security' tasks.3lS The number of 
RUC deaths also increased with 'Ulsterization', rising from 108 between 1969 and 1977 to 
144 between 1978 and 1987 before falling to 51 between 1988 and 2001.319 
3.5.3) The Special Powers Acts 
In response to the high level of violence,no the Stormont Government passed the Civil 
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (NI) (SPA) 1922, which, drawing heavily on the Defence 
of the Realm Act 1914,321 'became the cornerstone of Unionist security policy,.322 During 
the bill's passage Robert Megaw, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
stated: 'This is an exceptional time and requires exceptional measures. We may require 
stronger measures still' .323 The SPA sought to establish law and order, in contrast to the 
later acts which targeted terrorism specifically. It had a sunset clause of a year, subject to 
31S CAIN 'Strength (number) of RUC and, the UDR! RlR, 1985 to 2001-02' 
<eain.ulst.ac.uklnilsecurity/ni-sec-O I-police-strength.rtf.> accesscd May 1 2008. 
316 Weitzer 'Policing a divided society: obstacles to normalization in Northern Ireland' 41. 
317 Patten [9.1]. 
318 Weitzer 'Policing a divided society: obstacles to normalization in Northern Ireland' 48. 
319 McKittrick and others, Lost Lives: the stories of the men, women and children who died 
as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles, table 1. 
320 See above Chapter 3.5.1. 
321 Campbell, C, Emergency law in Ireland, 1918-1925 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994), 
Appendix 3. 
322 Donohue, Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom, 1922-
200016. 
323 HC Decs NI, 21 March 1922, Vol. n, col. 87. 
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renewal, which occurred annually until the introduction of the SPA 1928.324 The SPA 1928 
extended the 1922 Act by a further five years and was itself superseded by the SPA 1933, 
which made the 1922 Act permanent. The SPA 1922 remained in force until 1972. 
The SPA 1922 gave the Minister of Home Affairs, as the 'Civil Authority', virtual carte 
blanche.325 In addition to the powers within the Act, section 1(3) permitted him to vary, 
revoke or make further regulations 'for the preservation of peace and maintenance of order'. 
This was nominally subject to a veto by either house of Parliament, although in reality 
Stormont acted as a rubber stamp.326 The Minister was also permitted to delegate any or all 
of his powers to any officer of the police.327 The police powers were comprehensive and 
draconian. Particularly contentious were the powers to ban processions and public 
. 328 d h f' . 329 d' 330 D . h b d I demonstrations, an t e powers 0 proscrIption an mternment. esplte t e rea 11 
of the provisions there were few legal challenges, for two main reasons. First, the IRA, and 
other militant republicans, did not recognise the courts.331 Second, early judicial reactions 
seemed to confirm the minority's distrust in the legal system,332 for example, R (O'l/anIon) v 
Governor of Belfast Prison,333 condemned by Campbell as 'judicial abdication,.334 
324 Section 12. 
32S Section 1(2). 
326 Section 4. Ewing and Gearty, The struggle for civilliherties: political freedom and the 
rule of law in Britain, 1914-1945374; National Council for Civil Liberties 'Report ofa 
Commission of Enquiry Appointed to Examine The Purpose and Effect of the Civil 
Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922 and 1933' (NCCL, London 
1936). 
327 Section 2. 
328 Regulations 3 and 4 SPA 1922. 
329 Regulation 24 SPA 1922. 
330 Regulation 23 SPA 1922. 
331 Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard, Law and state: the case of Northern Ireland 7. 
332 For more on the judiciary and the Northern Ireland conflict see: ibid Chapter 2; 
Livingston, S, The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict' (1994) 57 MLR 333; 
Dickson, B, 'The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict - a sequel' (2006) 69 
MLR 383. 
333 [1922] 56 IL TR 170. 
334 Campbell, Emergency law in Ireland, 1918-1925337. 
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Under the SPA, regulation 3, the Civil Authority could make an order prohibiting or 
restricting in any area the carrying, having or keeping of arms, munitions, explosives or 
weapons or articles capable of being used as such?3S The Civil Authority could also 
prohibit or restrict the keeping, having or using, without a permit, cars, motorbikes or 
bicycles.336 A constable, soldier, the Civil Authority or anyone authorised by him in writing 
could stop and search any person suspected of carrying arms, munitions or explosives in 
contravention of such an order, or otherwise held unlawfully.337 Once the search power was 
triggered the constable, soldier, Civil Authority or authorised person could then seize not 
only the objects of the search but also any other item prohibited by the order or otherwise 
unlawfully.338 The regulation also gave a power to search premises or property where it was 
suspected that articles or objects were being held in contravention of an order or otherwise 
unlawfully.339 
The requirement of suspicion without more provides little protection against discriminatory 
application. It is subjective, merely requiring an honest and genuinely held suspicion, as 
opposed to the objective standard of 'reasonable suspicion'. The only additional procedural 
safeguard was that a soldier had to be on duty to exercise the power, although there is no 
corresponding requirement for a police constable. The power to stop and search in 
Regulation 3 is not limited to circumstances when an order has been issued under the 
Regulation; rather, it was exercisable in any circumstance where it was suspected that 
firearms etc. were being unlawfully held. Years later, the Newton Committee warned 
against this blending of legislation relating to 'ordinary' and 'emergency' powers,340 which 
carries the danger that extraordinary powers are 'ghosted' aboard emergency legislation 
without justification and that powers, justified by and for extraordinary circumstances, arc 
m Regulation 3, para. 3(1)(c)-(d). 
336 Regulation 3, para. 3(l)(e). 
337 Regulation 3, para. 3(b). 
338 Regulation 3, para. 3(c). 
339 Regulation 3, para. 3(a). 
340 Lord Newton, Anti-terrorism. crime and security Act 2001 Review: Report (lIC 2003, 
100) [11-15]. 
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used in 'ordinary' encounters. A similar decoupling is evident in Regulation 22a, under 
which it was a summary offence to refuse to answer 'reasonable' questions when stopped by 
a soldier on duty or a constable.341 However, there is no requirement of a connection 
between the questioning and a (suspected) offence under the Act, or even for a connection 
with some criminal offence. 
Regulation 21 permitted a constable to stop and search any vehicle travelling along any 
public road if he had 'reason to suspect' that it 'is being used for any purpose or in any way 
prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order, or otherwise unlawfully' 
and to seize the vehicle or anything found within it he suspected was being used for such a 
purpose.342 The potential breadth of activity for which the person searched may be 
suspected gives the police substantial lee-way, largely undermining any positive effect from 
the objective requirement of a 'reason to suspect'. Again, there is no requirement that the 
constable be on duty, or in uniform or produce any form of identification. Given the fact 
that, in particular, the 'Specials' gained their notoriety from criminal activities off-duty, a 
requirement that the officer be on duty and provide identification could have been a valuable 
safeguard. Although no statistics were kept on the usage of the SPA contemporary reports 
indicate that the search powers were among the most frequently exercised.343 
Its provisions aside, the fundamental problem with the SPAs was their application. The 
SPAs were 'rigorously enforced' against the nationalist minority, whereas 'in the case of 
Protestants and Unionists political considerations were allowed to operate and ministers 
were willing to use powers of discretion,.344 The disproportionate application of the SPAs 
led to a deepening sense of alienation amongst the minority community and contributed to 
341 Regulation 22a. 
342 Regulation 21. 
343 National Council for Civil Liberties, 'Report ofa Commission of Enquiry Appointed to 
Examine The Purpose and Effect of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern 
Ireland) 1922 and 1933' 27. 
344 Buckland, Thefactory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland. 1921-39 
219, see also generally 206-220; Ewing and Gearty, The struggle for civil liberties: political 
freedom and the rule of law in Britain. 1914-1945375. 
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the civil rights movement, which in 1968 demanded, inter alia, the repeal of the SPA.345 
The following year, the Hunt Report advocated the repeal of the SPA, noting that a 'number 
of police officers with first-hand experience of dealing with riots and extremists, told us that 
they considered that the powers given to them under the [SPA] Acts were unnecessary, and 
that the relationship between police and public would be improved if the Acts were 
repealed,.346 In April 1971 Gerry Fitt, the leader of the SDLP, warned that 'serious 
consequences' would follow if the powers continued to be used exclusively against Catholics 
in Belfast.347 As it transpired, both the SPA and Stormont's days were numbered. 
3.5.4) The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 
1972 marked a turning point in the history of Northern Ireland. It was to be the bloodiest 
year of the Troubles and signalled the first imposition of direct rule. The year began with 
the shooting dead of thirteen unarmed people by paratroopers during a civil rights march,348 
'none of whom was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury'. 349 This 'Bloody 
Sunday' led to 'increased nationalist resentment and hostility towards the Army and 
exacerbated the violent conflict of the years that followed' .350 There was also a rising tide 
of resentment and shock, both domestically and internationally, at the use of the 'five 
techniques' on detainees and prisoners.3SJ The SDLP had walked out of Stormont in 1971, 
depriving it, in Edward Heath's view, of 'any remaining legitimacy' and there was no 
34S NICRA "'We shall overcome" ... The history of the struggle for civil rights in Northern 
Ireland 1968-1978' (NICRA, Belfast 1978). 
346 Baron J Hunt, 'The Hunt Report' [35]. 
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351 See for example, the ECllR's ruling on the use of the '5 techniques' in Ireland v United 
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indication of any political rapprochement.352 On the 30th March 1972, in the face of 
escalating violence, Stonnont was suspended and direct rule imposed from Westminster in 
an attempt to enforce control over the security forces and progress the political situation.353 
The measure was intended to be temporary - lasting until a cross-community power-sharing 
executive could be devised, but was to endure, with brief interludes, until 1998. Direct rule 
proved to be no silver bullet and the violence continued to mount. In July, in what came to 
be known as 'Bloody Friday', the IRA set off 22 bombs in Belfast city centre over a period of 
45 minutes, killing 9 and injuring around 300.354 By the cnd of 1972 500 people had been 
killed and almost 5,000 injured by the 2,000 explosions and 10,000 shootings that had 
355 
occurred. 
Against this backdrop the British Government was unwilling to discard internment, 
introduced in August 1971, but ordered the Diplock Commission to inquire into 
I . 356 a ternattvcs. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) 1973 was 
introduced to codify, in the main, Diplock's recommendations. The repeal of the SPAs 
failed to placate the nationalist community, largely because the EPA was 'Special Powers re-
named,.357 The EPA introduced the 'Diplock courts',358 reversed the burden of proof 
regarding the admissibility of statements, continued the tradition of proscription,3S9 and, 
again, permitted the Secretary of State to make such regulations as he saw fit 'for promoting 
the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order,.36o Although nominally 
352 Quoted in McKittrick, D and Mc V ea, D, Making sense of the Troubles (B1ackstaff Press, 
Belfast 2000) 78. 
m ibid 78, 80. 
354 Coogan, The IRA 384. 
m ibid 78. 
356 Donohue, Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom. 1922-
2000122-3. 
357 Repealed by EPA 1973, section 31 (2). See ibid, Chapter 3. 
358 EPA1973, sections 2-7. 
359 EPA 1973, sections 19-23. 
360 This is a near carbon-copy of the SPA 1922, section 3. 
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temporary and subject to a yearly renewal clause,361 it remained in force, through several 
iterations, for almost three decades, until its repeal by TACT.362 Except where explicitly 
stated to the contrary, the following discussion will refer to the EPA 1978, as it is this statute 
that was the subject of the Baker and Colville Reports. The EPA 1978 re-enacted 
unmodified the powers to stop and search as found in the EP A 1973, with the exception of a 
cosmetic change combining the power to search for munitions and radio transmitters.363 
The EPA 1973 was the second specifically counter-terrorist legislation introduced in the UK, 
the first being the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939. The EPA 
defined 'terrorism' as 'the use of violence for political ends .. .includ[ing] any use of violence 
for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the pubic in fear,.364 Despite there 
being no offence of 'terrorism', it has been accepted as such by the ECtHR for the purposes 
of the ECHR, Article 5?65 A 'terrorist' is defined, in the EPA 1973, as 'a person who is or 
has been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in 
directing, organising or training persons for the purpose of terrorism,.366 These definitions 
remained static until TACT, section 1.367 The EPA definition is wider than TACT, section 
1, discussed in Chapter 1.3.2.1, in so far as it refers to 'violence' rather than 'serious 
violence'. It is narrower in so far as it requires the actual use of violence, or associated 
inchoate offences, rather than the 'threat' of violence. In terms of required 'motivation' for 
the act or threat of violence, TACT, section 1 casts the net wider by including, alongside the 
intimidation of the public, or a section thereof, which is very similar to the EPA's 
requirement of 'putting the public .. .in fear,' the intention to influence the government. 
361 Section 30. 
362 Schedule 16( 1), paragraph 1. 
363 EPA 1978, section 15. 
364 EPA 1973, section 28(1) (later EPA 1978, section 31). 
365 Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 539. 
366 EPA 1973, section 28(1). 
367 See: PTA 1974, section 9(1). 
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Despite these and other more minor differences, 'the changes in the 2000 Act to the terms of 
the definition are not tremendously significant' .368 
The police and army powers under the EPA were comprehensive, although fragmented 
across several sections, broadly divided according to the purpose of the search or arrest. 
Any power to search any person or enter and/or search premises or other place included the 
power to stop and search any vehicle or vessel or aircraft which was not airborne and search 
any container, which was be exercisable, if need bc, by force. 369 Section 18 empowered a 
constable or an on-duty member of the armed forces to stop and question any person to 
ascertain their identity, movements, or knowledge concerning recent incidents which killed, 
injured or endangered life. Failure to stop or answer to the best of their knowledge and 
ability any questions posed was a summary offence punishable by imprisonment for up to 
six months and/or a fine not exceeding £400.370 Despite the slight restriction on the nature 
of the questions that can be asked when compared to its forbearer, Regulation 22a SPA, the 
power is exceedingly broad.371 The lack of a requirement of suspicion, whether objective or 
subjective, gave an extraordinarily wide discretion to officers. There is, again, in this and in 
all the other sections discussed no requirement that the constable be on duty or in uniform. 
It is arguable that the section would today violate the right to liberty under Article 5( I) 
ECIIR, because of the coercive nature of the power and the absence of controlling 
. h bl" 372 reqUIrements, suc as reasona e suspIcion. 
Section 15 provided on-duty soldiers and the police with the power to stop and search any 
person in a public place with a view to ascertaining whether the person possessed any 
munitions or radio transmitters and to search a person in a private place who is suspected of 
having munitions or radio transmitters. Under section 16 all inspectors appointed under the 
368 Walker 'The legal definition of terrorism in United Kingdom law and beyond' 6. 
369 EPA 1973, sections 18(l )-(2), 18(5). 
370 EPA 1973, section 16(2). 
371 Walker, 'The role and powers of the Army' 120. 
372 Gillan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EIIRR 45 app.no.4158/05. See Chapter 5.4. 
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Explosives Act 1875, section 53 had the power to stop and search persons in a public place 
to ascertain whether they unlawfully had any explosives or explosive substances.373 The 
lack of a requirement of suspicion again affords officers nearly unfettered discretion in 
relation to searches in public places. This is acerbated by the fact that in the context of 
section 16 the Secretary of State could appoint anybody as inspector; the only requirement 
being that they were 'fit,.374 It seems unlikely, given the absence of any coercive penalties, 
that a routine stop and search under either section would pass the thrcshold from 'restriction 
of movement' to 'dcprivation of liberty' so as to engage ECIIR Article 5(1).375 
The police and on-duty members of the anned forces were empowered, under section 15( 1), 
to enter and search any premises, except dwelling-houses, to ascertain the unlawful presence 
of munitions.376 The absence of any suspicion afforded the police and army an unfettered 
discretion. Dwelling-houses where it was suspected that there were unlawful munitions 
could be searched only upon authorisation by a commissioned officer or RUC officer not 
below the rank of chief inspector.377 Soldiers and police also had powers to enter and search 
premises and places for the purpose of arrest. These sections were a development of 
Regulation 21 SPA, with greater breadth and specific reference to terrorism. The police 
could entcr and scarch any premises or other place for the purpose of arresting a suspected 
terrorist, under section 11(2), or a person suspected of committing or being about to commit 
a scheduled offence or an offence under the Act that was not scheduled, under section 13(2). 
The army's power was similar in relation to terrorist, explosives or firearms offences, 
requiring suspicion that the persons were terrorists or had or were about to commit an 
offence related to explosives or fireanns, and suspicion that they were on the premises or 
other place.378 In relation to all other offences, soldiers could only enter and search 
373 EPA 1973, section 14. 
374 Explosives Act 1875, section 53. 
m Gillan (EetIlR). These tenns are discussed in depth in Chapter 5.4.1. 
376 EPA, Section 13( I). 
377 EPA, Section 13(2). 
378 Section 14(3)(b). 
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premises or a place where the persons suspected of committing or being about to commit the 
offence actually were present.379 Again, the requirement for these powers was merely 
'suspicion', with no objective requirement of reasonableness. When arresting a terrorist an 
officer did not need to have a specific offence in mind, which commensurately broadened 
the power to search for a suspected terrorist.38o The armed forces' power to enter and search 
premises or any place with a view to arresting persons for any offence was eonsequently 
extremely broad. Using the army to assist the civilian security forces is a deviation from the 
norm; it cannot be proportionate that they then become involved in arresting persons for 
offences which are not directly linked to the emergency which justified their deployment. 
The first review of the EPA to address stop and search powers was carried out by Sir George 
Baker in 1984.381 Baker's major innovation was the recommendation that the requirement of 
'suspicion' for the purpose of arrest by the police, in sections 11 and 13, be raised to that of 
'reasonable suspicion' on the grounds that an objective standard was preferable and because 
the police used a constant standard of suspicion when dealing with all terrorist related 
offences.382 lie also recommended raising the standard in relation to the armed forces' 
power to search for the purpose of arresting suspected terrorists. 383 Baker strongly criticised 
the army's power to arrest for any offence, stating that it 'must be too wide' .384 lie 
recommended that it be amended to refer to 'any act of terrorism or violence or of rioting or 
an offence involving the use of an explosive, explosive substance or firearm, or of making or 
possessing a petrol bomb,.38s I1is discussion of the armed forces' powers highlighted the 
added difficulty in ensuring any meaningful curb on their discretion through legal rules. lie 
379 Section 14(3)(a). 
380 R v Officer in charge of Police office, Castlereagh, Belfast, ex parte Lynch [1980] NI 126. 
On a similar point, in relation to the SPAs see Re McEdu.ff[ 1972] NIl. 
381 Sir G Baker, Review of the operation of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1978 (Cmnd 9222,1984). 
382 ibid [280 - 283]. Implemented by the EPA 1987, section 6 and Schedule I, paragraph I. 
383 ibid [346]. 
384 EPA 1978, section 14 (formerly section 12, EPA 1978). 
38S Sir G Baker, 'The Baker Report' (349]. 
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conceded that raising the standard of suspicion to reasonable suspicion would probably 
make no difference in practice and noted that the GOe had argued against the change 
because of the 'enormous training difficulties' it would pose.386 Baker questioned whether 
soldiers could distinguish between a scheduled offence and non-scheduled offence under the 
Act.387 
Baker raised the level of suspicion in relation to searching dwelling houses for munitions to 
reasonable, but did not add any requirement of reasonableness to the power to search non-
dwelling houses, despite acknowledging it as a 'very widc and unfettercd power',388 In 
relation to the power to stop and question, Baker noted the tcnsion that its use, particularly 
by soldiers, caused in community relations, but argued that it could not 'in the prevailing 
circumstances in Northern Ireland be exercised only with reasonable causc' .389 Thereforc, 
although he criticised the vagueness of thc term 'recent', hc did not recommend any 
I . 390 a teratlOn. These recommendations were implemented by thc Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1987,391 which otherwisc updatcd rathcr than radically changed 
the powers of stop and search, inserting a reference to arresting a person under the PTA 
1984,392 and including scanning receivers alongside munitions and wireless receivers as 
b· f h 393 o ~ects 0 searc es. 
By thc timc of Viscount Colvillc's report on thc EPA, PACE had been implemented in 
Northern Ireland, with corresponding safeguards over policc stop and search powers,394 
Only onc, however, was extended to searches under thc EPA: if persons or vehicles arc 
386 ibid [346]. 
387 ibid [348], 
388 ibid [362, 363, 365]. 
389 ibid [384 - 390,393]. 
390 ibid [382-384]. 
391 Section 6; Schedule I, paragraphs 1-3, 
392 EPA 1987, section 6, 
393 EPA 1987, section 7. 
394 Thc Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, SI 1989/1341. 
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stopped with a view to searching them and it subsequently appears that a search is not 
required or is impractical then the search need not be carried OUt.395 This added little by way 
of oversight, merely extending to officers the option not to search. The duty of officers to 
make a record of each stop and search explicitly excluded the EPA powers.396 
Colville opened his Report by noting that '[a]part from the statistics, nothing much has 
changed' since the Baker Report six years previously.397 Three deficiencies were put to him 
by the security forces, of which two are relevant here.398 First, that soldiers in 'hot pursuit' 
usually lack the requisite authorisation by an RUC officer of the rank of chief inspector or 
above to search for munitions and transmitters in a dwelling house.399 Second, that the 
power under EPA 1978, section IS to search for munitions and transmitters would benefit 
from being widened to include, for example, documents and the like.4oo Colville rejected 
both requests, pointing in particular to the sensitivity of private documents as a reason to 
refuse expansion of section IS. lie questioned the difficultly in acquiring the requisite 
authorisation to search a dwelling house in practice, and the appropriateness of soldiers 
conducting 'impromptu' searches without authority and without police presence whose skills 
'were required' .401 He also predicted that civil actions would be brought in all but the most 
straightforward cases arising from issues over the definition of 'in hot pursuit' .402 
Colville rejected calls for the repeal of the EPA and reliance on PACE on the basis that 
soldiers would be able to act only as ordinary citizens, thus rendering 'the armed forces 
almost entirely impotent', noting that training police to fill the hiatus would be a lengthy 
395 The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, SI 1989/1341, section 
4(1). 
396 The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, SI 1989/1341, section 
S. 
397 Viscount Colville, Review of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts }978 and 
1987 (Cmd 1115, 1990)[2.1]. 
398 ibid [2.7]. 
399 ibid [2.7.1]. 
400 ibid [2.7.2]. 
401 ibid [2.9.1]. 
402 ibid [2.9.2]. 
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process.403 The on-going reliance on the army underlined the limitations of the Ulsterisaton 
policy, which specifically aimed to reduce the reliance on the army. It was, however, 
somewhat peculiar that a raft of measures, only some of which apply to the army, should 
have been retained simply because of the army's need. Could not a new bill have been 
drafted which provided exclusively for army powers to stop and search in Northern Ireland 
while 'normalising' police powers? This was never considered. Rather Colville argued that 
the focus should be on the exercise of the powers rather than the powers themselves.404 
Unfortunately he provided no recommendations on how this should be done and no 
additional safeguards were added to the Act. 
3.5.5) The Prevention of Terrorism Acts 
On the 21st of November 1974 bombs exploded in two public houses in Birmingham killing 
21 and injuring over 180 people.405 Eight days later, forty-two hours after the Bill was 
introduced, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) 1974 was 
passed through Parliament.406 This was the second piece of British legislation, not restricted 
to Northern Ireland, which sought to counter Northern-Ireland rclated violence, the first 
being the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, also passed through 
Parliament with exceptional speed in only two days.407 The 1939 Act was passed in 
response to the IRA's mainland campaign which it waged through 1939, in which there were 
127 terrorist incidents between January and July alone.408 The Act empowered the Secretary 
of State to make expUlsion and prohibition orders,409 and permitted extended pre-charge 
403 ibid [2.14]. 
404 ibid [2.16]. 
405 Lord Shackleton, Review of the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Acts 1974 and 1976 (Cmnd 7324, 1978). 
406 Hall, P, 'The Prevention of Terrorism Acts' in B Hadfield (ed) Northern Ireland: politics 
and the constitution (OUP, Buckingham 1992) 143-190. 
407 Donohue, Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom. 1922-
2000209. 
408 ibid 208. 
409 Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, section 1. 
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detention410 but contained no powers of stop and search, only search under warrant.411 It 
was subject to a two-year sunset clause but was renewed until 1953 and repealed in 1973.412 
The PTA 1974 covered the old ground ofproscription,413 exclusion orders,414 and extended 
pre-charge detention.41S The definition of 'terrorism' was the same as in the EPA.416 As 
indicated by its title, it was nominally 'Temporary', with a sunset clause of six months, yet 
remained in force, with amendments, until repealed by TACT. The power to stop and 
search, excluding that exercisable at borders, was contained in Schedule 3, paragraph 7, 
which empowered a constable to stop and search persons in any circumstances where they 
could exercise the power to arrest under section 7 so as to ascertain whether they had any 
documents or other articles which may constitute evidence that they were a person liable to 
arrest. Those circumstances were when a constable reasonably suspected the person to be 
subject to an exclusion order, guilty of an offence relating to proscription or exclusion 
orders, or concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.417 
The PTA uses the same language as EPA 1973, section 11 but relates the power to acts of 
terrorism rather than scheduled offences and is thus somewhat broader. In contrast, the 
reference to reasonable suspicion is a higher standard than the mere suspicion required 
initially under the EPA 1973 and 1978. It was, as noted by Donohue, on the whole neither 
'new [nJor innovative,.418 The subsequent embodiment, the PTA 1976, largely mirrored the 
previous Act except for a minor change in the arrest powers which were extended to cover a 
410 Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, section 4. 
411 Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, section 4(3)-(4). For more on 
the provisions in this act and its exercise see Donohue, Counter-terrorist law and emergency 
powers in the United Kingdom. 1922-2000208-216. 
412 ibid 216. 
413 PTA 1974, sections 1-2. 
414 PTA 1974, sections 3-6. 
415 PTA 1974, section 7. 
416 PTA 1974, section 9( 1). 
417 PTA 1974, section 7. 
418 Donohue, Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom. 1922-
2000225. 
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person 'who is or has been concerned' in the preparation, instigation or commission of acts of 
terrorism as opposed to 'a person concerned' in the commission etc.419 
Lord Shackleton headed the first review of the PTAs 1974 and 1976.420 There was no 
specific reference to stop and search powers, the focus in terms of police powers being on 
arrest and detention under section 12, specifically the absence of a requirement that the 
officer have a particular offence in mind, and seven day pre-charge detention.421 The 
subsequent inquiry was carried out by Earl Jellicoe in 1983.422 lIe again focused on pre-
charge detention under section 12 and made no reference to powers of stop and search. 
Jellicoe's recommendation that 'Temporary', which 'rings increasingly hollow', be removed 
from the title was not implemented when the next iteration, the PTA 1984 was passed.423 
The PTA 1984 again provided the power to search without warrant in circumstances where 
the constable could arrest a person under section 12 of the Act.424 It also introduced another 
of JeUicoe's recommendations: that the power of arrest under section 12 be limited to acts of 
terrorism 'connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland' or acts of international terrorism 
unrelated to the affairs of Britain.42s 
The IRA launched a car bombing campaign in London in 1992, aimed mainly at financial 
targets, which resulted in huge economic costs; the first bomb, at the Baltic Exchange 
caused £800 million worth of damage.426 The MPS responded by imposing a 'ring of steel', 
419 Section 12(1)(b). 
420 Lord Shackleton, 'The Shackleton Report'. 
421 ibid, Chapter 6. 
422 Lord Jellicoe, Review o/the operation o/the prevention o/terrorism (temporary 
provisions) act. 1976 (Cmnd 8803, 1983). 
423 ibid [18]. 
424 Schedule 6, paragraph 6( 1). 
425 Section 12(3). Lord Jellicoe, 'Jellicoe Report' [77]. 
426 Donohue, Counter-terrorist law and emergency powers in the United Kingdom. 1922-
2000256. 
117 
largely facilitated by random stops and searches.427 In order to strengthen the dubious legal 
base of these responses the PTA 1989 was amended by the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994.428 The amendment, section l3A, permitted an ACPO rank officer to give 
an order authorising any constable in uniform to stop and search any vehicle, driver, 
passenger or pedestrian for articles which could be used for a purpose connected with the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.429 Any person failing to stop or 
wilfully obstructing a constable in the exercise of the power was guilty of an offence and 
liable to imprisonment for up to six months or a fine not exceeding level 5.430 The 
authorisation could last up to twenty-cight days with a possible renewal of up to twenty-
eight days and related to any place or specified locality within the authorising officer's 
area.43I The section specifically states that the power may be exercised 'whether or not [the 
constable] has any grounds for suspecting the vehicle or person is carrying articles of that 
kind,.432 The Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996 inserted a new section 
into the PTA 1989, which provided the same powers as section l3A except it related only to 
pedestrians and required the authorisation to be confirmed by the Secretary of State.433 It 
also provided that only headgear, footwear, outer coat, jacket or gloves may be required to 
b d . bl· 434 h· f1 d· e remove In pu IC. T e sectIOn appears super uous as pe estnans were already 
included in section l3A. 
It is notable that these powers were broader than those introduced under the SPA or the 
EPA, for although the absence of reasonable suspicion is common with section 16 of the 
427 For more on the 'ring of steel' see Coaffee, J, 'Recasting the "Ring of Steel": Designing 
Out Terrorism in the City of London?' in S Graham (ed) Cities, War and Terrorism: 
Towards an Urban Geopolitics (Blackwell, Oxford 2004). 
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430 PTA 1989, sections l3A(6)-(7). 
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433 PTA 1989, section 13B(9). 
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EPA, sections l3A and BB confer the power to search as well as stop. Section BA is 
virtually identical to TACT, section 44, which adopts the same structure, temporal and 
geographical restrictions, and very similar language. Given the extensive analysis of section 
44 in the following Chapters, it suffices to say that section BA's only safeguard is the 
requirement that it appears to the officer making the authorisation that 'it is expedient to do 
so in order to prevent acts of terrorism', which does little to fetter officers' exceptionally 
b d d· . 435 roa IscretlOn. 
A desire, in the wake of the peace process in Northern Ireland, to review counter-terrorist 
law prompted the Lloyd 'Inquiry in Legislation against Terrorism', which resulted in the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and the repeal of the EPA and PTA.436 There have been further 
Northern Ireland specific legislation since TACT, however, as this thcsis focuses on the use 
of section 44 in England and Wales it will not discuss these in detail, although reference will 
be made to the powers where relevant. 
3.6) Conclusion 
Despite the vastly different socio-political contexts in which non-counter-terrorist and 
counter-terrorist powers developed, two major themes emerge across the divide: the use of 
stop and search to control sections of society, whether poor, 'suspect' or terrorist, and the 
detrimental effect this can have on police-community relations more broadly. Interwoven 
into these themes are two perennial criticisms regarding the use of stop and search power: 
excessive discretion and discrimination. The Scarman and Macpherson Reports singled out 
stop and search as undermining police-community relations. In terms of counter-terrorist 
powers: the discriminatory application of 'emergency' and public order laws against 
nationalists in Northern Ireland was one of the causes of radicalization.437 Although stop 
and search powers rarely get specific mention, the focus being internment, the Flags and 
435 Section 13A( I). 
436 Lord Lloyd, 'Lloyd Report'. 
437 See e.g. Adams, The politics of Irish freedom 30-1; Holland, J, Too long a sacrifice: life 
and death in Northern Ireland since 1969 (Penguin, lIarmondsworth 1982); Moloney, E, A 
secret history of the IRA (Penguin, London 2003). 
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Emblems Act 1954 and SPA 1922, Regulation 3, one must take account of the extraordinary 
circumstances in Northern Ireland - the decades of emergency legislation, the militarization 
of the police and the intense levels of violence from 1968. In a different situation they might 
prove to be a sufficient trigger for radicalisation. The potential of stop and search powers to 
cause violent confrontations with the police is certain, as witnessed in the Brixton riots. 
Integral to these issues is the high level of discretion inherent in stop and search powers 
which makes supervision and accountability extremely difficult. What is notable from this 
historical survey is that often the discretion afforded to officers is greater than that required. 
Notwithstanding the criticism concerning the increased bureaucracy post-Macpherson, stop 
and search continued to be a power widely used by the police despite the increased 
accountability of the stop and search fonns. The fact that stop and search continues to be 
highlighted as evidence of police disproportionality towards ethnic minorities underlines the 
on-going friction it engenders in police-community relations and demonstrates the 
importance of ensuring whatever curbs on discretion are possible are implemented even if, 
as with the stop fonns, these offer only aceountability in tenns of 'giving an account', rather 
than offering any real curb on officer discretion. 
Beyond these recurring debates around discretion and discrimination lies the fundamental 
question of whether stop and search 'works'? The answer depends on its perceived 
objectives. If the aim is the detection of crime the statistics clearly reveal its ineffectiveness. 
If the aim is the detection, prevention and deterrence of crime, the success or otherwise is 
more difficult to measure. Intrinsically linked to prevention is the idea of control and the 
need to control certain areas or groups deemed to be high risk. Opponents of using stop and 
search as a preventative or deterrent power argue that it is unlawful for the police to use stop 
and search for such ends.438 Perhaps a better question is whether the police need some form 
of powers to stop and search prior to arrest? It is submitted that they do, although it is 
questionable whether all the current powers are needed. These issues are discussed fully in 
relation to section 44 in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
438 Bowling, Band Phillips, C, 'Disproportionate and discriminatory: reviewing the evidence 
on police stop and search' (2007) 70 MLR 936. 
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Chapter 4) The Authorisation of Section 44 
This chapter analyses the authorisation process governing section 44, addressing the 
research questions: how is section 44 used and how ought it be used? It begins by 
considering the objectives of section 44, as articulated by the police sample and Lord Carlile 
during the fieldwork, and how these interact with CONTEST. The focus then turns to the 
limitations and safeguards imposed upon the authorisation process, in terms of the systems 
imposed by TACT, Code A, 'soft' regulations, such as the NPIA's practice guide and 
accountability to the community, and human rights. The Chapter concludes with an 
assessment of the authorisation process in terms of the framework principles of 
accountability, utility and adherence to human rights, considering how it could be improved. 
It is worth recapping at the outset what section 44 and section 43 permit the police to do. 
Under section 43 an officer can stop and search any person he reasonably suspects of being a 
terrorist. Under section 44, a uniformed officer may stop and search any person in an 
authorised area for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism. 
There is explicitly no requirement of reasonable suspicion for section 44. 
4.1) Objectives 
This section will outline the objectives behind the police authorisation of section 44 and the 
patterns of usage in the field samples. 
Two key objectives emerged from the fieldwork with the police sample: first, disruption and 
deterrence;! and, second, intelligence gathering.2 The use of section 44 as part of high-
visibility policing in and around iconic and high risk locations, which aims to deter terrorists 
from targeting those areas, fits within the objective of disruption and deterrence:3 'if [would-
be terrorists] see us there at transport hubs they're going to be less likely to carry anything 
! MPSSNROl; MPSFL02; MPSFLOl; MPSFL04; MPSSNR04; BTPFLOl; BTPFL03; 
BTPFL04; BTPSNR02; BTPSNR05. 
2 MPSSNROl; MPSFL02; MPSFLOl; MPSSNR04; BTPFLOI; BTPFL03; BTPPC03; 
BTPFL04. 
3 BTPFLlO. 
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on them,.4 This is underlined by the occasional use of signs explaining why section 44 is 
being used there and chimes with the 'all-risks' policing focus on location rather than people 
as the source of the risk calculation.s The fact that random stops of persons and vehicles are 
carried out reinforces the deterrent aspects as there is a chance that a would-be terrorist will 
be randomly stopped. However, most officers conceded that it was 'very unlikely' that an 
officer would catch a terrorist attempting to deliver a bomb,6 although this would be 'the 
ultimate - if you could stop that big thing happening,.7 
The second major objective is to obtain intelligence.8 Some frontline and almost all senior 
officers viewed this as secondary to the objective of disruption and deterrence.9 Others saw 
it as dependent on the type of operation that was being carried out. IO A few saw it as the 
primary objective. lt One officer, as a personal opinion, said 'I don't think the legislation is 
necessarily written for intelligence gathering purposes' .12 Tied to disruption and detcrrcnce 
was the Icsser noted objcctive of public reassurance, again primarily achieved through high-
visibility policing. 13 The issue of arrests is discussed in more dctail in the next Chapter, but 
it is worth noting at this stagc that several officers spccifically disavowed the use of section 
44 as an 'arrest tool,.14 Apart from section 44 not being an 'arrest tool', these objectives 
may explain the extremely low hit-rate - 320 terrorism-related arrcsts from a total of 
4 MPSFLOl. 
S MPSSNROI. 
6 MPSSNROI. 
7 BTPFL04. 
8 MPSSNR04; MPSSNROI;BTPFLOl; BTPpe03; BTPFL04. 
9 BTPFL02; BTPFL03; BTPFL04; BTPSNR02; BTPSNROI; MPSSNROl; MPSSNR03; 
MPSSNR05; MPSSNR06. C.f. MPSSNR04. 
10 BTPFLOl. 
11 MPSSNR04; MPSFLO 1. 
12 BTPFL07. 
13 MPSSNR03; MPSSNR04; MPSSNROI; BTPFLOI; BTPFL03; BTPPC03; BTPFL04. 
14 MPSSNRO 1; MPSSNR04; MPSFLO I; BTPFL04. 
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355,993 stops, or 0.09 per cent, between 2001102 and 2008/09, according to the Section 95 
statistics. IS 
These key objectives interact primarily with CONTEST's 'Protect' stream, which highlights 
the protection of CNI and crowded places. 16 Many of the CNls, notably transport hubs, are 
both CNls and crowded places. The nine listed CNls - government, finance, transport, 
communications, health, emergency services, energy, food and water - can all be found 
within the MPS force area, which is a key hub for government, finance, communications and 
transport. In addition, there is a large concentration of iconic sites within London. The 
BTP's purview is the rail network which obviously falls within the CNI. The 'Pursue' 
stream may also be engaged, intelligence gathering being onc of its explicit objectives. I? 
Disruption is also mentioned,ls specifically in tenns of arrests, although onc officer noted 
this would not happen 'unless we're rcally, really lucky' .19 It seems arguable that the 
broader meaning of disruption, encompassing the prevention of tcrrorist reconnaissance may 
also come under 'Pursue'. A related issue is the requirement that the exercise of section 44 
does not impact negatively upon 'Prevent'. This was acknowledged by MPS officers, 
although they knew of no instance when authorisation was not applied for because of such 
20 
concerns. 
4.1.1) The Approach of the MPS 
The MPS, from April 2001 through to mid-2009, had in place a 'rolling', force-wide 
authorisation of section 44. In July 2009 a pilot scheme was carried out in four boroughs 
IS Lord Carlile 'Report on the operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of 
the Terrorism Act 2006' (HMSO, London 2009) [147]; Lord Carlile 'Report on the operation 
in 2007 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006' (HMSO, London 
2008) [129]; Lord Carlile 'Report on the operation in 2006 of the Terrorism Act 2000' 
(HMSO, London 2007); Lord Carlile 'Report on the operation in 2005 of the Terrorism Act 
2000' (HMSO, London 2006). 
16 CONTEST, section 10. 
17 CONTEST, section 8. 
18 CONTEST, section 8.16. 
19 BTPSNR04. 
20 MPSSNR05; MPSSNR06. 
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before being rolled out force-wide in late August 2009. The sc heme aimed to respond to the 
annual criticisms in Lord Carl ile ' s Reports, centred in particular on the MPS 's refusa l to 
tailor the authorisation more narrowly to specific boroughs or parts thereof by introducing a 
'patchwork' authorisa tion.21 It was also a response to the NPIA 's ' Prac tice Advice on Stop 
and Search in Relation to Terrorism' .2 2 The number of section 44 stops was 'drastica lly 
reduced' following the implementation of the pilot scheme in the sampled borough and has 
fallen dramatically MPS-wide since the ' patchwork ' authorisation has come into force , as 
shown in Figure 4.1 below?3 
Figure 4.1: number of perso ns stopped by the MPS, December 2008 - June 201024 
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The patchwork authorisation divides each borough into three ' levels, ?5 Level I areas are 
21 Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 2005 of the Terrori sm Act 2000'. 
22 NPIA, 'Prac ti ce Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrori sm' (NPIA, Bedfordshire 
2008). 
23 MPSSNR02. 
24 Source: MPS 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrori sm Act: Jan 
2009' (MPS, London 2009); MPS 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the 
Terrorism Act: Feb 2009' (MPS, London 2009); MPS 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and 
Searches Under the Terrorism Aet: Mareh 2009' (MPS, London 2009); MPS 'Borough 
Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrorism Act: Apr 2009' (MPS, London 
2009); MPS Sample Borough 'Police and Community Safety Board: Annual Report 2009-
20 10' (London 2010) MPS 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrorism 
Act: Jun 2010' (MPS, London 2009); MPS 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches 
Under the Terrorism Act: July 20 I 0' (MPS, London 2009). 
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where section 44 is in force all the time. These continue to be covered by 'rolling' 
authorisations.26 These were referred to as 'security zones', raising memories of the 'Ring 
of Steel' ,27 although the distinction was made that unlike in the early 1990s there is no 
'target hardening' nor any obvious sign that one is entering a 'security zone,.28 In the 
borough surveyed, level one areas primarily surrounded 'iconic' and 'high risk' targets, 
including CNIs such as major transport systems, although one area which was significant in 
terms of the night-time economy was also includcd?9 'Level 2' areas are where section 44 
is invoked in response to a specific incident, such as a large social event. In order to use 
section 44 in these areas the borough had to apply to Scotland Yard in advance. 'Level 3' 
are areas where an officer may use section 43. Section 43 is in force permanently 
nationwide - and this was recognised - however, it appears that these areas were designated 
within the scheme for section 44 for a 're-education' of officers which emphasised the 
difference between the two powers and when and where each one was appropriate.3o 
There is an inconsistency in this use of section 44 around the night-time economy. While 
the attempted attack on a London nightclub in 2007 reinforced the fear,3! particularly 
evident since the Bali bombing, that the night-time economy could be a 'soft' target for 
terrorists, the officers stated that section 44 was not widely used at night. A 'few' evening 
patrols were run, with the latest lasting until two o'clock in the morning, although these were 
as much intended to disrupt through hi-visibility policing as to actually exercise section 44.32 
This suggests that a 'Level 2' authorisation would be more appropriate. Indeed, the 
argument could be made that high-visibility policing as a deterrent coupled with section 43 
25 MPSSNR02. 
26 MPSSNR05. 
27 Coaffee, 'Recasting the "Ring of Steel": Designing Out Terrorism in the City of London?'. 
28 MPSSNR02. 
29 MPSSNR02. 
30 MPSSNR02. 
31 Gardham, D, 'Glasgow bomb plot: NHS doctor found guilty of terror attack on airport' The 
Telegraph (London, 16th December 2008). 
32 MPSSNR02. 
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should be used, although there are two difficulties with section 43 in this situation. First, 
section 43 provides the power to search persons only, not cars. Though the need to stop cars 
is most likely to occur in response to specific information, in which case the area could be 
designated 'Level 2', this is a significant gap in the section 43 power. Second, if someone 
appears to stand out, perhaps because of carrying a large bag while entering a nightclub or 
pub late at night, this will be insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion for section 43 
while section 44, if authorised, could be exercised in such circumstances. When questioned 
on this point Lord Carlile suggested that is a bettcr argumcnt for section 44 in an area 'whcre 
there were lots of nightclubs cheek by jowl' and 'narrow streets' rather than in areas such as 
Tiger Tiger in Haymarket, 'which is in a very public area, there is a wide road, well lit and 
so on' where section 43 should be sufficicnt.33 
4.1.2) The BTP's approach 
The BTP also reviewed their procedures surrounding the authorisation and exercise of 
section 44, in light of the NPIA's guidance.34 Previously thcir authorisations covered the 
entire railway network, but since February 2009 they have adopted a 'three strand' 
approach.35 The first strand focuses on suspicious activity which falls short of the grounds 
required in section 43. This may be informed by the use of explosives dogs and/or 
bchavioural assessment techniqucs such as BASS (behaviour assessment screening system), 
discussed in Chapter 5. The second strand is a directed patrol, whieh is pre-planncd and 
intelligence led where the officers are looking for something or someone in particular. Risk 
and community impact assessments are carried out in advance. The third strand is 'visible 
search activity', which 'is not about who you stop, it's about just stopping people' .36 This 
strand clearly chimes with the objectives of both deterrence and public reassurance through 
high visibility policing and fits within the 'all-risks' policing framework. One officer 
distinguished the second and third strands in terms of 'intelligence based selection and 
33 Lord Carlile. 
34 BTPSNR05. NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism'. 
35 BTPFL08; BTPSNR03; Lord Carlile. 
36 BTPSNR05. 
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intuitive selection' .37 The 'three strand' approach is more focused than the previous pan-
force, rolling authorisation. It appeared that in practice some areas remain under rolling 
authorisations, due to the inherent vulnerability of the infrastructure, while other areas come 
under an authorisation in realtion to intelligence or in order to ensure a hostile enviroment on 
the railway network, by, for example, running 'strand 3' patrols.38 In addition to the 'three 
strands' procedure, the BTP also removed all reference to 'random' stops with officers 
instead referring to 'routine' stops, although the precise distinction between these is not 
entirely clear, as acknowledged by some officers.39 A final difference is that there appeared 
to be more diversity in terms of the times at which section 44 was exercised.4o 
4.2) The Authorisation Process 
There are two key stages to the authorisation process: first, the application for authorisation; 
and, second, the granting of the authorisation subsequent to ministerial approval. Straddling 
these is the 'trigger' for authorisation. Each of these will be discussed in turn, starting with 
the 'trigger' for authorisation. 
4.2.1) The 'trigger' 
Section 44 provides, in part, that: 
(1) An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to 
stop a vehicle in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to search-
(a) the vehicle; 
(b) the driver of the vehicle; 
( c) a passenger in the vehicle; 
(d) anything in or on the vehicle or carried by the driver or a passenger. 
37 BTPFLI0. 
38 BTPSNR03; BTPSNR05; BTPSNROl. 
39 BTPSNR02; BTPFL04. 
40 BTPSNRO 1. 
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(2) An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to 
stop a pedestrian in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to 
search-
(a) the pedestrian; 
(b) anything carried by him. 
(3) An authorisation under subsection (1) or (2) may be given only if the person 
giving it considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism. 
Thus the legal 'trigger' for authorisation is that the person making the authorisation 
considers it 'expedient' for the prevention of acts of terrorism.41 During the Bill's passage, 
Simon Hughes MP proposed an amendment inserting 'strictly necessary' in plaee of 
'expedient' .42 He argued that, coupled with the lack of reasonable suspicion, the threshold 
of 'expedient' would violate Article 5 of the ECIIR.43 He pointed to the subjective nature of 
the test and the fact that it was 'difficult to challenge the validity of that authorisation', 
concluding that it gave 'carte blanche to the police officer' .44 The then Home Secretary, 
Charles Clarke, contested these views, arguing the section was Convention compliant and 
that the term 'expedient' was required so that authorisations could be given when it was 
'advantageous or suitable ... even when it may not be strictly necessary,.45 The amendment 
was defeated by 12 to 1.46 Adding further breadth to authorisation power is the reliance on 
the definition of 'terrorism' in TACT, section 1 which, as discussed in Chapter 1.3.2.1, is 
exceptionally broad. 
41 Section 44(3) TACT. 
42 HC Standing Committee 0, 61h Sitting, l s' February 2000, am, part 4 (amendment no. 
112). 
43 HC Standing Committee D, 61h Sitting, 1 SI February 2000, am, part 4. 
44 HC Standing Committee D, 61h Sitting, 1 sI February 2000, am, part 4. 
45 HC Standing Committee D, 61h Sitting, 1 sI February 2000, am, part 4. 
46 HC Standing Committee D, 61h Sitting, 1 SI February 2000, am, part 4. 
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Lord Bingham, giving the leading judgment in Gillan (HL), refused to read 'expedient' as 
meaning 'necessary and suitable, in all the circumstances' on the grounds that 'expedient' is 
distinct from 'necessary' and Parliament chose the former. 47 This is clearly correct, 
although it was regrettable that Lord Bingham failed to provide any definition of 
'expedient'. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, section 60, discussed in 
Chapter 3.3, has a similar trigger, but the scant case-law on section 60 does not include the 
interpretation of 'expedient,.48 The question of definition was addressed by the ECtHR in 
GiIlan (ECtHR) , which held 'expedient' to mean 'no more than "advantageous" or 
"necessary'" .49 As the ECtHR noted, this threshold is so low as to preclude any 
consideration of proportionality. so This was a factor contributing to the ECtHR's ruling that 
section 44 was not in accordance with the law.51 Although not considered in GilIan (HL) , 
there is a question whether HRA, section 3 would permit or require words to be 'read in' or 
'read down' to ensure proportionality.52 Given the ECtHR's ruling, discussed further below, 
the point is now moot. 
4.2.2) Application for authorisation 
Leaving aside for now the human rights issues raised by the 'trigger', the next topic to 
consider is the limitations and safeguards around the process of applying for an 
authorisation. 
47 R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKIIL 12 [13-14]. 
48 In addition to references in GilIan (HL), which is properly concerned with section 44, the 
only cases which discuss section 60 in any depth are: Austin v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis [2007] EWCA Civ 989, DPP v A very [2001] EWHC Admin 748 (which focuses 
on section 60( 4A», 0 (A Juvenile) v DPP 1999 WL 477793, and R. (on the application of 
Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2006] UKlIL 55. 
49 Gi/lan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 45 app.no.4158/05 [80]. 
so Gi/lan (ECtHR) [80]. 
SI ibid [80-87]. 
52 Edwards, R. 'Reading down legislation under the Human Rights Act' (2000) 20 LS 354; 
Clayton, R. 'The limits of what's "possible": statutory construction under the Human Rights 
Act' (2002) 5 EHRLR 559. 
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The authorisation must be made in writing and if made orally must be confirmed in writing 
as soon as reasonably practicable.53 There were no oral authorisations in the MPS according 
to the officers interviewed. 54 This is unsurprising given that the pan-London 'rolling' 
authorisation was in place until July 2009. The authorisation must be given by an ACPO 
rank officer and it must be limited to a police area, including waters which are internal or 
adjacent to the specified area, and does not need to extend that far. 55 If the internal waters 
are adjacent to more than one force then an authorisation from each is required. 56 The 
authorisation may last 28 days and need not last so long. 57 Each MPS authorisation, 
between 19/2/2001 and 22/4/2009, lasted on average 26.38 days, with the shortest being 20.5 
days and each authorisation following directly after the other.58 The possibility of renewing 
the authorisation by writing indicates that repeated authorisations were in the mind of the 
drafters.59 This was reinforced by the approval of the MPS' rolling authorisations as lawful 
in Gillan (HL).60 Both the HO Circular and the NPIA's Practice Advice advise using less 
than the maximum geographical limit, requiring 'detailed' explanations to be given 
explaining why the option of a designated area was rejected, but are silent on the question of 
whether the maximum temporal limit should be used.61 As the ECtlIR noted in Gil/an 
(ECtHR), the MPS practice of a 'rolling', force-wide authorisation for over eight years 
highlights the failure of these restrictions to act as effective limitations.62 Moreover, the 
53 Section 44(5). 
54 MPSSNR05; MPSSNR06. 
ss Sections 44(4), (4A), 44(4B) and 44(4ZA) TACT. 
S6 Home Office 'Circular 08/2006: Terrorism and Organised Crime' (Home Office, London 
2006), section 74. 
57 Section 46(2). 
58 MPS 'Section 44 Authorisation Data' (MPS, London 20 10). 
59 Section 46(7). 
60 GilIan (flL) [18]. 
61 Home Office 'Circular 027/2008: Authorisations of Stop and Search Powers under Section 
44 of the Terrorism Act' (Home Office, London 2008); NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and 
Search in Relation to Terrorism' (3.1.4]. 
62 Gillan (ECtHR) [81]. 
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opacity surrounding the authorisations, discussed below, precludes any assessment of 
whether the guidelines in the Practice Advice and HO Circular are being adhered to. 
In both forces, the application is prepared by a dedicated team. 63 All authorisation 
applications must be completed on pro-formas issued by the NPIA (see Appendix B).64 
These forms, in circulation since late 2008 are very similar to the old forms, 'just 
underlin[ing] some of the initially broader ... questions, particularly about implementation,.M 
In the MPS most of the authorisations were signed around three days before the preceding 
authorisation expires, to allow for any dclays.66 Because the form is submitted to the 
National Joint Unit (NJU) and Home Secretary for approval there is no reference to the 
'levels' or 'strands' in the MPS' or BTP's authorisations or other 'internal jargon' as these 
may not be known to the NJU or Home Secretary.67 The NJU operates within the MPS' 
S012 (the counter-terrorist 'special branch'), and provides a point of contact for all matters 
relating to TACT.68 The MPS team completed each separately using the previous onc as a 
base.69 While there was a degree of content which remained constant, it was subject to 
. b fi h h . . 70 scrutmy e ore eac new aut onsatlOn. 
A copy of each application with an audit trail is retained, so for each statement in the 
application there is 'the equivalent of footnotes' .71 There is no collation of the applications. 
Such collation, by theme or by the section in the application to which the information 
pertains, could add an extra layer of accountability, subject to a time-lag, and may be useful 
in terms of internal analysis for best practice and perhaps even for intelligence. The officers 
63 MPSSNR02; MPSSNR04; BTPSNR03. 
64 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism' Appendix 8. 
6S MPSSNR05. 
66 MPSSNR05. 
67 MPSSNR05; BTPSNR03. 
68 MPS, 'Special Branch introduction and summary of responsibilities' (MPS, London 2004). 
69 MPSSNR05. 
70 MPSSNR05. 
71 MPSSNR05. 
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interviewed highlighted the 'think trial' approach, by which they anticipated defending each 
authorisation in court: 'everyone always says ... remember you could be standing in a witness 
box in case of unlawful searches or any other legal challenge,.n In terms of the detail, some 
sections are more 'pro forma', for instance in relation to the reason for exercising section 44 
powers, one officer stated: 'we generally say what we mean, it's to keep the public safe and 
secure and it's generally words to that effect in so few words,.73 
The Practice Advice's pro-forma sheds some further light on the reasons for authorisation. 
The notes to the pro-forma imply that a high state of alert in itself may be enough to justify 
an authorisation but the relationship between the state of alert and the decision to authorise 
must be detailed.74 That this is likely to be one of the more static areas is underlined by the 
fact that the pro-forma has a separate section for details of new information relating to recent 
events specific to the authorisation.75 Any reference to JT AC or Security Services reports 
are referenced and cited as appropriate and must be to current reports.76 Additional 
information may refer to reports of suspected hostile reconnaissance.77 The prompt to 
authorise section 44 in a particular area arises from intelligence from the central agencies, 
fed through the relevant special branch in conjunction with the counter-terrorism unit, 
although it must be noted that for the two forces sampled, despite their move to the patch-
work and three strand authorisation respectively, many of the areas under authorisation 
remain constant due to underlying vulnerabilities or sensitivities.78 A senior BTP officer 
commented that 'for BTP in particular I think it's more about the vulnerability of the 
infrastructure rather than any specific intelligence .. .if you're getting into the realms of 
72 MPSSNR05. 
73 MPSSNR05. 
74 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism'. 
75 ibid, Explanatory Notes. 
76 MSPSNR05; BTPSNR03. 
77 BTPSNR03. 
78 BTPSNR03. 
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specific intelligence then you are perhaps looking at a section 43' .79 This underlines the 
broad discretion afforded by the trigger of 'expedient' and also the consequences of all-risks 
policing: the threat is generalised by being focused on a location rather than persons and 
therefore often cannot be supported by specific intelligence. 
The pro forma requires the authorising officer to justify specifically why section 43 or other 
PACE powers are insufficient.8o Details of the briefing and training provided to officers 
using section 44 must also be provided. Both forces posted details of where section 44 is 
active on their intranets,81 which was crucial for officers who 'self-briefed' from the 
intranet.82 The issue of self-briefing is discussed further in Chapter 6.3.5. In the MPS, the 
daily briefing includes a counter-terrorist slide which provides details of where section 44 is 
in force.83 At the beginning of each authorisation an additional slide is included giving the 
details of the authorising officer and the dates of the authorisation.84 Lastly, details are 
provided of the practical implementation of the powers, in terms of the type of operations 
that will use the power, e.g. armed patrols, road checks, security of a vulnerable site, 
including arrangements for review procedures where applicable.85 
4.2.3) Ministerial approval of the authorisation 
In relation to the second stage of the authorisation process, the ministerial approval of the 
authorisation, the NJU should be contacted by telephone once an authorisation has been 
given, and a copy of the authorisation forwarded immediately. They then inform the Home 
Office. The Secretary of State may confirm or cancel the authorisation or amend its 
duration.86 The fact that the Home Secretary will be familiar with current intelligence 
79 BTPSNR03. 
80 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism', Section 10. 
8t MPSSNR05; BTPSNR03. 
82 BTPFL07. 
83 MPSSNR05. 
84 MPSSNR05. 
85 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism', Explanatory Notes. 
86 TACT, section 46(5-6). 
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reports prompted one officer to comment, as a personal view, that 'the signing or otherwise 
of the authority is not necessarily contingent on the quality of the application because the 
application itself states facts that are known to the Minister'. 87 Some BTP authorisations 
were queried, but it was not recently and 'they were more about the detail. .. and 
88 
methodology than the overall strategy'. Similarly, some MPS authorisations have been 
queried, but only in relation to specific points that require greater details, with, for example, 
the Home Office phoning the MPS to query a specific point which needed 'reinforcement' ,89 
although on one occasion, a number of years ago, the need for the authorisation was 
. d 90 questlOne . The MPS authorisation data reveals that onc application was refused, 
however, an application was authorised the following day suggesting that there were issues 
with the particulars rather than the underlying justifications.91 Lord Carlile affirmed that 
'there have been very few refusals, however, a number of forces have stopped asking for 
authorisations in the context of discouragement from the Home Office' ,92 although inhis 
2010 Report he criticises several of the authorisations made in 2009.93 
The fact that at least some authorisations have been rejected or queried is encouraging, 
however, the nub of the issue is the near-total lack of transparency. It is now ACPO policy 
for forces to acknowledge whether or not they have an authorisation in force, although no 
further details are provided, although this has not translated into forces actively notifying the 
public when an authorisation is in force.94 There is no routine publication of data relating to 
the number of authorisation applications, nor the number rejected, modified or approved, nor 
whether they tend towards the maximum or minimum in terms of the geographical and 
87 MPSSNR04. 
88 BTPSNR03. 
89 MPSSNR05. 
90 MPSSNR06. 
91 MPS, 'Section 44 Authorisation Data'. 
92 Lord Carlile. 
93 Lord Carlile 'Report on the operation in 2009 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of 
the Terrorism Act 2006' (HMSO, London 2010). 
94 MPS 'Section 44 Authorisation Data' (MPS, London 2010). 
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temporal limits. The sum total is a brief commentary in Lord Carlile's annual reports and 
occasional disclosures resulting from freedom of information requests. 9S This opacity 
effectively undercuts the effectiveness of the Practice Advice and 110 Circular and the 
accountability the Home Secretary's role purports to embody. Without such information, it 
is impossible to discern whether the power is being abused or not. Being given only the bald 
number of section 44s which have been carried out without knowing whether they relate to 
one or multiple authorisations makes it very difficult to assess the exercise of the power and 
provides no hint as to whether the power is being used in a targeted or indiscriminate 
manner. The recent disclosure that thirty-five authorisations purported to run for over 
twenty-eight days,96 with thousands of unlawful section 44 stops carried out subsequently, 
highlights this accountability deficit.97 
Any authorisation not confirmed within 48 hours lapses, but this does not affect the 
lawfulness of any action taken in the interim.98 Therefore, 'short term' authorisations may 
be made which do not require Ministerial confirmation. In such circumstances a copy of the 
authorisation should be forwarded to the NJU immediately, with details forwarded to the 
Home Office within two hours.99 If it is not possible to forward a copy of the authorisation 
within that time period, the details should be provided to the NJU over the telephone and 
they will alert the Minister. loo The NPIA Advice recognises that 'short term' authorisations 
do not require Ministerial approval while underlining that the Minister should be informed in 
such cases. One positive that could be drawn is that they encourage forces to use the power 
9S Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 200S of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of 
the Terrorism Act 2006'; Lord Carlilc, 'Report on the operation in 2007 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 and of Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006'; Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 2006 
of the Terrorism Act 2000'; Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 2005 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000'; MPS, 'Section 44 Authorisation Data'. 
96 HC volSll cols 24WS-2SWS 10 June 2010 (Herbert, Nick MP). 
97 See the distinction between 'unlawful' and 'illegal' stop and search highlighted in B. 
Bowling, & C. Phillips, 'Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the evidence on 
Police Stop and Search' (2007) 70(6) MLR 936, 939. 
98 Section 46(4). 
99 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism' 26. 
100 ibid 27. 
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for a short period, however, as they evade oversight they potentially constitute a loop-hole in 
the legal framework. In terms of best practice, they should be avoided and it is 
disappointing that the NPIA did not discourage their use. Neither the MPS nor the BTP had, 
according to the interviewees, used such authorisations, which is unsurprising given that 
both had, until shortly before the interviews, rolling force-wide authorisations in place. IOI 
Due to the absence of information regarding authorisations, it is unclear how often such 
'short term' authorisations have been used or by which forces. 
4.3) Community accountability 
The NPIA's Practice Advice puts community issues front and centre. The first section, titled 
'Community Engagement', concerns issues such as the role of and engagement with Police 
Authorities and community / police organisations. I02 This approach is reflected in the 
authorisation pro-forma, under which forces should provide details of the Community 
Impact Assessment (CIA). 103 The MPS produced a section 44 impact assessment in 2008, 
which remains in date until 2012. 104 The assessment notes that the Asian community 
'perceive they are being unfairly targeted' and that Asian and Black men are 
disproportionately targeted. IOS While this type of general, force-wide assessment is to be 
welcomed, it must be reviewed more regularly -the MPA recommended it be updated 
annually - and there should also be a CIA for each authorisation, at the borough level. I06 
The Practice Advice highlights neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs), who should 'where 
possible ... be involved in all stages of terrorism stop and search operations' and Independent 
Advisory Groups (lAGs) who should be 'fully engaged when section 44 applications are 
101 MPSSNR02; MPSSNR04; BTPSNR03. 
102 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism' [1.1-1.5]. 
103 ibid, Annex A, section 13. 
104 MPS 'Equality Impact Assessment on the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 Stop and 
Search Powers' (MPS, London 2008). 
IOS ibid. 
106 MPA 'Review of police use of counter-terrorism Stop and Search powers in London' 
(MPS, London 2007). 
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being considered', being briefed prior to an operation if appropriate. 107 In addition, forces 
'should' provide information to lAGS regarding the use of section 44 and 'may' invite them 
to observe operations.108 During the fieldwork a BTP IAG member observed a BTP force 
carrying out stops under section 44. The Practice Advice also refers to engaging with a 
'Prevent' lead officer, if available, which indicates a recognition of the potentially negative 
effective section 44 may have on PREVENT. 109 The term 'engage' is, however, open to a 
variety of interpretations, ranging from close involvement in the authorisation process, to 
simply informing the Prevent lead officer in general terms that section 44 is likely to be 
authorised. 
The acknowledgement of the importance of police / community engagement around section 
44 is to be welcomed but it is undermined by the highly conditional nature of the 
engagement: the force may invite an observer, it should prepare a CIA, the NPT should be 
involved if possible. To be effective these optional sections should be codified in a schedule 
to section 44, as discussed further below at 4.5. Ideally the schedule should include 
imperatives rather than merely the option to engage. Clearly, operational needs will mean 
that CIAs cannot always be carried out in advance, nor can the community, via Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) or lAGs, always be informed in advance, 
however, sufficient operational flexibility could easily be provided for by giving the option, 
in case of operational necessity, to carry out the CIA or inform the community after the 
operation. The authorisation merely permits the use of section 44 and does not necessarily 
mean that any operations using the power will in fact occur. During this second, operational 
phase additional CIAs may need to be carried out. One senior BTP officer noted that while 
issues around community tension would not stop him signing an authorisation, 'if there was 
a community issue which made section 44 difficult or problematic to use it simply wouldn't 
107 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism' [1.1, 1.3]. 
108 'b'd 7 1 1 , • 
109 'b'd 6 1 1 , • 
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be deployed there' .110 This issue is considered further in the next Chapter, although it is 
worth noting that the regulations around section 44 concern its authorisation and the 
encounter itself, not its deployment. 
Police Authorities (PAs) stand as an obvious route of community accountability, although it 
must be noted that a Bill has been tabled by the Government which would replace them with 
elected 'Police and Crime Commissioners', as discussed in Chapter 6.3.3. Focusing on the 
current system, PAs offer a conduit for community accountability because of their statutory 
role whereby their main function is to 'secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective 
police force' and to 'hold the chief officer of police of that force to account for the exercise 
of his functions and those of persons under his directions and control' .111 That section 44 
raises issues of efficiency was underlined by Lord Carlile who has stated that 'poor or 
unnecessary use ... of section 44 ... is not a good use of precious [police] resources'. JI2 There 
must be a degree of transparency regarding the authorisation and deployment of section 44 if 
the PA is to ensure that resources are being used efficiently. One of the PA interviewees 
indicated that there was no communication regarding section 44 before or after an 
authorisation, to the point where the force refused to clarify whether or not there was an 
authorisation in force, although the situation had ameliorated. I 13 
The Practice Advice highlights the 'essential role' of PAs and states that, where section 44's 
are carried out regularly, the PA 'may review the use of these powers' .114 The Practice 
Advice suggests that such a review 'may focus on supervision, briefing, training and general 
awareness as well as an analysis of any statistics used'; in short, the exercise of the power, 
not its authorisation. I IS The MPA's review of section 44, within their wider examination of 
110 BTPSNR03. 
111 Police Act 1996, Section 6(1-2). The proposal to replace PAs with 'Crime and Police 
Commissioners' is discussed in Chapter 6.3.3. 
112 Carlile 09 [177]. 
113PAOl. 
114 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism' 7-8. 
lIS ibid 8. 
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counter-terrorism in 'The London Debate' ,116 contributed to the MPS' review of section 44 
and is testimony to the potential impact of such oversight. I 17 
In addition to scrutinising the effectiveness of the force, the PA is one of the two major 
organisations to which a member of the public can make a complaint or query regarding the 
police, the other being the IPCC. They cannot serve this purpose if they are unaware 
whether or not there is an authorisation in place. One of the areas where judicial review in 
relation to section 44 is likely to be successful - and was likely to be successful pre-Gillan 
(ECtHR) - is when the stop is carried out when there is no authorisation in place. As noted 
above, this has already occurred on at least thirty-five occasions with thousands of unlawful 
stops being carried out, and the potential for its occurrence since the 'patchwork' 
authorisation has been acknowledged by the MPS.1I8 If the relevant PA is unaware of 
whether or not there is in fact an authorisation in place how can they advise a member of the 
public who queries the legality of a section 44 stop? 
One point which was particularly contentious with the PAl APA interviewees was that non-
Home Office forces were carrying out large numbers of section 44s but not informing the 
local force or the PA.119 When asked about this point, one BTP officer said: 'there's a 
clamour for our data now by forces across the country and .. .1 recommended that we don't 
[give it] because otherwise all we'll spend our time doing is servicing the needs of forty-
three forces in England and Wales' .120 This reference is clearly to more detailed statistics 
and, contrary to one of the other interviewee's statements, a senior BTP officer stated that 
they do always inform the local force when an authorisation is in place. 121 Other BTP 
116 MPA, 'Counter-terrorism: the London debate' (MPA, London 2007). 
117 MPSSNROl. 
118 HC volSll cols 24WS-28WS 10 June 2010 (Herbert, Nick MP). MPS, 'MPS Use of 
section 44 TACT in London - 2009 Update'. See also: Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation 
in 2007 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006'. 
119 PAOI; PA02. 
120 BTPSNR04. 
121 BTPSNR03. C.f. PAOI. 
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officers emphasised that they co-ordinated with the local forces in advance. 122 The apparent 
contradiction here may arise from the distinction between the authorisation and the actual 
exercise of section 44. It may also be that some members of a Home Office force are 
informed but that this information is not disseminated, in particular it may not be 
disseminated to the relevant PA. Suggested methods for resolving this difficulty are 
discussed below at 4.5. 
A problem underlying community accountability in relation to section 44 is the fact that 
many of those impacted by the power are part of a transient community. Leaving aside for 
the moment level 2 and strand 3, the focus of both police forces is on transport-hubs, iconic 
and high risk sites and - in the sampled borough - the night-time economy, which are 
primarily populated by a transient community consisting of commuters, workers, tourists, 
whether domestic or foreign, and revellers. This has a two-fold effect. First, it makes it 
incredibly difficult to identify, let alone communicate with the affected community by 
traditional means which focus on communities as identified by reason of religion or 
ethnicity or gender or sexuality. The other traditional identifier, geographic location, is 
equally flawed as while some people may be stopped in their home areas, others are stopped 
near work or a night-club or bar or while traversing the city or country. Therefore, the 
traditional routes of accountability via PAs, NPTs, CDRPs, lAGs, etc. on the whole do not 
provide a voice to the affected communities. An exception to this are businesses who 
operate within a high risk area or near an iconic site and participate on stop and search teams 
/ boards at PA level, as by including the businesses the difficulty of identifying employees or 
customers who do not live locally is side-stepped. However, businesses are likely to focus 
on security needs for their business rather than acting as a conduit between their customers 
or employees and the police, or PA. This was certainly the case with one security manager 
h . . d 123 w 0 was mtervlewe . 
122 BTPFL08; BTPFL04; BTPFLO 1. C.f. PAO 1. 
123COMMG. 
140 
One officer suggested that this meant that section 44 can be seen as having a 'light 
footprint' .124 The officer explained: 'in relative terms, section 44 has a very light footprint 
and so in London where you have over 150,000 stops in a year, London will have a resident 
population of 8 million and an operational population of at least twice that...it is very 
unlikely, especially because of the spread of the searches, to affect any individual more than 
once or maybe twice ... so it has actually got a very diffused actual experience ... Most people 
aren't affected at all by it'.125 While accepting this might be true in certain cases, Mike 
Franklin of the IPCC rejected the general depiction of a 'light footprint' .126 In relation to 
some of the transient communities affected by section 44, such as foreign tourists, it is 
clearly correct. The fact that section 44 impacts upon these transient communities may in 
fact diffuse the negative perceptions of the power more widely beyond the area when the 
stop has taken place. This should not be taken as an indication that no efforts need to be 
made to ensure accountability to these groups but, in conjunction with the disparate nature of 
these transient communities, it goes towards explaining perhaps why their voices have not 
been heard. It is notable that the Practice Code to section 47A, which replaced section 44 in 
January 2011 and is discussed in Chapter 7, makes reference to sections of the community 
'with whom channels of communication are difficult or non-existent', stating that in such 
cases channels of communication 'should be identified and put in place' .127 This appears to 
be an acknowledgment of the impact of the power upon transient communities. 
4.4) Human rights 
Before discussing the application of human rights on the authorisation process, it is 
necessary to outline the doctrines of the 'margin of appreciation' and 'deference'. as these 
impact upon how human rights are applied by the courts in the context of section 44. The 
124 MPSSNR05 (said in relation to London). 
I2S MPSSNR05. 
126 IPCC. 
127 Home Office 'Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the authorisation and 
exercise of stop and search powers relating to section 47 A of Schedule 6B to the Terrorism 
Act 2000' (HMSO, 2011) [6.1.2]. 
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precise operation of these doctrines in relation to each specific right will be highlighted 
when discussing the relevant rights under the ECHR, in this and following Chapters. 
4.4.1) The 'margin of appreciation' 
The 'margin of appreciation' originates from the jurisprudence of the ECtIIR, specifically 
Article 15 cases,128 rather than the Convention itself, which may account for some of the 
confusion surrounding its definition and application. 129 It has been criticised as 
contradicting the basic tenants of human rights, with its implied relativism and subjectivity 
seen by some critics as opposing human rights' foundational base of universality. 130 The 
'margin of appreciation' describes the discretion accorded by the ECtI IR to' States to balance 
for themselves conflicting public goods which necessitate the limiting of onc or more 
Convention rights. \31 It contains the 'substantive' doctrine, which addresses the balancing of 
individual and collective rights, and the 'structural' doctrine, which refers to the level of 
deference the ECtHR, as an international court, should accord domestic authorities on the 
basis of institutional competence and, in some of the case-law, the subsidiary role of the 
ECtIlR, articulated in Article 1.\32 The 'substantive' clement is most commonly invoked 
when the rights under issue are 'limited', whereby the State may interfere with their exercise 
to pursue a legitimate aim, necessary in a democratic country. Of the ECIIR Articles 
relevant to this research, Articles 8, 10 and 11 are 'limited' in this manner, as is the right to a 
128Lawless v Ireland (No. 3). Its origins before the Commission go back even further to 'The 
Cyprus Case' [1958-59] 2 YB ECHR 174. See also the 'Greek Case'. 
129 Letsas, G, 'Two concepts of the margin of appreciation' (2006) 26 OJLS 705, 705. 
130 Sce, e.g. Judge De Meyer's dissent in Z v Finland (1998) 25 EIIRR 371 app.no.2209/93; 
Sweeney, J, 'Margins of appreciation: cultural relativity and the European Court ofIluman 
Rights in the post Cold War period' (2005) 54 ICLQ 459; Teson, F, 'International human 
rights and cultural relativism' (1985) Virginal JIL 869; Lavender, N, 'The problem of the 
margin of appreciation' (1997) 4 E.H.R.L.R. 380 and Benvenisti, E, 'Margin of appreciation, 
consensus, and universal standards' (1999) 31 NYUJ Int'l L & Pol. 843. 
131 Sweeney 'Margins of appreciation: cultural relativity and the European Court of Human 
Rights in the post Cold War period', 462. 
\32 Letsas 'Two concepts of the margin of appreciation', 706, 721-22.lIandyside v United 
Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737 app.no.5493/72 [48]; Belgian Linguistic Case (1968) 1 
EHRR 252 app.nos.l474/62; 1677/62; 1691162; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64. 
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public trial under Article 6(1). The ECtHR has traditionally afforded States a wide margin 
of appreciation in cases concerning terrorism, often melding the arguments for the 
'substantive' and 'structural' aspects. \33 However, the margin of appreciation is not 
unlimited in any circumstances; rather it goes 'hand in hand with European supervision'. 134 
This is evident even in national security cases, as emphasised in Lawless, where the ECtHR, 
while finding the derogation justifiable, specifically reserved their right to scrutinise the case 
for a national emergency.13S 
A core problem with the doctrine is that it is 'as slippery and elusive as an eel' .136 Its 
operation varies 'according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background,.137 
The nature of the aim of the restriction and the nature of the activities involved will also 
affect the scope of the margin of appreciation,138 with positive obligations being accorded a 
wider margin. \39 Further muddying the waters, the ECtlIR has reached contradictory 
conclusions in similar situations,140 often without specifying its methods, which results in 
seemingly arbitrary decisions and casuistic reasoning. 141 The variation these approaches 
engenders has led one commentator to refer to the 'standardless doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation' .142 
\33 Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 EIIRR 553 app.no.21987/93; Lawless v Ireland (No. 3). 
Lavender 'The problem of the margin of appreciation'. 
134 Lawless v Ireland (No. 3) [49]. 
\3S ibid, 55. In the 'Greek Case' the ECtHR found that there was no emergency warranting 
the invocation of Article 15 ([1969] 12 Y.B. ECHR). 
136 Lester, L, 'Universality versus subsidiarity: a reply' (1998) 6 EIlRLR 73, 75. 
137 Rasmussen v Denmark (1984) 7 EHRR 371 app.no.8777179. 
138 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 ElIRR 149 app.no.7525176 [52]. Sce also, 
lIandyside v United Kingdom; The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EIIRR 245 
app.no.6538/74. 
139 P van Dijk and Y Arai, Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (4th edn Intersentia, Oxford 2006) 349 c.r. Wildhaber's judgement in Stjerna v 
Finland (1997) 24 EHRR 195 app.no.18131191. 
140 van Dijk and Arai Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
141 Shelton, D, 'The boundaries of human rights jurisdiction in Europe' (2003) 13 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 95, 134. 
142 Lester 'Universality versus subsidiarity: a reply', 76. 
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The principle of deference is, baldly, the level of discretion afforded by domestic courts to 
the Government. It is justified on two main grounds. First, the constitutional competence 
argument: judges are unelected and should therefore defer to the (elected) politicians on 
sensitive topics such as national security, questions of morality,143 or how to deal with 
certain social problems. 144 Second, the 'institutional competence' argument: the 
Government has greater competence in certain matters. 145 This ties in with the courts' 
reluctance to review factual or evidential questions on appeal. 146 The relevant competence 
for this thesis is national security which Lord Diplock described as being 'par excellence a 
non-justiciable question' :47 This comment requires some tempering, and the situation is 
better described by Lord Steyn who, while noting that it is 'self-evidently right that national 
courts must give great weight to the views of the executive on matters of national security', 
stated that 'issues of national security do not fall beyond the competence of the courts' .148 
As Lord Atkins stated: 'In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent' .149 
That this is so was demonstrated clearly in the case of A v Secretary 0/ State for the Ilome 
ISO Department. 
Against these justifications for broad deference, the separation of powers doctrine, the fact 
that judges argue rationally from legal authority and the (usually) public nature of legal 
143 R (on the application a/Countryside Alliance) v AG [2007] UKJlL 52 [125] . 
144 Secretary a/State/or the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKIIL 47 [50-54] (Lord 
Hoffman). Leigh, I, 'The standard of judicial review after the Human Rights Act' in 11 
Fenwick, G Phillipson and R Masterman (eds) Judicial reasoning under the UK Iluman 
Rights Act (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 179. Sce, e.g. R (on the application 0/ Mahmood) v 
Secretary a/State/or the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 840); R v Lichniak [2002] 
UKHL47. 
14s]owell, J, 'Judicial deference: servility, civility or institutional capacity?' [2003] Win PL 
592,598-99. See also A v Secretary a/State/or the Home Department, [29,39-42] (Lord 
Bingham) c.f. [107] (Lord Hope). 
146 Leigh, 'The standard of judicial review after the Human Rights Act', 183-188. 
147 Council a/Civil Service Unions v Minister/or the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374,412 
(Lord Diplock). See also Chandler v DPP [1964] AC 763. 
148 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [31-32]. 
149 Anderson v Liversidge [1942] AC 206 244. 
ISO [2004] UKHL 56. 
144 
judgements may be invoked to justify narrow deference. l51 In addition, the liRA has 
weakened the constitutional competence reasoning, as it may be argued that Parliament, with 
its democratic competence, has set the judiciary as guardians of human rights, albeit while 
preserving Parliamentary sovereignty.ls2 To similar effect is the designation of human rights 
as a universal value or 'higher order' law, which wrests competence from Parliament, 
placing human rights 'above' Parliament's democratic competence, with judges tasked to 
ensure Parliament's adherence to this 'higher order' law. IS3 The existence of 'qualified 
rights' in the ECBR are a key reason why the BRA has not resulted in the death of deference 
in relation to issues concerning human rights. Absolute rights cannot be overridden by 
Parliament;S4 although primary legislation may infringe them, thereby giving rise to a 
declaration of incompatibility,155 however, qualified rights reintroduce the issues of relative 
competence between Parliament and the judiciary. The precise interplay between these 
competing principles is drawn out in the analysis of the specific human rights discussed 
below and in the next Chapter 
4.4.2) Is the authorisation of section 44 prescribed by law? 
Turning again to the application of human rights to the authorisation of section 44, there are 
two issues which intersect: whether the authorisation process adheres to the requirement, 
under the ECHR, Article 5{ 1), that a procedure be prescribed by law and whether the process 
adheres to the common law principle of legality. The latter requires the court to 'where 
possible, interpret a statute in such a way as to avoid encroachment on fundamental 
151 Feldman, D, 'Human rights, terrorism and risk: the roles of politicians and judges' [2006] 
PL 364. 
152 R (on the application of Countryside Alliance) v AG [125], although note that Baroness 
Hale considers this applicable only if the matter does not fall within the margins concept. 
See also A v Secretary of Slate for the Home Department, discussed below. 
153 Jowell, J, 'Judicial Deference and Human Rights' in P Craig and R Rawlings (eds) Law 
and Administration in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2003); Roth v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158; Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 
Admin 934. 
154 R (on application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the 
Environment and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389 [70] (Lord Hoffman). 
IS5 HRA, section 4. 
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The right that is engaged is the right to liberty, which is protected under the ECHR, article 5 
as well as being a common law fundamental right. Given this overlap, the following 
discussion will focus on the requirement that the authorisation process be prescribed by law. 
The ECtHR discussed the requirement that a procedure is prescribed by law in Ma/one v 
United Kingdom, which concerned the legality of intercept evidence.158 The Court held that, 
although the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be able to 
foresee when their communications are likely to be intercepted, 'the law must be sufficiently 
clear in its tenns to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and 
the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and 
potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life and 
correspondcnce.'159 The ECtHR notcd in particular the dangers of arbitrary interference by 
public authorities with the rights of the individual when a power is exercised in secret. 160 In 
Gillan (HL), Lord Bingham argued that an officer is not free to act arbitrarily, as to do so 
would open himself to a civil suit, and that, although no reasonable suspicion is required, 
people who do not appear to be terrorist suspects would not be stopped as this 'would be 
futile and time-wasting' .161 Here Lord Bingham appears to confuse the object of section 43, 
stopping and searching a person who is reasonably suspected of being a terrorist, with that of 
section 44: searching for articles that could be used in connection with terrorism. The 
fieldwork indicated that, particularly when the objective is high visibility reassurance, 
156 R (Youssej) v llM Treasury [2010] UKSC 2 [111] (Lord Philips). See also Laws, LJ's 
discussion of 'constitutional or fundamental' statutes in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council 
[62-3]. 
157 R v Home Secretary of State for the /lome Department. Ex p. Pierson [1998] AC 539, 
574 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
158 Ma/one v United Kingdom. 
159 ibid [67]. See also Iluvig v France (1990) 12 EIIRR 528 (NI76-B) app.no.l 1 105/84. 
160 Ma/one v United Kingdom [67]. 
161 GiIlan (HL) [35]. 
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section 44 is used in the main on persons who are under no suspicion, reasonable or not. 162 
Lord Bingham presumes a rational approach to the exercise of section 44 which would be 
absent if an officer was exercising the power based on, for example, racist beliefs. The 
presumption of rationality offers no succour in such a case, which is surely precisely the 
type of case which must be guarded against. 
Lord Bingham's central argument was that section 44 is prescribed by law as it is defined 
and limited with 'considerable precision', relying in particular on PACE, Code A,163 This 
confuses two separate issues: the first is whether the authorisation is prescribed by law; the 
second is whether its exercise, to which Code A is relevant, is also prescribed by law. 
Among Lord Bingham's 'close regulations', relating to the authorisation process, were that 
the authorisation may only be given by an ACPO rank officer if expedient for the prevention 
of acts of terrorism, that it is limited temporally and geographically and that it must be 
confirmed by the Secretary of State. The inadequacy of these has been discussed. Lord 
Bingham also cited the role of the Independent Reviewer as a safeguard. The Independent 
Reviewer annually reviews the operation of many of the terrorist statutes, including TACT, 
in addition to various ad hoc reports, for example on the definition of terrorism. 164 The fact 
that criticism of section 44 in successive reports led to scant changes in practice - at least 
until 2009 - underlines the limitations of this role. Additionally, the ECtllR noted that the 
. h I I h' . 165 RevIewer as no power to a ter or cance aut onsahons. Although the Reviewer 
presently reads every authorisation it is doubtful whether he is best placed to provide such 
oversight, being already under a considerable workload and having a far broader remit than 
'just' section 44. It would be better to improve the present system involving the Home 
Secretary and NJU or to have the authorisations confirmed judicially, as discussed below. 
162 Sec Chapter 5.1. 
163 Gi/lan (HL) [35]. 
164Lord Carlile, 'The definition of terrorism'. 
16S GiIlan (ECtllR) [82]. 
147 
The final factor, that any misuse of the power to authorise or confirm or search will expose 
the officer, the Secretary of State and authorising officer to 'corrective legal action' appears, 
in light of Gillan (HL), to be a toothless threat. The inadequacy of these limitations, coupled 
with the extraordinarily broad discretion inherent in the 'trigger' of 'expedient' led the 
ECtHR to hold that the authorisation process was not 'in accordance with the law' as it did 
not sufficiently guard against the arbitrary interference with a person's Convention rights by 
public officials.166 Alternative 'triggers' and additional forms of accountability which 
would ensure the authorisation process is prescribed by law are discussed in the final section 
below. 
The claimants in GilIan (HL) focused on the fact that an authorisation under section 44 was 
not accessible to the public so that individuals knew neither whether they were liable to be 
stopped and searched nor, if they were stopped and searched, whether the action was legally 
authorised. 167 Against this point, Lord Bingham argued that it would undermine the very 
purpose of the power if an authorisation were made public and that Ma/one permitted such 
an approach,168 in addition to citing Kuijper v the Netherlands as supporting the proposition 
that legislation may have to avoid excessive rigidity so as to deal with changing 
circumstances.169 The fact that at the time of Oil/an (HL) the MPS wcre in their fifth year of 
a rolling, pan-London authorisation effectively undercuts Lord Bingham's argument. Lord 
Hope viewed the question of legality as answered by the fact that the authorisation and 
confirmation could be viewed if tested by judicial review. 170 These argumcnts were not 
addressed by the ECtHR, but the mere act of reviewing the authorisation and confirmation 
could not be sufficient to ensure the authorisation was passed in accordance with the law. At 
the very least, even to adhere to the low standard of expediency, closed material on which 
the authorisation was based would also have to be viewed. 
166 ibid [79-82; 86-7]. 
167 Gi/lan (lIL) [32] (Lord Bingham). 
168 ibid [33). 
169 ibid [33]; Kuijperv The Netherlands (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. SE 16 app.no. 64848/01,277. 
170 Gillan (lIL) [55]. 
148 
4.5) Assessment 
This section will draw together the strands of the earlier discussion, concluding whether the 
authorisation process does or could satisfy the framework principles set out in Chapter 1 of 
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in adhering to CONTEST and adherence to 
human rights and how section 44 could be improved in relation to these principles. 
To begin with accountability, the preceding discussion reveals several disturbing gaps. At 
present the main functioning form of accountability over the authorisation process is the 
requirement of Ministerial confirmation. It suffers from a lack of transparency as to the 
methods used by the Home Secretary and as to the outcomes. Without such information, it 
is impossible to even attempt to discern whether the power is being abused or not. It also 
makes it very difficult to assess the exercise of the power as the bald number of section 44s 
carried out without knowledge of whether they relate to one or many authorisations provides 
no hint of whether the power is being used in a targeted or indiscriminate manner. This is 
aggravated by the lack of information passed to the PAs. 171 
Data on authorisations from all UK forces - whether Home Office or not - should be 
published annually with a time lag, similar to the Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System,t72 in an annex to the Carlile Reports or on their own. The number of authorisations 
should be broken down by force, number applied for, number approved, number modified 
by geographical area, number modified by time limit and number rejected. The publication 
should also indicate for how many days each authorisation lasted and whether the 
authorisations were for the maximum geographical limit, in terms of both those applied for 
and those confirmed. In terms of the geographical limit, this information could perhaps be 
broken down further by broad percentages (e.g. 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of the force area) 
by the force. The number of stops carried out under each authorisation, broken down in the 
usual manner, should also be published. As the relevant authorisation would be evident 
from the date of the stop, it will require little change in practice and impose no additional 
171 PA01; PA02. 
172 Published under Criminal Justice Act 1991, section 95. 
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bureaucratic burdens on the officer exercising the power, although it may require changes to 
the stops database and to the PDA (palm computer) software. None of this information 
reveals sensitive data which might hamper police activities or enable would-be tcrrorist to 
'pattern spot', although for this reason it may not be appropriate to provide details of the 
dates to which authorisations pertain should be revealed. That such information is not 
sensitive is underlined by the fact that the MPS recently revealed the temporal limits of its 
authorisations between 19/212001 and 22/4/2009. 173 Such information, while not revealed 
sensitive material, would make it far easier to hold police forces to account. 
The mere fact of having an authorisation in place does not mean that any section 44' s need 
be carried out: 'the [authorisation] form is not a policy document nor is it a tactical 
deployment document', although clearly the force should not 'keep it up its sleeve for a 
rainy day'. 174 This raises the question of whether there should be accountability at the level 
of tactical deployment? Such accountability would require at a bare minimum data linking 
authorisations with the number of stops carried out under them. Additional information 
regarding where and when the stops were carried out would enable the necessity of the given 
temporal and geographical boundaries to be tested. While it is plausible that the number of 
stops under each authorisation might be published under the 'section 95 statistics' or in a 
Home Office statistical bulletin, it seems highly unlikely that the additional information 
would be made public; the most likely argument against this being that it would enable 
would-be terrorists to anticipate the use of the power and thus attempt to avoid it. The 'bare' 
number of section 44s carried under each authorisation should ensure that authorisation are 
not passed for a 'rainy day'. If a force is consistently tending towards the maximum 
geographical and temporal limits then it may be appropriate for the Independent Reviewer, 
who has security clearance, to probe more closely into the necessity of using the maximum 
limits, or the issue could be brought before judicial review. 
173 MPS, 'Section 44 Authorisation Data'. 
174 MPSSNR05. 
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The Home Office forces are not obliged to disseminate information of their operations to 
each other nor to non-Home Office forces, nor vice-versa, however, the successful 
interaction of the various forces within the 'Guardian forces' (the MPS, the City of London 
Police, the BTP and the MOD Police), indicates that such cooperation is possible. There 
should be a requirement to notify another force immediately following the signing of an 
authorisation which is likely to impinge upon their force area whereupon the forces can 
notify their own PA. Another option would be to require notification following the decision 
to tactically deploy section 44, although this would intrude more into forces' operational 
independence and could be problematic if a decision to deploy the power was taken at short 
notice. The first option therefore seems preferable and should be contained within a 
schedule to section 44. 
Changes should be made to reduce the possibility of using 'short term' authorisations. As 
discussed above, encouraging police forces to use shorter authorisations is a positive but the 
present system of 'short term' authorisations can be viewed as constituting something of 
loophole, given that it effectively avoids Ministerial oversight. There should be an 
opportunity for temporally 'short' authorisations to be issued subject to the 'normal' 
confirmation process if submitted sufficiently in advance, the present system being clearly 
geared towards allowing sufficient operational leeway to authorise the use of section 44 for 
immediate deployment if required. To this end TACT, section 46 should be amended to 
read: 
46(3A) In the case of an authorisation that is for a period of up to 48 hours the NJU 
must be contacted immediately when the authorisation is signed. 
46(4A) In the case of an authorisation that is for a period of up to 48 hours ifit is not 
confirmed by the Secretary of State within 24 hours beginning with the time when it 
is given-
46(4A)(a) it shall cease to have effect 
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46(4A)(a) its ceasing to have effect shall not affect the lawfulness of anything done 
in reliance on it before the end of that period. 
The NPIA Advice and HO Circular should be amended to include directions urging 
authorising officers to submit temporally 'short' authorisations several days before the date 
of commencement to allow sufficient time for confirmation and to caution against the use of 
'short term' authorisations as a means of bypassing the confirmation process. Data on the 
number of 'short term' authorisations made without prior confirmation should be published, 
broken down by force, alongside the other authorisation data detailed above. The HO 
Circular should also include the requirement that any forces seen to rely unduly on such 
authorisations be subject to an automatic review by their PA and/or the Independent 
Reviewer and/or the IPCC. 
In terms of community accountability, at present the major conduits between the community 
and the police, the PA, and representative groups such as the CORPs and lAGs may be left 
out of the loop due to the absence of any statutory requirement that they be informed before, 
during or subsequent to an authorisation. This situation undermines community 
accountability over section 44 and the ability of the PA to fulfil their statutory function of 
effective oversight of their force. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that non-
Home Office forces use the power widely and in doing so may impinge upon a Home Office 
force area where the local PA or police-community group may be unaware of the 
authorisation. This is too crucial a part of the accountability jig-saw to be left to the whims 
of best practice. Underlying these issues is the problem of identifying the transient 
'community' who are stopped outside their own police district or even force, whose 
commonality is that they are either commuters, tourists or people on a night out. Therefore, 
even if improvements were made to the system as it applies to the PAs and the other 
community groups, a gap will remain. 
Despite this underlying difficulty, efforts must be made to improve the accountability 
structures. A proposal is being considered by the Association of Police Authorities 
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regarding the development of a national protocol to govern the reporting of authorisations 
and subsequent activity under section 44 to the PAs.17S As this has not yet been approved, it 
is necessary to consider additional options. Even if a national protocol is developed, it 
would be better to entrench it as a schedule to TACT rather than as an ACPO national 
protocol which, while likely to be adhered to, carries no legal weight. A schedule should be 
added to TACT and section 44 be amended to state that the provisions of the schedule apply 
when a person is stopped under section 44. The schedule should require adherence to the 
Practice Advice on similar lines to the obligation to adhere to the PACE Codes, that is, a 
breach will not of itself give rise to civil or criminal liability but would be admissible in 
evidence.176 The Practice Advice should also be amended to require, rather than encourage, 
engagement with CORPs and lAGs, although it should be at the force's discretion whether, 
subject to security concerns, this occurs retrospectively or prospectively. The Advice should 
also include a requirement that in areas where section 44 is frequently used the PA should 
conduct an annual review considering, inter alia, the necessity for authorisation, whether the 
geographical and temporal limits tend towards the minimum or maximum and, if the latter, 
whether there is sufficient justification for this approach, as well as the areas already cited 
by the Practice Advice relating to the exercise of the power. In addition, the schedule should 
require notification of: a) the PA in whose area an authorisation has been granted; b) any PA 
in whose area the exercise of section 44 may be carried out pursuant to an authorisation 
where the force areas overlap (i.e. non-Home Office forces should inform the relevant PA 
when the authorisation is likely to impinge upon their district); and, c) the Chief Constable 
or equivalent of any force in whose area the exercise of section 44 may be carried out 
pursuant to an authorisation where the force areas overlap. 
The core issue with the authorisation process is the unfettered discretion afforded by the 
trigger of 'expedient'. It is clear that nothing less than an amendment of the trigger will 
suffice to address the concerns raised in Gillan (ECtIlR). The new usage of the powers, in 
m PAOl (personal email correspondence 3rd February 2010). 
176 PACE 1984, Section 67(10-11). 
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terms of the 'patchwork' authorisation and 'strands' approach, suggests two possible 
options. The first, and preferable, option is to simply raise the trigger across the board. One 
alternative to 'expedient', temporarily instigated in response to the ECtHR's refusal to allow 
the appeal of Gillan (ECtHR) to the Grand Chamber, is 'necessary' .177 If the trigger were 
permanently raised to 'necessary', then this formula would restrict the MPS to 'Level 2' 
deployments and the BTP to 'Strand I' and 'Strand 2'. 
A second option would be to adopt a two-tiered approach, with different triggers for the 
authorisation of section 44 around high risk sites, including transport hubs, from other areas, 
the former being of a lower threshold. Given that 'Level 2' areas are identified in response 
to particular events or intelligence, it should be possible to meet the higher threshold of 
'necessary'. This option may not impact significantly on the use of section 44 by the MPS 
and BTP, although the higher standard serves to remind both senior and front-line officers 
that this is an extraordinary power to be used in specific circumstances. It could 
significantly reduce the use of the power in other areas. When questioned about an 
alternative to 'expedient', Lord Carlile suggested that a phrase such as 'reasonable for the 
protection of the public' would be more suitable than 'necessary,.178 This might be an 
appropriate trigger for 'Level l' I 'Strand l' areas which are at risk from a general rather 
than specific threat, possibly due to their innate vulnerability or importance. If 
implemented, the authorisation data to be published, discussed above, should be broken 
down by the number of 'Level 1 'I'Strand l' and 'Level 2' type authorisations. This would 
provide some additional transparency and permit closer monitoring of the use of section 44 
by the general public, PAs and Parliament. 
While it seems probable that the threshold of 'necessary', along with additional transparency 
around the authorisation, would ensure that the authorisation of section 44 is 'in accordance 
with the law', the lower threshold suggested by Lord Carlile is unlikely to suffice. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, the deployment of section 44 is such that it may 
177 HC vol 513 col 540 8 July 20 I 0 (Theresa May, MP). 
178 Lord Carlile. 
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require closer scrutiny over the authorisation process. Additional accountability is therefore 
required. One method would be to make the authorisation subject to judicial rather than 
ministerial confirmation. The most likely objection to such oversight is that the 
authorisation will be at least partially justified on closed information. There is, however, 
precedent for such judicial oversight in relation to extensions to pre-charge detention 
subsequent to arrest under TACT, section 41 and control orders.179 Judicial oversight is 
particularly crucial in the area of detention, as underlined by Brogan v UK. 180 While it 
might be argued that stop and search is of a 'lower order' that does not require such 
intensive oversight, the ECtHR's commcnts on Article 5 in Gillan (ECtHR) suggest that a 
section 44 stop might involve a detention, albeit ordinarily a short one.181 Even if it does 
not, it is evident that there is an incursion into the right to privacy under Article 8 and this of 
itself should merit judicial supervision, although it must be noted that the ECtllR has 
accepted ministerial oversight as sufficient in relation to wire-tapping.182 It is, however, 
notable that Shenin, the Special Rapporteur, has recommended that all measures which 
impact upon freedom of expression and assembly be subject to judicial oversight. ls3 As 
discussed in Chapter 5.4.4, section 44 has the potential to impact upon these freedoms. In 
addition, the practically unfettered nature of the discretion bequeathed upon the individual 
officers by the absence of reasonable suspicion and the broad nature of the object of the 
search point to this being an extraordinary power that warrants intensive safeguards. 
Another method for increased transparency would be to publish a list of sites which could be 
considered for authorisation under the lower threshold. The system of 'designated sites' set 
out in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA) suggests that sensitive 
179 Schedule 8, para. 33(3). Non-derogating control ordcrs issued in pursuance to Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005, section 3(1)(a). 
180 Brogan v United Kingdom. 
181 Gillan (ECtHR) [57]. 
182 Kennedy v United Kingdom (2011) 52 EHRR 4 app.no.26839/05. 
183 Schenin 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism' [29]. See also: CTITF 
Working Group on Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism 'Basic human 
rights reference guide: the stopping and searching of persons' (UN, New York 20 I 0)[ 12]. 
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sites could be listed by means of a statutory instrument. 184 In SOCPA all nuclear sites and 
those designated in the relevant statutory instrument are deemed to be 'protected sites' .185 
For section 44 all CNls and designated sites could be 'protected sites'. One notable 
difference between SOCA's designated lists and the proposed one is the number of sites that 
would be included. There are only 29 designated sites under SOCA, mainly RAF bases, 
government and royal buildings. 186 The list for section 44 would need to be substantially 
larger. Such a list could be seen as providing terrorists with a list of 'hard' targets enabling 
them to adjust their plans to target 'soft' sites thus merely shifting the risk rather than 
reducing it, although having an authorisation in place does not mean there will be actual 
deployment impling that merely being on the list does not mean the target will necessarily be 
'hardened' at any given time. Such a list might also raise issues of commercial sensitivity, 
as one MPS officer noted: owning or renting a property that is on the list would almost 
certainly push up insurance premiums which could make it difficult to operate and might 
even encourage businesses to move to a different city or country. As the officer asked, 'who 
wants to be the proprietor of a vulnerable site?,187 There could, however, be benefits to 
being on such a list: it would help to mitigate any attempt to bring a case via occupiers 
liability if there were a terrorist attack and enhanced security could encourage business to 
lease property or consumers to enter the premises if they perceive security to be higher 
there. 188 An alternative would be for the Home Secretary to draw up such list, which would 
not be published but would be scrutinised annually by the Independent Reviewer and 
perhaps a Parliamentary body such as the Home Affairs Committee. Given that a list of 
designated sites would almost certainly not be published, this two-tier approach would be a 
184 SOCPA, section 128. See, e.g. Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
(Designated Sites under Section 128) Order 2005, SI 2007/930. 
185 Section 128(IA). 
186 13 under Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Designated Sites under Section 
128) Order 2005, SI 2005/3447 and 16 under Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
(Designated Sites under Section 128) Order 2007, SI 2007/930. 
187 MPSSNR06. 
188 See further: National Counter Terrorism Security Office 'Counter Terrorism Protective 
Security Advice for Commercial Centres' (NCTSO, London 2008) 7. 
156 
regressive step that would lessen the transparency around, and hence potential accountability 
over, the authorisation of section 44. 
There is a final option, relevant only to the BTP, which would be to make stop and search a 
condition of entry onto the railways. This is the approach taken by Amtrak in the USA and 
can be compared with similar conditions of entry in relation to bars, clubs and football 
grounds etc. Amtrak requires, as a condition of carriage, that passengcrs consent to security 
inspections of persons and/or baggage on-board trains or at designated sites, such as train 
platforms and boarding or waiting areas. 189 National Rail could impose such a condition of 
carriage as part of the 'national rail conditions of carriage', or individual railway operators 
could alter the bye-laws, under the Railway Act 2005, section 46. An offence under the latcr 
could lead to a maximum of a level 3 fine. 190 There are a numbcr of objections that may be 
made against this suggestion. As noted by a BTP officer, 'the good thing about 44 ... is that 
it is not only subject to our own authorisation at a vcry senior level in the police service it's 
also subject to government scrutiny whereas a lower level carriage of entry condition 
probably wouldn't be so on that 44 is probably better' .191 Given the criticisms above 
regarding the failings in the present system of accountability further weakening these 
systems cannot be supported. An option would be to build in checks and balances within the 
bye-law or condition of carriage but this seems to be a long-winded way of arriving at the 
same result that section 44 offers at the moment. 
Such a condition of carriage would presumably be carried out by rail staff in addition to the 
BTP, which raises the additional subject of private policing. That it is feasible has been 
provcn in Israel, where private sccurity, in close association with the local police, run 
189 Amtrak 'Terms of transportation: carriage ofpassengcrs' < 
http://www.amtrak.com!servlet/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=am%2FLayout&cid=12 
41337896121> downloaded 22nd December 2009. 
190 Railways Act 2005, schedule 9, paragraph 2. 
191 BTPSNR03. 
157 
., . h k 11 192 H h Id d b 1 1 mtenslve secunty c ec sat ma s. owever, t ere wou nee to e c ose contra over 
training and recruitment, to a far greater degree than presently applicable to private security 
firms under the Private Security Industry Act 2001. 193 The blurring of the private and public 
policing spheres has been accelerating over the past decades, the details and consequences of 
which are beyond the scope of this research, however, the 'out-soureing' of counter-terrorist 
policing must be particular cause for concern. 194 Remembering that section 44 is an 
extraordinary and intrusive police power justified on the basis of tangible terrorist risk, how 
could it be justified to rely on private companies to carry out sufficient checks on and 
training of employees to ensure they are fit for the task? There could be no control over 
such procedures. Additionally, community and democratic accountability, such as it is, 
would be replaced by corporate accountability. It is also highly unlikely that National Rail 
or the individual train companies would be willing to take on the additional costs required to 
ensure there were enough security officers. 
4.6) Conclusion 
There have been some positive steps towards improving accountability over the 
authorisation process. The NPIA Practice Advice is to be welcome for its more detailed 
approach to the authorisation form, although its lack of imperative is a fundamental 
weakness. There is no outside scrutiny to ensure adherence to the guidance. There is 
potential for community groups, notably the relevant PAs to step in to fill this gap but, again, 
there is no compUlsion nor external monitoring. The second stage in the authorisation, the 
approval by the minister, is utterly opaque, the only comment on its functioning being the 
brief statements in the Independent Reviewer's Reports. This stage requires significant 
alteration to provide at least some degree of transparency. Accountability, in turns of 
'giving an account', is notable by its absence throughout the process, at least in terms of 
giving an account to the public, to the point where there can be said to be no systematic 
192 See: R Davis, C Ortiz, et a1. 'An assessment of the preparedness of large retail malls to 
prevent and respond to terrorist attack' (The Police Foundation, Washington 2006) I 0-11. 
193 Button, M, Private Policing (Willan, Cullompton 2002) 125-128. 
194 See, e.g. Ibid. 
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community accountability at all. The extremely permissive trigger of 'expedient' suggests 
that, at least without an analysis of the underlying intelligence, there is no possibility of a 
successful legal challenge against the validity of the authorisation. 
The adherence to CONTEST is far more nebulous, primarily due to the lack of transparency 
around the authorisation process, in particular, how many are granted, for what reasons and 
with what outcomes. It is apparent since Gillan (ECtHR) that the key human rights issue, 
that the process be prescribed by law, is not satisfied. Moreover, the various human rights 
that may be engaged when the power is exercised, discussed in the next chapter, are 
dependent on the authorisation being in itself justifiable. So although it may pass its sole 
test, to adhere to the spirit of human rights must require more stringent control. 
There are relatively straight-forward steps that could be taken which would make 
considerable inroads into the difficulties described above. These would centre around 
placing the NPIA Advice on the same standing as the PACE Codes, or supplementing the 
PACE Codes with similar content to that in the NPIA Advice, which must be approved by 
Parliament, and making imperative the requirement of engaging with community partners 
and the P A, including in terms of a required review where the force is a heavy user of 
section 44. In addition, a schedule should be added to TACT relating to section 44 which 
requires the publication of details of the authorisations, preferably broken down by 'Levels', 
with 'Level 2' - type authorisations sub-categorised. The number of authorisations applied 
for, granted, refused and modified by force should have to be published within the section 95 
statistics, alongside the number of 'short-term' authorisations. There should be a 
requirement of notification to PAs and other force when an authorisation is granted that 
might result in section 44s being carried out in their area. An attempt must be made to 
curtail the use of 'short term' authorisations by requiring that any authorisation lasting less 
than 48 hours be confirmed by the Minister within 24 hours and by amending the NPIA 
Advice to caution against their use except in exceptional circumstances. 
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The key change must be to the trigger for the authorisation. The options have been set out 
above. The best option would be the first, which raises the bar higher for all authorisations, 
whether 'Level l' or not. Such oversight should occur at the authorisation stage due to the 
difficulties arising from the nature of stop and search as part of street policing in exercising 
oversight over the practice of section 44. It is to that practice which this thesis now turns. 
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Chapter 5) The deployment of section 44 
Having considered the authorisation of section 44, it is time to turn to the deployment of the 
power. This chapter addresses the research questions: how is section 44 used and how ought 
it be used? It begins by setting out the provisions relating to the exercise of section 44, then 
assessing the factors invoked by the officers for using it, the safeguards provided by PACE 
Code A and the use of intelligence arising from section 44. This is followed by an 
assessment of the compliance of the exercise of section 44 with the BRA, which refers to the 
principles of the margin of appreciation and deference discussed in Chapter 1. The chapter 
concludes with an assessment of the deployment of section 44 against the framework 
principles of accountability, adherence to human rights and efficiency and effectiveness in 
terms of the CONTEST principles. 
S.l) The deployment of section 44 
Before discussing the factors which officers invoked for exercising section 44, it is 
necessary to outline the law governing it, arising from TACT and PACE Code A. The object 
of the search is articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism, referring 
to the definition in TACT, section 1, discussed in the previous chapter. 1 The ECtIIR viewed 
this 'as a very wide category which could cover many articles commonly carried by people 
in the streets,.2 There is explicitly no requirement of reasonable suspicion.3 
The power may only be exercised by a constable in uniform.4 That the exercise of the power 
is limited to constables in uniform chimes with the use of section 44 for high visibility 
policing, deterrence and the provision of public reassurance.s This includes PCSOs, 
providing them with their only stop and search power, although they can carry out stop and 
accounts.6 Within the MPS field sample, there was a strong reliance on PCSOs to carry out 
section 44 stops. It was indicated that, while this is not the de facto approach, some other 
boroughs that were 'heavy users' of section 44 also use PCSOs.' This was justified on the 
basis of logistics, which makes sense when the objective is deterrence and public 
reassurance through high-visibility police, although questions may be raised in relation to 
I Section 45(1 )(a). 
2 Gillan (ECtIIR)[83]. 
3 Section 45(l)(b). 
4 Section 44( 1 )-(2). 
s MPSFL02; MPSSNR03; MPSSNR04. 
6 Police Reform Act 2002, Schedule I, para.I5. 
7 MPSSNR04. 
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intelligence gathering, PCSOs ordinarily being less experienced and less well trained than 
full time officers.8 One of the BTP units interviewed, which carries out a substantial number 
of the force's section 44s, did not use PC SOs, while the other unit did use them, although 
one officer argued that 'it's bad' to use PCSOs for section 44s as 'it's not their job. Their 
job is community related, to talk to people,.9 
During the search a constable may require a person to remove headgear, footwear, an outer 
coat, jacket or gloves. I 0 Headgear worn for religious reasons may only be removed if there 
is a reason to believe the item is being worn wholly or mainly for the purpose of disguising 
identity and where practicable the item should be removed in the presence of an officer of 
the same sex and out of sight of anyone of the opposite sex. 11 When there may be such 
religious sensitivities, the officer should offer to carry out the search out of public view. 12 
Any item discovered in the course of a search which the officer reasonably suspects is 
intended for use in connection with terrorism may be seized and retained. 13 A search must 
be carried out at or near where the person or vehicle was stopped and take no longer than is 
reasonably required. 14 Most officers interviewed in the fieldwork maintained that it would 
take less than five minutes - some suggesting five as a maximum, some stating it would take 
a minute or two, although longer if there was a large bag to search. IS The pedestrian or 
driver, but not the passenger, who is stopped is entitled, upon request, to a written statement 
that the car or person was stopped by virtue of section 44( 1) or (2), so long as the application 
is made within twelve months. 16 This is in addition to the stop form, which must be given to 
all persons stopped.17 Refusal to submit to a stop or the obstruction of an officer in the 
exercise of his power constitutes a criminal offence under section 47 for which the person 
may be liable to imprisonment for up to six months and/or a fine not exceeding level 5 on 
the standard scale. 
8 MPSSNR04. 
9 BTPFL07. 
10 Section 45(3). 
11 Code A, note 4. 
12 Code A, note 8. 
13 Section 45(2). 
14 Section 45(4). 
IS MPSFL02; MPSFLOl; MPSFL04; MPSSNR03; MPSSNR04. 
16 Section 45(5). 
17 PACE, Code A, paragraph 4. 
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5.2) The factors for deploying section 44 
The fieldwork revealed several factors for exercising section 44: location, intelligence, 
deterrence, behaviour and external events. 
In keeping with section 44 as an 'all-risks' policing power, location was the central factor 
for deployment, with the focus being on CNIs and high risk or 'iconic' sites. ls This focus 
has been explicitly incorporated within the MPS' 'Levels' system, so it is unsurprising that 
location featured strongly among those interviewees as a factor for using section 44. 19 In 
terms of the BTP, although location is not explicit within the 'Strands' approach, the fact 
that much of the rail network constitutes a CNI means location must be considered an 
underlying factor. The majority of stops are carried out in and around the railway station, 
although some are carried out on trains.20 
The second most cited factor for the use of section 44 was intelligence.21 This usage is 
consistent with the objectives of section 44 (see Chapter 4.1) and it is appropriate that there 
is a dialogue between the front-line officers and members of SO 15 regarding such 
intelligence. Intelligence may be gathered from the search itself, however, the low 'hit rate' 
suggests this is not the main source.22 While the 'hit rate' relates to subsequent arrests, 
preumsably if someone was found in possession of materials which could be used in 
connection with terrorism they would be arrested and questioned. Although the broad nature 
of such materials might suggest that the person's details could be taken and the issue 
followed up as necessary, there is no obligation to provide such details to an officer during a 
section 44 stop, there being in any case obvious questions concerning the veracity of any 
details which may be given. While in certain circumstances intelligence can be gathered 
from nearby CCTV cameras, it appears that a considerable amount of the intelligence comes 
from what the person says during a stop. 
The fieldwork revealed it to be common practice to 'chit chat' with persons who have been 
stopped, including asking where they came from and were going to.23 This was justified on 
the basis that it was 'good manners as much as anything,24 that aimed to put the person 
18 MPSSNROl; MPSSNR02; MPSSNR03; MPSFL02; MPSFLOl; MPSFL04. 
19 MPSFL02; MPSFLO 1; MPSFL04; MPSSNR02; MPSSNR03. 
20 BTPSNR03. 
21 MPSFL04; MPSSNR04; BTPFLOI; BTPFL02; BTPFL03; BTPFL04. 
22 See Chapter 4.1. 
23 MPSSNR03; MPSSNR04; MPCSOOl; MPSC002; BTPFLOI; BTPFL03. 
24 MPSSNR03. 
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being stopped 'at ease'.25 Drawing on Stone and Pettigrew's conclusions, this would seem 
to constitute 'best practice', their research having strongly emphasised the attitude of the 
officer during the encounter.26 Furthermore, it can be argued that citizens are under a civic 
duty to assist officers in detection and prevention of crime.27 
Most officers noted either that people were not obliged to give any information during a 
section 44 stop or stated that they talked to the people but did not 'interview' them.28 One 
officer said that he would make a note of any intelligence in a pocket book and get the 
person to sign it.29 However, another stated that on one occasion she was asked by SOl5 to 
make a note of mobile phone numbers, which she did, and 'they got lots of intelligence from 
that' .30 This is very dubious ground to which the retort 'if they don't want to talk to you 
they won't' is insufficient. It is analogous to the concerns surrounding stops by consent, 
discussed in Chapter 3.2, in respect of which it was noted that the lack of knowledge and 
power on the part of the person stopped, combined with the police reluctance to provide 
information and their tendency to 'bamboozle' the suspect meant that 'consent' was a very 
relative concept that 'frequently consists of acquiescence based on ignorance' against a 
background of 'contextual irrelevance of rights and legal provisions,.31 
Another factor for exercising section 44 was behaviour, including suspicious activity. This 
was a major factor with the BTP, corresponding to onc of their 'strands', but was cited less 
frequently by the MPS. The BTP utilise the Behavioural Assessment Screening System 
(BASS).32 This is one of a number of passenger screening systems, others include the 
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) and the Visible Intermodal 
Prevention and Response (VIPR).33 Such screening has become widespread in the transport 
industries in the US since 9111.34 It was described by onc officer as 'almost quantifying 
2S MPSSNR04; BTPFL04. 
26 Stone and Pettigrew 'The views of the public on stops and searches'. 
27 PACE Code C, lK asserts this to be so. 
28 MPSFLO I; MPSSNR04; BTPFL03. 
29 BTPFL04. 
30 MPSSNR04. 
31 Dixon, Coleman and Bottomley 'Consent and the legal regulation of policing', 346-348. 
32 BTPSNR03. 
33 Transit Cooperative Research Program 'Public Transportation Passenger Security 
Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers' (Transportation Research Board, 
Washington 2007) 19. 
34 Transportation Security Administration 'Behavior Detection Officers' 
<http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_ do/layerslbdo/index.shtm> accessed 20th December 2009. 
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common sense' ,35 requiring an understanding of the 'base level of what is normal in that 
area and [then] anything outside of that's going to heighten your suspicions' .36 In relation to 
section 44 it permits a targeted use of the power, although the suspicion is unlikely to reach 
the required level for an 'ordinary' stop. It is likely that similar criteria are used instinctively 
by experienced officers. For example, one MPS officer noted how, with experience, officers 
learn what to look out for: for example, attempted avoidance of the police or fear. 37 Another 
stated that they would stop someone looking 'out of place' .38 These examples related to all 
stop powers, not necessarily section 44. As discussed more fully in the next Chapter, these 
types of passenger screening methods may disproportionately target particular ethnicities or 
people with disabilities, such as autism, who may avoid eye-contact or act in ways which 
may be 'suspicious' .39 Nonetheless, BASS training should be provided across the forces as 
it would help hone the skills of, in particular, inexperienced officers and reinforce the fact 
that it is behaviour, not someone's appearance, in terms of age, ethnicity, race or gender, that 
should prompt suspicion. It could be of significant benefit to PCSOs, who may lack the 
experience and confidence levels of constables in relation to stop and search given that 
section 44 is their only stop and search power. In an example perhaps of lack of confidence 
and/or experience, one PCSO felt that stopping someone because of their behaviour would 
be more the purview of a constable who could use section 43.40 
A note of caution should be sounded, however, as evident from the successful civil suit 
brought by a passenger, who happened to be the co-ordinator of the American Civil Liberties 
Union's (ACLU) national campaign against racial profiling, who was stopped and asked for 
identification when exiting Logan Airport and was then detained when he refused.41 The 
case was supported by the ACLU who criticised the role of behavioural screening, although 
the jury decided the case without considering what role such screening had played. The case 
may be distinguished on the grounds that it concerned a border search. The US Supreme 
Court has held that routine checkpoints carrying out stop and question and a visible search of 
cars without reasonable suspicion near the Mexican border did not violate the 4th 
Amendment because the need to carry out the checkpoints to stop illegal immigrants was 
Transit Cooperative Research Program, 'Public Transportation Passenger Security 
Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers' 19-20. 
35 BTPFL01. 
36 BTPFL01. 
37 MPSFL02. 
38 MPSSNR03. 
39 See Chapter 6.2.2.2. 
40 MPSFL01. 
41 King Downing v Massachusetts Port Authority Civil Action No. 2004-12513-RBC. 
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great whereas the intrusion on the 4th Amendment was quite limited.42 It is also notable that 
searches similar to section 44, carried out without reasonable suspicion by the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority, were deemed to constitute a special need that involved only a 
minimal intrusion into the 4th Amendment and were therefore constitutiona1.43 These US 
cases concerned stops without reasonable suspicion and not racial profiling, however, 
additional fears, relevant to the UK, regarding the role of racial profiling as an clement of the 
screening have been voiced.44 The issue of racial profiling is discussed further in the next 
section. 
Another manner of ensuring a more targeted use of section 44 is through the use of dogs 
trained to identify explosives, as used by the BTP .45 If a dog gives a clear indication on 
someone or something then section 43 can be used. However, if the dog gives a weak 
indication, which would be insufficient for section 43, it may be appropriate to use section 
44. 
Another factor for exercising section 44 was as a deterrence: would-be terrorists would sce 
high visibility police carrying out a large number of stops and avoid that location or area. 
This is explicit in the BTP's 'visible search activity' 'strand' and implicit in the references 
by MPS officers to the utility of section 44 in terms of high visibility policing (see Chapter 
4.1). There may be some differences in the approach of the two forces in that a BTP 
Sergeant stated the final strand is 'about just stopping people' ,46 while a MPS Sergeant 
noted that while no grounds were required they 'didn't start dipping everyone for the sheer 
hell of it' .47 PACE, Code A requires that section 44 not be used for reasons unconnected 
with terrorism and that its exercise reflects 'an objective assessment of the threat posed by 
the various terrorist groups active in Great Britain', but, coupled with the object of the 
search, it appears to allow the police to 'just stop people' if the purpose is the deterrence of 
• 48 
terrorIsm. 
42 United States v Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 US 543. See also: United States v Flores-
Montano (2004) 541 US 149. 
43 Mac Wade v Kelly (2006) 460 F.3d 260. 
44 ACLU 'ACLU of Massachusetts Challenges Use of Behavioral Profiling at Logan 
Airport' (November lOth, 2004) < http://www.aclu.orglnational-security/ac1u-massachusetts-
challenges-use-behavioral-profiling-logan-airport> downloaded 20th December 2009. 
45 BTPSNR05; BTPFLOI; BTPFL05. 
46 BTPSNR05. 
47 MPSSNR04. 
48 PACE, Code A [2.25]. 
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Two MPS officers referred to carrying out 'purely' or 'completely' 'random' stops.49 
Similarly, in relation to vehicular stops, one MPS officer attested to using 'random' stops,s° 
while another said a vehicle would be stopped because it was in an authorised area.sl Ihis 
use of 'random' or 'routine' stops has prompted criticism from Lord Carlile who, in relation 
to an observation of the BIP, noted that his one concern was their use of nearly 'random' 
stops, where it 'looked like they were stopping people for something to do' .52 In relation to 
numerical stops, which involve stopping, for example, every fifth person, most of the BIP 
officers were clear that these were illegal,53 constituting the fettering of a discretion with 
policy, whereas one MPS officer said he used them in relation to vehicular searches.54 
Stopping every eighth person stepping through a door is as (ir)rational as stopping everyone 
with a blue jumper. Similarly stopping every eighth car is as (ir)rational as stopping all 
Audis. Unless it is intelligence led, such arbitrary factors should not be used as they will 
distract the officer from paying attention to more rational indicators, such as suspicious 
behaviour or a car with an unusually heavy load. Ihis system of numerical stops may be 
contrasted with the officers being told to maintain a high visibility by stopping as many 
people as possible. This would not constitute a fettering of a discretion with a policy as it is 
arguable that this would be a briefing rather than 'policy' and, even if it were deemcd to be a 
policy, it would constitute a rational exercise of the discretion, the object being to deter 
terrorists from reconnaissance or acts of terrorism through a visible police presence. 
The final factor for exercising section 44, which was cited far less frequently than the others, 
is external events, such as a terrorist attack or attempted attack or a change in the terrorist 
threat level. One senior BTP officer cited the decreased threat level as one of the prompts 
for the DIP to move from a pan-force, rolling authorisation to the 'strands' approach.5S It is 
reasonable to expect the usage of section 44 to increase if there is an increase in the threat 
level, however, the continuance of the level at severe from July 2005 until July 2009 raises 
questions about whether there should be such an unsophisticated correspondence between 
the two. Indeed, if one focuses on intelligence gathering then, as suggested by one officer, 
there is no reason why this should decrease with a decreased, but still serious, threat level.s6 
49 MPSFLO 1; MPSSNR02. 
so MPSFL04. 
SI MPSSNR04. 
52 Lord Carlile. 
S3 C.f. BIPFL03. 
54 MPSFLOl. 
55BIPSNR03. 
S6 BTPFL04. 
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There have been substantial variations between the usage of section 44, particularly in some 
forces, despite the constant threat leve1.57 It remains to be seen whether the decrease in the 
threat level between July 2009 and January 2010 will be followed by a substantial decrease 
in the number of section 44 stops and the correspondence with the MPS' deployment of the 
'Levels' system -and the resulting decrease in section 44 stops - may skew the data. s8 
The emphasis on broad factors such as location or intelligence - the usefulness of which 
cannot be established until after the stop - rather than subjective factors such as behaviour is 
required by the dictates of 'all-risks' policing and enabled by the absence of the requirement 
of reasonable suspicion and the consequential permission to conduct random stops - the 
particular usefulness of section 44 in permitting random car stops being specifically 
mentioned in an interview.59 It is, however, a two-edged sword, as one senior officer stated: 
'the biggest problem .. .is how does an officer decide who they're going to search and that's 
the key in the whole issue around the person's liberty, rights and why me and not the person 
next to me,.60 This was echoed by a front-line officer who said: 'it's got to be black and 
white for police .. .it absolutely has to be straight down the line so officers know what they're 
doing' .61 The Independent Police Complaints Commission's (lPCC's) position on stop and 
search, that the officer must explain why they are stopping the person,62 is extremely 
difficult to implement in relation to 'random' section 44 stops. This was acknowledged by 
one officer, who commented that 'it's still quite an uncomfortable thing to do, to search 
somebody with no grounds whatsoever, very difficult to explain,.63 Another said 'under 
section 44, because it is supposed to be a groundless search, it's very hard to formulate or to 
tell that person why you are searching them' .64 The primary problem is how to provide 
57 Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2008/09'; 
Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2007/08'; Ministry 
of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2006/07'; Ministry of Justice, 
'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2006'; Home Office, 'Statistics on Race 
and the Criminal Justice System - 2005'; Home Office, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal 
Justice System - 2004'; Home Office, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System -
2003'. 
58 See figure 4.1 above. 
59 MPSFL04. 
60 BTPSNR03. 
61 BTPSNR02. 
62 IPCC, 'IPCC position regarding police powers to stop and search' (lPCC, London 2009) 
principle 1; Mike Franklin. This is also the position of the UN, sce: CTITF Working Group 
on Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, 'Basic human rights reference 
guide: the stopping and searching of persons' [53]. 
63 BTPSNR02. 
64 BTPFLlO. 
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more concrete guidelines regarding the selection process without section 44 being subsumed 
within section 43. The NPIA Guidance required the use of objective criteria but the criteria 
provided - location and/or the person - offers little actual guidance, as discussed further 
below at Chapter 5.4 and 5.5. 
One factor which all officers stated they did not use in determining whether or not to 
exercise section 44 was racial profiling, although some officers felt that they should be able 
to target certain ethnicities who were more likely to be engaged in a particular type of 
terrorism, while stating that they did not do so. Two officers commented that they could use 
racial profiling, if it was based on 'really good intelligence', but said that this had not 
happened to date.6s Another officer said: 'I don't feel comfortable in stopping white, male 
or female ... when quite clearly in this situation, i.e. the Al Qaeda ... [they] tend to be [from 
an] Asian background' .66 One officer stated that they stopped people to 'balance' the 
numbers and that it was these, white people, who were most vocal in thcir opposition to the 
power.67 Another officer did not think such 'balancing' was useful: 'it's a waste of our time, 
it's going to alienate people who are never going to be of any interest to us,.68 Another 
officer categorically denied that 'balancing' occurred.69 Officers should not stop people to 
'balance' the statistics on ethnicity as doing so is unlawful, being the fettcring of a discretion 
with policy. On a corresponding issue, most officers rejected the concept of a terrorist 
profile,7o although one said that 'young British Asian males are going to be 90 per cent of 
the guys that commit terrorist activity under the AQ [al 'Qaeda] banner,.71 One officer 
questioned whether it was possible to construct a profile but argued that if there was relevant 
intelligence the police should use it.72 Profiling is discussed in depth in Chapter 6.2. 
5.2.1) Reasons for not exercising section 44 
In terms of reasons not to exercise section 44, there were more disparate opinions. The 
officers appeared to be talking theoretically rather than from experience. There appeared to 
6S BTPSNR05; BTPFL05. 
66 BTPFL09. 
67 BTPFL05. 
68 BTPFLOl. 
69 MPSFL03. 
70 MPSSNROl; MPSFL07; MPSFL06; MPSFL01; BTPFL02; BTPFL03; BTPFL06; 
BTPFL04; BTPFLlO c.r. BTPFL08 and BTPFL09 who were equivocal. 
71 BTPFL05. 
72 BTPSNR02. 
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be different interpretations to the question; 73 one officer stated that once you start to carry 
out a section 44 stop you would finish it, interpreting the question as asking what factors 
would make you stop mid-search rather than before the search started.74 Another interpreted 
it in the same way, stating that whether they finished the stop would depend on 'whether the 
stop's a normal stop or an important stop' ,75 while others appeared to be discussing what 
would make one not start to carry out a stop. Given the prompts of safety, conflicting 
priorities and fear of causing or aggravating community tension, the officers stated that the 
first two factors would be reasons not to carry out a section 44 stop, safety relating to either 
officers or the general public, with an urgent call possibly also relating to someone's safety, 
for instance if someone had been stabbed nearby.76 One peso stated that if the peso with 
whom they were paired was called away then, for reasons of officer safety - peso's must 
work in pairs - they would not exercise section 44.77 A few officers mentioned community 
tension.78 One commented that in some areas of the borough there could be community 
tension but that they would still carry out section 44.79 
A final issue relating to the exercise of the power, although not in fact a factor for exercising 
it, is the confusion regarding whether the stop power could change during the stop and 
search depending on the outcome. The suggested scenario was that while carrying out a 
section 44 stop drugs are found: does the power then 'switch' to the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971, section 23? Some thought it would not change,80 while others though that it would 
change.81 One officer was more nuanced, stating that if a further search then had to be 
carried out then it would be done under section 23.82 Another said that the power would not 
change, although the drugs would be seized and an arrest carried out under section 23.83 
Onc officer referred to a borough where there was procedure whereby if something was 
found in the course of section 44 stop to prompt a search under a different power - for 
instance drugs were found, then the section 44 search ceases and another under the relevant 
73 See Appendix A. 
74 MPSSNR03. 
75 MPSFL04. 
76 MPSSNR03; MPSSNR04; MPSFL02; MPSFLOl; MPSFL04; BTPFLOl; BTPFL03. 
77 MPSFLOl. 
78 MPSFL04; BTPFLO 1; BTPFL04. 
79 MPSFL04. 
80 MPSSNR04. 
81 MPSSNR03; MPSFL04; BTPFL03. 
82 MPSFL02. 
83 MPSSNR04. 
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power begins.84 This is the correct approach, however, the confusion in this area points to 
the need for such procedures to be introduced in across all forces and for more, or refresher 
training to be given, particularly as this may skew the statistics if an officer were under the 
impression that a section 44 stop which resulted in a drugs seizure should be categorised as a 
section 23 stop. Both the section 44 stop which initiated the search and the subsequent 
section 23 search should be recorded. To ensure consistency across forces, a paragraph 
should be added to PACE detailing the approach officers should take when progressing 
through two stop and search powers in this manner. 
5.3) Safeguards 
In addition to the regulations within TACT, section 44 is governed by PACE Code A,85 
pursuant to PACE, section 60(1)(a). The latest version of Code A came into force on the 1st 
January 2009.86 The general guidance, relating to all powers of stop and search, states that 
the power to stop and search: 'must be used fairly, responsibly, with respect for the people 
being searched and without unlawful discrimination', be carried out 'with courtesy, 
consideration and respect for the person concerned' and that the co-operation of the person 
to be searched must be sought in every case.87 The person being searched must be informed 
that they are being detained for a search, which legal power is being exercised, the purpose 
of the search and that they are entitled to a record of the search.88 If the person appears not 
to understand or to be deaf reasonable steps must be taken to explain their rights under the 
Code.89 
These regulations appear to have been taken on board by the poliee with officcrs listing 
'respect' ,90 'politeness' ,91 'fricndliness',92 'communication skills' ,93 and the provision of as 
much information as possible regarding the stop - why the person is being stopped, what the 
84 MPSSNR05. 
8S Paragraph 2.1(c). 
86 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revisions to Code A) (No.2) 
SI Order 2008/3146. 
87 Paragraphs 1.1,3.1,3.2. 
88 Paragraphs 3.8(a), (c), (d) and 3.10. 
89 Paragraph 3.11. 
90 MPSFL02; MPSSNRO 1. 
91 MPSFL02. 
92 MPSFL02; BTPFL02. 
93 BTPFLO 1; BTPFL03; BTPFL04. 
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object of the search is for, etc.,94 as factors constituting a 'good stop' or which made an 
officer 'good' at stop and search. One noted that there can be difficulties when explaining 
the reason for the stop to tourists who may not speak English very well and that on such 
. . . d h h I 95 I fl ' occasIOns wntmg own t e reasons may e p. The availability of 'stop ea ets, 
explaining the objectives behind section 44 and the reasons for its exercise are a positive 
step in adhering to the Code A requirements, although they should be available in several 
languages for both tourists and residents who may have no or a low level of English. One 
senior officer noted that complaints regarding section 44 focused on why the person had 
been stopped with no criticism of the manner of the police in stopping them; some even 
stated that the officer acted respectfully and courteously. 96 
Another safeguard, which provides a layer of accountability, are the annual reports by the 
Independent Reviewer. These provide an account to Parliament, accessible to the general 
public, regarding the exercise of section 44. The discussion on section 44 runs over only a 
couple of pages and does not go into significant detail, although this is both predictable and 
necessary given the present breadth of counter-terrorism powers and the corresponding 
limits on the Reviewer's time and space in the report. In addition, the commentary on 
section 44 became, on the whole, rather pro forma. This can be viewed as reflecting the 
static nature of the use of the power over the past number of years, which perhaps explains 
the substantially more strident tone taken in the 20 I 0 Report, after the Gillan (ECtIlR) 
I· 97 ru mg. 
5.3.1) Stop forms 
One key aspect of accountability over section 44 are the stop forms. 98 As discussed in 
Chapter 3.2.3, these were instituted following the recommendation of the Macpherson 
Report.99 According to PACE, Code A, 'forces in consultation with police authorities must 
make arrangements for the records to be scrutinised by representatives of the community' .100 
The operation and effectiveness of the various police-community organisations is discussed 
94 MPSFLOl; MPSFL04; BTPFL02; BTPFL03; BTPFL04. 
95 MPSFL01. 
96 MPSSNRO 1. 
97 Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 2009 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of 
the Terrorism Act 2006'174-187. 
98 Form 5090 (see appendix A). 
99 Sir W Macpherson, 'The Macpherson Report'. 
lOO PACE, Code A, paragraph 5.4. 
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in the next Chapter. In 2009 the forms were changed, shortening them considerably.IOI 
They aim to provide a system of oversight, which feeds into the statistics on the use of stop 
and search, providing a record for the person stopped. The stop form given to the person 
stopped has a second page explaining the person's rights under each stop power. A form 
must be completed for every stop at the time and given to the person stopped, or if there are 
exceptional circumstances which would make it wholly impracticable then once it becomes 
practical.102 From the officers surveyed the trend was to complete the form on the spot.103 
One community representative said that when he joined the MPA in 2006, it took some 
boroughs 180 days to input the stop forms, although this period had decreased to 30 days by 
2009.104 This raises questions relating to intelligence gathering objectives of section 44, 
presuming that information is inputted into the intelligence database at the same time. The 
default position, that the officer must provide his or her name, does not apply in cases of 
enquiries linked to the investigation of terrorism where the officer must only provide their 
warrant number. 105 One officer stated that she would normally give the name of the base 
station, notwithstanding that this was not required. 106 
As section 44 has no requirement of reasonable suspicion officers could complete the form 
very tersely, merely stating that section 44 was used. Some of the officers surveyed took 
this approach, one saying they only put in 'searching under section 44, TACT, searching for 
paraphernalia, documentation and the operation we're on',1°7 while another stated they 
would just put in 'section 44' and who it was authorised by.108 Other officers took a more 
expansive approach, some put in 'all the details' ,109 some put in information such as location 
and timellO and possibly why section 44 was being used at that location. I I I One of the units 
had 'sticky labels ... which explain that the power has been granted by the ... deputy Chief 
Constable and authorised in conjunction with the Home Secretary and it has the powers' 
101 Compare the old form in Appendix B. 
102 PACE Code A [4.l-4.2A]. 
103 MPSFL01; MPSSNR03; BTPFLOl; BTPFL03. 
\o4 COMMD. 
105 Paragraphs 3.8(b), 4.4. 
106 MPSFL02. 
107 MPSFLO 1. 
108 MPSSNR03; BTPFL02; BTPFL04. 
109 BTPFL03. 
110 MPSSNR04. 
111 MPSFL02; MPSSNR04. 
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listed beneath the statement.112 One officer drew a distinction between a 'normal stop' 
where nothing is found, in which case 'no further action taken' is written on the form, and a 
stop where something comes out of the stop, in which case that will be recordcd. l13 In a 
similar vein, another officer said that if they had no suspicions about someone the form 
would be quite brief, whereas if they had some suspicions they would 'try and get as much 
information as possible' .114 Some guidclines as to what information should be includcd in 
the case of authorised stops should be addcd to PACE Code A to ensure consistcncy. 
All forms must be entered onto thc force database. Most frequently the officer inputs the 
form,llS although sometimes an officer's assistant I 16 or a deskbound officcr does it. 117 In 
the MPS when, for instance during a large event, officers are brought in from other boroughs 
they sometimes leave the forms to be inputted by members of that borough. I 18 The data 
quality manager for the MPS stated that 'sometimes' the data quality is bettcr if the pcrson 
who writes the form inputs as this avoids any issucs surrounding bad handwriting and may 
allow the officer to pick up a misscd entry or obvious error (such as giving a woman's name 
and then ticking the gendcr as male). I 19 
The BTP have rolled out PDAs, which are hand hcld computcrs, at lcast to the units 
surveyed, and the MPS bcgan to pilot them in early 20 I 0. 120 The BTP use thcirs in 
conjunction with portable printcrs carried in their jackets, connected by Bluetooth, although 
paper copies are also carried in case there is a technical fault. 121 There are a two major 
advantages to the PDAs. First, the stop form is automatically inputted into the force 
database. Second, there are some boxes which must be completed before the officer can 
move onto the next screen. 122 There are also some potential drawbacks. It was noted that 
they take a 'little bit 10nger,.123 The BTP's printed copy of the form is shorter than the 
paper form and does not explain the various stop and search powers nor the person's rights; 
112 BTPSNROl. 
IJ3 MPSFL04. 
114 BTPFLOl. 
lIS MPSFL02; MPSFLOI; BTPFL04. 
116 MPSFLO 1. 
117 BTPFL04. 
118 Data Quality Manager (DQM). 
119 DQM. 
12°DQM. 
121 BTPFLOl. 
122 BTPFL03. 
123 BTPFLOl; BTPFL03. 
174 
rather the person is referred to a website. However, the person may be given a stop leaflet, 
which details the extent of the power and their rights. Although most people now have 
access to the internet, perhaps via a library or similar, they may not have access to (free) 
printing. To ensure the use of abbreviated forms does not impact unfairly upon such people 
they should be given the option of having the full form or relevant information printed for 
them at a local police station, upon production of the stop form. 
What was worrying about the discussions of the stop forms with the front line officers was 
their absolute lack of knowledge concerning the audit trail. All were aware that the forms 
had to be inputted into the stop database but few knew - even vaguely - what happened after 
the forms were inputted - whether they were audited at borough level or centrally or how 
they were audited.124 In one of the BTP units, the sergeant checked the forms and signed the 
back of each when this was done. 12S This general lack of knowledge suggests that the forms 
provide little in terms of a real audit and instead are just an example of 'number crunching'. 
Most officers could not give any example of sanctions or measures being applied for the 
misuse of section 44, although one remembered being taken aside and told 'it might be a 
good idea' to carry out the stop slightly differently,126 while another said they had spoken to 
a member of the team, advising them on how to improve their stop.127 Lord Carlile knew of 
similar measures - where a senior officer advises a junior officer to amend the way they 
. 44 128 carry out section . 
5.4) Intelligence 
This section considers the role of intelligence relating to the exercise of section 44. 
Intelligence may be broken down into four constituents: collection, collation, evaluation and 
analysis. 129 It is beyond the scope of this research to go into detail regarding the evaluation 
or analysis of intelligence, 130 although it should be noted that it is when the step from data 
collection to data collation and analysis is taken that ECIIR, Article 8 is most likely to be 
124 MPSSNR03; MPSSNR04; MPSFL02; MPSFLOI; MPSFL04. 
125 BTPSNRO I. 
126 BTPFL04. 
127 BTPFLl O. 
128 Lord Carlile. 
129 Phillips, D, 'Police intelligence systems as a strategic response' in C IIarficld and others 
(eds) The handbook of intelligent policing: consilience, crime control, and community safety 
(OUP, Oxford 2008) 26. 
130 Sce, e.g. Ibid; Innes, M, Fielding, N and Cope, N, 'The appliance of science?': the theory 
and practice of crime intelligence analysis' (2005) 45 BJC 39. 
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engaged. \31 This section will instead focus on collection and collation, in particular the 
potential intersections with human rights, and data quality. That intelligence gathering is 
one of the objectives of section 44 is both a consequence of the imperatives of the risk 
society and chimes with the centrality of intelligence in broader counter-terrorism terms. 132 
While intelligence stands as the life blood of counter-terrorism -and policing more broadly -
it also constitutes a potential minefield in terms of accountability and adherence to human 
rights, in particular the right to privacy. In a report on surveillance, the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution identified 'the freedom of the individual' as a 
paramount precondition to proper constitutional functioning and warned that 'the growing 
use of surveillance by government bodies and private organisations ... could constitute a 
serious threat' to this principle, underpinned as it is by the requirements of privacy and 
restraint in the use of surveillance and data collection. l33 
5.4.1) Data quality 
Taking collection first, a key issue is its quality. For intelligence to be useful, it must be of a 
sufficient quality. The importance of data quality to policing was underlined by the Bichard 
Inquiry Report following the Soham Murders, which noted that poor data quality in a 
number of Ian Huntley's contacts with the police and social services, such as the day and 
month of his birth being reversed in his vetting check, contributed to him 'falling through 
the cracks'. 134 Special attention must therefore be given to the procedures which ensure data 
quality in addition to systems of accountability and safeguards. The MPS have a data 
quality team (DQT), situated within the Directorate of Information, which aims to improve 
the quality of data retained by the MPS through technological solutions. The DQT produces 
a number of weekly and monthly reports which are collated centrally then fed back to, for 
example, the Stop and Search Action Team and boroughs. The reports focus on whether 
'the information is valid, whether it's in the right format, whether it is consistent across a 
report and also specifically some business rules that will be specific to that particular 
application'. \3S An example of a business rule in relation to stop forms is recording arrests 
131 Home Office 'The National Intelligence Model' (Home Office, London 2000) 29-38. 
132 Walker, C, 'Intelligence and anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom' (2005) 44 
Crime, Law & Social Change 387. 
133 Select Committee on the Constitution, Surveillance: Citizens and the State (ilL 2008-09, 
18-1 ). 
134 Sir M Bichard, The Bichard Inquiry Report (HC 2003-04, 653-1). 
I3S DQM. 
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related to counter-terrorism.136 A sample of the tests applied on a daily basis to the Stops 
Database is given in Table 5.1 below, with the full example providcd in Appendix B.2. 
Table 5.1: Tests applied to data in MPS Stops Databasel37 
Field in Stops Data Quality tests applied 
database 
Person Name contains invalid characters (e.g. numerals, invalid punctuation 
Forename marks) 
Name is entcred as 'Unknown' or 'N/A' or some variant 
Form indicates that person gave their name, but the field is blank or 
shown as 'N/N', 'REFUSED', 'ANONYMOUS' or some variant. 
Form indicates that person gave their name but only a single initial is 
entered. 
Age/DoB The Age entered is inconsistent with the DoB. 
DoB and Age are both blank 
DoB Year of Birth is pre 1900 
Is later than or the same as the Date of the Stop 
Not entered 
Age Age is <= 9 years 
Age is > 75 years 
Is recorded a 0 
Gender / Person The Person's gender is inconsistent with the Person's gender e.g. 
Forename Mary recorded as Male or Barry recorded as Female (we have list of 
names/genders that we are reasonably confident should agree). 
\36 DQM. 
137 Source: DQM. 
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Field in Stops Data Quality tests applied 
database 
Self-Defined Is blank or not recorded (where the reason for it not being recorded is 
Ethnicity (SDE) given as one ofthe 'N' codes: 
NI - Where the officer's presence is urgently required elsewhere 
N2 - Situation involving public disorder 
N3 - When the person does not appear to understand what is required 
N4 - Where the person declines to define their ethnicity 
Is not recorded (i.e. is blank on the form - no reason for not recording 
the SDE is given) 
Ethnicity (IC Is recorded as 'Unknown' 
Code) 
SDE& ICCode Are inconsistent e.g. SDE indicates 'Black or Black British' and IC 
code indicates 'White Northern European' 
Vehicle Vehicle is stopped, but registration mark is not recorded (fic\d is 
Registration blank) 
Mark 
Outcome/Subject Outcome is inconsistent with Subject of Search e.g. Only Searched a 
of Search vehicle, but outcome is shown as either Arrest, Verbal Warning, 
Advised (i.e. relevant to a person not a vehicle). 
Outcome is applicable to an adult only, but the Person stopped has an 
age of< 16 years - for Outcome code 7 - 'Directed to leave alcohol 
related crime or disorder locality. 
The Data Quality Manager highlighted the dual nature of the reports: 'We're trying to ask 
the person who created the stop in the first place to review the record but hopefully it's also 
a training and education activity as well to say these fic\ds are quite important, make sure 
you get it right next time' .138 The subjects of the above tests underlines the potential 
benefits of using PDAs to input stop forms: basie data inputting errors, such as giving a date 
of birth of 11111850, could be blocked by the software, ensuring officers can correct the error 
at the time they are completing the form and would, ordinarily. have the person stopped in 
front of them if any clarification were needed. The MPS systematic approach to improving 
their data is to be wc\comed and thought must be given to how to exploit these improved 
systems and this improved data to provide much needed accountability over section 44. 
138DQM. 
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In addition to these generic issues of data quality, data that is used for intelligence must 
adhere to additional quality principles. According to the 'Code of Practice: Management of 
Police Information', the source, nature and reliability of the police information should be 
graded.139 The usual approach is the 5 x 5 x 5 system which evaluates the source, from 
reliable to unreliable and unknown; the information, on a five-point scale; and, the 
appropriate handling code, that is, to what degree it may be disseminated among the police 
and partner agencies.140 An alternative approach is the 4 x 4 system which grades the 
reliability of the information, on a scale of A, B, C and X, and the source, on a scale of t to 
4.141 It appeared from the interviews that front-line officers simply inputted data they felt 
was relevant and that SOt5, or the relevant branch, then assessed the information and, 
presumably, applied the grade at that stage.142 
5.4.2) Collection 
Intelligence from section 44 stops tends to come from either oral statements made to the 
officer during the stop or from visual records obtained through CCTV. Any articles relating 
to terrorism which are found would also provide intelligence and the stop forms themselves 
may constitute intelligence, although one senior officer dismissed them as 'useless for 
intelligence' .143 In addition to the discussion at 5.1 above, regarding officers 'chit-chatting' 
with people stopped, it should be noted that the person stopped under section 44 may be 
lawfully detained only for the duration of that stop and search. Any detention thereafter for 
the purpose of questioning the person would be unlawful and constitute false imprisonment 
and a violation of the ECHR, Article 5. The illegality of such action is underlined by the 
NPIA 'Practice Advice', which states that section 44 'does not provide officers with the 
power to detain individuals for the purpose of questioning'. 144 In this respect section 44 
may be contrasted with the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, section 21, 
which permits officers to stop and question people to ascertain their identity and movements. 
Under section 21 the person may be detained until they have answered the relevant 
questions. A related issue is that section 44 may only be used for the purpose of searching 
for articles that could be used in connection with terrorism. It cannot be used primarily as an 
139 National Centre for Policing Excellence 'Code of Practice: Management of Police 
Information' (NCPE, 2005) para.4.3. 
140 Walker 'Intelligence and anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom', 411, footnote 
180. 
141 Harfield, C and Harfield, K, Intelligence: investigation, community and partnership 
(OUP, Oxford 2008) 193. 
142 MPSFL01; BTPFL02; BTPFL04; BTPFLOl; MPSFL05; BTPFL05. 
143 BTPSNR04. 
144 NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism' 12. 
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intelligence gathering tool, although it would be virtually impossible to prove intent in this 
regard. 
Turning to the use of CCTV, it should be noted that 'CCTV' is something of a misnomer 
given that most surveillance cameras today are networked and digital rather than 'closed-
circuit' .145 Given this proviso and the popular use of the term, 'CCTV' will be used in this 
research to refer to surveillance cameras. The use of CCTV to monitor the actions of an 
individual in a public place does not interfere with the individual's rights under Article 8,146 
however, the processing or collecting of the data and, in particular, making a permanent 
record of the image(s) may give rise to an interference with the right. 147 In Perry v UK the 
claimant successfully argued that the police had violated his Article 8 rights by covertly 
recording him in a police custody suite for the purposes of arranging a video identification 
parade.148 The ECtHR focused in particular on the fact that the CCTV was altered - the lens 
was focused - so as to capture a clear image of the claimant. While being on CCTV in the 
custody suite was foreseeable and would not ordinarily engage Article 8, the use to which 
the police put the footage 'went beyond the normal or expected use of this type of 
camera' .149 One officer described how he could call the control room, who would direct 
him to move the person stopped into a particular position so their image could be 
captured. lso The need to speak to an engineer or controller and direct them to direct andlor 
focus the camera on the person and possibly manoeuvre the person into an appropriate 
position to get a clear shot is analogous to the behaviour of the police in Perry, although the 
question of an Article 8 infringement is likely to turn on what is done to or with the image 
afterwards, as illustrated by the case of Friedl v Austria. ISI 
Friedl concerned an alleged violation of Article 8 by the Viennese police for photographing 
and retaining the image of the claimant who was attending a demonstration. The 
Commission held there was no violation of Article 8 on the basis that the photographs were 
of a public incident and were taken in view of ensuing criminal proceedings. IS2 The fact 
that the photographs remained anonymous and that neither they nor the personal details 
145 Home Affairs Committee, A surveillance society? (HC 2007-08, 58-I) [30]. 
146 Herbecq v Belgium (1887) 92-A OR 92 app.no.32200/96. 
147 Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 41 app.no.44647/98; Perry v United 
Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 3 app.no.63737/00. 
148 Perry v United Kingdom. 
149 ibid [38; 41). See also Peck v United Kingdom. 
150 BTPSNR05. 
151 Friedl v Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 83 app.no. A/305-B. 
152 ibid [49). 
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gathered subsequently by the police were entered into any data processing system was also 
highlighted.153 The ECtHR also highlighted the fact that the claimant in Friedl was at the 
location to demonstrate, the purpose of which is to be seen. Friedl suggests that if the image 
of the person stopped is captured on CCTV but they do not give their details and the image 
is not collated with a database this will not infringe Article 8, however, if the image is 
processed further or linked with personal data it seems likely to engage Article 8. If there is 
no reasonable suspicion, then it seems likely that the infringement will not be justifiable 
under Article 8(2). Although it is not clear-cut, the fact that Article 8 may be violated 
through this use of CCTV suggests that this practice should be reviewed and that considered 
procedures are put in place and made accessible to the general public. 
The use of CCTV may also engage the Data Protection Act 1998 (OP A) and may require 
authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). The DPA 
only applies to the data gathered from the CCTV and offers relatively little succour unless 
the individual can be identified, in which case it becomes 'personal data' and is covered by 
the 'data protection principles,.154 However, the use of CCTV operated for non-cri me-
related purposes, for example, road traffic cameras designed to manage the flow of traffic, 
for crime-related purposes may breach the OPA. The use of CCTV is not covered by the 
provisions of RIP A unless it is being used for a pre-planned operation, which would exclude 
the 'routine' use of section 44 under the MPS 'Level I' and DTP 'Strand I' and 'Strand 
3' .. 155 If CC TV is being used as part of a pre-planned operation, then an authorisation 
would have to granted under RIP A, section 28. Such an authorisation may be made if the 
authorising officer believes it necessary because, inter alia, it is in the interests of national 
. d' . 156 security an IS proportIOnate. 
Despite the recommendation of the 'National CCTV Strategy', there is to date no standard 
period for image retention. 15? The BTP retain any image which contains intelligence or 
reveals an offence for seven years and does not keep any others. 158 All the areas where the 
MOD Police carry out section 44 stops have CCTV coverage so the images are 
automatically captured and an officer may take copies of the images, upon production of 
153 ibid [50]. 
154 DPA, section 1; schedule 1. 
155 Home Office 'Covert surveillance and property interference: revised code of practice' 
(TSO, London 2010) [2.21; 2.27-2.28]. 
156 RIPA, section 28(1)(2); 28(3)(a). 
157 Gerrard, G and others, 'The national CCTV strategy' (ACPO/Home Office, London 2007) 
30. 
158 BTPSNR04. 
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appropriate documentation, which is kept for as long as necessary for the investigation. 159 It 
is evident that closer regulation is required as a matter of urgency. 160 This should address 
issues relating to the potential to infringe Article 8 ECHR and also seek to set forth clear 
lines of accountability, within the police forces and between them and the public the most 
obvious conduit being either the Information Commissioner and/or the CCTV Regulator. 
A difficult1y with CCTV as an intelligence source is that the quality of coverage varies 
widely across the country.161 There are variations in terms of how advanced the cameras 
are, with resulting issues relating to picture quality, whether they are static or not, and 
whether they are monitored or not and if so whether by an officer or a civilian. 162 There has 
been a vast proliferation of differing CCTVs, meaning that many are incompatible with each 
other, leading to difficulties for the police in playing back images. 163 One significant issue 
in terms of collecting intelligence from them is the interface between the CCTVs belonging 
to different organisations, be it local government, the police or private companies. The vast 
majority of CCTVs are owned and operated by private companies, although most public 
space CCTVs are operated by local authorities. 164 The City of London pioneered such 
integration with the creation of 'Camerawatch' in 1993, which networked over 1,200 
cameras from over 373 systems as part of the 'ring of steel' .165 Such integration has been 
replicated in London with the London Councils' Camera Sharing Scheme. 166 There is also a 
problem of information over-load whereby so much data is gathered that there is insufficient 
capacity to collate or analysis it. 167 These issues have been identified by the Government 
and are being addressed through the National CCTV Strategy Board which created a CCTV 
Oversight Body and a CCTV Regulator in December 2009. 168 The challenges and needs of 
counter-terrorism policing were specifically addressed, but the report of the consultation was 
d bl· 169 not ma e pu IC. 
159 MODPC (by email3rd February 2010). 
160 The implementation of a Code of Practice for CCTV is included in the Protection of 
Freedoms Bil12010-2011, sections 29-35. 
161 BTPSNR03. 
162 Gerrard and others 'The national CCTV strategy' 12. 
163 ibid 12. 
164 ibid 8. 
165 Norris, C and McCahill, M, 'CCTV: Beyond penal modernism?' (2006) 46 BJC 97. 
166 Gerrard and others 'The national CCTV strategy' 13. 
167 ibid 24. 
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5.4.3) Collation and dissemination 
Moving onto collation, the MPS is planning to integrate their stop forms system with their 
intelligence system, CRIMINT.170 This would permit officers to complete stop forms within 
CRIMINT and, if relevant, to complete an intelligence report which is automatically linked 
to the stop form. 171 Stop forms will also be able to be linked to each other. These linkages 
should ensure key intelligence is not overlooked and will enable more systematic analysis of 
the stop forms. The stops database could be used more broadly than at present to provide 
accountability over stop and search by performing analysis force wide on the number of stop 
forms which do not, for example, have ethnicity included, or the number of section 44 
searches being carried out on minors or in a specific area on a given date and time, for 
example when a protest occurred. If some issue is uncovered, then the relevant officer could 
be identified and measures taken. There is no indication that the Data Quality Team will 
move towards this type of audit, and it may be that their attempts to improve the quality of 
the data gathered by the MPS would be undermined if they began to audit it in such a 
manner as instead of aiming to help the police improve thcir data quality the Data Quality 
Team may be viewed in opposition to the police, as a monnitoring mcchanism that is trying 
to 'catch them out'. However, there is no reason why a separate team, perhaps linked to the 
Stop and Search Action Team or similar, could not do so. Thought should be given to 
whether CCTV images can also be linked into the various intelligence systems, although, 
again, care must be taken to ensure compliance with the DPA and liRA. 
The final issue is the dissemination of any relevant data. The failings III effective 
dissemination highlighted by Bichard prompted him to recommend that 'a national IT 
system for England and Wales to support police intelligence should be introduced as a 
matter of urgency'. J72 The response was the instigation of a new Police National Database 
(PND), which forces began testing in 20 I 0.173 The PND ought to make the dissemination of 
intelligence across forces seamless. The proliferation of PDAs should also assist officers in 
accessing relevant data. Beyond the police themselves, relevant intelligence must be 
disseminated to the other relevant security services involved in counter-terrorism. 
Intelligence which is flagged on the force intelligence system is analysed by their special 
branch, SO 15 in the case of the MPS, and ought then to be progressed up the chain to JT AC 
if required. 
170 DQM. 
171DQM. 
172 Sir M Bichard, The Bichard Inquiry Report 13. 
173 NPIA 'Largest UK police force connects to the NPIA Police National Database' (NPIA) 
<http://www.npia.police.uklenlI7085.htm> accessed 1st February 2011. 
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5.5) Human rights and the exercise of section 44 
The next matter for consideration is whether a stop and search, in accordance with the 
provisions and regulations of TACT and PACE, Code A and in line with the officers' 
comments on how they exercise the power, would constitute a violation of the person's 
rights under the ECHR, specifically in relation to articles 5, 8, 10, 11 and 14? Each article 
will be dealt with in turn, with the tort offal se imprisonment considered alongside Article 5. 
The ruling in Gillan (ECtHR) will be discussed in depth in relation to Article 8, as this was 
the focus taken by the ECtBR. 
Before considering the law it is worth noting that the front-line officers surveyed were not, 
on the whole, particularly familiar with the BRA. Some thought it was simply not an issue 
in relation to section 44,174 onc acknowledged its importance but only in the vaguest 
terms. m One, who trained other officers, stated that he would not discuss the impact of the 
liRA in training on section 44,176 although another stated that 'it always comes up in 
training,.177 Two officers cited privacy as being engaged by section 44.178 While the 
identification of a specific right which may be engaged was positive, it was the only right the 
officers mentioned. Only one front-line officer seemed to comprehend how human rights 
impacted upon stop and search, in particular the authorised powers, noting the requirements 
of proportionality and reasonableness. 179 This suggests that the training, both in the broadest 
terms and specific to section 44, ought to be reviewed. The focus should be on embedding 
the HRA within training, rather than treating it as an add-on or a box to be ticked. A good 
example of such incorporation is the PSNI's approach to human rights, with the NI Policing 
Board specifically mandated to monitor the performance of the PSNI in complying with the 
HRA and produce an annual report on the subject,180 while the PSNI produces an annual 
Human Rights Programme of Action in response to the Board's recommendations. 
5.5.1) Article 5 
The central issue regarding the applicability of Article 5 to section 44 is whether a stop and 
search under the power crosses the threshold from the restriction of movement, protected by 
Article 2 of Protocol 4, which the UK has not ratified, to the deprivation of liberty, protected 
174 MPSFL02; MPSSNR03. 
175 MPSFL04. 
176 MPSSNR03. 
177 MPSFL04. 
178 MPSFLOI; BTPSNR03. 
179 MPSSNR04. 
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by Article 5. There is no bright line for the threshold, rather the distinction between the 
restriction of movement and deprivation of liberty is 'merely one of degree or intensity, and 
not one of nature or substance,.181 Consenting to the detention does not mean it may not 
constitute a deprivation of liberty.182 The ECtHR has held that the correct starting point is 
the concrete situation in the specific case, which must take account of 'criteria such as the 
type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.' 183 The 
relevant case law is highly ambiguous. It has been held that house arrest for twelve hours a 
day and all weekend,184 is not a deprivation of liberty, nor is ten hours curfew a day; 185 
however, the restriction of a man for a matter of minutes while forcibly taking blood was 
held to be a deprivation of liberty.186 In Storck v German/ 87 the court held that 
confinement for 'a not negligible length of time' would constitute a deprivation of liberty 
under Article 5, although in that case the period was several months it is arguable that 'not 
negligible' encompasses far shorter lengths of time. Domestically, Lord 1I0ffmann, in a 
control order case, stated that one must confine 'the deprivation of liberty to actual 
imprisonment or something which is for practical purposes little different from 
imprisonment',188 while Lord Brown proffered sixteen hours as the threshold. 189 
In reaching his conclusion in Gillan (HL) that section 44 did not constitute a deprivation of 
liberty, Lord Bingham emphasised that persons stopped and searched under section 44 
would 'not be arrested, handcuffed, confined or removed to another place' and that the 
procedure would 'ordinarily be relatively brief .190 A number of criticisms may be made 
about this argument. First, the length of the detention is not determinative in deciding 
whether or not it crosses the threshold from restriction to deprivation of liberty.191 Second, 
the exact length of the detention was contested, with the officers claiming Quinton's search 
181 Guzzardi v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 333 app.no.7367176 [93]. 
182 HMv Switzerland (2004) 38 EHRR 17 app.no.39187/98; De Wilde, Doms and Vesyp v 
Belgium (1979-80) 1 EHRR 373 (Series A, No.12). 
183 Guzzardi v Italy [92]. The degree of supervision and impact upon the possibility of 
maintaining normal social contacts are also pertinent, although not relevant to section 44 
(van Dijk and Arai Theory and practice 0/ the European Convention on lIuman Rights 458). 
184 Trijonis v Lithuania (2005) app.no.2333/02,judgment of 17 March 2005. 
185 Raimondo v Italy (1994) 18 EHRR 237 app.no.12954/87. 
186 X v Austria (1979) 18 DR 154 app.no.8278/78. 
187 Storck v Germany (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 6 app.no.61603/00 [74]. 
188 Secretary o/State/or the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKIIL 45 [44]. 
189 ibid [105]. 
190 R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKl-IL 12 [25]. 
191 Jarvinen v Finland (1998) app.noJ0408/96. 
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took five minutes while she maintained it was closer to thirty, while both parties agreed that 
Gillan's search took approximately twenty minutes. 192 Third, anyone refusing to submit to a 
search under section 44 commits an offence under section 47 for which they will be liable to 
imprisonment for up to six months or a fine not exceeding £5,000 or both. 193 A final, minor 
point is that the person may be removed to a different place, if headgear which has religious 
connotations is to be removed.194 It was the element of coercion that was the focus of the 
ECtHR's comments on Article 5 in Gillan (ECtHR).19s 
Before discussing the ECtHR's approach it is necessary to note the case of Austin v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis .196 In A ustin Lord Hope introduced the novel 
concept of the 'purpose principle', by which Article 5 was held not to apply ab initio in a 
case of 'kettling' - where the police place a cordon around a crowd - because the purpose of 
the restriction was deemed to be legitimate, proportionate and not arbitrary. Clearly there 
are several points of contention with this case, primarily the fact that it appears to stand in 
conflict with ECtHR case law and basie statutory interpretation which clearly shows that 
Article 5 always applies, if the threshold has been crossed, the question being whether it is 
justifiable under any of the qualifying paragraphs. 197 Austin has been appealed to the 
ECtHR and it awaits to be seen whether they will uphold the 'purpose principle' but in the 
meanwhile it stands as good law and reinforces the perception that domestically there is a 
very high bench mark for infringements of Article 5 in relation to police powers or counter-
terrorism which a section 44 stop is unlikely to reach. 
Gillan (ECtHR) strongly suggests that the ECtllR will find there to have been a deprivation 
of liberty in Austin. In Gillan the ECtHR discussed the potential applicability of the Article 
5 but deemed it unnecessary to rule on the matter given their ruling on Article 8. It stated 
that coercion, such that if the person refused to submit to the police activity they may be 
forced, as occurred in Foka v Turkey,198 or would be committing an offence, as under 
TACT, section 47, 'is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 
5(1),.199 If this view is endorsed in later cases, such as Austin, then this will bring some 
192 Gillan (HL). 
193 The fine is the standard level 5 (Criminal Justice Act 1982, section 37). 
194 PACE Code A, note 4. 
195 Gil/an (ECtHR). 
196 [2009] UKlIL 5. 
197 See: Lennon, G, 'Police Powers: Article 5 ECHR and Crowd Control' (2009) 3 Web JCLI 
198 Foka v Turkey (2008) app.no.28940/95. 
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weleome clarification to the law in this area and will serve notice to the domestic courts that 
police detentions do engage Article 5. 
Proceeding on the basis that Article 5 is engaged, the next question is whether such 
interference is justified under Article 5( 1). As it stands, section 44 cannot be justified under 
Article 5(1) as its authorisation is not in accordance with the law (see Chapter 4.4). It is 
argued below in relation to Article 8, that the exercise of the power is also not in accordance 
with the law, however, presuming that changes are made to ensure that section 44 is 
authorised and deployed in accordance with the law, by raising the trigger and bolstering 
accountability and making the changes suggested in the next section, then the interference 
with Article 5 would be justifiable under Article 5(l)(b) - to secure the fulfilment of an 
obligation prescribed by law and there would therefore be no infringement of Article 5. 
A related question is whether the tort of false imprisonment might apply. False 
imprisonment is not on all fours with the deprivation of liberty: an act may constitute false 
., . h b' d" f l'b d' 200 Th 201 . Impnsonment Wit out emg a epnvahon 0 I erty an vice versa. e tort reqUIres 
that the claimant be 'imprisoned' in circumstances not expressly or impliedly permitted by 
law?02 'Imprisonment' is the complete restraint of the claimant's freedom of action,203 
whether 'in the open field, or in the stocks or cage in the street, or in a man's own house, as 
well as in the common gaol' ?04 There is no requirement the claimant be aware that they are 
compelled to remain, although this may go towards the quantum of damages. 205 The courts 
have been consistently unsympathetic to claims of false imprisonment arising from a legal 
search. Cases from Northern Ireland show the courts are willing to imply a power to detain 
persons so as to prevent them from raising the alarm or resisting arrest,206 or such as is 
'necessary for the execution of a speedy and efficient search', 207 including the detention of 
200 Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5[87] (this aspect of the 
ruling was not subject to appeal). 
201 It is also a criminal offence. 
202 Warner v Riddiford(1858) 140 ER 1052. 
203 Bird v Jones [1988] 1 W.L.R. 692. 
204 Termes de la Ley cited in Rogers, WVH, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (16th ed. edn 
Sweet Maxwell, London 2002) 81. 
20S Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44 (e.f. Herring v Boyle 
(1834) 1 CrM&R, 149 ER 1126, approved in Murray v Ministry of Defence [1987] 3 NUB 
84). 
206 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692. 
207 Kirkpatrick v Chief Constable of the RUC and Ministry of Defence [1988] 4 NUB 73; 
DPP v Meaden [2003] EWHC 3005 (Admin) [32] per Rose, Ll 
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208 persons who are not the target of the search. Although these cases have been subject to 
academic criticism they remain good law,209 Murray having been cited with approval by the 
Court of Appea1.210 If the basis for the legal action is unlawful then the subsequent 
detention would be false imprisonment, however, the requisite hurdles to prove that the 
authorisation or its exercise are ultra vires are almost insurmountable, at least without access 
to the underlying intelligence. It seems that such detention engages the maxim: de minimis 
non curat lex. 
5.5.2) Article 6 
Article 6 guarantees the right of access to the courts in the determination of civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge.211 If evidence procured during the stop and search 
was used subsequently in court a challenge might be brought under Article 6.212 The fact 
that no criminal charge was brought against the claimants in GilIan may explain why they 
did not argue their case in relation to Article 6. If the claimants cooperated with the police, 
Article 6 is applicable on the basis of determining civil rights.m If a claimant refused to 
submit or obstructed the police in their exercise of section 44 then Article 6(3) would be 
engaged, the case being a criminal one. Oijk argues that the principles in Article 6(2) and 
6(3) are applicable to both civil and criminal cases,214 although the ECtIlR affords 'greater 
latitude' to the State in civil cases.m 
The central issue concerns the right to not incriminate oneself, which intersects with the 
right to silence, neither of which are absolute.216 In Funke, the fact that the authorities 
attempted to compel Funke to disclose the documents which they suspected he had through 
the imposition of accumulating fines, was a key factor in the ECtIIR determining that there 
had been a violation of Article 6(2).217 The coercive nature of section 44, by virtue of the 
208 Murray v Ministry of Defence. 
209 Walker, C, 'Army special powers on parade' (1989) 40 NILQ 1. 
210 Connor v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2006] EWCA Civ 1549. 
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offences under TACT, section 47, is comparable. The ECtHR distinguishes between 
material which has an 'existence independent of the will of the applicant', such as bodily 
samples and documents, and that which is co-existent with the will of the applicant.2lS This 
suggests that the procurement of documents or similar materials during a section 44 search 
would not raise issues relating to Article 6 in a subsequent trial, however, as discussed above 
at Chapter 5.1, intelligence appears to be gathered from 'conversations' with the persons 
stopped and this is liable to be covered by Article 6. A complicating factor is that section 44 
does not compel persons to provide any information and it is likely to be argued that such 
information was provided voluntarily. As a counter-argument, the various criticisms 
regarding the (non)-voluntary nature of 'voluntary searches', as discussed in Chapter 3.2, 
could be raised. The absence of legal advice would also strengthen the case of the person 
stopped,219 but as there is no analogous case-law it is unclear whether it would succeed. 
5.5.3) Article 8 
The right to privacy was the only specific right cited in the fieldwork as being engaged by 
section 44, though one of the two references was to the fact that the person stopped did not 
need to give their personal details to the officer - a situation which the ECtHR has held is 
not covered by Article 8.220 It is settled law that actions taking place in public may still be 
afforded the protection of the article221 and that private life includes 'a person's physical and 
psychological integrity,222 and 'social identity' .223 In Gillan (HL) the defendants conceded 
that Article 8(1) was engaged only in the case where an address book, diary, correspondence 
or similar was perused.224 Lord Bingham concurred, stating that 'an ordinary superficial 
search of the person and an opening of bags ... can scarcely be said to reach the level of 
seriousness to engage the operation of the Convention,.22s Lord Bingham's dismissal of 
contention that Article 8 is engaged by the routine exercise of Article 8 is perhaps indicative 
of the wider reluctance in the British courts to acknowledge the impact of Article 8.226 lIe 
argued that a search under section 44 was 'of the kind to which passengers uncomplainingly 
218 Heaney & McGuinness v Ireland [40]. 
219 Salduz v Turkey (2008) 49 EHRR 421 app.no.36391102. 
220 MPSFLO 1. Reyntjens v Belgium decision of 9th September 1992 app.no.1681 0/90, 136. 
221 Peck v United Kingdom [57]. 
222 Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 app.no.59230100 [50]. 
223 R (Marper) v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 39 [66]. 
224 Gillan (HL). 
225 ibid [28]. 
226 Sce, e.g. R (Marper) v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police; c.f. R (Wood) v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. 
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submit at airports'. 227 A similar point was made by one of the officers.228 As noted by the 
ECtHR, this reasoning is flawed: section 44 is exercised on persons going about their daily 
business who have done nothing to warrant the attention of the police, still less a search of 
their person and bag?29 Borders and ports have always subjected persons to distinct, and 
more onerous, conditions of passage than occur while travelling within a country. It is true 
that this distinction has been broken down somewhat in recent years as all air travel, whether 
domestic or international, now imposes the same conditions of travel, in terms of searching 
persons or bags. Nonetheless there remains the important distinction that passengers choose 
to travel and may be viewed as having consented to the security checks as a condition of 
travel. 
The ECtHR held in GilIan that Article 8 was engaged by a section 44 search, whether or not 
there was personal correspondence.23o This approach, by attacking the 'ordinary' use of 
section 44, clearly puts any 'extraordinary' searches, such as those involving personal 
correspondence beyond the pale as well. The ECtHR focused on the coercive nature of the 
search, while emphasising that the public nature of the search may 'compound the 
seriousness of the interference because of an clement of humiliation and embarrassment' ,231 
This accords with the reaction of some of the community participants, interviewed after they 
had been stopped under section 44, who stated that they were embarrassed at being stopped 
by the police so publicly.232 
Given that Article 8 is ordinarily engaged, the encounter would be permissible only if it 
complies with Article 8(2): being in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety, or for the prevention of crime, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.233 The starting point is whether the 
procedure is 'in accordance with the law', Although the ECtHR did not do so, it is 
necessary to consider whether the exercise of section 44 could be deemed to be 'necessary in 
a democratic society'. This, which relates equally to Articles 10 and 11, is intrinsically tied 
to the principle of proportionality.234 The law as it presently stands is disproportionate 
because of the authorisation process, therefore the following discussion will proceed on the 
227 GiIlan (HL) [28]. 
228 MPSSNR03. 
229 GiIlan (ECtHR) [64). 
230 ibid [63]. 
231 ibid [63]. 
232 COMMSl, COMMS3. 
233 The other exceptions in article 8(2) are inapplicable here, 
234 GilIan (HL) [29], 
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basis that the 'trigger' to section 44 is 'necessary' and that this suffices to ensure the power 
is in accordance with the law. In Gi/lan (HL) Lord Bingham argued, in the context of 
Article 8, that if section 44 were exercised in accordance with the law 'it would ... be 
impossible to regard a proper exercise of the power ... as other than proportionate when 
seeking to counter the great danger of terrorism', thus, Article 8(2) would be engaged.235 
This terse appraisal of the requirement of 'necessary in a democratic society', which skips 
several key steps, seems to turn on playing a trump at the end: the objective is countcr-
terrorism; ipso facto, it must be necessary and proportionate. Terrorism is no such trump. 
While the BCtHR have recognised that the investigation of terrorist offences present 
h .. . h . I bl 236 h h h . d h h' d aut ontIes Wit specla pro ems, t ey ave emp aSlse t at t IS oes not present 
authorities with a carte blanche?37 
If one takes the legislative object broadly as the prevention of terrorism this will be 
sufficiently important to warrant limiting fundamental rights,238 as required under the 
proportionality principle.239 The next question is whether the procedure is rationally linked 
to that object and is the least restrictive alternative.240 Lord Carlile's statement that '[t]here 
is little or no evidence that the use of section 44 has the potential to prevent an act of 
terrorism as compared with other statutory powers,241 and that 'its utility has been 
questioned by senior Metropolitan Police staff with wide experience of terrorism policing' at 
the very least raises doubts as to whether there is a rational link between section 44 and the 
prevention of acts ofterrorism.242 In contrast to these pronouncements the front line officers 
interviewed maintained that section 44 was necessary and that the power should remain,243 
and Lord Carlile maintained the need to retain the power until his report in 2010.244 Proving 
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237 E.g. Aksoy v Turkey [78]. 
238 Brogan v United Kingdom. 
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241 Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 2007 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of 
the Terrorism Act 2006' [130] (emphasis in original) and Lord Carlile, 'Report on the 
operation in 2006 of the Terrorism Act 2000'[ 11]. lIe also commented that 'other powers are 
on the whole perfectly adequate for most purposes' (Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 
2005 of the Terrorism Act 2000' [96]. 
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the necessity of preventative measures such as section 44 is extremely difficult, given that its 
'success' rests on an event not happening. If deemed necessary, the procedure must also 
have sufficient safeguards to ensure no arbitrary treatment.24S The key issue therefore is 
whether, even with amendments to the 'trigger', the deployment of section 44 is sufficiently 
circumscribed to prevent arbitrary treatment. The ECtllR stated ofthe exercise of section 44 
that 'there is a clear risk of arbitrariness in the grant of such a broad discretion to the police 
officer', focusing its criticism on the absence of any curb on the officer's discretion as to 
who to stop?46 This is remarkably similar to King where, in relation to 'sus', Hency, J 
stated that 'in its arbitrariness and its unjustifiable discrimination ... [it] fails to hold ... all 
citizens to be equal before the law' .247 
While raising the 'trigger' would circumscribe, to some degree at least, the areas where 
section 44 was authorised, it would not affect the open-ended nature of the officer's 
discretion on the street. Code A, as noted by the ECtIlR, regulates the officer's actions 
when she is conducting the search and does not affect her discretion in choosing who to 
search. Interestingly, this open-ended aspect of section 44 made several of the officers 
interviewed uncomfortable, as it went against their training and the 'normal' use of stop and 
search powers?48 The NPIA's Practice Guidance instructs officers to 'always use objective 
criteria to select people for search', the suggested criteria being: the individual himsclf or 
herself; the location the person is in; a combination of the two.249 It gocs on to suggest that 
when using section 44 as part of a pre-planned policing operation then, although the various 
tactics that could be deployed are too numerous to comprehensively list, consideration 
should be given to stopping and searching everybody entering or leaving a given location, or 
h d · "fi f h . I' hi' 250 t ose omg so usmg a specl IC route or some 0 t ose entenng or eavmg t e ocatlOn. 
Even taken together these suggested criteria or tactics provide virtually no meaningful 
guidance to an officer. The focus on location, while perhaps natural given the geographical 
nature of an authorisation, is made redundant by that very fact - of course location is 
relevant as it is only in the specified location that the deployment of section 44 is legal, but 
how does that become an objective criteron which assists front-line officers in exercising the 
power? The reference to the 'individual' is followed by a clear injunction not to use a 
person's ethnicity, perceived religion or 'other pcrsonal criteria' as the sole basis for 
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exercising the power and that profiling on the basis of age, gender, sexuality or disability 
may amount to illegal discrimination.25I Given this, it is difficult to understand what the 
'objective criteria' of 'the individual themselves' refer to. The only conceivable criteria 
would be suspicious behaviour falling below the threshold of reasonable suspicion. 
Evidently, a person could be stopped on the basis of personal criteria if appropriate 
intelligence suggested they were or had been involved in the commission or preparation of 
acts of terrorism, however, in that case section 43 would be the appropriate power to use. 
Without adding the requirement of reasonable suspicion it is difficult to conceive how the 
criteria could be circumscribed, yet if this was included then section 44 would become 
redundant, being a mere repetition of section 43, presuming that section 43 was widened to 
include the stopping and searching of cars.252 
Another option would be to refine the object of the search to something more precise than 
articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism. It would be possible to 
provide a list of objects, such as explosives or items relating to explosives, including 
manuals, publications etc. The difficulty with such a list is that to make it sufficiently 
inclusive to cover all objects the police might want to search for would end with the list 
being as broad as the present objective of section 44. It may be that the ECtllR would 
accept the broad discretion afforded to the officer in selecting who to stop if the 
authorisation process was considerably more circumscribed, for example, by raising the 
'trigger' threshold and introducing judicial oversight, particularly given the wide margin of 
appreciation afforded to states when matters of national security are invoked as a 
justification for restricting the rights under Article 8.253 
5.5.4) Articles 10 and 11 
Compliance with Articles 10 and II depends firstly on whether the procedure is 'necessary 
in a democratic society'. As has been discussed above and in Chapter 4, at the very least 
without amendment to the 'trigger', this requirement will not be satisfied. It is nevertheless 
still necessary to consider the treatment of the issue by the House of Lords and whether the 
power would infringe Articles 10 and II if the power was amended and the 'trigger' raised. 
25\ Practice Advice 14. 
252 As advocated by the coalition government: the Protection of Freedoms Bill 2010-2011, 
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Lord Bingham stated that if the power was exercised in compliance with the provisions of 
the statute and Code A, and not to 'silence a heckler at a political meeting',254 it would be 
hard to conceive of examples where it would violate Articles 10 or 11, but if it did it would 
be justified under Articles 10(2) and 11(2), which carry the same exceptions as 8(2). There 
can surely be no automatic justification as suggested. A violation of Articles 10 or 11, 
unlike a violation of Article 8, is not a consequence of the intrinsic process of the power. 
Whether or not the interference is justifiable must be dealt with on a case by case basis with 
regard to the particular facts, although their Lordships' treatment of the claimants' assertion 
that section 44 was exercised against them because they were protesting, and in the case of 
Gillan reporting on the protests, is not grounds for optimism that this will be done: the 
claims were summarily dismissed in nine and a half lines.255 
Much of the criticism of section 44 surrounds precisely these Article 10 and 11 situations, 
with Liberty criticising the use of section 44 at anti-war, anti-weapons and anti-capitalist 
protests?56 The 'Level 2' areas for the use of section 44 could clearly incorporate protests 
and, in any case, most protests are likely to pass through 'Level I' areas. Similarly, protests 
against the war in Iraq and MOD policy have congregated in areas where section 44 was 
authorised?57 One senior officer said: 'if you have a protest and people are protesting and 
they're ... [committing] offences, arrest them for those offences or use other stop and search 
powers, don't use [section] 44 as a fishing trip .. .1 wouldn't look on it as an object to search 
people who are protesting, to me it's a preventative power .. .1 don't think [section] 44 should 
be used as a blunt instrument like that' .258 However, he noted that there might be legitimate 
reasons to use both sections 44 and 43 at protests, particularly 43.259 If a non-authorised 
stop and search power can be used it should be used; of the authorised powers CJPO, section 
60 would generally be more appropriate in such situations than section 44, which is not to 
say that it should be relied on in all or even in most protest situations. It is at present very 
difficult to assess whether the 'heavy' users of section 44, such as the MPS, use it 
inappropriately in protest situations because it is unlikely to cause a spike in their numbers, 
although this may be evident in areas with typically low use of section 44 such as 
Gloucestershire, which went from 22 section 44 stops in 2001/02 to 511 in 2002/03 to 
254 This is a reference to its use against Mr. Wolfgang at the Labour Party Conference in 
2005. 
2SS Gillan (HL) [30] (per Lord Bingham). 
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251 ibid; COMMB. 
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1,1013 in 2003/04 before falling to 0 in 2004/05. 260 This strongly suggests that the rise was 
at least in part attributable to the protests around RAF Fairford. 
Freedom of speech is accorded a special position in the ECIIR as 'onc of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each 
individual's self-fulfilment' .261 Where, as in GiIlan, the expression of free speech does not 
encourage violence or constitute hate speech,262 or invoke the protection of morals263 then it 
is unlikely that\ a wide margin of appreciation will be accorded by the ECtHR to the State: 
'[t]here is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions on political 
speech or on debate on questions of public interest' .264 Indeed, the use of the margin 
concept at all in relation to Article 10 has been strongly criticised. 265 In addition, the 
chilling effect doctrine comes into play.266 Presuming section 44 to be authorised by law, 
then given the national security dimension the interference is likely to be accepted as 
pursuing a legitimate aim. However, if the police use section 44 to target protesters qua 
protesters without more - particularly if the protesters could prove that they did not pose any 
terrorist security risk - it would be an inappropriate use of the power: it would not be 
rationally linked to the objective of counter-terrorism, it would not be the least restrictive 
alternative and would therefore not be necessary in a democratic society. 
An additional factor in GiIlan, given the fact that Quinton was an accreditedjoumalist, is the 
great importance the ECtHR attaches to the press.267 Campaign groups, even if small and 
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informal, such as the Gloucestershire Weapons Inspectors,268 may claim analogous 
protection as that afforded to joumalists.269 In a similar vein it strongly guards the right to 
criticise public figures, particularly politicians,270 although there is no requirement generally 
of public interest in relation to the freedom of expression.27I In GiIlan (ECtHR) the ECtIlR 
deemed it unnecessary to consider the issue of a violation of Article 10 given its ruling in 
relation to Article 8, however, it is likely that if the matter came before it again it would 
emphasise that section 44 cannot be used as blanket power in protest situations where it 
exerts a chilling effect on the freedom of speech.272 
In relation to Article 11, the approach of the ECtIlR is very similar to that with Article 10 
but it is not identical,m although Article 11 must be considered in light of Article 10.274 
There is a slim margin of appreciation in relation to the freedom of assembly,27S although it 
is broader if incitement to violence is proven.276 In addition, targeted bans are less likely to 
fall foul of Article 11 than general bans.277 The ECtIlR's function is to 'review' the decision 
of the domestic courts, not to rehear the case as it relates to the Convention,m although later 
cases highlight inconsistency in this area as to the degree of review required.279 It is clear, 
however, that in cases where the State alleges that there was a threat of violence (only the 
right to peaceful assembly is protected), then the ECtIlR itself considers the evidence for 
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that claim and does not defer to the State.280 That the views espoused in the protest are 
offensive, shocking or disturbing provide no grounds to limit it.281 
The ECtHR in Gillan (ECtHR) did not rule on Article 11 in light of its finding of a violation 
of Article 8. Following the arguments in relation to Article 10 it again seems possible, even 
likely, that the use of section 44 against non-violent protesters who do not pose any 
particular terrorist risk would be viewed as an unjustifiable violation of Article 11. 
However, it is worth sounding a note of caution. The quantitative study of Article 11 cases 
before the ECtHR by David Mead provides a detailed insight into the operation of the 
ECtHR in relation to the right to protest and suggests that the chances of succeeding in such 
a claim are low.282 Mead found that in only one quarter of all such cases is a violation 
found.283 Cases relating to more disruptive and obstructive forms of protest, such as direct 
action or marches, were least likely to succeed, followed by those where it was deemed 
necessary or proportionate to interfere so as to prevent disorder.284 
5.5.5) Article 14 
The final Convention right which may be invoked is Article 14. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the issue of the discriminatory application of stop and search powers is perennial and has 
been flagged in relation to section 44.28S It has already been noted that all officers 
disavowed the use of racial profiling. Article 14 does not provide a stand-alone right to non-
discrimination but is more properly viewed as an accessory to the other rights in so far as a 
claim may only be made under Article 14 if another Convention right is invoked, although a 
breach does not need to be proven for it to come into play.2R6 The ECtIlR, however, has 
been quite lenient in its application of this principle.m Discrimination can arise either from 
differential treatment in analogous situations or from similar treatment in different 
situations.288 The ECtHR's approach is to ascertain whether there is (a) differential 
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treatment of equal cases, or similar treatment of distinct cases, (b) without an objective and 
reasonable objective, or if (c) the aims are disproportionate to the means,289 although in 
practice it only considers the comparability test if the claim has no merit, otherwise it is 
subsumed within the assessment of the justifications.29o Given that strong arguments can be 
presented relating to Articles 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11, (albeit with the likely acceptance of a 
justifiable interference with Article 6), Article 14 could also be invoked. 
The margin of appreciation is applicable in Article 14 cases.291 While, as with all areas of 
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, it is difficult to define precise lines of 
demarcation, in areas where there is common ground among Member States, in existing law 
or policy, there appears to be a narrower margin afforded to States.292 Such common ground 
is evident in relation to non-discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity or religion, with all 
members of the ECHR being signatories to the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in addition to the prohibition on such discrimination 
in the Treaty of Rome Article 13.293 Most Member States are also signatories to the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Certain grounds of 
discrimination, including, in all likelihood, race, require close scrutiny and a significant 
narrowing of the margin doctrine, if indeed it applies at all.294 
Although it was not applicable in Gi/lan, the potential for the discriminatory use of section 
44 was mentioned by their counsel and was addressed by their Lordships, albeit obiter dicta. 
Article 14 was tested in the Roma Rights case,29S which held that the motive for 
discrimination is irrelevant and that individuals 'should not be assumed to hold 
characteristics which the [exerciser of the power] associates with the group, whether or not 
most members of the group do indeed have such characteristics,296 even though this may not 
seem to accord with 'common sense' ?97 In Gillan (ilL) Lord Hope concurred with these 
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principles, noting that '[d]iscrimination on racial grounds is unlawful whether or not, in any 
given case, the assumptions on which it was based turn out to be justificd' .298 lIe proceeded 
to argue that while being of Asian appearance might initially attract the officer's attention 'a 
further selection process will have to be undertaken ... before the power is exercised', this 
further process constituting the difference between inherent discrimination and non-
d· . . . 299 Iscnmmahon. 
Lords Brown and Scott concluded that the disproportionate targeting of individuals of Asian 
appearance would not be discriminatory. Lord Scott based this on sections 41(1)(a) and 42 
of the Race Relations Act 1976, as amended, which state that no act done in pursuance of a 
statutory authority or for the purpose of national security will be rendered unlawful by Parts 
II to IV of the Act. This does not, however, address the human rights issue but rather the 
question of liability under the 1976 Act. Under the HRA 1998 it is unlawful for a public 
authority, including the police and courts, to act in a manner that is incompatible with the 
ECHR. The HRA, section 6(2) is not applicable as nothing in TACT demands the 
disproportionate targeting of a particular group using section 44. Lord Brown argued that 
'[e]thnic origin ... can and properly should be taken into account when deciding whether and 
whom to stop and search provided always that...the selection is made for reasons connected 
with the perceived terrorist threat and not on grounds of racial discrimination. ,300 It is 
telling that Lord Brown admitted finding it 'most difficult' to reconcile this with the 
judgment in the Roma case, stating that the only basis he could discern was that in the Roma 
case the immigration officers failed to treat each applicant as an individual.301 This 
approach is mirrored in PACE, Code A which, while cautioning officers to take particular 
care to ensure no discrimination occurs when stopping members of minority ethnic groups 
under section 44, states that it may be appropriate to take into account a person's ethnic 
origin in response to a specific terrorist threat.302 If there is sufficient intelligence to suspect 
that particular persons are terrorists then ethnicity can validly be used, but in such cases 
section 43 should be used. Stopping, for example, all Algerians because there is a threat 
from Groupe Islamique Armce, is not compatible with the Roma case, Article 14, the Race 
Relations Act 1976,303 or PACE, Code A304 and would be discriminatory.30s Somewhat 
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confusingly Lord Brown, notwithstanding his earlier comments, concurred that additional 
f: . d 306 actors are reqUlre . 
Proceeding on the presumption of an associated claim under Articles 5, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 14, 
the facts of the case would obviously need to be different from Gillan. Let us therefore take 
the facts as follows: a Muslim man on his way to peaceful protest against the latest Anti-
Terrorism Bill is stopped and searched which, according to his evidence, deters him from 
attending the protest. Once discrimination is proved, or proven as arguable,307 it is for the 
Government to prove its justification.308 Statistics may constitute part of the evidence 
submitted to prove discrimination.309 On the imaginary facts it seems likely that the burden 
would be shifted onto the Government to disprove or justify the alleged discrimination. In 
particular the introduction of the statistics regarding section 44 seem to give an arguable 
case. As underlined in the Roma case,31O no difference in treatment based 'exclusively or to 
a decisive extent on a person's ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified'. Thus 
any attempt to argue that Muslims are disproportionately involved in Islamist terrorism will 
be no justification.311 If a discretion capable of interfering with a Convention right is 
conferred on a national authority then the regulations governing the exercise of that 
discretion will be material.312 As argued above, the discretion inherent in the exercise of 
section 44 is not sufficiently well regulated, although this arises partially from the intrinsic 
nature of street policing. The most plausible way to defeat this claim would be if the 
Government could prove that, as required by the PACE Codes, race was not the only or 
decisive factor in choosing who to stop and search. It is arguable that a violation of Article 
14 would be upheld. Certainly it will be difficult for the Government to discharge its 
reversed burden of proof. 
5.6) Assessment 
This section, as in previous Chapters, pulls together the various strands of argumentation, 
concluding whether the deployment of section 44 is, or is capable of, adhering to the 
305 Moeckli, D, 'Stop and search under the Terrorism Act 2000: a comment on R(Gillan) v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis' (2007) 70 MLR 654, 664. 
306 GilIan (HL) [91]. 
307 Nachova v Bulgaria (2006) 42 EHRR 43 app.no.43577/98. 
308 Chassagnou & Others v France (2000) 29 EBRR 615 app.nos.25088/94, 28331195, 
28443/95 [91-2]. 
309 Hoogendijk v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22 app.no.58641100; DH v Czech 
Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3 app.no.57325100. 
310 R (European Roma Rights Centre and Others) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport. 
311 Timishev v Russia (2007) 44 EHRR 37 app.no.l8465105 [58]. 
312 DH v Czech Republic [206]. 
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framework principles set out in Chapter 1 of accountability, human rights and efficiency and 
effectiveness in implementing the relevant sections of CONTEST. 
The fact that location is a key factor for the exercise of section 44 could provide a means of 
additional accountability if statistics were published identifying how many authorisations 
were granted in each force justified primarily by the location, whether due to innate 
importance or vulnerability. These are comparable with relative ease across the country. 
Similarly, a way of controlling the misuse of section 44 at protests and similar events would 
be to require that the number of section 44s carried out at such events be published in annual 
reports, adopting the definition of 'public assembly' in the Public Order Act 1986, section 
11(1). The broad nature of the category would not permit 'pattern spotting' by would-be 
terrorists while the increased transparency would allow closer monitoring of the use of 
section 44. It was suggested in Chapter 4.5 that data on authorisations of all UK forces be 
published annually. This data should be broken down further into broad types based on the 
major factors for exercising section 44. The categories might include: high risk site/CNI; 
night-time economy; intelligence operation; public assembly; and sporting fixtures. An 
authorisation might cover more than one category. The authorisation pro-forma should be 
expanded to include a section with the list of categories, and the relevant ones should be 
ticked. None of this information reveals sensitive data but it would make it easier to hold 
police forces to account. For example, if it transpired that a force carried out 90% of its 
section 44 stops at 'public assemblies', then this would suggest an abuse of the power and 
the infringement of Articles 10 and 11 and should prompt a review by the relevant PA 
and/or the IPCC. 
In order to control better the use of the power, PACE Code A should be amended to set out 
minimum standards regarding what information should be inputted on the stop form in a 
section 44 stop. This should include, in addition to present requirements, the location, 
operation name (if relevant), details of suspicious activity (if relevant) (for example, BASS 
or a police dog, trained to detect explosives, giving a weak indication towards a person) and 
the age and gender of the person stopped. To improve the quality of data on the stop forms 
and to ensure better collation of that data PDA's should be introduced across all forces in 
place of paper stop forms. However, an effort must be made to ensure that any curtailed 
details, formerly included on the paper form, are available to all persons. This could be 
addressed by providing the person with a stop leaflet, which contains the same information. 
The stop leaflets are a useful innovation but should be printed in a variety of languages. If a 
system of receipts is introduced, then means should be provided for persons who do not have 
access to either the internet or a printer to print the stop form at a local police station or 
library. Stop databases should be updated to permit the linking of intelligence reports to 
stop forms and of stop forms to other stop forms. The Home Secretary announced in a 
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speech to the Police Federation in 2010 that she would abolish all stop forms, although there 
is to date no legislation advancing this proposal. This should be strongly opposed. 
Although they are a highly imperfect form of accountability over stop and search, they are 
one of the only forms of accountability governing the encounter between the officer and 
person stopped. The reason why stop forms were adopted was discussed in Chapter 3.2.3. 
These reasons remain and, at least until a more effective form of accountability is devised, 
so should the stop forms. 
To ensure that any conversation between the officer and person is on the basis of consent, 
PACE Code A should be amended to instruct officers to inform persons at the outset that 
they do not need to respond to any question posed to them and that declining all questions 
does not of itself provide any suspicion, for example, to instigate a section 43 search. Such 
information may not affect people's response: the community sample, interviewed after they 
were stopped, revealed that all persons, even those relatively disgruntled about being 
stopped, provided their details to the officer even though they were told that they did not 
need to do so.313 Officers should be cautioned to adhere to the requirements of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 (DPA), in particular that the data collected is proportionate to the 
purpose of collection.314 Clear, publicly assessable procedures on the use of CCTV and the 
use of data from CCTV should be available on all police websites. 
In terms of human rights, Gil/an (ECtHR) has made clear that the present usage of section 44 
is in violation of Article 8. Though the ECtHR declined to rule on possible violations of 
Articles 5, 10 or 11, its comments on Article 5 suggest it is potentially applicable, and the 
case-law suggests that, depending on the facts, a strong case may be made for a violation of 
all of these Articles, in addition to Article 14. There is also a possibility that Article 6 would 
be violated if evidence procured during the search was used in a subsequent criminal case. 
The issue is whether, if the authorisation was amended so that it was in accordance with the 
law, could the deployment be carried out in a Convention compliant manner? It seems 
likely in such circumstances, although Article 5 is engaged, it would be a justifiable 
interference under Article 5(2). The potential engagement of Article 6 is relatively narrow 
as it realtes to evidence which does not have an independent existence from the will of the 
accused in a criminal trial. If PACE, Code A was amended, as suggested above, so that 
officers had to inform the person at the outset that they did not need to provide any 
information whatsoever then this would seem to head off any potential interference with the 
right to silence, notwithstanding the coercive nature of the power. It appears doubtful, 
313 COMMS1, COMMS3, COMMS4, COMMS5. 
314 DPA, schedule 1, paragraph 3. Emphasised in S v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50 
app.nosJ0562/04, 30566/04 [l07]. However, c.f. DPA, section 28(l)(a), which exempts any 
data from the provisions of the data protection principles if required for national security. 
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however, that raising the 'trigger' without more would satisfy Article 8, given the coercive 
nature of the stop and the extremely broad nature of the object of the search. It may be 
sufficient if additional forms of accountability over the authorisation process were 
instigated, such as judicial oversight and increased transparency through the publication of 
statistics on the granting and modification of authorisations. 
If it is necessary to amend the object of the search, it is difficult to imagine how that could 
be done without bringing section 44 so close to section 43 as to make it redundant. The 
breadth of the object of the search, and the difficulties arising from it, are natural 
consequences of the fact that the power enables police to act pre-emptively. Because the 
police are acting in advance of any evidence that a specific person has been involved in an 
offence or an inchoate offence, they are forced to focus on the subject of the risk - the 
location or something in it- rather than on the object of the risk. 'All-risks' policing powers 
necessitate vagueness in the statutes governing the powers.3lS Therefore, not only is it 
practically exceptionally difficult to conceive of ways of limiting the officer's discretion in 
relation to section 44, except in terms of giving an account afterwards, to do so would 
undercut the purpose of the power as an 'all-risks' policing tool. 
The use of section 44 at protests and similar situations where it is likely to impinge on 
Article 10 and 11 was not a key factor cited by the officers but has been flagged by other 
groups. While such use of section 44 may be for counter-terrorist ends, it will ordinarily be 
inappropriate. Certainly the routine use of section 44 in such circumstances would be. The 
use of terrorism powers for non-terrorism related purposcs can be highly damaging to 
community / police relations and consequently for PREVENT. A simple and effective way 
of curbing such misuse of section 44 would be to instigate bctter monitoring of the 
deployment of the power by requiring officers to write 'protest' on the stop forms, or by 
adding another box to the forms. Such an approach would provide a degree of transparency 
and the resulting evidence of usage would indicate whether further action, such as a section 
in the NPIA 'Practice Advice', is required or not. For example, if a force carried out 90% of 
its section 44 stops at 'public assemblies', this would suggest an abuse of the power, and the 
infringement of Articles 10 and 11, which should prompt a review by the relevant PA and/or 
the IPCC and/or the Independent Reviewer. If section 44 is deployed according to its stated 
cnds it should not infringe Article 10 or 11. 
The final pertinent right is Article 14. Clearly there is substantial potential for the 
discriminatory use of section 44, as evidenced by the statistics on its use to date. Whether 
315 See also the discussion in Chapter 3.1.2 for the similarities with 'sus'. 
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this potential has moved to actuality and what can be done to limit the potential for section 
44 to be discriminatorily applied are discussed in the next Chapter. 
5.7) Conclusion 
This Chapter addressed the questions of how section 44 was used and how it ought to be 
used. The recent developments in the use of section 44 within the BTP and MPS are 
advances on their previous usage, although time is needed to judge the effect of these 
changes in terms of the number of stops carried out. Section 44 is deployed primarily with 
the objective of deterrence and disruption, and, to a lesser degree, intclligence gathering. 
While arguably outside the spirit of the law, the former objectives are accommodated within 
the letter of the law as set out in section 44. Intelligence gathering walks a finer line and 
officers should be required under PACE Code A to explain to the person stoppcd that they 
are under no obligation to respond to any questions asked which do not pertain to objects 
found in the course of the search. 
In terms of the encounter itself, the fact that officers cited respect, courtesy and a clear 
explanation of the powers as constituting a 'good stop' is encouraging and suggests that the 
conclusions from Stone and Pettigrew's research on stop and search are being taken into 
account.316 The regulations relating to the encounter under PACE Code A are admirable, so 
far as they go, and if adhered to should bound somewhat the excrcise of stop and search, 
although the major difficulty remains that there is simply no way of effectively ensuring 
their enforcement. 
The criticism in GiIlan v UK of the expansive nature of the object of the search is difficult to 
address without bringing section 44 so close to section 43 as to make it obsolete. However, 
increasing accountability around the deployment, in particular by increasing transparency 
over its use, coupled with changes in the authorisation process, may be enough to address 
the ECtHR's concerns. These changes would also assist in ensuring that section 44 is only 
used for its prescribed ends and not used in non-counter-terrorist situations. 
316 Stone and Pettigrew 'The views of the public on stops and searches', discussed in Chapter 
3. 
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Chapter 6) The Impact of Section 44 
6.1) Introduction 
The two preceding chapters have detailed how and to what ends section 44 is authorised and 
used by the police, discussing whether these practices adhere to the nonnative framework of 
adherence to human rights, accountability and utility in tenns of CONTEST. This chapter 
addresses the penultimate research question: how does section 44 impact upon the 
community? As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, section 44 impacts upon individuals stopped 
and searched, affecting their rights to privacy, liberty and, potentially, the right to a fair trial. 
However, these are not the focus of this Chapter as they equally affect all persons stopped 
and have already been discussed in detail. Rather, this Chapter focuses upon when and how 
section 44 impacts upon 'communities' or groups. The impact of section 44 upon 
communities raises issues around disproportionality and goes to the core of the question of 
whether section 44 adheres to CONTEST. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the community sample is less expansive than that of the police 
and stake holders due to the limited time and resources available, difficulty in gaining access, 
and the fact that, if the impact on the community was the sole focus of this thesis, then little 
would be added to the existing literature.! The fieldwork therefore focused on a sample of 
'community representatives'. While not allowing definitive conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the impact of section 44 on all communities the interviews served to highlight 
areas of concern among some communities and groups. The qualitative findings are 
interwoven with doctrinal analysis from secondary sources and case-law, highlighting areas 
of concern without claiming to detennine their extent. Consequent to this 'broad-stroke' 
approach and the need to set forth and critique the major debates in relation to areas such as 
discrimination and the criminal justice system, the first sections of this Chapter are more 
descriptive than Chapters 4 or 5. This is balanced by the later analysis when detennining 
how the debates fit around the particular issues raised by section 44. 
The first section below introduces the topie of discrimination in the criminal justice system, 
providing a brief overview of the historical experiences of 'Black' and minority ethnic 
(BME) communities before considering the statistical evidence for discrimination and the 
explanations for the evident disproportionality. The next section draws upon the fieldwork 
to assess the practice of section 44 in relation to the communities and groups represented in 
the interviews. The final section assesses the practice in light of the theoretical discussion in 
section 1, detennining whether disproportionality is evident, how it can be explained and 
what changes could be made which would contribute towards reducing disproportionality. 
I See Chapter 2.2.3. 
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6.1) Discrimination and the Criminal Justice System 
This section deals with discrimination in the criminal justice system in broad terms, although 
focusing in particular on stop and search and counter-terrorism. The focus is upon 'Black 
and minority ethnic' (BME) communities as there has been sustained criticism - and 
statistical evidence - regarding their disproportionate targeting under stop and search 
powers. Although, as the final section below highlights, it is not only BME communities 
who are disproportionately targeted by section 44, much of the criticism regarding section 
44's impact relates to Muslim communities, themselves a BME community. In addition, 
most of the literature on discrimination and the criminal justice system focuses on one or 
more BME communities, whether in broad terms or in relation to stop and search.2 The 
literature on race and the criminal justice system, both academic and governmental, 
increased exponentially from the early 1970s, therefore that date will be taken as a 
convenient starting point, although this is not to suggest that no discrimination was evident 
in policing before that point. Chapter 3 has highlighted how this is clearly not true in 
relation to stop and search.3 As this section draws upon government statistics, and literature 
which draws upon government statistics, the same categories will be used, that is: 'Asian', 
'Black', 'mixed', 'other' and 'white,.4 
Discrimination in the criminal justice system occurs in two main ways: BME communities 
are over-policed by being disproportionately represented as actors in the criminal justice 
system, and they are under-policed, that is, while on the one hand they are more likely to be 
victims than the majority white population, they have consistcntly lower levels of trust in the 
efficiency, effectiveness and justice of the system, in addition to the perennial issues in 
relation to the policing of racist attacks, epitomised by the Steven Lawrence affair.s From 
the early 1970s, the literature focused on the over-policing of the Afro-Caribbean 
2 See: Gelsthorpe, L, 'Minority Ethnic Groups in the Criminal Justice System: papers 
presented to 21st Cropwood Roundtablc Conference 1992' (Cambridge, Institute of 
Criminology 1992); Benyon, J and Bourn, C, The Police: Powers. Procedures and 
Proprieties (Pcrgamon Press, Oxford 1986); Bowling and Phillips, Racism. crime and 
justice; Smith and Gray, Police and people in London: the PSI Report; Crawford, A and 
others, The Second Islington Crime Survey (Middlesex Polytechnic Centre for Criminology, 
Middlesex 1990); Rowe, M (cd), Policing beyond Macpherson (Willan, Cullompton 2007); 
Institute for Race Relations, Policing against Black People (IRR, London 1987). 
3 One of the first Government report on police and BME relations dates to 1971: Select 
Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, Police/immigrant relations. See also: Select 
Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, Report on the West Indian community. 
4 Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2007/08'. 
S Sir W Macpherson, 'The Macpherson Report'. 
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community, who were significantly over-represented in tenns of the prison population, 
number of arrests and in relation to stops and searches.6 
Given the particular issues in relation to section 44 and Muslim communities and the 
frequent conflation of' Asian' and 'Muslim' in related critiques,7 it is worth noting that the 
'Asian' experience of the criminal justice system deviates in several regards from that of the 
Afro-Caribbean and other 'Black' communities, although often the literature collapses the 
two into the categorisations of 'Black's or 'ethnic minority,.9 Stevens and Willis, using data 
from 1975, found that 'Asian' arrest rates were comparable to those of white people, while 
'Black' people were substantially over-represented.10 In tenns of stop and search, the PSI 
study revealed that' Asians' were less likely to be stopped than white people, while 'West 
Indians' were twice as likely to be stopped than white people. 11 'Asians' were, however, 
more likely to suffer attacks on their person and property than white people. 12 A 1981 
Home Office Report found that 'Asians' were also the most likely ethnic group to be victims 
of racial attacks. 13 'Asians', in common with 'Black' people, have had consistently lower 
levels of satisfaction in the police and criminal justice system more broadly.14 Smith and 
Grey, in their study of policing in London, found that though the police 'occasionally ... refer 
6 Smith and Gray, Police and people in London: the PSI Report; Stevens and Willis 'Race, 
crime and arrests'; Bowling and Phillips, Racism, crime and justice; Reiner, R, 'Race, Crime 
and Justice: Models oflnterpretation' in L Gelsthorpe (ed) Minority Ethnic Groups in the 
Criminal Justice System: papers presented to 21 si Crop wood Roundtable Conference J 992 
(Cambridge, Institute of Criminology 1992). 
7 See below, Chapter 6.2.3.1. 
8 E.g. Reiner, 'Race, Crime and Justice', note 1; Benyon and Bourn, The Police: Powers, 
Procedures and Proprieties: 'A ... survey of the British black population revealed that 30 per 
cent of Asians believed that they were treated worse than white people by the police' (30). 
9 E.g. Bowling and Phillips, Racism, crime andjuslice. 
10 Stevens and Willis 'Race, crime and arrests' Chapter 3. 
11 Smith and Gray, Police and people in London: the PSI Report 87. 
12 Modood, T, 'British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair' in J Donald and A Rattansi 
(eds) 'Race', culture and difference (Sage, London 1992) 261. 
13 Home Office 'Racial attacks: Report of a Home Office study' (Home Office, London 
1981). See also: Mayhew, P, Elliot, D and Dowds, L, 'The 1988 British Crime Survey' 
(Home Office (HORS Ill), London 1989) Chapter 5; Mayhew, P, Aye Maung, Nand 
Mirrlees-Black, C, 'The 1992 British Crime Survey' (Home Office (HORS 132), London 
1993) 87-8. 
14 Home Office, 'Racial attacks: Report of a Home Office study'; Mayhew, Elliot and Dowds 
'The 1988 British Crime Survey' 13-8; Mayhew, Aye Maung and Mirrlees-Black 'The 1992 
British Crime Survey' 33-5; Crawford and others, The Second Islington Crime Survey; 
Skogan 'Contacts between police and public: findings from the 1992 British Crime Survey' 
21-5. 
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to Asians as 'Pakis', they had a 'limited abusive vocabulary to describe ... Asians' .15 While 
they found lower levels of open hostility towards' Asians' than 'Black' people, it was 'far 
more common ... to say that Asians or 'Pakis' are devious, sly or unreliable, and in particular 
that they don't tell the truth' .16 In a similar vein, J efferson argued that the racist 
connotations of 'Asianness' tended to paint 'Asians' as 'manipulative conformists' rather 
than criminals,17 in contrast with the perception of 'Black' people as 'disorderly; as having a 
predisposition to crime; as violent; and as a complaining, untrustworthy group' .18 
Writing in 1992, Jefferson suggested that the majority Indian population among the broader 
'Asian' category might be 'masking' the different experiences of Bangladeshi and Pakistani 
communities, both of whom had a younger and more deprived demographic profile from 
which, '[g]iven the correlation between age/deprivation and criminalization, one could 
anticipate a concomitant difference in these groups' involvement in processes of 
criminalization' .19 By the time of the 'Section 95' reports, changes are evident in these 
trends as 'Asians' became more likely to be arrested and stopped and searched than white 
people, although still less likely than 'Black' people?O Similarly, data from the 2006/07 
British Crime Survey indicates that people from a white or 'mixed' ethnic background are 
slightly less satisfied with the police than those from an 'Asian', 'Black', 'Chinese' or 
'other' background, with overall confidence in the system falling since 2001/02.21 
6.1.1) Statistical evidence of discrimination 
Chapter 3 detailed how, historically, stop and search powers impacted disproportionately 
upon ethnic minorities. Statistically stop and search powers continue to fall 
disproportionately upon BME communities (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3 above). In 2007/08, 
15 Smith and Gray, Police and people in London: the PSI Report 391. 
16 ibid 396. 
17 Jefferson, T, 'The racism of criminalization: policing and the reproduction of the criminal 
other' in L Gelsthorpe (ed) Minority Ethnic Groups in the Criminal Justice System: papers 
presented to 21st Cropwood Roundtable Conference 1992 (Cambridge, Institute of 
Criminology 1992) 37. 
18 Holdaway, S, The Racialisation of British Policing: Black or White? (MacMillan, London 
1996) 78. 
19Jefferson, 'The racism of criminalization: policing and the reproduction of the criminal 
other', note 14. 
20 Home Office, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System: 1999'; Home Office, 
'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System: 1998'. 
21 Jansson, K and others, 'Attitudes, perceptions and risks of crime: Supplementary Volume 
1 to Crime in England and Wales 2006/07' (Home Office (Statistical Bulletin 19/07), 
London 2007) 8-9. See also: Nicholas, S and Walker, A, 'Crime in England and Wales 
2002/03: supplementary Volume 2: Crime, disorder and the Criminal Justice System-
public attitudes and perceptions' (Home Office (Statistical Bulletin 2/04), London 2004), 
Chapter 1. 
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under PACE, section I ' Black ' people were 7.6 times more li kely to be stopped than white 
people, whi le 'Asians' were 2.3 times more likely to be stopped than white peoplc. 22 As the 
numbcr of stops in relation to the CJPO, sec tion 60 or sec tion 44 are not broken down per 
1,000 of the population they arc produced below in Table 6.1 followed by the percentages of 
each ethnicity according to thc 200 I Census. Thcre is cvidcnt di sproportionali ty when the 
percentage of those stoppcd by cthnicity is compared to the proportion of that ethnicity 
within the total popul ation. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below show the numbcr of stops under 
scction 44, broken down by ethnicity, since 200 1/02 . 
Table 6.1: Stop and search under section 60, CJPO and section 44, TACT 2007-08.23 
Power White % Black % Asian % Other % 
(census%) (census %) (census %) (ccnsus %) 
Section 60, CJ PO 67% (91.3%) 22% (2.2%) 7.7% (4.4%) 2.2% (2.1 %) 
Section 44, TACT 64% (9 1.3%) 13% (2.2%) 18% (4.4% ) 5% (2. 1 %1) 
Figure 6.1: Stops under section 44, TACT 2001/02 - 2008/0924 
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22 Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2007/08' 28. 
23 ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.2: MPS stops under section 44, TACT 2001/02 - 2008/09. 25 
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Despite the seemingly obvious di sproportionality, the limitations of using such stati tics as 
definitive evidence of such must be considered. This discussion goes over ground covered 
in Chapter 3, but bears brief repetition given its importance. The first difficulty is the strong 
likelihood that stops are under-reported ,26 although the latest research on thi s dates to 2000 
and improvements may be seen if PDAs are rolled out fully . The second problem is with the 
classification of 'white ' 1 ' Black' 1 'Asian' 1 'mixed ' and 'other '. The crude nature of these 
classifications prompts prac titioners and academics to talk in terms of race, despite the 
general disavowal of the term. In addition, these class i fications provide no additional 
infonnation, regarding, for instance, the person's soc io-economic background, wh ich IS 
often an explanatory factor as to why certai n groups are targeted more by the police. 27 1\ 
side-point is that the ' Section 95' statistics, until 2008/09, provided only the pol ice officer's 
perception of the person' s ethnicity, which may differ from the person's ethnic self-
classification. Another difficulty is the inaccuracy of the Census data, given that it is carried 
out only once a decade. The final, general , difficulty, is that these quantitative fi gures reveal 
nothing about the quali ty of the stop, which has been found to be central in determining 
whether or not the person stopped is 'satisfied ' with the encounter. 28 Even if stat istically 
25 Ibid. 
26 Quinton, Bland and Miller 'Police Stops, Decision-making and Practice'. 
27 Jefferson, 'The racism of criminalization: policing and the reproduction of the criminal 
other' note 14. 
28 Delsol and Shiner 'Regulating stop and search: a challenge for police and community 
relations in England and Wales', 258; Waddington, P, Stenson, K and Don, 0 , 'In 
Proportion: police stop and earch' (2004) 44 BJC 889, 892. 
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disproportionately can be proven, it is highly problematic to then apply those conclusions to 
. d··d I 29 m IVI ua cases. 
The 'available' population thesis, discussed in Chapter 3.2.4, argues that the proportion of 
stops and searches by ethnicity ought to be calculated by reference to the demographic of the 
population in the area at the time of the stop as opposed to the demo graphics of the 
'resident' population. There are, however, difficulties in applying the 'available' population 
thesis to section 44. First, the studies which used the 'available' population did not focus on 
authorised powers without reasonable suspicion. Waddington et aI's study focused on 
PACE, section 1, and, although it is unclear which powers were included in Miller's study, 
only two of the forces, the MPS and Leicestershire, carried out a significant number of 
section 60 stops over the time period.30 It therefore seems likely that, like Waddington et aI, 
much of Miller's study focused on 'routine', non-authorised search powers. It may well bc, 
as suggested by Miller, that authorised search powers reveal different patterns of usage.31 
Certainly, section 44 has different patterns of usage from PACE, section 1, being used at 
choke points such as transport hubs and around iconic sites where pedestrian traffic is heavy. 
Second, some of the explanations regarding the 'availability' of some BME communities do 
not apply to the use of section 44. In Waddington et al most of the stop and search activity 
took place in the late evening and early morning. However, the fieldwork in this thesis 
indicates that, generally, section 44 activity takes place during the day.32 If particular BME 
communities are more 'available' to the police in the late evening and night-time, due to 
structural inequalities such as higher levels of unemployment, such groups, or at least some 
of them, should therefore be less 'available' for section 44 stops. Certainly in relation to 
unemployment, such groups should have been less 'available' for stops by the BTP under 
their previous deployment of section 44, which operated primarily during rush hour.33 This 
does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that more 'white' people will be stopped than 
members of BME communities, as the structural inequalities which may lead some to be 
'available' at night clearly apply only to some sub-groups within particular communities. 
However, the logic underlying the thesis appears flawed in relation to section 44: if a person 
appears 'out of place' because this is not a place or time where the police would usually 
29 Alschuler, A, 'Racial Profiling and the Constitution' [2002] University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 163,245. 
30 Miller 'Profiling populations available for stops and searches' ; Waddington, Stenson and 
Don 'In Proportion: police stop and search'; Ilome Office, 'Statistics on Race and the 
Criminal Justice System: 1999/00'. 
31 Miller 'Profiling populations available for stops and searches' 90. 
32 See Chapter 5.1. 
33 See Chapter 4.1.2. 
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view them as 'available', this fact of itself may prompt the police to stop them under section 
44, although the issue was not raised in the fieldwork. A final point, which is perhaps 
particularly relevant to the fieldwork forces, is the difficulty of ascertaining who the 
'available' population is, given its transient nature.34 Given these problems, the 'available' 
population thesis does not appear to be applicable to section 44. 
6.1.2) Disproportionality 
This section will consider the explanations for the statistical disproportionality discussed 
above, focusing on two categories, those which accept the fact of its occurrence and seek to 
explain how it occurs and those which argue the disproportionality is justifiable. The latter 
will be discussed within a broader analysis of profiling, in general terms and in relation to 
counter-terrorism. 
6.1.2.1) Explanations of disproportionality 
Turning first to the former category, which accepts the fact of disproportionality and tries to 
explain rather than justify it, adapting from Bowling and Phillips, there are four main theses: 
the 'bad apple' thesis; the 'canteen culture' thesis; the 'reflection of society' thesis and the 
institutional racism thesis.35 The first two draw upon cultural analysis, while the latter two 
adopt a structural mode1.36 As will become evident there is some overlap between the bases 
of the following arguments and those which will be considered in the next section which 
justify disproportionality. 
The 'bad apple' thesis, cited in the Scarman Report,37 is fairly self-explanatory, accepting 
that some officers act in a prejudicial or racist manner, but asserting that these are a tiny 
minority of the force.38 The 'canteen culture' thesis points to policing cultures, the 
characteristics of which have been variously identified as: authoritarian conservatism; racial 
prejudice; in-group loyalty and solidarity, with resulting alienation from 'general' society; a 
sense of mission; action; cynicism; and pessimism.39 Reiner has argued that these 
characteristics combine to result in the police treating sections of society as 'police 
property', whereby certain groups bear the brunt of policing and are denied "full' 
34 See Chapter 4.3 for further discussion of this 'transient' community. 
35 Bowling and Phillips, Racism, crime andjustice 156-161. 
36 Reiner, 'Race, Crime and Justice' 3. 
37 Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [4.63]. 
38 Sce, e.g. Ibid. 
39 Skolnick, J, Justice Without Trial (John Wiley & Sons, London 1966) passim 42-70; 
Waddington, P, 'Police (canteen) sub-culture: an appreciation' (1999) 32 BJC 287; Reiner, 
The politics of the police Chapter 3. 
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citizenship' .40 Chapter 3 detailed how stop and search powers have, historically, been used 
against such 'police property': those groups at the margins of society.41 Smith and Grey 
warn against presuming a straightforward relationship between attitudes and action, arguing 
that racist attitudes serve various different needs than those which come into play when an 
officer is actually interacting with a member of a BME group and therefore 'it would be 
quite wrong to assume that, because there is a good deal of racialist talk .. .it follows that the 
police discriminate against members of minority groups or regularly behave towards them in 
a hostile manner' .42 
While these cultural explanations may explain the disproportionality in part, the structural 
explanations of disproportionality against BME communities, historically focusing on the 
Africo-Caribbean populations, are the most convincing and academically dominant 
theories.43 They assert that it is structural discrimination against BME communities which 
results in their over-representation within the criminal justice system. This intersects with 
other theories discussed above, such as the 'available' population thesis. As Reiner 
explains: '[t]he basic trigger for what can become a vicious circle of spiralling conflict is 
societal and institutionalised racism. This forces discriminated-against ethnic minorities to 
acquire those characteristics upon which 'normal' policing bears down most heavily, and it 
is the policing element which is crucial for feeding disproportionate numbers of 'Black' 
people into the system' .44 Although the historical focus has been on the disproportionality 
against 'Black' people within the criminal justice system, the structural inequalities which 
fed, and continue to feed, this manifestation are evident among many of the Muslim 
communities in Britain.4s 
The 'reflection of society' and 'institutional racism' theses can be seen as two sub-genres of 
the structural approach. The 'reflection of society' thesis argues that as the police are a 
reflection of society as a whole and as a proportion of society are racially prejudiced it 
follows that a proportion of officers will be also prejudiced.46 In the context of section 44 
and its alleged misuse against 'British Muslims', this thesis offers an interesting study given 
the substantial increase in recent times in Islamophobia. In the UK, the Runnymede's 
40 Reiner, The politics o/the police 78. 
41 See especially Chapter 3.1.4. 
42 Smith and Gray, Police and people in London: the PSI Report 402. 
43 See, e.g. Reiner, R, 'Race and Criminal Justice' (1989) 16 New Community 5; Bowling 
and Phillips, Racism, crime andjustice. 
44 Rciner 'Race and Criminal Justice' 18. 
45 Department for Communities and Local Government 'Understanding Muslim Ethnic 
Communities: Summary Report' (The Change Institute, London 2009). 
46 Bowling and Phillips, Racism, crime andjustice 156. 
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seminal report on Islamophobia dates to 1997,47 while the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), an EU body, first noted Islamophobia in its second 
annual report in 2000.48 Indeed, the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance's 'General Policy Recommendation, No. 5', which focuses on combating 
intolerance and discrimination against Muslims, dates to April 2000.49 The EUMC has since 
published several reports focusing solely on Muslim communities and/or Islamophobia 
across the EU.sO 
Since 9/11, previous attempts to depict a 'clash of civilisations' have gained traction in some 
quarters, and increasingly there is a tendency, particularly within the print media, to equate 
Islam and terrorism.S1 The study of Moore, Mason and Lewis into the depiction of Muslims 
in the UK print media revealed that stories about British Muslims and 'terrorism or the war 
on terror' accounted for 36% of the total between 2000 and 2008, 22% focused on cultural 
or religious issues, particularly the 'cultural differences between British Muslims and other 
British people', with Muslim extremism accounting for a further 11 %.52 Only 5% of stories 
focused on problems which Muslims face or attacks on Muslims.s3 More generally, Hudson 
and Bramhall argue that 'since the Rushdie Affair, and even more since Septembcr 11' there 
is evidence of 'the recasting of close family ties, strong informal social control, self-
regulation and conformity from positive to negative constructions of Asianness'. 54 The 
'reflection of society' thesis therefore suggests that, given the increase in Islamophobia 
across society, an equivalent increase in prejudice will be evident among the police. 
47 Conway, G, 'Islamophobia: a challenge for us all' (Runnymede Trust, London 1997); 
Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 'Islamophobia: issues, challenges and 
action' (Runnymede, London 2004). 
48 EUMC 'Diversity and Equality for Europe: Annual Report 2000' (EUMC, Vienna 2000) 
47. 
49 ECR! 'General Policy Recommendation No. 5' (2000) . 
so EUMC, 'Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001' (EUMC, 
Vienna 2002); EUMC, 'The fight against Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: bringing 
communities together' (EUMC, Vienna 2003); EUMC, 'The Impact of the 7 July 2005 
London Bomb Attacks on Muslim Communities in the EO' (EUMC, Vienna 2005); EUMC, 
'Muslims in the European Union: discrimination and Islamophobia' (EUMC, Vienna 2006 ). 
See also: Allen, C and Neilsen, J, 'Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 9/11' (EUMC, 
Vienna 2002); Abbas, T, Muslim Britain (Zed Books, London 2005) Pt 11. 
St Huntington, S, 'The clash of civilizations?' (1993) 72 Foreign Affairs 22. 
52 Moore, K, Mason, P and Lewis, J, 'Images ofIslam in the UK: The Representation of 
British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000-2008' (Cardiff School of 
Journalism, Cardiff 2008) 10. 
S3 ibid 11. 
54 Hudson, Band Bramhall, G, 'Assessing the "other": constructions of "Asianness" in risk 
assessments by probation officers' (2005) 45 BJC 721, 734. 
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'Institutional racism', now synonymous with the Macpherson Report, draws upon both the 
cultural approach, given its reference to attitudes, and the structural approach through its 
emphasis on the unwitting impact that processes and behaviours may have on particular 
communities.55 As discussed in Chapter 3.2.3, Macpherson's definition of institutional 
racism focused on collective failures of an organisation to provide an appropriate service to 
BME communities, often arising through unwitting prejudice, stereotyping or prejudice.56 
The definition, described as 'slippery', proved controversial and was frequently 
misunderstood.57 In particular individual racism was elided with institutional racism.s8 This 
led to much 'anger' among individual officers who felt that the label signified widespread 
individual racism.59 As Waddington et al have noted, the complexity of the definition lies in 
the interaction between processes, attitudes and behaviours and between various policing 
. 60 practIces. 
6.1.2.2) Justifying disproportionality: Profiling 
Profiling in broad terms is intrinsically linked to the exponential rise of the use of actuarial 
methods within the criminal justice system, and thus also entwined with the rise of the 'risk 
society', responding to models of risk and pre-emption. Within the criminal justice system, 
risk management came to the fore initially in relation to parole, with the most recent 
theoretical developments concerning indeterminate sentences61 and the economic analysis of 
'efficient' profiling in relation to stop and search.62 Although incubated within theories of 
risk, it may appear at first blush that profiling has no role in 'all-risks' policing, given the 
logic of treating all persons within a given location as a risk. This presumes that the police 
will exercise no discretion whatsoever and will in fact treat all people as equal risks, 
however, some selection process is inevitable given the restraints upon police resources. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chaptcr 5.1, the police would be acting ultra vires if they selected 
55 Sir W Macpherson, 'The Macpherson Report'. 
56 ibid [6.34]. 
57 Skidelsky, R, 'The Age ofInequality' in 0 Green (ed) Institutional Racism and the Police: 
fact or fiction? (Institute for the Study of Civil Society, London 2000) 1. 
58 Home Affairs Committee, The Macpherson Report - Ten years on (HC 2008-09, 427). 
59 Foster, J, Newburn, T and Souhami, A, 'Assessing the impact of the Stephen Lawrence 
Inquiry' (Home Office (HORS 294), London 2005» Chapter 3. 
60 Waddington, Stenson and Don 'In Proportion: police stop and search', 910. 
61 Wells v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] UKHL 22 
62 Ayres 'Outcome tests of racial disparities in police practices'; N Pcrsico and PE Todd 'The 
Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Motor-Vehicle Searches'; c.f. Engcl 'A Critique of the 
"Outcome Test" in Racial Profiling Research'; Engel and TiIlyer 'Searching for Equilibrium: 
The Tenuous Nature of the Outcome Test'; Engel, Calnon and Bcrnard 'Theory and racial 
profiling: shortcomings and future directions in research'; Anwar and Fang 'An alternative 
test of racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches: theory and evidence'. 
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persons on the basis of arbitrary numerical categories. The proliferation of profiling within 
counter-terrorism has been noted with concern by the Special Rapporteur.63 
Profiling may be used in relation to suspects on the basis of evidence arising from a specific 
committed offence. This type of evidence-based 'suspect-profiling' is not contentious, 
leaving aside issues of eye-witness reliability, and is not under discussion here. Rather, the 
focus is on profiling on the basis of group membership. Before discussing such profiling it 
is worth making a few points concerning behavioural profiling. Behavioural profiling 
'appears to be significantly more efficient' than profiling on the basis of group membership 
and is nominally neutral in terms of race, ethnicity and religion.64 However, some 
commentators fear that behavioural profiles may act as a proxy for group profiling on the 
grounds of characteristics.65 One criticism is that the criteria used are usually so broad as to 
permit officers to act on preconceived racial biases.66 For example, the Department of 
Homeland Security lists the following among its list of 'Indicative Behaviors of Suicide 
Bombers': 'eyes appear to be focused and vigilant'; 'clothing is loose'; 'does not respond to 
authoritative voice commands or direct salutation from a distance'; and 'suspect is walking 
with deliberation but not running' .67 A second issue is that such behavioural profiling may 
constitute indirect discrimination or institutional racism. For example, certain nationalities 
and ethnicities may wear loose clothing or not make direct eye contact. People with certain 
disabilities may behave in a 'suspicious' manner.68 BME communities who have suffered 
from over-policing or immigrants who have been mistreated by their domestic police, may 
not respond positively to 'authoritarian ... commands' or salutations.69 
Turning now to profiling on the basis of group characteristics, such profiling can be on the 
basis of any number of characteristics but the concern here is with ethnicity, national origins 
and religion. The CTITF has accepted that difference in treatment based on criteria of race 
63 Schenin 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism' [32-62]. 
64 CTITF Working Group on Protecting Iluman Rights while Countering Terrorism, 'Basic 
human rights reference guide: the stopping and searching of persons' [38]. 
65 Ritchie, A and Mogul, J, 'In the shadows of the war on terror: persistent police brutality 
and abuse of people of color in the United States' (2008) 1 De Paul J. for Soc. Just. 175, 217-
218. 
66 ibid, 217-218. 
67 DHS 'Maintaining awareness regarding AI-Qaeda's potential threats to the Homeland' < 
http://www.dps.state.vt.us!homelandllibrary_aware.htm > downloaded 27 July 20 I O. 
68 City of London Police 'Counter-terrorism Policy' 
<http://www .ci tyoflondon.police. ukINRlrdonlyres/6CACD994-1 B22-443 E-9B3F-
F458C76D57E6/0/counterterrorismFOl.pdf> accessed 20th May 20 I 0 9. 
69 Ritchie and Mogul 'In the shadows of the war on terror: persistent police brutality and 
abuse of people of color in the United States' 218. 
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or religion may be non-discriminatory 'if it was supported by objective and reasonable 
grounds', albeit with the caveat that it is usually not possible to provide such objective and 
reasonable grounds.70 As noted in Chapter 5.5.5, this does not accord with domestic or 
ECtHR jurisprudence. Those who support profiling often justify it on the basis that it leads 
to more 'efficient' policing. This view is predicated upon the belief that there is an 
offending differential between groups, however characterised. If Group A offends more 
than Group B then, it is argued, the police will maximise their efficiency by targeting Group 
B rather than Group A, at least until such a time as the offending differential is eliminated. 
There are a number of difficulties with this approach. One fundamental problem is the issue 
of which characteristics are used to define the group. It is ethically problematic to assert 
group membership on the basis of 'un-chosen' characteristics, such as race or ethnicity. 
Similar concerns arise with religion and national origins, although it could be argued these 
may, in some circumstances, be 'chosen'. Various studies, including Tyler's 'Chicago 
Study', have found that the key factor which influences a person to comply with the law or 
not is its perceived legitimacy, on which perceptions of procedural justice have the greatest 
impaet.71 If the general public, majority or minority groups feel that the police are acting 
illegitimately or are failing to adhere to procedural nonns in targeting groups on the basis of 
shared characteristics this may undennine their perception of the legitimacy of the law and 
their adherence to it. In tenns of counter-terrorism, this 'collateral impact' may also alienate 
them from the police, damming the flow of crucial information.72 The perception of 
legitimacy is likely to be particularly pertinent in relation to stop and search given the 
extremely low hit-rate. As Fitzgerald noted: 'even if there were no discrimination in 
searches ... as long as some groups have a higher risk of being the legitimate target of 
searches, disproportionate numbers of innocent people in those groups will be searched' .73 
Even if this ethical issue is put to one side, difficulties remain. In relation to ethnicity, 
religion and national origins, a more prosaic problem, which may undermine any purported 
gains in efficiency, is the difficulty in identifying someone on the basis of any of these 
characteristics. An obvious exception is at border controls where national origin can be 
detennined, or at least onc's current national origin. Where ethnicity is underlined by 
national origins, for instance the categorisation of 'Arabs' in the USA, it may be somewhat 
easier to discern group members, although the category will still suffer from both over- and 
70 CTITF Working Group on Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, 'Basic 
human rights reference guide: the stopping and searching ofpcrsons' [36]. 
71 Tyler, T, Why People Obey the Law (Yale UP, London 1990). 
72 CTITF Working Group on Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, 'Basic 
human rights reference guide: the stopping and searching of persons' [20]. 
73 FitzGerald, M. 'Supplementary memorandum' to Home Affairs Committee, Young Black 
People and the Criminal Justice System' (HC 2006-07, 181-I1) Ev 242 [4.9]. 
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under-inclusion. While some members of groups may have overt indicators of their 
ethnicity, religion and national origins, many will not. Moreover, most overt indicators of 
these characteristics may be easily disguised or 'substituted' for characteristics which are not 
profiled. Tucker notes that in Israel 'suicide bombers have ... sought to foil profiling efforts 
by shaving their beards, dyeing their hair blond, and wearing Israeli uniforms or even the 
traditional clothing of orthodox Jews' .74 Islamophobic attacks have focused particularly on 
visible indicators of faith, targeting for instance women wearing the hijab or burka, however, 
there has also been a noted increase of attacks on Sikhs, which, while reflecting the 
perpetrators' ignorance of different religions, also underlines the difficulty in drawing 
concrete conclusions regarding religious discrimination based on visible difference.75 
6.1.3) The Outcome Test 
In relation to stop and search, one of the major contemporary debates concerns the 'outcome 
test', whereby 'efficiency' is judged in terms of maximising the 'hit-rate' from searches.76 
Deriving from economic theory originally devised in the 1950s by Becker,77 the 'outcome 
test' was developed significantly in the 2000s.78 Essentially, a comparable rate of 
'successful' searches across groups represents an 'equilibrium' with any disproportionality 
explicable on the basis that the police arc maximising their efficiency rather than on the 
basis of any discrimination, or as Boorah puts it, the police are acting out of 'business 
necessity' rather than 'bigotry,.79 A number of criticisms may be made concerning the 
'outcome test'. First, a successful 'outcome' from a stop and search is not the same as 
saying that the person has been found guilty of an offence. This undercuts the correlation of 
an offending differential. Second, it is predicated on the understanding that the only 
differentials for police action are the 'hit-rate' and costs in terms of time, effort and a 'taste 
74 Tucker, J. cited in Harcourt, B, Against prediction: profiling. policing. and punishing in 
an actuarial age (University of Chicago Press, London 2007) 232. 
7S EUMC 'Muslims in the European Union: discrimination and Islamophobia'; Alien and 
Neilsen 'Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 9/11 '. 
76 Engc1 'A Critique of the "Outcome Test" in Racial Profiling Research' 3. 
77 Becker, a, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago UP, Chicago 1957). 
78 Ayres 'Outcome tests of racial disparities in police practices'; N Persico and PE Todd 'The 
Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Motor-Vehicle Searches'; c.r. EngcI 'A Critique of the 
"Outcome Test" in Racial Profiling Research'; Engel and Tillyer 'Searching for Equilibrium: 
The Tenuous Nature of the Outcome Test'; Engel, Calnon and Bernard 'Theory and racial 
profiling: shortcomings and future directions in research'; Anwar and Fang 'An alternative 
test of racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches: theory and evidence'. 
79 Boorah, V, 'Racial bias in police stops and searches: an economic analysis' (2001) 17 
European Journal of Political Economy 17. 
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for discrimination' .80 However, research has pointed to various other factors which may 
influence an officer. Young and Skogan both argued that socio-economic factors were more 
dominant than racial ones.81 Waddington highlighted the demeanour of the person when 
they were stopped,82 while empirical research by Norris et al found that white people were 
more likely to be aggressive towards the police, perhaps due to the fact that they were also 
more likely to be intoxicated.83 The outcome test fails to take account of these factors or of 
differences in the intensity of the search which may impact upon the 'outcome'. Extraneous 
factors, such as the deployment of police resources, whether in relation to specific offences, 
locations or times may also impact upon the 'hit-rate'. 
Another criticism of the 'outcome test' is that it presumes a constant 'elasticity' of offending 
to policing across all groups, which represents the response of individuals to police 
actions.84 Harcourt argues that where there is an offending differential between groups the 
group that offends more is likely to have less elasticity, particularly if there are underlying 
socio-economic causes.8S The structural inequality thesis, discussed above, suggests that in 
such a case increased police attention may not significantly impact upon the group due to the 
continuing underlying factors. 86 Margoth and Blumkin take this further, arguing that where 
a minority group offends more the majority group should be targeted by the police as the 
'marginal group' within the majority, that is those people who are as likely to obey the law 
as to disregard it, are likely to be more sensitive to deterrence than the minority group.87 In 
relation to 'ordinary' crime, this suggests that targeting the minority group with a higher 
offending differential will increase crime. 
Terrorism must be distinguished from 'ordinary' crime in this respect. The ideological 
framework within which terrorists justify their actions makes it unlikely that a 'marginal 
group' will turn to terrorism simply because they think they are unlikely to be detected. 
However, taking account of terrorists' elasticity is important. Due to the ideological nexus, 
80 Harcourt, Against prediction: profiling. policing, and punishing in an actuarial age 124. 
81 Skogan 'Contacts between police and public: findings from the 1992 British Crime Survey' 
21-5; Young, Policing the streets: stops and search in North London. 
82 Waddington, P, 'Black Crime, the "racist" police and fashionable comparison' in D 
Andersons (ed) The Kindness that Kills (SPCK, London 1984). 
83 Norris, C and others, 'Black and blue: an analysis of the influence of race on being stopped 
by the police' (1992) 43 BJC 207. 
84 Harcourt, Against prediction: profiling, policing. and punishing in an actuarial age. 
85 ibid. 
86 ibid 123. 
87 Margalioth, Y and Blumkin, T, 'Targeting the majority: redesigning racial profiling' 
(2006) 24 Yale LPR 317. 
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terrorist's elasticity is likely to be very low, especially in relation to suicide bombers. 
Moreover, while profiling a group may lead to higher detection rates in relation to that type 
of event or in relation to that location, history suggests that it will result in the substitution of 
different terrorist attacks, whether in terms of different types of attacks or different locations. 
For example, the implementation of metal detectors in US airports in 1973 radically 
decreased the number of hijackings but studies suggest that there was a corresponding rise in 
the number of assassinations; similarly, the fortification of US embassies resulted in a rise of 
. . 88 
assassmatlons. 
While it is evident from the criticisms above that the 'outcome test' cannot justify statistical 
discrimination on the basis of maximising efficiency, the question remains whether 
disproportionality that maximises efficiency would be acceptable. In the context of section 
44, given that one of the central aims of the power is deterrence, 'efficiency' must be seen as 
the overall reduction of the threat from terrorists. Difference in treatment does not 
necessarily constitute discrimination under Article 14 and is acceptable if it has an 'objective 
and reasonable justification,.89 Ireland v United Kingdom established that the Government 
may act differentially in its response to different terrorist groups, in that case, interning only 
suspected IRA terrorists between 1971 and 1973 and thereafter interning a very small 
number of suspected Loyalist terrorists.90 It is perhaps notable that the ECtIlR limited its 
discussion to distinguishing Loyalist and IRA/Republican terrorism rather than considering 
how the security tactics impacted upon the wider community, in terms of Catholics and 
Protestants.91 This suggests that the case could stand as a precedent for the application of 
differential security measures against, for instance, dissident Republicans rather than 
'international terrorists', a regional approach having been approved in Magee v United 
Kingdom.92 However, Ireland v United Kingdom may not stand in aid of disparate treatment 
of communities in respect of the same terrorist threat. The ruling in A v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department is a reminder that the current 'international terrorism' threat 
comes from 'home-grown' and foreign terrorists and that it is not possible to contend that 
88 Cauley, J and Im, E, 'Intervention policy analysis of skyjackings and other terrorist 
incidents' (1998) 78 American Economic Review 27; Enders, Wand Sandler, T, 'The 
effectiveness of anti terrorism policies: a vector-autoregression-intervention analysis' (1993) 
87 American Political Science Review 829; Enders, Wand Sandler, T, 'What Do We Know 
About the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?' in A Silke and G Ilardi (eds) 
Researching terrorism: trends, achievements,failures (Frank Cass, London 2004). 
89 Belgian Linguistic Case. 
90 Ireland v United Kingdom. 
91 The terms 'Republican terrorism' and 'IRA terrorism' are used interchangeably in the 
judgement. 
92 (200 I) 31 EIIRR 35, app.no.28135/95. See also Brannigan v United Kingdom (1994) 17 
EHRR 539 app.no.l4553/89. 
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national origins are an 'objective and reasonable justification' for differential treatment. 
Most 'international terrorists' are Muslim. However, these are a tiny proportion of the 
Muslim popUlation and to target all Muslims, ignoring the difficulties already noted in 
respect of identifying someone on the basis of their religion, could not be seen as a 
reasonable or objective reaction and would in any case be far too large a class to be an 
efficient method. 
Three final points must be made in relation to profiling. The first, which links into thc 
legitimacy argument is that profiling, especially in relation to 'sensitivc' characteristics such 
as religion, race, ethnicity or national origins, is likely to reinforce the perceptions of 
injustice, thus strengthening the 'preferences of terrorists' .93 There seems little doubt that 
singly or cumulatively, the detention of over 1,200 non-citizens post 9/11 - some for up to 
three years, the scandals in relation to torture and thc degrading treatment in Abu-Ghraib and 
Guantanamo, the differential treatment of certain nationalities at borders, all combined to 
alienate, at least some, among the Muslim and Arab communities from the USA.94 Similar 
arguments may be made domestically in relation to the mistreatment of prisoners in Iraq, thc 
internment of non-nationals in Belmarsh and continuing control orders. The second point is 
that many commentators argue that there is no terrorist profile. Sageman, for example, after 
studying the biographies of 400 terrorists, concluded that there was no terrorist profile; the 
most that could be discerned was the similar paths to jihad that many took. 95 Thc 
final point is that focusing on apparent profiles may lead the police to miss more pertinent 
factors because of their presumptions regarding group characteristics. 
6.1.3.1) 'Suspect Community'? 
One explanation given for the disproportionate impact of section 44 upon 'Asians' in 
particular is that the Government has creatcd a 'suspect community' of 'British Muslims' 
who suffer the brunt of counter-tcrrorist measurcs.96 It could perhaps be said, adapting 
93 Cited in Harcourt, Against prediction: profiling, policing, and punishing in an actuarial 
age 234. 
94 Donohue, L, The cost of counter-terrorism (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 117-122; lIarcourt, 
Against prediction: profiling, policing, and punishing in an actuarial age 234; ACLU 
'Sanctioned bias: racial profiling since 9/11' (New York 2004). 
9S Sagcman, M, Understanding terror networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia 2004). See also: Travis, A, 'MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in 
Britain' The Guardian (London,20th August 2008); Walker "'Know thinc enemy as 
Thyself': Discerning Friend from Foe under Anti-Terrorism Laws'. 
96 Pantazis, C and Pembcrton, S, 'From the 'old' to the 'ncw' suspect community' (2009) 49 
BJC 646; Nickels, H and others, 'A comparative study of the representations of "suspect" 
communities in multi-ethnic Britain and of their impact on Irish communities and Muslim 
communities' (Institute for the Study of Europcan Transformations, London 2010); Liberty, 
'The impact of anti terrorism powers on thc British Muslim population' (Liberty, London 
2004); Peirce, G, 'Was it like this for thc Irish?' (2008) 7 London Revicw of Books 3; 
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Kennedy's analogy, that 'British Muslims' pay a 'religious tax' for society's 'war on 
terrorism' .97 To assess the explanatory force ofthis thesis it is necessary first to consider its 
origin and then to consider how it is applied contemporarily. 
The term 'suspect community' is derived from Hillyard's eponymously titled book which 
analysed the impact of the PTAs on the Irish in Britain.98 His thesis was that the PTAs 
created a two-tiered justice system wherein Irish people were targeted not because they were 
suspected of involvement in or of carrying out an illegal act but rather they were 'suspects 
primarily because they [were] Irish': the PTAs turned the Irish into a 'suspect community' .99 
His methodology may be criticised from a number of angles. Although there are 
discrepancies within the text regarding the number and background of his interviewees, I 00 
there is unquestionably a heavy bias towards 'Irish' people, whether Irish Catholics living in 
Britain or Northern Ireland or from the Republic of Ireland. IOI By excluding other groups 
Hillyard at best proves that one community - the Irish - was a 'suspect community'. Thus, 
the thesis cannot explain why of those stopped under the PTA 1989, section 13A, 7% were 
'Black' persons and 5% were Asian.102 The second bias - towards Northern Irish 103 - is 
potentially problematic as this group is likely to have been influenced by the PT As as 
practised in Northern Ireland, in addition to the EPAs. 104 The legislation and policing 
practices differed significantly between Northern Ireland and Great Britain and so 
conclusions in relation to Britain may be inaccurate. Additionally, policing at ports and 
borders must be considered separately from 'general' policing in Britain. 
Spalek, B, El Awa, Sand MacDonald, L, 'Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for 
the Purposes of Counter-terrorism: An Examination (Summary Report)' (University of 
Birmingham, Birmingham 2008); Mythen, G, Walklate, S and Khan, F, "'I'm a Muslim, but 
I'm not a terrorist': victimization, risky identities and the performance of safety' (2009) 49 
BJC 736 (although they do not refer specifically to a 'suspect community', speaking rather 
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103 Hillyard, Suspect community: people's experience o/the Prevention o/Terrorism Acts in 
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The thesis would be more tenable if applied to specific and identifiable communities in 
Northern Ireland. For example, persons living in and around the Falls Road in Belfast were 
'suspects' because they came from the Falls. As a community they were repeatedly 
subjected to military and police activity, with examples including: internment in 1971 and 
the Falls Curfew of 1970, which was imposed to curb rioting provoked by house searches.105 
This is not to say that the group was the only 'suspect community', merely it was an 
example of a 'suspect community'. Clearly many of the practices cited also impacted upon 
other communities. 
Many of today's commentators who adopt Hillyard's thesis do so uncritically.l06 None 
mention the significant differences between the conflict and the law in relation to 
'international terrorism' and Northern Ireland-related terrorism. HilIyard's book restricts 
itself to the operation of the PT A in Britain, however, following on from the arguments 
above that the 'suspect community' thesis can best be sustained in relation to the impact of 
counter-terrorist laws in Northern Ireland, the differences between the impact on British 
Muslims and on the communities in Northern Ireland will now be sketched. 
First, with Northern Ireland-related terrorism, thcre was a clear stratification to the law: the 
'basic' law applied across the UK, in addition to supplementary powers in Northern Ireland, 
often significant in their breadth, relating to, for example, internment, trial without jury and 
exclusion orders. l07 There has not been, and it is implausible to imagine their being, 
different laws applied to areas in Britain which have substantial Muslim communities. The 
attempt, under Operation Champion, to encircle two predominantly Muslim areas in 
Birmingham with Automatic Number Plate Recognition Cameras and CCTV, funded 
through PREVENT, reveals that the same laws may be differentially applied, although the 
outcry and subsequent dismantling of the scheme suggests that stratification to the degree 
seen in Northern Ireland is unacceptable. 108 
105 CampbeU, C. & Connolly, I. itA Model for the 'War against Terrorism'? Military 
Intervention and the 1970 Falls Curfew." (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society 341~ 
McKittriek and McVea, Making sense of the Troubles; Coogan, The IRA . 
106 Nickels and others 'A comparative study of the representations of "suspect" communities 
in multi-ethnic Britain and of their impact on Irish communities and Muslim communities'; 
Liberty 'The impact of anti terrorism powers on the British Muslim population'; Peiree 'Was 
it like this for the Irish?'; Spalek, El Awa and MacDonald 'Police-Muslim Engagement and 
Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter-terrorism: An Examination (Summary Report)'; 
My then, Walklate and Khan "'I'm a Muslim, but I'm not a terrorist': victimization, risky 
identities and the performance of safety'. C.f. Pantazis and Pemberton 'From the 'old' to the 
'new' suspect community'. 
101 Regulation 23, SPA 1922; Section 2, EPA 1976. 
108 Thompson, S, 'Project Champion Review' (Thames Valley Police, 2010). 
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The second major difference is the military, who were present in Northern Ireland on a 
permanent basis from 1969 until 2007, their numbers peaking at 21,800 in 1972, and who 
were particularly active in the 1970's pre-'Ulsterization'. \09 The third difference is the 
intensity of the conflict, both in terms of terrorist attacks and the security services' response. 
The 717 attack was more deadly than any previous terrorist attack in the UK, however, the 
intensity of the 'Troubles', in terms of the number of attacks and the cumulative death toll -
3,720 - far outstrips the intensity to date of 'international terrorism' in the UK. IIO In terms 
of policing, in 1975, the 'heaviest' year for counter-terrorist policing during the Troubles, 
there were 437 people detained under the PTA 1974, section 12, compared with 285 under 
TACT, section 41 in 2005106, again the year with the 'heaviest' statistics. III While there 
have been instances, such as Forest Gate and the de Menezes killing, where the police 
adopted a heavy handed, militarised approach, this is not the norm. I 12 In contrast, the police 
in Northern Ireland were routinely armed, used plastic bullets and water cannons and were 
directly responsible for the deaths of fifty-one people.1I3 The issue of collusion, again 
disputed although reports to date strongly suggest its occurrence, has also not featured in the 
'current' counter-terrorist strategies.114 These differences have been highlighted not to 
suggest that no correlation can be made between the impact of counter-terrorist strategies 
now compared with those employed during 'the Troubles' but rather to insist that any 
comparisons must be suitably nuanced. 
The most significant flaw among the research which asserts 'British Muslims' have become 
a 'suspect community' is the uncritical approach towards 'British Muslims', who are 
portrayed as a homogenous group. While this is not problematic among those who talk 
broadly of the impact of counter-terrorist measures upon 'British Muslims', without 
109 Walker, 'The role and powers of the Army'. Sce Chapter 2. 
110 McKittrick and others, Lost Lives: the stories of the men, women and children who died 
as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles, table 1. 
III Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 2006 of the Terrorism Act 2000'; Walker, C, The 
prevention of terrorism in British law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1992) 162. 
112 See: IPCC, 'IPCC Independent Investigation into the Shooting of Muhammed Adbulkhar 
in 46 Landsdown Road, Forest Gate on Friday 2 June 2006' (lPCC, London 2006); IPCC, 
'Stockwell One: Investigation into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell 
underground station on 22 July 2005' (IPCC, London 2007); IPCC, 'Stockwell Two: An 
investigation into complaints about the Metropolitan Police Service's handling of public 
statements following the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005' (IPCC, 
London 2007). 
113 McKittrick and others, Lost Lives: the stories of the men, women and children who died 
as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles, table 2. See also: Punch, Shoot to kill: 
Exploring police use of firearms. 
114 Judge Cory, 'The Cory Collusion Inquiry: Lord Justice Gibson and Lady Gibson; Chief 
Superintendent Breen and Superintendent Buchanan; Billy Wright; Patrick Finucane; 
Rosemary Nelson and Robert Hamill'. 
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reference to particular groups or statistics,1I5 others, such as M ythen and Walklate and 
Liberty uncritically read 'Asian' as 'Muslim,.1I6 Statements regarding the impact of 
counter-terrorist policing on 'British Muslims' must be nuanced and refrain from drawing 
generalisations without sufficient evidential proof. Just as Garland et a1. have argued that 
the dominant discourses of 'Black', 'Asian' or 'BME' 'obscure the distinct experiences of 
certain groups', so too the use of the term 'British Muslims' obscures the distinct 
experiences of groups, such as British-Pakistanis, or British-Bangladeshis. 1 17 
6.2) Section 44: the practice 
This section considers the practice of section 44 as revealed in the community interviews. 
As explained in Chapter 2.2.3, this snapshot of the 'community' was informed by the main 
research focus - the police; all bar two of the interviewees were mcmbers of police I 
community groups, the remaining interviewees being contacted directly following their 
public comments on how the police were carrying out section 44. In addition to its impact 
on the Muslim communities, the fieldwork revealed that section 44 is being (mis-)used 
against 'protesters', 'photographers' and members of the GLBT community. I 18 It is not 
possible to draw definitive conclusions regarding the extent of the misuse of section 44 on 
the basis of this small sample, however, the qualitative experience may trump the question 
of quantity in shaping community opinion. Indeed, even, as noted by Lord Scarman after 
the Brixton riots, the perception of misuse rather than actual misuse can lead to community 
distrust of the power, its objectives and use. 119 Comparisons can perhaps be drawn with the 
community reaction to Operation Champion, which was found to have 'resulted in 
significant community anger and loss of trust', notwithstanding that the CCTVs never 
became operative.12o To similar effect, the community may not distinguish between one 
type of stop and search and another: 'if you ask the community, they don't care whether it's 
section 44, PACE; stop and search per se, that's it' .121 More broadly, 'it's the wider policing 
liS Spalck, El Awa and MacDonald 'Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the 
Purposes of Counter-terrorism: An Examination (Summary Report)'; Nickels and others 'A 
comparative study of the representations of "suspect" communities in multi-ethnic Britain 
and ofthcir impact on Irish communities and Muslim communities'. 
116 Liberty 'The impact of anti terrorism powers on the British Muslim population' 5; 
My then, Walklate and Khan "'I'm a Muslim, hut I'm not a terrorist': victimization, risky 
identities and the performance of safety' 738. 
117 Garland, J, Spalek, Band Chakraborti, N, 'Hearing lost voices: issues in researching 
'bidden' minority ethnic communities' (2006) 46 BJC 423, 423. 
118 COMMA; COMMB; COMMC. 
119 Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [4.67]. See Chapter 3.1.4. 
120 Thompson 'Project Champion Review' 49. 
121 COMMD. 
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agenda' that can impact upon how people view stop and search, and their view may be 
coloured by 'personal intervention with the police on a different matter, or a friend of a 
friend' .122 
6.2.1) Choice of person stopped 
6.2.1.1) 'Black; ~sian' and Muslim communities 
As highlighted above, the 'Section 95' statistics, even taking account of their limitations, 
indicate a disproportionate impact of section 44 against 'Black' and 'Asian' communities. 
This chimes with the most persistent criticism of section 44, which relates to its 
disproportionate targeting of, variously, 'British Muslims', 'Asians' and, although cited to a 
lesser degree, 'Black' people. 123 There is of course an overlap between these categories, 
given that, while a majority (76%) of British Muslims are Asian, Muslims were represented 
in 11 of the 15 ethnic groups recorded on thc 2001 Census. 124 Pantazis and Pemberton 
argue that, based on the 'resident population', for 2006/07, 'Blacks' were stopped most (185 
per 1,000 population), followed by Asians (179 per 1,000 population), then 'Other' (173 per 
1,000 population), with 'Whites' being stopped least (54 per 1,000 population).12S The high 
level of 'other' may mask further disproportionality.126 By contrast, the MPS found that the 
statistics for London revealed limited disproportionality, with Asians slightly over-
represented and Blacks slightly under-represented. m Nonetheless, the MPS highlighted the 
perception of disproportionality among the community, with young peoplc interviewed as 
part of thc 'London Debatc' saying that 'stop and search is being targeted at young Muslim 
men'; 'stop and search is only used against immigrants or foreigners'; and that 'police .. .just 
make searches on ethnic minority groups,.128 Similar views were voiced by participants in 
122COMMD. 
123 Nickels and others 'A comparative study ofthc representations of "suspect" communities 
in multi-ethnic Britain and of their impact on Irish communities and Muslim communities'; 
My then, Walklate and Khan '''I'm a Muslim, but I'm not a terrorist': victimization, risky 
identities and the performance of safety'; Liberty 'The impact of anti terrorism powers on the 
British Muslim population'; Peirce 'Was it like this for the Irish?'; Spalek, El Awa and 
MacDonald 'Police-Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter-
terrorism: An Examination (Summary Report)'. 
124 O'Beimc, M. 'Religion in England and Wales: findings from the 2001IIome Office 
Citizenship Survey' (London, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics 
Directorate (no.274) 2004), TABLE 2.3; 8. 
12S Pantazis and Pemberton 'From the 'old' to the 'new' suspect community', 657. 
126 MPA 'Counter-terrorism: the London debate'. 
127 ibid 47-9. 
128 ibid 50-1. 
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Mythen and Walklate's focus groups.129 The HAC, in 2004, stated that it did not think that 
Asians were being disproportionately targeted under section 44, however, it continued: 
'[n]onetheless, we accept that there is a clear perception among our Muslim witnesses that 
Muslims are being stigmatised by the operation of the Terrorism Act: this is extremely 
harmful to community relations'. 130 Just as the broader policing agenda impacts upon how 
people view stop and search, so the broader counter-terrorist agenda will impact upon how 
communities view section 44. It will be extremely difficult to alter the perception of 
discrimination without reasonable suspicion, whether or not statistical disproportionality 
falls - as is happening in the MPS. 131 
One community interviewee was a Pakistani Muslim who was active in her community and 
involved with one of the police / community groups. She said that section 44 was a major 
grievance among the Pakistani Muslim community: 'the problem with section 44 and why it 
causes the most problems and grievance is because people don't know why they're being 
stopped and they find it offensive that they're just being stopped on the mere basis that 
they're Pakistani Muslims, not because ... they might be implicated in a crime 
somewhere'. \32 She contrasted section 44 with other stop and search powers, saying that, 'if 
people are stopped under other acts ... they're not going to say we're stopped because we are 
Pakistani Muslims, more importantly than even Pakistani, they're not going to say we were 
stopped because we're Muslims, so it's not going to cause that much of a grievance,.133 
This links in with the difficulty, noted in Chapter 5.2, that some officers had in explaining 
the selection process for a suspicionless stop. The interviewee emphasised that religion is 'a 
very intimate subject', and argued that the psychological impact of being stopped under 
section 44 was not acknowledged: 'what about the severe humiliation knowing you've been 
stopped because you happen to outwardly look like a Muslim or a Pakistani? .. it has an 
impact on you,.134 This sense of embarrassment was also noted by the participants 
interviewed by My then and Walklate, onc of whom said 'it's really embarrassing being 
. d l·k h ,135 questlone 1 e t at . 
129 Mythen, Walklate and Khan "'I'm a Muslim, but I'm not a terrorist': victimization, risky 
identities and the performance of safety' 744-5. 
130 Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and Community Relations [152-3]. 
131 See Figure 4.1. 
132COMME. 
133 COMME. 
134COMME. 
13S My then, Walklate and Khan '''I'm a Muslim, but I'm not a terrorist': victimization, risky 
identities and the performance of safety' 744. Note that this quote is cited as relating to 
section 44, although it appears to refer to stop and question. 
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6.2.1.2) Other affected groups 
The sections below deal other groups affected by the deployment of section 44. 
6.2.1.3) GLBT communities 
One interviewee, who was a member of police / community organisations in both police 
forces, representing, inter alia, GLBT communities felt that section 44 was 'a very blunt 
tool,.136 He said that it was being used against the GLBT community, in particular gay men: 
'the worst examples of [the misuse of section 44] are gay guys on, essentially cruising 
grounds or public sex environments ... maybe late at night. It's perfectly obvious they're 
being stopped because the particular police officer takes a dim view of what they're doing, 
but it's perfectly legal...when asked "why am I being stopped?" "section 44, Terrorism 
Act",.)37 
The interviewee concluded that there were two major consequences of such stops: 'there's 
the negative bit on people's feelings, the outrage' and 'it completely undermines PREVENT, 
because we've got a whole bunch of people who say 'well, they're just using it to stop 
people for whatever'. 138 While emphasising that this type of abuse of section 44 was carried 
out 'by a few ... rogue officers' and that it 'is not massive numbers, but there are enough 
numbers to keep us constantly worried about it', this may cause a wider impact upon the 
community as the people who hear about this type of abuse of section 44 may feel alienated 
fi h 1· 139 rom t e po Ice. In this manner section 44 undermines the broader objectives of 
CONTEST in so far as it casts doubt on the 'true' objectives of counter-terrorist law more 
broadly. 
6.2.1.4) Protesters 
A consistent line of criticism against section 44 has been its use against protesters. In 
evidence to the JCHR's report, 'Demonstrating respect for rights? A human rights approach 
to policing protest', section 44 was cited as being misused in protest situations in seven 
different pieces of written evidence. 140 The use of section 44 against protesters simply 
because they are protesting is unlawful, undermines confidence in the broader counter-
136 COMMA. 
137 COMMA. 
138 COMMA. 
139 COMMA. 
140 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect/or Rights? (IlL 2008-09, 47-
11). The submissions were by: Liberty (Ev 1, 158, 164), Justice (Ev 1, 149, 153), 
Aldermaston Women's Peace Campaign (Ev77), the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(Ev 107), Justice not Vengeance (Ev 155), David Mead (Ev 169), Dr Michaclllamilton and 
Dr Neil Jarman (Ev 183). See also: Liberty 'Casualty of War: 8 weeks of counter-terrorism 
in Rural England'. 
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terrorist strategy and infringes the rights to freedom of assembly and expression under 
Articles 10 and 11, directly and by virtue of the 'chilling effect'. One interviewee stated that 
section 44 '[is] not about preventing terrorism, it's just simply shutting people up for 
speaking up against the government, which is actually the most worrying part of this section 
44, even being a Pakistani Muslim and worrying about things like that [discrimination] I 
would say that's still number two on my concerns, number one is not being able 
fi 11 d . . . h h . d' ,141 to ... peace u y emonstrate or to express opmlOns agamst w at t e government IS omg. 
The use of section 44 against Climate Camp protesters as they sat in a cafe prompted Earl 
Onslow to comment that 'buying sausages in a cafe does not appear to be, on the face of it, a 
terrorist activity' .142 Among the other examples of such misuse are its use against Waiter 
Wolfgang at the Labour Party Conference and its use against people wearing 'slogan t-
shirts' .143 The fieldwork included an interview with an activist who protested regularly 
against the presence of American bases in the UK. 144 She recounted being routinely stopped 
under section 44 when near onc such base. 145 While the military nexus could be argued to 
raise counter-terrorism concerns, the fact that the Home Office and MOD police knew her 
by sight and name, due in part to the fact that she had been involved in the campaign for 
nearly ten years, strongly suggests that its exercise against her was not related to 
terrorism. 146 The interviewee was always stopped when in her car: 'then [the Home Office 
force] come in front, they follow you, a car behind and then another car overtakes so you're 
boxed in' .147 Such aggressive tactics may exert a chilling effect on the rights to free speech 
and assembly. The interviewee recalled section 44 being used against a 72 year old woman 
who was taken from her car and searched. 148 This woman was presumably known to local 
police, having lived locally for some decades. As Lord Carlile noted, the absence of 
reasonable suspicion does not mean you do not need a reason to use section 44. 
Another aspect of the misuse of section 44 in relation to protests, flagged in the evidence to 
the JCHR, was officers demanding people's details following a section 44 search. The 
interviewee recalled observing a family who had been taken from their car and stopped and 
141 COMME. 
142 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect/or Rights? Q290. 
143 Ibid. Ev 106. 
I44COMMB. 
14SCOMMB. 
146COMMB. 
147 COMMB. 
148COMMB. 
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searched under section 44 being then photographed by the police.149 This reinforces the 
need for PACE Code A to be amended so that the police are obliged to inform people that 
they do not need to give their details, or any other information, as detailed in Chapter 5. It 
also underlines the need for public education and the usefulness of signage which details 
what the police can and cannot do at areas where section 44 is being carried out. 
6.2.1.5) Photographers 
A final group whose targeting under section 44 has been publicised is photographers. One 
senior MPS officer admitted 'there's a perception we're picking on photographers' ,ISO The 
JCHR evidence included a submission by a photographer stopped under section 44. 151 Other 
reported incidents include an artist being stopped under section 44 when painting a scene 
near an airport,152 a reporter being stopped when photographing the Gherkin, an amateur 
photographer stopped while photographing the Christmas lights in Brighton and another 
stopped when photographing a fish and chip shop.153 Casting automatic suspicion upon 
such groups may infringe their right to freedom of expression or, depending on the context, 
freedom of assembly, although the case law focuses on photography for journalistic ends. I S4 
More basically, it is using counter-terrorist powers in non-counter-terrorist situations which 
undermines confidence in counter-terrorist powers as a whole, and PREVENT specifically, 
and is disproportionate, being unrelated to the objective of the legislation and not the 
minimum necessary intrusion into their rights. 
One of the community interviewees was a professional photographer who had been stopped 
under section 44 and was involved in the march in Trafalgar Square in January 20 I 0 
protesting against the use of section 44 against photographers, which was attended by some 
2,500 people.155 He recounted being stopped on five occasions, usually after being 
149COMMB. 
150 MPSSNRO 1. 
151 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect/or Rights? Ev 99. 
152 Walker, P and Lewis, P, 'Anti-terrorism police stopped painter near airport' Guardian 
(London, 18th December 2010) <http://www .guardian.co. uk/uk/2009! dec/ I8/anti terrorism-
police-stop-painter-airport> accessed 3rd August 20 I O. 
153 Batty, D, 'Photographers protest against police stop and search' The Guardian 
(London,23rd January 2010) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/20IO/jan/23/photographers-
protest-stop-search-terrorism-police> accessed 3rd August 2010; Rowlands, M, 'Media 
freedoms in the UK curtailed by police "culture of suspicion" and double standards' 
(Statewatch, 2008). 
154 Van Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR I; Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22. 
ISS Batty 'Photographers protest against police stop and search', 
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approached by a security guard who then called the police. IS6 As a professional 
photographer he was in no way covert, carrying a tripod and usually a large camera. IS7 He 
was subject to only one stop and search, the other encounters being 'stop and accounts', 
though section 44 was the power cited in all cases. This is a clear misuse of the power as 
section 44 does not permit officers to carry out 'stop and accounts,.IS8 On one occasion, 
after refusing to give the security guard details of what he was doing, on the basis that he 
was on public land, three officers and a riot van responded. On another occasion he was 
attended by three armed officers and 'two bobbies on the beat'. This is, at the very least, a 
questionable allocation of resources. 
The interviewee recounted one section 44 stop and search which occurred when he was 
photographing a church in London: 
'The police were called by the private security guards ... in response to the 
information they were given, that is, there was an aggressive male in the building 
reception photographing members of staff and refusing to leave. All of that was 
untrue, apart from being aggressive and my aggression was in not telling them who 1 
was. So when the police arrived, they knew there was no terrorist related activity 
going on ... [I] told the police officer. .. that anybody stopped by the police wasn't 
obliged to give any information ... and he said "well, be that as it may, what's your 
name?" ... [1 refused] So he said, right I'm going to search your camera bag for 
terrorist-related paraphernalia ... he obviously satisfied himself that there was no 
terrorist related material there. lIe then asked me for my name and then when I again 
refused he says "well I'm going to physically search you". Having a bit of 
knowledge about this I decided this was not a particularly pleasant option ... so 1 then 
h· . ti . ,159 gave Im my 10 ormatlOn. 
This is intimidation in order to secure information that the police are not entitled to. 
Moreover, if the police were aware that there was no suggestion of terrorist activity they 
should not have used section 44. 
When asked what could improve section 44, the interviewee responded 'discretion and 
actually not treating photographers and artists as suspicious just because [they're taking 
photos or painting or drawing], .160 Several officers disavowed stopping people for 'simply 
156COMMC. 
IS7 COMMC. 
IS8 C.f. Justice and Security (NI) Act 2007, section 21 (1), discussed above, Chapter 5.4.2. 
IS9COMMC. 
16°COMMC. 
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photographing', stating that it would depend on the context: if someone was photographing 
CCTV in a tube station, especially covertly, thcn this might prompt an officer to approach 
them. 161 Another officer said she would approach the person and ask what they were doing, 
noting that architecture students, for example, could have an assignment photographing 
emergcncy exits or similar structures.162 If the explanation sufficed, then no section 44 
would be carried out. This chimed with what the community desired: a bit of 'common 
sense'.163 However, another community interviewee questioned where this would lead: 'an 
officcr approachcs you and [you] say "I'm an artist and I'm taking picturcs because I'm 
going to sketch these when I get back home ... ", let's suppose this person is you - you might 
be accepted, let's suppose it's a Pakistani guy who can't speak much English in which case 
the officer's going to turn around and say "you're an ... artist? I don't think so", so do they 
then take that further and say "prove you're an artist"? In which casc they're conducting a 
. 1 h . , , 164 tna on t e street...lt s crazy . 
While photographing ccrtain buildings or structurcs may indicate terrorist reconnaissance, 
there can be no simple correlation betwccn the two. As noted by one intcrvicwce, dctails of 
building's structural layout and floor plans are usually publicly available. 16S Maps of CCTV 
locations in various cities are available on-line, for example, the New York Civil Libcrties 
Union mappcd all CCTVs in the city in 2006. 166 Google Earth's 'strcet view' provides 
anothcr source of publically available information that could be used in reconnaissance. All 
of this points to the disproportionality of treating all photographers as suspicious. In late 
2009 the Home Office issued guidance underlining that section 44 does not entail a 
h'b' . h h" h . d 167 pro 1 lhon on p otograp mg 10 an aut onsc area. 
6.2.2) The encounter 
In terms of the comportment of the officer during the encounter, there was some variation, 
among both the full length interviews and the five shortcr intervicws carried out straight 
after people had been stopped. Of the longer interviews, COMMD, who had bcen stopped 
161 BTPSNR03; BTPSNROl. 
162 MPSSNR02. 
163COMMC. 
164COMME. 
165COMMC. 
166 NYCLU, 'Who's watching? Video surveillance in New York City and the need for public 
oversight' (NYCLU, New York 2006). 
167 Home Office 'Circular 012/2009: Photography and Counter-terrorism Legislation' (I Iome 
Office, London 2009). 
232 
and searched twice under section 44, said the police 'were courteous, they were lovely' .168 
COMMA, referring to the misuse of section 44 against the GLBT community, said that the 
officers were 'truculent'. COMMB found the officers to be 'rude and aggressive ... "do it", 
sort of thing, "get out of the car'" .169 Of the shorter interviews, one thought the officer was 
'quite abrupt' 170 while the other four interviewees were broadly satisfied with the encounter, 
stating variously that 'it was fine', 171 'it was carried out fairly and discreetly,172 and it 'was 
quite nice,.173 The last comment was from a 16 year old male. When asked about whether 
the police were polite and whether he was happy with the encounter he answered: 'I'd a 
good laugh,.174 9% ofa11 MPS section 44 stops between January and October 2009, where 
the person gave their details, were carried out on under 21 year olds. m The interviewee's 
response highlights that the police must pay particular attention to explaining the nature and 
potential consequences of the stop to young people, as wen as adhering to PACE, Code 
A.176 
In terms of giving out stop forms and explaining the legal base of the power, all bar onc of 
the 'short' interviewees were given a stop form and informed of the legal base. 17? However, 
the 'long' interviewees were on the whole negative regarding the information that police 
gave them during the encounter. CommE was stopped, although not on under section 44, 
and was not given a stop form. 178 CommC was given a form on all but onc occasion during 
which the officer stated that they no longer needed to issue stop forms. 179 Although the 
168COMMD. 
169 COMMB. 
170 COMMSl. 
171 COMMS4. 
172 COMMS5. 
173 COMMS3. 
174 COMMS2. 
175 Source: MPS, 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrorism Act: Jan 
2009'; MPS, 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrorism Act: Feb 
2009'; MPS, 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrorism Act: March 
2009'; MPS, 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrorism Act: Apr 
2009'; MPS Sample Borough, 'Police and Community Safety Board: Annual Report 2009-
20 I 0' MPS, 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrorism Act: Jun 
2010'; MPS, 'Borough Breakdown of Stops and Searches Under the Terrorism Act: July 
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176 Home Affairs Committee, Young Black People and the Criminal Justice System' , Ev 346 
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officers informed him of the legal base of the stop they then (illegally) demanded his details 
on a number of occasions. I80 This type of obfuscation is contrary to PACE Code A and the 
NPIA advice, and underlines the difficultly of ensuring control over street policing. 
COMMB was given a stop form but no information regarding the legal base of the stop, 
although she noted that it was several years ago and that now 'maybe they're a little bit 
more ... careful about things,.181 When asked whether stop forms were given or asked for, 
CommA replied 'no ... our members who have been stopped are not really in a position to 
182 
argue much'. 
When asked whether they had heard oftheir Police Authority or the IPCC, two of the 'short' 
interviewees had heard of the IPCC but none had heard of their PA. 183 Given that the short 
interviews were carried out directly after the stop, the interviewees did not have an 
opportunity to read the 'stop leaflet', which lists organisations that can provide advice or to 
whom a complaint can be made. 184 In terms of complaints, most of the 'long' interviewees 
were pessimistic regarding their usefulness. COMMA highlighted the power differential 
between the police and the person stopped, saying, in relation to noting the officer's number 
and making a complaint: 'it's ok if you're a member of, you know, Tunbridge Wells 
Women's Institute and live on the high street but it's not down the back alleys and the police 
know that'.185 He also noted that people would fear 'being picked on more' by the police 
and so not complain. I 86 While he tried to challenge some of the stops, the lack of stop forms 
was a serious obstacle. IS7 COMMC was aware of the IPCC and had made a complaint to the 
police force regarding onc of his stops, specifically the fact that it was prompted by security 
guards who gave false information. 188 COMMD noted that when complaints were made in 
person at a station their effectiveness was undermined by delays and the fact that 'it's not a 
very nice environment' .189 He contrasted the complaints procedure in relation to the police 
to that relating to doctors, election candidates or supermarkets where there is a choice of 
180COMMC. 
ISI COMMB. 
182 COMMA. 
183 COMMSI; COMMS5. 
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service provider: 'with policing I have no choice' .190 At the interview, COMMB showed 
copies of four letters of complaint which she wrote to the local Chief Constable, one of 
which was a follow-up to earlier correspondence. The complaints concerned three separate 
incidents. There was no response to any of the letters. When asked whether she would 
consider complaining to the IPCC, she replied: 'I think being realistic 1 wouldn't waste my 
t · ,191 Ime. 
6.3) Assessment 
This section will thread together the arguments from the preceding sections to conclude 
whether there is evidence of disproportionality or misuse in relation to section 44 and, if so, 
how this ean be explained and what changes could be made to ameliorate the situation. 
6.3.1) Disproportionality 
None of the statistical limitations discussed above can fully account for the on-going 
statistical disproportionality evident in the section 95 data. Factors which might 'reduce' the 
disproportionality between 'Black' and 'Asian' people as against 'white' people include the 
under-reporting of stops, with officers wanting to 'do it by the book' in relation to BME 
communities, and the increase in population, particularly in relation to Asians, since the last 
census against which the proportion of stops are judged. l92 Neither is likely to account for 
the substantial deviation between the census break-down and that of section 44. As 
discussed above, the 'available population' thesis does not fit well with the usage of section 
44. This leads to the conclusion that section 44 is exercised in a manner that 
disproportionately impacts upon 'Black' and 'Asian' people. The fieldwork, in combination 
with some of the secondary literature, suggests that section 44 may also impact unevenly on 
other groups, such as 'protesters', 'photographers' and the members of the GLBT 
community, although the sample was too small to draw definite conclusions. As emphasised 
already, to a degree, the practice is irrelevant if there is a continuing perception of 
disproportionality as this will decrease the legitimacy of the power in the eyes of the 
community. The difficulty of altering such perceptions is underlined by the fact that, as 
noted by two interviewees, the public do not care under what power they are stopped, nor by 
190COMMD. 
191 COMMB. 
192 Fitzgerald, M, 'Final Report into Stop and Search' (Metropolitan Police Authority, 
London 1999). 
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which force, but simply that they have been stopped by the police and that encounter 
influences their attitude towards all stop and search practices.193 
Aspects of the various explanations in section 6.2.2.1 above apply to the different 
manifestations of disproportionality. The targeting of GLBT people on cruising grounds 
appears to be, as was attested by the community interviewee, a case of some 'bad apples', 
who were acting far from supervisory oversight.194 During the observation of the BTP force 
while they carried out section 44s, no member of an ethnic minority was stopped, however, 
the area in which the deployment was taking place had a substantial white majority. On the 
evidence of the police interviews, the 'profiling' of 'Muslims' or those appearing to be 
Muslims, also seems to be the province of a few 'bad apples'. Although none of the officers 
admitted profiling, some felt that they should be able to profile. 19S As noted already, the 
community sample was far too small to draw empirical conclusions whether or not any of 
the communities or groups were being disproportionately targeted. It seems highly unlikely 
that the association in much of the media, and occasionally among politicians, of 'Muslim' 
and' Asian' or 'Arab' and' Islamic terrorism' and the increasing levels of Islamophobia has 
not impacted upon public perceptions of what a terrorist 'looked like'. If the reflection of 
society thesis is accurate, then this is likely to have seeped through to at least some officers. 
These theories at best account for only some of the uneven application of section 44. A 
better explanation is that these diverse groups constitute what Reiner terms 'police 
property' .196 Discovering which characteristics of each group makes them susceptible to be 
treated as such requires disentangling the multiple-discriminations suffered by the 
communities or groups, whether cumulatively or intersectionally. Such disaggregation 
permits a closer investigation of the origins of the disproportionality while contesting the 
homogenisation of the various 'others' into one simple category which denies internal 
difference. This incorporates the various explanatory theses discussed above and permits 
accommodation of those who do not actually fall into a 'suspect' category but are perceived 
to fall into one. To take one example: Pakistani young men, they come from one of the most 
socio-economically deprived sections of society. In addition, being young men, they are 
more likely to come to the attention of the police in stop and search practices. Finally, being 
Muslim, they are more likely than, for example, young Norwegian men, to be additionally 
193 COMMF; BTPSNR04. 
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195 See Chapter 5.1.1. 
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impacted upon by counter-terrorist policies.197 This suggests that in attempting to combat 
this disproportionality one must look at why the police target young men, why they target 
the socially deprived and why they target Muslims. It is impossible from this study to 
determine to what extent each factor influences the police but this thesis argues that this 
disaggregation points to the areas of accountability that can and should be strengthened. 
6.3.2) Legal accountability 
In terms of legal accountability, the misuse of section 44 as detailed by some of interviewees 
is ultra vires and would, if the facts were proven, succced in a case for judicial review. A 
claim could also be brought for misfeasancc in a public office, for damages arising for the 
misuse of public power whereby the holder of the public office deliberately or recklessness 
abused their power.198 However, as noted by some interviewees, the difficulty is in proving 
the case when the encounter forms part of street policing. It has already been outlined how 
the routine use of section 44, in accordance with the limits set forth in TACT and PACE 
Code A infringes ECHR, Articles 5, 8, 10 and 11, albeit with a likely justifcation for the 
infringement of Article 5. 199 That discussion will not be rehearsed here again. An 
alternative route would be for the person stopped to sue the police in tort for false 
imprisonment, battery and/or assault. If proven, then ordinary damages would be awarded, 
with damages for false imprisonment starting at around £500 for the first hour.200 If police 
are proven to have acted in a 'high handed, insulting, malicious or oppressive manner' or to 
have humiliated the person, then aggravated damages are likely to be awarded of between 
£1,000 and £2,000.201 Exceptionally, exemplary damages may be awarded if the police are 
deemed to have acted in an 'oppressive or arbitrary' way.202 These figures are of course 
guidelines only and it is notable that they were set out in relation to arrest and detention, 
197 Department for Communities and Local Government 'The Pakistani Muslim Community 
in England: Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities' (The Change Institute, London 
2009) [l.4]. 
198 Three Rivers Council v Bank of England (No. 3) [2000] 2 WLR 1220; Three Rivers 
Council v Bank of England (No. 3) (Summary Judgement) [200 I] UKIIL 16. 
199 See Chapter 4.4, Chapter 5.4. 
200 Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] QB 498, 515. 
201 ibid, 516. 
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although there seems no reason why they would not be equally applicable to cases where 
d h . d 203 stop an searc powers were misuse . 
Another possible avenue of legal recourse would be the Equality Act 2010 which protects 
the characteristics of, inter alia, race, religion or belief and sexual orientation from 
discrimination from, inter alia, the police.204 These characteristics clearly provide protection 
to Muslims, under the characteristic of religion, and to GLBT persons who are 
disproportionately targeted, under the characteristic of sexual orientation. There is a 
question whether 'Muslims' or 'British Muslims' constitute a 'racial group' and could 
therefore claim additional protection under the 'race' characteristic. A 'racial group' is 
defined as 'a group of persons defined by reference to race', which includes colour, 
nationality and ethnic or national origins.205 As the Equality Act came into force in Octobcr 
2010 and there is no case-law to date, the following discussion will refer back to the 
definition in the Race Relations Act 1976, section 3(1), and related case-law. Section 3(1) 
differed from the Equality Act 2010, section 9 in one respect only: it included 'race' within 
h d &:·· f . I 206 t e ellmtIon 0 a racla group. 
Research on religious affiliation, from the Home Office Citizcnship Survey, underlincs the 
heterogeneity of British Muslims, who are found in fourteen 'national' groups, in terms of 
national origins in a broad sense, not necessarily equating to either nationality or citizenship, 
with significant cultural, historical and linguistic variations among them.207 On the basis of 
ethnicity as recordcd in the census, 76% of British Muslims are 'Asian', 6% are 'white', 3% 
are 'mixed', 4% are 'Black' and 8% are 'other,.208 It is evident from this survey that British 
Muslims cannot be said to form a racial group on the basis of colour or national origins. 
British Muslims may still come within the protection of the Act if decmed to be an 'cthnic 
group'. In Mandla v Dowell Lee Lord Frascr defined an 'cthnic group' as onc which regards 
itself, and is regarded by othcrs as a distinct community by virtue of specific 
203 ibid. Sce also: Manley v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] EWCA Civ 
879; Rowlands v Chief Constable of Merseyside [2006] EWCA Civ 1773; Rogers, Winfield 
& lolowicz on Tort [22.8-9]. 
204 Equality Act 2010, sections 4, 9, 10, 12. 
20S Equality Act 2010, sections 9(1),(3). 'Caste' may be added as a characteristic by 
ministerial order (Equality Act, section 9(5». 
206 Race Relations Act 1976. 
207 Departmcnt for Communities and Local Governmcnt, 'The Pakistani Muslim Community 
in England: Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities', tables 2 and 3. 
208 O'Beirne, M, 'Religion in England and Wales: findings from the 2001 110 me Office 
Citizenship Survey' (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate London 
2004) table 2.3. 
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characteristics?09 Essential among these are: 1) 'a long shared history, of which the group is 
conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive; 2) 
a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners'; other 
relevant, but non-essential, characteristics are: 'a common geographical origin, or descent 
from a small number of common ancestors'; 'a common language,;210 'a common literature 
peculiar to the group'; 'a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or 
from the general community surrounding it'; 'being a minority or being an oppressed or a 
dominant group within a larger community' .211 Applying this definition, Sikhs were held to 
be an ethnic group for the purposes of the Race Relations Act 1976.212 Also relevant is the 
historical age of the ethnic group.213 It seems that a majority population can constitute an 
hn· 214 et lC group. 
It follows that 'British Muslims' are not an 'ethnicity', for although they have a common 
religion, ignoring differences, for example, between - or indeed within - Shi'aism and 
Sunnism, and common cultural traditions and history pertaining to Islam there are 
substantial cultural and historical differences among the various national and ethnic groups 
comprising British Muslims. This is underlined by the fact that the absence of protection for 
religious groups under the offences of 'racial hatred' in the Public Order Act 1986, in 
particular Muslims, was a motivating factor for passing the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 
2006, which amended the Public Order Act. The same impetus was evident in the attempt to 
introduce religiously aggravated offences, offences of religious hatred and the incitement to 
religious hatred in the A TCS Bill 2001, although the clauses did not feature in the final 
ACt.2IS 
It is possible that some of the sub-groups of 'British Muslims' could constitute a racial group 
for the purposes of the Equality Act. Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims would clearly 
constitute a 'racial group' on the basis of shared nationality. It also seems likely that a sub-
209 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548, 562. 
210 Note that common language alone is insufficient to constitute a racial group (Gwyneed 
CC v Jones [1986] ICR 833). 
21 I Mandla v Lee 562. 
212 Section 1(1). 
213 Crown Suppliers v Dawkins [1993] ICR 517. 
214 Ealing LBC v Race Relations Board [1972] 2 WLR 71,364 (Lord Simon); Northern Joint 
Police Board v Power [1997] IRLR 610; BBC Scotland v Souster [2001] SC 458; Gwyneed 
CC v Jones [1986] ICR 833. C.f.Commissionjor Racial Equality v Dutton [1989] 2 WLR 
17,801. 
21S ATCS Bill 2001, Part V. Grimwood, G and Miller, V, 'The Anti-terrorism, crime and 
security Bill: Parts IV & V: immigration, asylum, race and religion' (HC Library (Research 
Paper 01196), 2001). 
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group such as Indian Muslims would constitute an ethnic group as analogous to the Mandla 
ruling relating to Sikhs: they are distinct from the rest of the population in India in terms of 
their religion, language and significant aspects of their culture, and have a long shared 
history which, while not divorced from that of other Indians is nonetheless distinctive. 
Therefore, in addition to action against the police for the ultra vires use of section 44, it may 
be that such sub-groups of 'British Muslims' could bring a case under the Equality Act. 
However, under the present recording requirements, it would be extremely difficult for one 
of these sub-groups to adduce sufficient evidence for such a claim. 
6.3.3) Community accountability 
Onc of the central conduits between the community and the police are the PAs. One of the 
criticisms made of PAs in the Home Office's 'Policing in the 21 51 Century: reconnecting the 
police and the people' is that they 'remain too invisible to their public. The public do not 
know how to influence the way policing is delivered in their community, let alone get 
involved' .216 This criticism seems valid, with none of the 'short' interviewees having heard 
of their P A. The PAs were initially hoped to herald the democratisation of policing and 
police accountability but have, on the whole, proven to be toothless and timid, with the MPA 
being a notable exception.217 The MPA's 'London Debate' and the MOD Committee's 
internal inquiry into section 44 reveal that PAs (or their non-Ilome Office variants) can exert 
accountability over their force's use of section 44.218 Nationally, the APA's 'Know Your 
Rights' card is a significant step forward in informing the public of their rights under stop 
and search.219 
Being a conduit between the public and the police is a central aspect ofPA's responsibility, 
underlined by the fact that those members of the PAs and APA who were interviewed 
wished to be counted among the 'community stakcholder' category. However PAs are 
relatively technical organisations which can bc, in comparison to the police, remote from the 
communities they serve. The police, being on the front-line, are in a better position to 
increase public awareness of PAs than the PAs themselves. Some easy ways of doing this 
would be to add details of the local PA to the stop form and to have visible links to the PA 
from the force website, as some forces do. A structural change that would bring greater 
oversight would be to require PAs to consider the force's adherence to the liRA, as the 
Northern Ireland Policing Board does in relation to the PSNI. 
216 Home Office, 'Policing in the 21st Century' [2.4]. 
217 Kempa, M, 'Tracing the diffusion of policing governance models from the British Isles 
and back again' (2007) 8 Police Practice and Research 107, 114. 
218 MPA 'Counter-terrorism: the London debate'; MOD Police Committee 'MOD Police 
Committee's Annual Report 08/09' (MOD Police committee, 2008) [16-21]; MODPC. 
219 See Appendix B.1. 
240 
The Government has tabled a bill that would replace PAs with 'Police and Crime 
Commissioners', who are to be directly elected by the public with the aim of providing 
democratic accountability?20 Both the MPS and BTP are excluded from these plans, the 
former because they already have 'strong' local accountability, the latter because they are a 
non-home office force. 22I The Police and Crime Commissioners will be assisted by a Police 
and Crime Panel, established by the local authority or authorities, with ten members from 
the authority/authorities and two members co-opted onto the Panel.222 This continues the 
movement from a practical accountability, which sought to exert control or require 
explanations for actions, towards manageralism and professionalism with a 'market-based 
"calculative and contractual" style of accountability', summarised by Reiner and Newburn 
as the move 'from PC Dixon to Dixon PLC' .223 The locally elected Commissioner will have 
a term of four years, with a maximum two term limit. 224 They will have similar powers to 
authorities: inter alia, holding Chief Constables to account;22S ensuring the force is efficient 
and effcctive;226 agreeing a local strategic 'police and crime plan' ,227 and, appointing and 
removing Chief Constables.228 
Ultimately both PA's activism and the success of community / police structures depends on 
the composition of its members and the interest of its communities. PAs tend to be trapped 
within well-worn tracks whereby the 'usual suspects' make their voices heard, but it is 
difficult to break beyond these confines to truly 'engage' with the public. Another problem, 
mentioned by onc officer, is meeting fatigue. 229 lIe had recently combined the various 
meetings into one to try and reduce the problem.23o Another problem that was noted is that 
people turn up when there is a problem, not when things are going smoothly,231 which 
engenders a fire fighting response rather than more calculated long term strategy. All these 
220 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill 2010, section 1. See also: Home Office, 
'Policing in the 21 st Century' Chapter 2. 
221 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill 20 I 0, section I (1). 
222 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bi11201O, section 28; schedule 6, paragraph 3. 
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problems are likely equally to afflict the Police and Crime Commissioners. A dual strategy 
that exploits fixed structures, such as police-community structures, in addition to more 
general public awareness campaigns is needed to overcome these difficulties. 
At the local level there has been a proliferation of community I police structures, with the 
MPS borough having a Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP), a Police and 
Community Safety Board (PCSB), an JAG, and neighbourhood policing teams. The CDRPs 
and PCSBs provide borough level accountability and feed into city-wide structures such as 
the MP A. The PCSB provides the community with a link between local government, in the 
form of the local Council, the MPA and the MPS, with representatives from each group on 
the board. In 2009-10, the PSCB held three executive and four public meetings, two of 
which were aimed specifically at young people, and four stop and search community 
monitoring group meetings.232 In the minutes of PSCB meetings, held over a period of 
. h h . . d h 233 N . I . sixteen mont s, tree presentatiOns were given on stop an scare . 0 partlcu ar Issues 
regarding section 44 were raised, although the use of CJPO, section 60 in relation to knife 
crime and the use of stop and search in relation to drugs were discussed.234 In the minutes 
of a community question and answer session, stop and search was raised as one of nearly 
forty questions, though the focus was on section 60.235 It is notable that the locally agreed 
priorities among the twenty-odd safer neighbourhood teams focused overwhelmingly on 
. . I b h' d d . 236 anti-socla e aVlour an rug misuse. 
The MPS and the BTP both have lAGs, the BTP having a national IAG and an Independent 
Advisory Network centred on London which feeds into the national IAG. Members of lAGs 
are provided with access to some privileged information, notified in advance of some pro-
active operations, invited to observe the police and invited to attend some pre and post-
. b . fi 237 operatIOn ne mgs. Potentially they constitute a robust form of community 
accountability. One weakness is that, in the absence of any statutory requirement, they rely 
on police cooperation to invite them to the various operations and share information with 
them and to take regard of their recommendations. 
232 MPS Sample Borough, 'Police and Community Safety Board: Annual Report 2009-2010'. 
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In terms of formal structures, the MPS's system of 'stop teams' provides an example which 
could be adapted by other forces. There are 'stop meetings' at borough level, convened by 
the PCSB,238 'which scrutinise their local borough for stop and search and they hold their 
local commander and the officers of the local station accountable for stop and search'. 239 
The information is brought together at force level within the 'stop and search action team' 
which oversees the implementation of stop and search policies and liaises with the MP A.240 
This permits dialogue at local level which may identify borough issues while also 
encouraging a broader analysis at force level. In addition for section 44, as a counter-
terrorist power, there are local counter-terrorist forums which, in the borough surveyed, 
worked primarily with businesses, local authorities and housing associations, explaining 
what was happening on the counter-terrorist front through meetings 'every 5 to 6 weeks·.241 
These meetings sometimes had guest speakers such as 'senior officers ... [and] associate 
Professors from universities who've come in to talk about different things and different 
perceptions so within that area we try to explain the reasoning behind what we're dOing,.242 
This separation into business and other communities is sensible as different constituencies 
have different needs and priorities, particularly in relation to counter-terrorism, and may 
play different roles in relation to the police. For instance, large businesses may be informed 
if there is a heightened threat of a particular type of attack so that they can be alert and 
provide feedback to the police. Providing information at borough and force level increases 
the likelihood that the information will be digested and permits the borough to focus on local 
issues while at force level more general information can be conveyed. 
In addition to these formal structures, the borough was intending to do a 'road-show' at onc 
of the sites where section 44 was deployed. The officer explained that this entailed setting 
up a stand and saying 'this is why we're doing it; here, come and speak to us ... tcll us if you 
want us to do it differently'. 243 In a similar public awarcness raising exercise, membcrs of 
one of the BTP forces sometimes deployed posters explaining that section 44 was being 
used, what the power was when exercising section 44 and had signs on their vans explaining 
section 44?44 This type of public awareness raising, particularly in areas where section 44 is 
deployed frequently should be carried out by all forces. Onc pitfall of increasing public 
awareness is that constant information tends to be 'normalised'. As onc officer noted, no 
238 PCSB 'Notes of the meeting on -- 2008' (PCSB, London 2008) [5.2]. 
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one really pays attention to the various automated announcements at railway stations or in 
trains.245 Varying the method of communication may help - using posters, 'road-shows', 
stop leaflets, web sites and occasional public awareness campaigns on the television or 
radio.246 This type of 'on the spot' public awareness raising is particularly important in 
order to ensure communication with the transient communities stopped under section 44. 
Tied into this must be increased transparency regarding how section 44 is being used. In this 
the MPS have shown best practice by publishing, on a time lag of three-months or so, 
borough data on stops and search, including section 44, broken down by officer defined 
ethnicity, self-defined ethnicity, age, gender and whether it was a section 44( I) or section 
44(2) search. They have also, albeit after a FOI request, begun publishing some 
authorisation data, providing details of the length of the authorisation and the date it was 
confirmed by the Home Office. Although the degree to which perceptions of 
disproportionality can be challenged is questionable, the most effective way of doing so is 
by transparency regarding the use of section 44 and publishing as much information as 
possible regarding its exercise. A similar approach to publishing a break-down of stop and 
search data should be adopted by all forces. 
6.3.4) Complaints 
In relation to complaints, there was a sense of resignation among the interviewees - 'what's 
the point?,247 The difficulty in 'proving' a complaint given the 'street policing' nature of 
stop and search aggravates this sense of powerlessness. While the IPCC serve as an 
independent body to which the public may turn it is a small organisation with limited 
resources which means, despite the priority put on stop and search by the IPee's Mike 
Franklin, that it cannot handle all the 'routine' stop and search complaints. The IPee has 
requested that all forces pass any section 44 complaints to it. However, the forces are under 
no statutory duty to do so. The PAs, as mentioned above, suffer from a lack of visibility 
among the community and have, like the IPCC, limited resources and multiple functions. 
They can and should be more prominent in dealing with complaints, in particular ensuring 
that any training is carried out and reviewing any potential systemic problems. 
The bottom line is that it is likely that very few of the people who are unhappy with the stop 
and search encounter complain. One interviewee said, 'I don't want us to keep focusing on 
complaints I want us to have constant feedback flows so that...it wouldn't be a case of 
"we've only got four complaints", it would be "we're actually going to seck those people 
245 BTPSNRO I. 
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and get feedback'" .248 He suggested that the stop forms which had details included be dip-
sampled and those people contacted and asked 'three or four questions,.249 This is an 
excellent suggestion which would enable forces, and PAs, to determine how the community 
felt they were performing in relation to stop and search rather than focusing merely on the 
'number' of complaints, which is likely to be unrepresentative. Moreover, it would provide 
an opportunity for community engagement and positive feedback regarding any aspect of the 
encounter that the person stopped felt was carried out well. This type of 'dip sampling' 
eould be carried out by the community liaison officer. Such sampling would have an 
inherent flaw in that it could only reach those persons who had given their (accurate) details, 
perhaps indicating satisfaction with the encounter or ignorance of the law. Nonetheless, it 
would be an improvement on the current approach and its sampling failings could be 
counteracted, to a degree, by combining it with other approaches, such as observations by 
lAGs or other independent groups. 
6.3.5) Other forms of oversight 
In addition to accountability, there are three other main changes which could provide 
additional oversight in relation to section 44. The first is to issue more detailed guidelines, 
whether in the form of PACE, Code A or Ilome Office Circulars or guidance from the 
NPIA. Suggestions for such improvements have been detailed in Chapters 4.5 and 5.5. The 
second response is through training. Training on stop and search is carried out during police 
training at Hendon. One of the officers had one full day on section 44: 'about what to seareh 
for, how to search a bag, how to search a vehicle,.25o In addition to this some refresher 
and/or additional training on search powers generally and/or section 44 specifically was 
given to at least some of the officers.251 Two BTP officers mentioned watching a DVD on 
section 44.252 Officers were also given briefings on the intra-net on section 44, in particular 
on changes to operations, and in relation to counter-terrorism generally.253 One senior BTP 
officer noted that cultural training was included: 'we have a whole briefing section on the 
intranet around section 44 and the reasons for doing it, the issues around, terrorists are not 
all brown, wearing turbans and beards and Islam covers ... so we do all of that and we do a 
lot of work around the Sikhs and the use of the kurpan and the 7 Ks and all of that...don't 
248 COMMD. 
249COMMD. 
250 MPSCOI. 
251 MPSFL02; BTPFLOI. 
252 BTPFL02; BTPFL03. 
253 BTPSNR04; MPSSNR02. 
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use dogs in a Mosque to search it unless we've really, really got good reasons ... and the 
taking off of the shoes ... and all the things around Ramadan that we need to be aware of.254 
After the initial training period most 'refresher' training appears to be via the intranet, as do 
most briefings - indeed, one of the BTP forces was briefed purely through self-briefings 
over the intranet.255 None of the officers had heard of anyone being required to undergo 
additional formal training, following a poor encounter or complaint, although some said that 
a more senior officer would 'have a word' .256 It would be beneficial to formalise the 
requirement of additional training for officers who are deviating from the desired approach 
to the encounter, be it in their attitude towards the public, or their completion of the stop 
form etc., especially given the emphasis on 'self-briefing' and 'self-training' which could 
result in some officers continuing bad practices. 
A final change would be to increase contemporaneous oversight by superiors. The MPS and 
one of the BTP forces interviewed routincly deployed officers using section 44 in teams with 
a sergeant present. For forces that do not do so, the deployment of a sergeant alongside pes, 
at least occasionally, would be beneficial, enabling them to identify, as necessary, any points 
of practice that could be improved. However, limited resources mean that this will not 
routinely be possible within all forces. The nature of street policing means 
contemporaneous oversight will always be of limited impact as, even if a sergeant is present, 
they cannot monitor the actions of all their team simultaneously. 
6.4) Conclusion 
Despite the provisos regarding the section 95 statistics, the disparity in the statistics is such 
that it is apparent that 'Black' and' Asian' people are disproportionately targeted by section 
44 in comparison to 'white' people, especially given the inapplicability of the 'available 
population' thesis to section 44. The fieldwork, and some secondary literature, suggests that 
there are additional 'communities' who are disproportionately impacted upon by section 44. 
The extent of these practices is unclear. It is the extraordinary discretion inherent in section 
44 which enables it to be abused, whether by 'rogue officers' targeting gay 'cruising 
grounds' or more systematically against 'Asians' or 'Black' people. The absence of a 
requirement of reasonable suspicion reinforces the perception among British Muslims, in 
particular Asian Muslims, that the reason they are being stopped is that they 'look' Muslim! 
'Asian'. Some of the suggestions in relation to accountability in terms of 'giving an 
account' of the authorisation and deployment of section 44, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
might reduce its use against protesters and it must be hoped that places such as Hampstead 
254 BTPSNR04. 
2SSBTPSNROI. 
256 Sce Chapter 5.2.1. 
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Heath are not covered by the patchwork authorisation. However, it is difficult to see how 
the perception that people are being targeted because they 'look' Muslim can be challenged 
without introducing some form of reasonable suspicion. Despite these difficulties, improved 
public awareness of how section 44 is deployed and greater transparency from forces should 
lead to improved levels of trust between the police and communities. 
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Chapter 7) Conclusion 
7.1) Introduction 
This final Chapter draws together the threads of the various arguments made in the 
preceding Chapters. The first section reflects critically on the thesis. The subsequent 
section summarises the main conclusions and recommendations regarding how section 44 
should be amended so that it adheres to the framework principles. The following section 
considers how these proposals compare with the amended power under TACT, section 47A, 
which is the same as the amended power proposed under the Protection of Freedoms Bill 
2010-11.1 The final section highlights areas of continuing concern. 
7.2) Critical reflection 
The socio-Iegal approach of this thesis has enabled a detailed and nuanced analysis into how 
section 44 is used by the MPS and BTP and for what perceived ends, as well as how it ought 
to be used to adhere to the framework principles. The case-study approach to the two forces 
provides an in-depth picture of their usage of section 44 and, while conclusions cannot be 
necessarily drawn regarding the use of section 44 by other forces, some of the best practice 
which has been highlighted should be applied across the board. Moreover, the focus on the 
MPS and BTP was warranted by their substantial use of section 44, the two forces 
accounting for over 85% of the total section 44 stops carried out between 2005/06 and 
2007/08.2 
While the interviews of community representatives permitted areas of potential concern to 
be highlighted, it was not possible to qualitatively examine in depth the 'whole' 
'community'. It would make an interesting study to investigate further the various 
communities and groups highlighted within Chapter 6 as being disproportionately impacted 
upon by section 44 to determine how widespread such practices are. Similarly, as part of a 
study into the perceptions of Muslim communities towards counter-terrorist policing, it 
would be interesting to see whether section 44 can be disaggregated from other stop and 
search powers and whether stop and search as whole can be disaggregated from other 
policing powers and what the impact of each is upon the community's perception of the 
police. 
I Section 60. 
2 BTP, 'Annual Report: 2008-09'; BTP, 'Annual Report: 2007-08'; BTP, 'Annual Report: 
2006-07'; BTP, 'Annual Report: 2005-06'; Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the 
Criminal Justice System - 2007/08'; Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal 
Justice System 2006/07'; Ministry of Justice, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System - 2006'; Home Office, 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2005'. 
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It would also be interesting, but was beyond the scope of this work, to carry out a 
comparative study, in terms of current and historical laws, of stop and search powers which 
do not require reasonable suspicion. Relevant jurisdictions would be the Republic of Ireland 
and South Africa, which are both common law countries that used emergency legislation 
which provided broad policing powers. The USA and Australia could also provide an 
interesting comparison in terms of their considerably more recent legislation against 
terrorism. In addition, it would be interesting to analyse whether the US Constitution 
enables more effective accountability of police stop and search, with particular reference to 
Fourth Amendment. 
7.3) Principal research findings 
7.3.1) How did the powers of stop and search develop historically? 
Chapter 3 surveyed police powers to stop and search from the Vagrancy Acts to the present. 
This historical study revealed two major trends and two perennial complaints. One trend 
was the use of the powers to 'control' the streets, targeting the 'police property': those 
groups at the margins of society or who were viewed as 'problematic'. These ranged from 
itinerant vagrants or 'strangers', to the local poor, and immigrant communities. In Northern 
Ireland this saw counter-terrorist stop and search powers used primarily against the minority 
Catholic population. A second trend was the use of the powers against sub-criminal 
behaviour, which was evident in the later Vagrancy Acts but has been avoided post-PACE. 
The two perennial complaints concerned excessive police discretion and the disproportionate 
targeting of certain groups or communities. There is a clear overlap between the two trends 
and complaints - broad discretion enables the disproportionate targeting of 'problem' 
groups, which also flows from the use of the powers to 'control' the streets. Similarly, the 
criminalisation of sub-criminal behaviour provides the police with greater discretion than 
would ordinarily be afforded them and feeds back into a loop, enabling the disproportionate 
use of the power. It is important to note that while there was clear evidence of 
disproportionality in respect of certain powers at certain times, the perception of 
disproportionality can be just as damaging to police-community relations as actual 
disproportionality. 
While PACE was a significant improvement on 'sus' and section 66, the Macpherson Report 
evidences the on-going difficulties in achieving a balance whereby police have the power to 
stop and search short of arrest, which requires a wide discretion, and effective accountability 
and oversight, which would ensure that the power is used proportionately. Stop and search 
powers are situated within 'street policing', meaning that either the discretion must be curbed 
ex ante or that it must be accounted for post facto. It is not routinely possible for there to be 
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effective oversight at the time the power is deployed. Where the power is not limited by 
reasonable suspicion, the balance is tilted towards post facto accountability. 
There is clear evidence that stop and search powers can be exceptionally damaging to police-
community relations where there is a perception, and/or reality, of the disproportionate use 
of the powers. It should also be noted that 'street policing' powers are often conflated - as 
'sus' and section 66 were - in the minds of the public. 
7.3.2) How is section 44 used and how ought it be used? 
Chapters 4 and 5 considered how section 44 was authorised and deployed and how it ought 
to be authorised and deployed in order to adhere to the framework principles. Section 44 is 
used primarily for the objectives of disruption and deterrence and intelligence gathering. 
Neither TACT nor the accompanying 'soft' regulations exclude section 44's use for 
deterrence and disruption but its use for intelligence gathering is far more dubious, and may 
raise issues under the ECHR, Article 6 and/or 8, depending on the facts. 
The authorisation process is insufficiently robust to permit consideration of the 
proportionality of the authorisation, as evidenced by the Gil/an (EetHR) case. This flows 
primarily from the low 'trigger' of 'expedient', which is exacerbated by the ineffectiveness 
of the safeguards. On the evidence available, ministerial approval appears to act as a rubber 
stamp. The MPS' 'rolling' authorisation reveals the inadequacy of the temporal and 
geographical limits, while the Gil/an (ilL) case highlights the limits of judicial review. 
These failings are further aggravated by the lack of transparency regarding the authorisation 
process which in turn undercuts such community accountability as exists. Community 
accountability is also weakened by the fact that it is recommended, not required, that forces 
engage with the community and that forces are not required to inform their PAs when an 
authorisation is in place, nor the PAs of other forces whose area overlaps with their 
authorisation area. 
It follows that of the framework principles, the authorisation process adheres only in part to 
effectiveness and efficiency in relation to CONTEST. It is not in accordance with the law. 
It does not provide for adequate accountability. These two failings aggravate the perception 
of those who argue that section 44 is disproportionately deployed and those who argue that it 
is used for non-counter-terrorist related ends, thus undermining the 'Prevent' strand of 
CONTEST. This undercuts the adherence of the power to the CONTEST strategy, 
notwithstanding that its proper deployment may further the objectives of the 'Protect' strand 
and, to a considerably lesser degree, the 'Pursue' strand. 
There are various improvements that could be made to the authorisation process so that it 
adheres, at least more closely, to the framework principles. Central to these is raising the 
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'trigger' to 'necessary'. The preferred option would be simply to raise the trigger to 
necessary. A second option would be to implement a two-tier approach whereby the trigger 
for high-risk sites, which are authorised because of their vulnerability, is 'reasonable for the 
protection of the public', while it is raised to 'necessary' for all other areas. Judicial 
oversight should replace ministerial oversight. There should also be far more detailed data 
provided publicly regarding the authorisation process. This would in particular enable closer 
community accountability which should be strengthened further by requiring rather than 
permitting community consultation, whether before or after the authorisation and 
deployment. Forces should also be required to inform other forces and their PA when their 
authorisation area overlaps. 
Section 44 is primarily exercised on the basis of location, intelligence, deterrence, the 
person's behaviour and, to a far lesser degree, external events. As with its historical 
predecessors, excessive discretion is the key concern in relation to the deployment of section 
44. The usual discretion associated with 'street policing' powers is aggravated in the case of 
section 44 due to the explicit absence of suspicion and the exceptionally broad nature of the 
object of the search. It was notable that a number of officers voiced their disquiet at the 
breadth of the discretion, particularly in relation to the consequential difficulties in 
explaining their selection process to the person stopped.3 An area of particular concern is 
the use of section 44 stops to gather intelligence through questioning the person stopped. 
There is, again, insufficiently detailed data released to enable effective oversight, although 
the publication of detailed borough data by the MPS is an improvement. 
It follows that the deployment of section 44 infringes the three framework principles. Its 
routine use violates the right to privacy under the ECBR, Article 8, and is likcly to also 
violate the right to liberty under Article 5.4 Depending on the facts, the exercise of section 
44 may also violate the right to a fair trial,S the right to freedom of expression and 
assembly,6 and the prohibition on discrimination.' The potential for the disproportionate 
application of section 44 and the perception among some communities that it is applied 
disproportionately severely undercuts the 'Prevent' strand of CONTEST by alienating 
people from the police and the broader counter-terrorist strategy. This, like the authorisation 
process, significantly undercuts any success the exercise of section 44 has towards the 
3 See Chapter 5. 
4 Gillan (ECtHR). 
S ECHR, Article 6. 
6 ECHR, Articles 10, 11. 
7 ECHR, Article 14. 
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'Protect' and 'Pursue' strands, with the extremely low hit-rate reinforcing the fact that 
'Pursue' is, at best, a secondary objective. 
Improving the adherence of the exercise of section 44 to the framework principles is 
dependent on implementing the recommendations above in relation to the authorisation 
process. At the very least, the trigger must be raised if there is to be any possibility that the 
deployment of the power complies with human rights. Presuming the recommendations to 
have been acted upon, further improvements in relation to the exercise of section 44 include 
amending PACE Code A to require that officers inform the person stopped that he or she 
does not need to respond to any question unrelated to the search and requiring a minimum 
amount of detail be recorded in the stop forms. If general regulation of CCTV is not 
forthcoming, then officers should be cautioned regarding their use of CCTV in rclation to 
section 44 in a Home Office circular or in the NPIA 'Practice Advice' or similar. The 
concerns raised around the misuse of section 44 at protests could be addressed, to some 
degree, through more detailed recording requirements on the stop form and the publication 
of the data. 
7.3.3) How does section 44 impact upon the community? 
Chapter 6 analysed how section 44 impacts upon the 'community'. While the statistical 
evidence of disproportionality must be understood as subject to a number of provisos, none 
of these individually or collectively account for the disparate use of section 44 against 
'Black' people and 'Asians'. In addition, the fieldwork indicated that several communities 
and groups felt disproportionately targeted by the power: Asians, Muslims, members of the 
LGBT community, protesters, and photographers. This broad range covers some ground 
already covered in other research and highlights some new areas of concern and suggests 
that multiple discriminations may be at play whereby various different factors intersect to 
make the person more likely to be targeted. 
It follows that section 44, when used disproportionately, infringes the framework principle 
of human rights on the basis of unjustified discrimination and, depending on the 
circumstances, also infringes the freedoms to expression and assembly. If groups or 
communities are targeted because of their religion, gender or sexual orientation, this will be 
unlawful under the Equality Act 2010. The detrimental impact on the group or community's 
perception of counter-terrorist powers when section 44 is used or perceived as being used 
disproportionately or in non-counter-terrorist situations significantly undercuts any efforts 
made under Prevent and more broadly risks damming the flow of information to the police. 
As outlined above in relation to the authorisation and deployment of section 44, community 
accountability is inadequate. 
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Changes must start with amendments to the authorisation process and deployment of the 
power. Some recommendations in relation to bolstering community accountability have 
already been mentioned. Additional changes should include a pro-active approach to the 
complaints system whereby persons who have been stopped are sought out and asked their 
opinion on the encounter, greater training for officers, and more contemporaneous oversight 
by superiors (where this does not already happen). None of these singly or cumulatively can 
eliminate the possibility that section 44 will be used to disproportionately target specific 
communities or groups or be used in non-counter-terrorist situations. However, these 
recommendations would provide greater oversight, thereby enabling trends to be identified 
at an early stage and for remedial action to be taken. It should also make it easier for the 
police to challenge false perceptions of disproportionality. 
7.3.4) Is it possible to reform section 44 so as to comply with the 
normative principles? 
This research question is addressed in the commentary below, with conclusions drawn in 
section 7.4.2. 
7.4) Section 44: the future 
This penultimate section will consider the future of section 44 in the light of the 
Government's proposals in the Protection of Freedoms Bill 2010/11 and the amendment of 
section 44 using a remedial order.s The remedial order, under the liRA, section 10, can be 
used to amend legislation if it contravenes the ECHR and the relevant Minister considers 
there to be compelling reasons to make recourse to the remedial order, which will usually 
relate to time constraints. In relation to the amendment of section 44, the remedial order was 
used so as to bridge the operational gap which existcd bctwecn thc suspcnsion of the 
'ordinary' exercise of section 44 in July 2010 and thc proposed amendment of the power 
undcr the Protcction of Frecdoms Bill 2010/11.9 
The first part, below, will outline thc Governmcnt's proposals and critiquc thcm against the 
recommendations made in the preceding Chaptcrs. The final part will highlight areas of 
continuing concern. 
7.4.1) Section 47A 
The Government's proposals in the Protection of Freedoms Bill 20 I 0/11 mirror exactly the 
changes made to section 44 by means of the 'The Terrorism Act 20000 (Remedial) Order 
2011' (Remedial Order), which repeals sections 44 - 47(G), rcplacing thcm with scction 
82011, SI 2011/631. 
9 Explanatory Memorandum to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Remcdial) Order 2011, no.631. 
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47 A. \0 As the Code of Practice is available for the remedial order, the following discussion 
will focus on that source of reform, while providing the relevant references to the Protection 
of Freedoms Bill as well. The Code, which like PACE is admissible as evidence in court 
though a breach of the Code constitutes neither a civil nor criminal wrong of itself, provides 
further details on the authorisation requirements. I I 
The Remedial Order raises the authorisation 'trigger' in two ways. First, the authorising 
officer must 'reasonably suspect' that an act of terrorism will take place and, second, the 
officer must consider the authorisation to be 'necessary' to prevent acts of terrorism. This 
incorporates the recommendation that the 'trigger' be raised to 'necessary' to adhere to the 
requirement of the ECHR and adds an extra hurdle, which potentially strengthens oversight 
via judicial review. This also appears to be the minimum required by the CTITF's guide to 
stopping and searching persons, which states that the decision to stop and search person 
must be 'necessary to prevent acts of terrorism' .12 There is no reference to the imminence 
or otherwise of the act of terrorism nor is there an explicit requirement that the act of 
terrorism relates to the authorisation area. However, the Code states that a general high 
threat from terrorism is insufficient grounds of itself as a basis for an authorisation. I 3 This, 
and the requirement that the power be necessary to prevent the act of terrorism, suggests a 
required correspondence between the threat and the authorised area. A site's vulnerability 
may be taken into account but cannot be the sole reason for the authorisation. 14 The Code 
explicitly states that the usefulness of the power in terms of public reassurance, deterrence or 
intelligence-gathering are insufficient bases upon which to found an authorisation. IS The 
Remedial Order also reinforces the internal limits upon the power by requiring that the 
temporal and geographical limits to the authorisation be no more than is necessary to prevent 
the act of terrorism, thereby providing statutory bite to the recommendations previously 
contained in the NPIA 'Practice Advice' and the Home Office Circular. 16 The temporal 
10 Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism: The Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) order 
2011, SI 20111631. 
11 Home Office, 'Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the authorisation and 
exercise of stop and search powers relating to section 47 A of Schedule 6B to the Terrorism 
Act 2000' [1.2.3]; TACT, section 47C(2)-(3). 
12 CTITF Working Group on Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, 'Basic 
human rights reference guide: the stopping and searching of persons' [14]. 
13 Home Office, 'Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the authorisation and 
exercise of stop and search powers relating to section 47 A of Schedule 6B to the Terrorism 
Act 2000' [3.1.5]. 
14 ibid [3.1.5(b)]. 
IS ibid [3.1.6]. 
16 TACT, section 47A(I)(b)(ii-iii). 
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maximum is cut in half to fourteen days.17 The second stage of the authorisation process, 
Ministerial confirmation, is largely unchanged, with the exception that the Minister may 
now substitute a more restricted area.18 The Code acknowledges the possibility of 'short-
term' authorisations and echoes the NPIA's 'Practice Guidance'. 
The Code requires 'detailed' intelligence to back up the authorising officer's reasonable 
suspicion that an act of terrorism will take place. It is likely that this will result in little 
change from the current approach, where intelligence elements are routinely referenced. The 
temporal and geographical limits are tightened, with force-wide authorisations being 
permitted only in 'exceptional' circumstances. 19 'Rolling' authorisations are explicitly 
prohibited, however, it is unclear how this prohibition will be enforced given that forces can 
apply for new authorisations once the old one has expired. 
In terms of community accountability, the Code requires Home Office and Scottish forces to 
notify any non-Home Office forces in whose area an authorisation has been issued and vice 
versa.20 Each force 'should' also inform their PA, or equivalent.21 This is a significant 
improvement which will increase the ability of communities, via their PA, to hold forces to 
account for their use of the power. There is, however, no automatic referral to the local PA 
or to the IPCC for 'rolling' authorisations, as was suggested in Chapter 4. The requirement 
in PACE Code A that forces, in consultation with their P A, make arrangements for the 
community to scrutinise records of stop and search is reproduced in the Code.22 One novel 
requirement in the Code is that where section 47A affects section of the community 'with 
whom channels of communication are difficult or non-existent, these should be identified 
and put in place,.23 This seems to refer to the 'transient' communities who were identified 
in Chapter 4 as being affected by section 44. This is a clear improvement, however, it 
remains to be seen how these new channels of communication will be forged and how 
effective they will be. 
17 TACT, schedule 6B, paragraph 6. 
18 TACT, schedule 6B, [7(4)(b)]. 
19 Home Office, 'Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the authorisation and 
exercise of stop and search powers relating to section 47 A of Schedule 63 to the Terrorism 
Act 2000' [3.2.5]. 
20 ibid [3.6]. 
21 ibid [3.6]. 
22 ibid [5.5.3]. 
23 ibid [6.1.2]. 
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The object of the search under 'section 47A' is evidence that the vehicle is being used for 
terrorism or that the person is a terrorist.24 This is somewhat more circumscribed than 
articles which could be used in connection with terrorism but it remains an exceptionally 
broad term, because of the breadth of section 1 and section 41 of TACT. The Code requires 
officers to be reminded in briefings that the object of the search is for objects which connect 
that person or vehicle with terrorism.2s However, this does not significantly narrow the field 
particularly in relation to a search of persons, where most objects found on a person or in 
their belongings that could be used for terrorism will prompt the suspicion that that 
particular person is a terrorist. Moreover, there is again an explicit absence of suspicion: 
while the officer may only search for evidence of terrorism or that the person is a terrorist, 
they need no suspicion to prompt the search. Therefore, the officer's discretion remains 
nearly completely unfettered within the authorisation area. 
There has been an attempt to circumscribe this discretion by listing four 'indicators' which 
should be considered when selecting whom to stop. The first is 'geographical extent', that 
is, is the area within the authorisation area? This is less of an indicator than a legal 
requirement. The second is behaviour, which chimes in particular with the BTP's use of 
section 44 under strand one. The third is 'clothing', specifically whether the clothing could 
conceal relevant evidence of terrorism. This 'indicator' is likely to pour fucl on the 
allegations that the power is used disproportionately to target specific groups, notably 
Muslims, and is unnecessary: if someone appears to be concealing something, whether in 
their clothing or elsewhere, this comes under 'behaviour' and may, on the facts, be sufficient 
for a section 43 stop. The final indication is 'carried items' which may 'conceal an article 
that could constitute evidence' of terrorism. This is extremely vague - presumably any bag, 
even if relatively small, could conceal such evidence, which suggests that anyone carrying 
anything may be stopped. These indicators add nothing to the NPIA 'Practice Advice', 
which listed relevant criteria as being: the individual; his or her location; or a combination of 
the two and provided little practical guidance to officers regarding the selection process. 
The Code reminds officers of the need to explain their actions to the person who has been 
stopped, mirroring the NPIA's 'Practice Advice' .26 The Code states that briefings should 
provide officers with 'a form of words that they can use when explaining the use of 
24 TACT, section 47A(4). 
25 Home Office, 'Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the authorisation and 
exercise of stop and search powers relating to section 47 A of Schedule 6B to the Terrorism 
Act 2000' [4.2.6]. 
26 ibid [1.1.6]; NPIA 'Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism' [2.3]. 
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... section 47A,.27 The Code provides a list to help officers to explain the use of the power, 
however, the final point - 'why the person or vehicle was selected to be searched' is, as 
outlined in Chapter 5, the core difficultly: how can officers explain the selection process for 
a power that does not require suspicion of any offence?28 
It remains a requirement to provide a stop form, unless wholly impracticable, or rather, a 
stop form or receipt must be offered to the person.29 The Code is somewhat contradictory 
on this point, stating at one stage that the receipt or form must be given if it is requested,30 
while later stating that the person must be asked if they want a copy of the receipt or form. 31 
The former is clearly undesirable as members of the public may be unaware of their right to 
request a form and may therefore not do so. The latter option is less desirable than the 
previous requirement under PACE that a copy of the record 'must be given immediately to 
the person searched,.32 In cases where it is alleged that the officer refused to give a stop 
form, the retort will be that the person did not want or request, it, and it will be exceedingly 
difficult to prove either way. This unnecessarily weakens onc of the major forms of 
oversight over section 47A. In terms of content, the form must contain the person's self-
defined ethnicity, the date, time and place of search, the officer's warrant number, that the 
search took place under section 47A, and why the person was sclected.33 This is positive in 
that it ensures some degree of uniformity. However, the details required were the minimum 
inputted by officers anyway so if there is any change in officers' reporting it will be a 
reduction in the detail recorded.34 While the Code notes that persons who are stopped do not 
need to provide their details, there is no requirement that officers inform the person stopped 
of this. 
27 Home Office, 'Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the authorisation and 
exercise of stop and search powers relating to section 47 A of Schedule 6B to the Terrorism 
Act 2000' [4.2.7]. 
28 See Chapter 5.2. 
29 Home Office, 'Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the authorisation and 
exercise of stop and search powers relating to section 47 A of Schedule 6B to the Terrorism 
Act 2000' [5.3.1]. 
30 ibid [5.2.I(d)]. 
31 ibid [5.3.1]. 
32 PACE, Code A [4.2] (Code issued under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes 
of Practice) (Revisions to Code A) (No.2) 2008, SI 2008/3146). 
33Home Office, 'Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the authorisation and 
exercise of stop and search powers relating to section 47 A of Schedule 6B to the Terrorism 
Act 2000' 5.4.1. 
34 See Chapter 5.2.1. 
257 
7.4.2) Continuing concerns: 
It is clear that section 47A goes some way to addressing the concerns raised in the Gil/an 
(ECtHR) case and more generally. The raising of the 'trigger' to 'necessary' is a key 
improvement. The addition of a second layer to the trigger by way of the requirement that 
the authorising officer 'reasonably suspects' an act of terrorism will take place may further 
restrict the granting of authorisations, although it seems largely dependent on the degree of 
oversight exercised by the Minister or on the judicial interpretation, if judicial review arises, 
in relation to the requirement or not of imminence and the degree of proximity required 
between the suspected act and the authorised area. If section 47 A is to be a restricted tool, 
used only in specific areas where there is an imminent risk of a terrorist attack, then this 
should be explicit in the authorisation trigger. Fourteen days is overly long for such a 
targeted power. However, even on its own, raising the trigger to 'necessary' permits 
consideration of the proportionality of authorisation, therefore going some distance towards 
ensuring the authorisation process is 'in accordance with the law'. Another concern is the 
on-going possibility of 'short-term' authorisations. These need to be more tightly restricted 
so that they are used for genuinely 'short' authorisations rather than to avoid ministerial 
over-sight, as recommended in Chapter 4. 
Even if raising the trigger of itself addresses the concerns voiced in Gil/an (ECtlIR) in 
relation to the authorisation process, there remain outstanding issues regarding 
accountability and adherence to CONTEST, specifically in terms of ensuring that sections of 
the community are not alienated by the use of the power, which would undermine the 
'Prevent' strand. One on-going concern is the Ministerial oversight. This lacks 
transparency and appears to be a rubber-stamping exercise. At the least records of the 
authorisations applied for, rejected and modified, and the grounds on which they were 
modified, must be published on a time-lag annually. This will enable some evaluation of the 
level of scrutiny that is occurring. The preferable option would be judicial review, as 
detailed in Chapter 5. Even if the current changes suffice to answer the concerns in Gil/an 
(ECtHR), the exceptional nature of the power is such that it can be argued that a higher level 
of scrutiny is required rather than 'just' ensuring legality. Judicial review would ensure 
independent oversight with some degree of transparency, although it is likely that most of 
the underlying intelligence will be from closed source materials. 
In relation to community accountability over the authorisation process, the fact that PAs 
should be informed when section 47A is authorised in their area, whether by their own force 
or another, is an improvement. However, in common with the information to be provided to 
communities, the language in the Code continues to be permissive rather than imperative. 
Forces should have to inform the relevant PA of an authorisation and should have to consult 
with their communities on their use of section 47A, whether through their PAs, CORPs or 
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other police-community groupings. In order for such engagement to be meaningful, the 
community must have access to details of the authorisations, in terms of the numbers applied 
for, rejected or modified, the temporal and geographical limits, and the number of stops 
carried under each. Only if such information is provided can any meaningful assessment of 
the authorisations be undertaken. Such information should be made publicly available, on a 
time-lag and with such redactions as necessary to ensure national security, whether to 
protect sources or to hamper 'pattern-spotting'. 
Turning to the deployment of section 47A, the object of the search is slightly more restricted 
than under section 44, through its connection to the specific vehicle or person. However, it 
continues to be 'a very wide category which could cover many articles commonly carried by 
people in the streets. ,35 There is still an explicit absence of suspicion, whether reasonable or 
not. Therefore the officer retains a virtually unfettered discretion as to who to select to stop 
and search and can still search for an extraordinary wide class of objects. Section 47A has 
not meaningfully limited 'the clear risk of arbitrariness in the grant of such a broad 
discretion to the police officer,.36 It is therefore at least questionable whether the 
deployment of section 47A would be deemed to be proportionate. The difficulty in 
restricting the discretion of the officer in deploying the power is another reason why all 
means of increasing accountability over the authorisation process should be adopted, such as 
judicial rather than ministerial authorisation. This is also why additional transparency and 
community engagement must be prioritised as a requirement rather than being optional. The 
reporting methods, suggested in Chapters 4 and 5, whereby the type of authorisation would 
be broken down may not be as appropriate to section 47 A, depending on its use. Further 
research should be undertaken to identify the types of authorisation that are occurring and 
the authorisations should thereafter be broken down into these types. It is also imperative 
that officers continue to be required to give the person stopped the stop and search form. 
This is a flawed method of accountability which can be circumvented with relative ease but 
it remains one of the few 'independent reports' from the encounter. Additionally, stop and 
search forms should be 'dip-sampled' on a quarterly basis as a pro-active approach to 
complaints. The findings from these should be fed-back to the relevant unit through 
briefings, with good practice disseminated force-wide, and to the community through the 
relevant police-community partnerships and PAs. 
35 Ci/lan (ECtHR) [83]. 
36 ibid [85]. 
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7.4.3) Is it possible to reform section 44 so as to comply with the 
normative principles? 
The final research question asked whether: it is possible to reform section 44 so as to 
comply with the normative principles? Following from the comments above, and the 
conclusions of the other research questions, the answer must be no, or at least not to a 
satisfactory degree. It is arguably possible to alter section 44 so that it complies with human 
rights. However, this would require ammending the power so that it can be exercised with 
reasonable suspicion, which merely replicates section 43. Moreover, amending section 44 in 
this manner would undercut the justifications for the power, thereby undermining its 
proportionality and, consequentially, its adherence to human rights. The police also need to, 
and as yet have not, proven the need for section 44, certainly in terms of its present 
deployment. Lord Carlile has stated that there is 'little or no evidence that the use of section 
44 has the potential to prevent an act of terrorism as compared with other statutory powers 
of stop and search' .37 One of the PA interviewees also doubted its necessity, arguing that 
'the risks from [the detrimental impact on community-police relations] outwiegh the 
.. , 38 posItives. 
It is not possible to exert close accountability over the power. The discretion required for 
section 44 is to fulfil its operational goals is such that it necessitates closer accountability 
over the power than would be required with, for example, a stop and search power that 
required the officer to have reasonable suspicion the person stopped had committed an 
offence. The question of adherence to CONTEST is far more difficult to quantify but there 
is at least anecdotal evidence that the exercise of section 44 is contributing to negative 
perceptions of the police and of counter-terrorist policies more broadly. It may be worth 
remembering Lord Scarman's arguments against aggressive law enforcement which may 
bring marginal gains in law enforcement at the cost of public tranquillity.39 One could add 
to public tranquillity the cost of intelligence lost through poor community-police relations. 
It is notable that among the police sample many said that improved public awareness or 
education regarding what the objectives of section 44 were would best improve section 44.40 
One senior officer said: 'if we're going to have this legislation which is so controversial let's 
tell everybody why we've got it and not be scared to do that,.41 Given that section 47A is in 
force and it appears likely that relevant sections of the Protection of Freedoms Bill 20 I 0/11 
37 Lord Carlile, 'Report on the operation in 2007 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of 
the Terrorism Act 2006' [130]. 
38 PA02. 
39 Lord Scarman, 'The Scarman Report' [4.57]. 
40 BTPFLOl; BTPFL02; BTPFL03; BTPFLlO; MPSFLOl; MPSSNR04; MPSSNR06. 
41 BTPSNR02. 
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will be passed, this is something that the police should urgently address if they want to 
reduce the friction around the deployment of section 47A and the proposed section 43B. 
There should be an open and honest discussion with the public whereby the police can 
attempt to justify their need for the power and can also listen to the concerns of the public. 
This will not suffice to bring the power within the framework principles of this thesis but it 
may serve to lessen the detrimental impact it has on community-police relations and rcduce 
the tension that front-line officers have to deal with whcn exercising the power. The 
importance of such a discussion, for police and the public, was clearly stated by one officer: 
'we need a robust policy that will stand up to scrutiny, even if it's not pretty and even if 
it's not nice for certain areas of the community. It's got to be a strong and tough policy 
that police officers can fall back on and use without any worry or concern that it's going 
to affect them personally - as in complaints - but that's just from the police point of 
view. The public: all the same reasons. The public need a robust policy that they can ask 
about and expect to be told the truth even if thcy don't like it'. 42 
7.5) After section 47A? 
It remains to be seen whether section 47A will be used in a similar manner to section 44. It 
is curious that the Code explicitly excludes authorising the power for use for deterrence or 
reassurance or intelligence-gathering and that the vulnerability of the site cannot of itself 
justify an authorisation. On the basis of the findings in this thesis, section 47 A should 
hardly be used at all. While its use to search vehicles for suspect devices, as suggested in 
the Macdonald Report, is credible, in relation to stops of persons, the power is not an arrest 
tool, unless looking for a needle in a haystack is an accepted justification.43 Given 
intelligence gathering and deterrence are excluded bases, all that remains is disruption. 
However, attempting in practice to separate disruption from deterrence is futile - indeed, the 
two concepts were generally mentioned in one breath by officers.44 If section 47 A continues 
to be widely used, even if its usage is less than a quarter of that of section 44, it is hard to 
conceive how this will be lawful if used for objectives other than deterrence, intelligence or 
reassurance. 
The evolutionary path of stop and scarch powers appcars to be as follows: extensive use of 
the power with minimum oversight followed by a crisis which prompts and/or adds credence 
to existing complaints, the outcry then leading to investigation and reform: 'sus' - Brixton 
42 BTPSNR02. 
43 Lord Macdonald, Review of counter-terrorism and security power: a report by Lord 
MacdonaldofRiver Glaven QC (Cm 8033, 2011) 4. 
44 See Chapter 4.1. 
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riots - PACE; PACE - Macphcrson Report - stop forms (increased accountability); section 
44 - Gillan (ECtHR) - section 47A. It remains to be seen what crisis will prompt the next 
evolutionary stage from section 47A and whether it will survive in a more curtailed form or 
be assigned to the judicial scraphcap, though the forthcoming Olympic Games in London, 
during which the power to stop without reasonable suspicion would undoubtedly be 
welcomed by the police, suggests it has not yet run its course. 
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Appendix A: Fieldwork 
A.1: Interview schedules 
The interview schedules for front-line officers, authorising officer and community and related stakeholders 
are reproduced below. Variants on these basic schedules were used for specific stakeholders, for example, 
the interview schedule used for Lord Carlile combined aspects of all three. The introductory, biographical 
and concluding sections were included in all schedules but, to avoid repetition, are included only in the first 
schedule below. For the same reason, the 'prompts' in the sub-paragraphs are included only once. 
A.2: Front-line officers 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. As indicated in my previous contacts with you, my 
PhD thesis at the University of Leeds concerns stop and search under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
It aims to assess the role, use and impact of stop and search under section 44 of the Terrorism Aet 2000. Part 
of my research is empirical, involving qualitative interviews with sample groups of the police, community 
and national stakeholders. The purpose of this interview is to investigate how section 44 is exercised, the 
systems of accountability which govern it and how it impacts upon the public. It is important for me to 
gather information from these interviews so that a proper analysis of section 44 can be carried out. It is a 
contentious power, having for instance been criticised annually by Lord Carlile, the Government's reviewer 
of counter-terrorism legislation, but without knowing its actual role and impact it is impossible to judge these 
criticisms or to suggest how to resolve them. 
I do not expect to be given information about individual cases or data which is sensitive in any way. I am 
interested in general policy and how it is applied. I expect the interview to take approximately onc hour. This 
interview is subject to your consent, so you can refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the 
interview at any time and for whatever reason, although I hope that you will not feel the need to do so. Some 
of the questions may have different responses, depending on whether you are answering as an individual or 
in your professional capacity or as a representative of an organisation. It would be very helpful in these 
situations if you can clarify how your answers would differ between the 'personal' and 'official' capacities. 
I would like to tape-record this interview. This is because (i) recording mcans I do not have to slow our 
conversation to take notes; and (ii) it allows me to undertake analysis in a more systcmatic way. Is that 
acceptable? 
Biographical: 
First of all, I would like to ask you for some basic biographical information. 
1. Gender? 
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2. Age range? « 30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+) 
3. What is your current post? 
4. How many years experience do you have in this role? 
Section 44 in general: 
This section of the interview will focus on the general policy behind section 44, putting it in a strategic. 
tactical, or operational setting: 
5. What do you think are the key objectives of section 44? 
a. Intelligence gathering! disruption ... ? 
b. Arrests for criminal prosecution? 
c. Any other? 
d. How does it achieve these? 
e. What is the balance between the objectives - which is the most important in your opinion? 
6. How does it fit into the CONTEST strategy? 
Section 44: operations 
Next, I want to ask some questions around the actual operation of section 44 on the ground. The purpose of 
these questions are to build a picture of how the power is actually exercised, and again the checks and 
balances - whether they are effective. 
7. What factors prompt the use of section 44 in a particular case? 
a. Intelligence? (General infonnation; suspect description; known criminal) 
b. An event? 
c. Location? (Hot spot etc.) 
d. Time? (I.e. unusual to be in that location at that time) 
e. Appearance of the suspect? (Clothing, ethnicity, age, gender) Do you ever use racial 
profiling? If so, in what circumstances? 
f. Behaviour of the suspect? 
g. Vehicular search? (Type, age of car; age or ethnicity of driver) 
h. Any others? 
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8. If you imagine that some of these factors are present, what might prompt you not to carry out a 
section 44 stop and search? 
a. Safety 
b. Fear of causing/aggravating community tension 
c. Balancing priorities (another urgent call comes is, etc.) 
9. What constitutes a 'good' stop and search under section 44? 
a. Arrest? 
b. Intelligence gathering? 
10. What makes an officer good or bad at stop and search? 
11. What advantages and disadvantages does section 44 have over other stop and search powers? 
a. When is it most appropriate and least appropriate? 
b. When is it most effective and least effective? 
c. Do you think that the police use 'authorised' stop and search powers when they might not be 
appropriate because of the absence of a requirement of reasonable suspicion? Is this tied in 
any way to the 'support' that the police are given in exercising their discretion? If so, is it 
preferable to 'support' police' discretion or to use 'authorised' stop and searches? 
d. Do the police take a different approach to 'authorised' powers of stop and search to s.l 
PACE or is it assimilated? 
a. Do you think there is any correlation between the use of such powers and the force's 
approach to police discretion? (I.e. do you think less 'support' to police' discretion leads 
to a reliance on 'authorised' stop and search?) 
b. If so, is it preferable to 'support' police' discretion or to use 'authorised' stop and 
searches? 
12. How does the Human Rights Act 1998 impact upon stop and search powers in general and section 44 
specifically? 
13. Have you been given any training on section 44? 
a. Any training on stop and search in general? 
b. Was it effective? 
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c. How long did it last? 
d. Was it repeated? 
14. Are the regulations and paperwork surrounding the use of section 44 workable/manageable? 
a. Are mistakes made? 
b. How much detail is put into a stop and search form? 
c. Is it always completed on the spot? 
15. What information is given to the person stopped and searched? 
16. What do the police do with the stop and search forms afterwards? 
a. Is there any collation? At force, regional or national level? Are the forms computerised? 
b. Is there any follow-up or audit? Any focus on legality/effectiveness/impact on public 
confidence and trust? 
c. How is intelligence dealt with? Does it go to districtlregionaVCTU? 
d. Is policy reviewed or revised in the light of actual operations? 
17. Have you any experience of sanctions being imposed for an improper stop and search? 
a. If so in what circumstances? What were the sanctions? 
Concluding questions: 
Finally, I want to ask some concluding questions ofa general nature about section 44. 
18. What would improve the use of section 44? 
a. Should it be amended - if so in what way(s)? 
b. Should the policies around its use be changed - if so in what way(s)? 
19. Could the objectives behind s.44 be better achieved by other changes/reforms in law or practice? If 
so, what? 
20. Have you any further comments which have not been raised in this interview? 
Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this research. A summary of the findings will be 
available on request. 
A.3. Authorising police officers 
Section 44 in general: 
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1. What do you think are the key objectives of section 44? 
2. How do these fit into the CONTEST strategy? 
The authorisation of section 44: 
Next, I want to ask some questions around the theme ofthe authorisation of stop and search under section 44. 
My purpose in this is to find out how the process actually works and how the checks and balances (i.e. 
paperwork!) fit in and if they are effective. 
3. What advantages and disadvantages does section 44 have over other stop and search powers? 
a. When is it most appropriate and least appropriate? 
b. When is it most effective and least effective? 
4. What factors prompt the authorisation of section 44? 
a. What is the role of intelligence - general or specific? 
5. If you imagine that some of these factors are present, what could prompt you not to use section 44? 
a. Community issues/tension? 
b. Prioritisation? 
c. Safety? 
6. It has been suggested that section 44 is used by some forces 'without full consideration' of whether 
other powers are adequate and that authorisations should be more critically examined. What do you 
think should be considered before authorising section 44? 
7. In general, do the authorisations use the maximum or minimum in terms of geographical spread and 
time? 
a. What factors would limit the geographical spread / time? 
8. Has an authorisation ever been modified to alter the geographical spread or time? 
a. How? (Larger/smaller; shorterllonger?) 
9. Are the regulations and paperwork surrounding the use of section 44 workable/manageable? 
a. Are mistakes made? (As happened in South Wales, Sussex and Greater Manchester ... ) 
b. How long does it take to fill in the paperwork for an authorisation? 
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1. How much detail is required? 
ii. How many people are involved? 
c. Have there been any difficulties liaising with the National Joint Unit or the Home Secretary? 
i. Have either ever asked for more information, etc.? 
10. It has been suggested that the use of section 44 should be halved. Do you agree? 
a. Is section 44 used too much or too little? 
b. How frequently is it used in this force? 
11. Do forces ever coordinate the use of section 44? E.g. with the British Transport Police? 
12. Do you inform all officers when section 44 is operative? 
a. How? 
13. How does the Human Rights Act 1998 impact upon stop and search powers in general and section 44 
specifically? 
Section 44: operations 
14. What factors prompt the use of section 44 in a particular case? 
15. What constitutes a 'good' stop and search under section 44? 
16. Have you any experience of sanctions being imposed for an improper stop and search? 
Accountability: community: 
Next, I want to ask some questions around the relationship between the police and the community, in 
particular around the communication between the two. 
17. What are the main systems for communication /liaison with the community? 
a. Role of the police authority? 
b. Police-community partnerships? 
18. Is section 44 discussed with the community? 
a. Prospectively/retrospectively? 
b. Local level or strategic level (steering groups ... )? 
c. Is the community informed of its rights under section 44? How it is to be used etc. 
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d. If it is not discussed with the community, why not? Should it be? 
e. Is policy reviewed or revised in the light of actual operations? 
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A.4 Community and related stakeholders 
Section 44 in general: 
1. What do you think are the key objectives of section 44? 
2. What advantages and disadvantages does section 44 have over other stop and search powers? 
Accountability: community: 
3. What are the main systems for communication / liaison between the police and the community? 
4. Is the authorisation of section 44 discussed with the community? 
5. It has been suggested that section 44 is used by some forces 'without full consideration' and that 
authorisations should be more critically examined. What do you think should be considered before 
authorising section 44? 
6. Is the deployment of section 44 discussed with the community? 
7. How does section 44 impact upon the community? 
The exercise of section 44: 
8. What factors prompt the use of section 44 in a particular case? 
9. It has been suggested that the use of section 44 should be halved. Do you agree? 
10. What constitutes a 'good' stop and search under section 44? 
11. What is the purpose of stop and search forms? 
a. Are they effective (why)? 
12. What information is given to the person stopped and searched? 
a. Stop and search form? 
b. Information regarding basis of power, person's rights ... ? 
13. What means are there to challenge or review a section 44 stop and search? 
a. How effective are these means? 
A.S Data quality manager schedule 
Stop and search forms: 
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These form a key form of accountability and to be able to assess their effectiveness it is necessary to know 
how they are monitored, collated etc. This is what I hope to find out in this interview. 
1. What is the process for collating stop and search forms? 
a. Is it by borough or force? 
b. Do you liaise with other forces or feed into national databases (e.g. section 95 statistics on 
race and the Criminal Justice System)? 
2. How much information is normally put into a section 44 stop form? 
a. What type of information? 
b. Is it consistent across boroughs? 
3. Do you think the quality of data would benefit from increased / decreased information? 
a. If so what type of information? 
4. Do you think that the present stop forms are an improvement on the previous ones? 
5. Do you agree with the proposed system of 'receipts'? Would it make a difference? 
6. Do you think that the quality of data would benefit from minimum standards regarding what must be 
put into the stop forms in relation to section 44? 
7. Who can access the information in the database? 
a. MPS? 
b. MPA? 
c. Other forces? 
d. Communities? 
e. Government? 
f. Should they be able to? 
8. Are there 'compliance' procedures for the stop forms? 
a. What are these? 
9. What would constitute a discrepancy? 
10. How are discrepancies flagged/followed up? 
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a. Is the borough/force informed? 
b. Have sanctions ever been recommended? By whom? 
11. Is intelligence from the stop and search forms fed back to SO 15 or other branches? 
a. How? 
12. Have you any further comments which have not been raised in this interview? 
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A.6 Lord Carlile 
1. What do you think are the key objectives of section 44? 
2. How does it fit into the CONTEST strategy? 
a. Is the borough/force infonned? 
The authorisation of section 44: 
3. What advantages and disadvantages does section 44 have over other stop and search powers? 
4. What factors prompt the authorisation of section 44? 
5. You have been suggested that section 44 is used by some forces 'without full consideration' of whether 
other powers are adequate and that authorisations should be more critically examined. What should be 
considered before authorising section 44? 
a. Would a change in the law from authorisation when 'expedient' to onc where 'necessary' be 
beneficial in ensuring forces consider the relevant issues? 
6. If you imagine that some of these factors are present, what might or should prompt authorising officers 
not to use section 44? 
7. In general, do the authorisations use the maximum or minimum in terms of geographical spread and 
time? 
8. Has an authorisation ever been modified to alter the geographical spread or time? 
9. Are the regulations and paperwork surrounding the use of section 44 workable/manageable? 
a. Has the Home Secretary ever rejected any authorisations? 
10. Would the publication of the number of authorisations per force benefit transparency, accountability, the 
considered use of the power? 
a. Would it help to publish the 'type' (Le. intelligence; location; protest)? 
1l. Do forces ever coordinate the use of section 44? E.g. with the British Transport Police; MOD? 
12. How does the Human Rights Act 1998 impact upon stop and search powers in general and section 44 
specifically? 
13. The MPS have recently launched a pilot where 'Levell' sites are permanently designated (high risk, 
transport hubs, iconic sites); 'Level 2' respond to specific intelligence. Is this an improvement? 
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a. Could it be rolled out nationally? 
b. Could it be incorporated into law? 
Section 44: operations 
14. Your last report refers to persons who are 'so far from any known terrorist profile'. Is there a terrorist 
profile? If so, should this be used? 
15. What factors prompt the use of section 44 in a particular case? 
16. What constitutes a 'good' stop and search under section 44? 
17. Do you know of cases in which sanctions were imposed for an improper stop and search? 
Accountability: community: 
18. What are the main systems for communication / liaison with the community? 
19. Are the Police Authorities informed? Why? Why not? When? 
20. Is section 44 discussed with the community? 
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A7: Description of research handed to short interview participants 
RESEARCH 
I am carrying out research into stop and search under the Terrorism Act, section 44 at the School of Law, 
University of Leeds. The research will explain and assess the role, use and impact of stop and search under 
section 44. Section 44 is important as it is the main site of interaction bctween the public and police in terms 
of counter-terrorism and is contentious due to the absence of any requirement of reasonable suspicion. 
As part of this research I am carrying out ficldwork with the police and 'community'. I am completing the 
police sample at present and am looking for members of the public who use the railways and would be 
willing to be interviewed about stop and search under section 44. All participants will be anonymised in the 
research. The interview should take twenty to thirty minutes. 
For more details or if you have any queries, please contact mc, Genevieve Lennon, at law5gl@leeds.ac.uk. 
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AS: Consent Form 
Consent Form 
Policing terrorist risk: stop and search under section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 
• I have received information and been given an opportunity to ask questions about this research. 
• I understand the purpose of the research and how I will be involved. 
• I understand that the data obtained will be held in confidence and that my identity will not be divulged in 
the final report. 
• I understand that the recording of the interview and any paper or electronic transcripts will be destroyed 
at the end of the project. 
• I understand that I may refuse to answer any question. 
• I understand that I may withdraw my involvement in the research at any time and for any reason. 
• I understand that the interview will be recorded and electronically transcribed. 
• I understand that the findings of the research will be incorporated into your research findings. 
• I agree to participate in a research interview. 
Name (block capitals): 
Signature: __________________________ _ 
Date: __ 1 __ 1 __ 
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A9: Sample of tree nodes used in NVivo analysis 
Parent Community 
Node 
Child Node Community police bodies 
Child Node Discussion before or after deployment or authorisation 
Child Node Disproportionality 
Child Node Encounter infonnation given politeness 
Child Node Review 
Parent HRA 
Node 
Child Node Training 
Parent Sanctions or review 
Node 
Parent What would improve the use of s.44 
Node 
Parent S.44 - General 
Node 
Child Node Advantages and or disadvantages of s.44 over other stop and 
search powers 
Child Node Objectives of s.44 
Child Node S.44 and CONTEST 
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Parent S.44 Authorisation 
Node 
Child Node Geographical Limits 
Child Node NJU 
Child Node Notification of other forces or PAs 
Child Node Paperwork 
Child Node Reasons not to authorise s44 
Child Node Role of Intelligence 
Child Node Temporal limits 
Parent S.44 Deployment 
Node 
Child Node Factors prompt stop 
Child Node Interview person stopped 
Child Node Reasons to not carry out s.44 
Child Node Stop and search forms 
Child Node What makes a good stop 
Appendix B: Police materials 
8.1: APA 'Know your rights' 
This guide tells you wnat 
happens if you are stopped 
by the police. 
fof rnor(" d(>tdd('d Information. 
IOcludlfl<J 1('96' dcl,nollOOI. Iransiallons 
,nlo ail('fnal"" IdngVd<J~ and d,ffe<('fll 
formals 90 10 .... ,,'" dpa poI'ce uk or 
<onldCl you, kx al polICe aulhoflly 
What Is 'stop and actount'? 
·SIOp and account" 'I when an offICe< 
'tops you and d S you 
• "hat you are do,ng 
• \\ hy ~ou afP In an arN ex where you 
diP qOlllQ. or 
• >'>fly they ItOPped you. 
• what thi'y are Iook'ng for. and 
• your light 10 a r(!(ropt 
The OfflCCf (an ask you to take oH 
more than an OUIe< COdI. JiKlCI or 
gIO\'I.-.s. and anytt.ng you wear for 
religlOUl reasonl. such as a face scarf. 
vet! Of lurban. bUI only ,f they !ilk. 
you \Om .... ·h.r. oul of publIC Vlew 
You Cdn d,k that the ollKe< who 
searches you 1\ lhe ~me sex as you 
It does not mean you are being 
arrested. 
· ,""'I you arc Cdr"l'nq 
A poloc. off" rr or poll{ e 
communtly support offICer (PeSO) does 
not hd"" the ~W" to force you to stay 
wllh Ih"'" ,f you are \lOPped and 
asked for your a 1'001 
Who can CllfrY out a 'stop ""d 
Kcount'7 
• A polICe offlCet'. Or 
• a PeSO 
A f'(SO must be ,n un,form bul d 
poIKe offtccr does flO ha,e 10 be They 
nw '>hoY, you oor ('fll,\y (drd ,f nol 
In uniform 
What is recorded and your 
right to II reuipt 
If you al, """hed you hdve the 
IIghl 10 a r('("'pl and Ih. offKCf 
musl r(!(ord lhe follOWIng deta,ls 
• your name or a descnpllon of you 
(only ,f you are searched). 
• how you de5cnbf your elhnlC 
background. 
• .... hen and whe<e you Wt'f. 
SlOPped or SCSIrched. 
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What is reconled ."d your 
right to a receipt 
If \'OU are ,topped ttv> oH. Cf w,II 
only record your elhn,c,ty and you 
\\111 be 91\t11 0.1 fl'C('tpt ~ ng thP ddh~ 
dnd tlm~ you \veff 'Jtopped. dnd ttl(" 
01l1C"" ""1ll0 and dnt.,I, 
What is 'stop and snrch' ? 
Yoo coo be \topped .nd \('J,dwd 
~1'H'f\ dn uffl( f't t\d') It'd'lOf\Jblt 
9roond, to ""r«t th.t you .,0 
(.rtylng 
• cJflKj\, M·<tpor~ Of \tolc-n 
property. or 
A \(fet.'fll'tg (knife) dl(h IS not d 'Jtop 
dnd lear(h You Cdnt b<> forced lOgo 
thfough. but IPiuSd md)' r('\Ut, I' lur1~'oI" 
oHIC('f a t'Of\ or ('VCn d full .... arch 
PlNIC flOl~ that .In offICI'\' <dn 
(onflsc:at~ (l9arMt~ Of ilko~ In VI(W 
(~rf.t 's ,n a (on ,ocr) ,f you are 
undffaqe Th,\ 'S nol a Slop Jnd lI'df(h 
Who can 'stop ~nd Hllrch' you7 
• A polICe Off~Cf "hu m~1 be In 
un,form If Ihe "",rch 's related to 
ll'fTonsm or senous lIIoICOI come 
,f thty dre nol'n ur.fonll. IhPy rn~1 
show you toor Identlly c.ud. or 
What Clln you do if you are 
unhappy about how you were 
treated? 
The officer should treat you fairly 
and with respect. If you are unhappy 
Wllh how)'Ou WCf~ trNled you (~n 
(ompY,n If you fCf.'l you were tr&lled 
d,ffl'fCOliy beuUIC of your rd(~ aqe. 
IClIWI orO('flI"~on. gCflder. d,,,,boI,ty. 
relogtOn or fMh. you can compla,n It 
woll help ,f you cop tt.. rec",pt that the 
polICe 9d'~ you 
You can get ad""" aboul how to 
make a complalnl from 
• • poIoc:estatlOfl. 
• Itl"fl)'> 'hhKh (ould be us.~ to (onlrTl I 
dlfl"""o 
SorrIf'IUTh"\ olfl(("f\ tdf! \top .... nd 'lRoH( t: 
\()u "", hln a ~'(tfl( ar .... a vI,'llhout any 
IN\Of\dbl(. ground\ I' It 1\ ~~,("",->d 
th.Jt 
• ~IOUH'tOI("O( r (ould td\t' pi.)c(' or 
otf("f.~V(" \NNpon\ drt' oonq ufflh1 
or t~h(, bt'ffi umt, Of 
Tt)(' Offl{(,1 mu\t (·;.;OiclUl thl~ to you ,Ifld 
mu~t b(. ~r(hIfKJ for \\'C'dpon\ Of 
Itt."I'n\ ..... lI'hlCh (ould t'x- lISt"Ci In 
(Ofll'W'(hon WIth tPHQ(I\ITI 
· • pno. but OI,ly If th~ ""',h" 
rf'iJIt'CI to t('fronvn. tlry drr on 
unl' >fm .)r\d ..... Ith a poI" ( OffKf'f 
How should a stop .nd Harch 
be u,med out7 
Befor~ you Mt ",.rched ttv> off~('f 
mu~1 wke dll reJsonJblc \ll'PIlO 
t'f\sur~ 1""1 you und'."dn" 
• thdt you mu\t wait to I.Jf' 'IoI .. trd'\tod. 
• wNll.lw lhi'y dre u~nq dnd ytJUr 
r'9ht\: 
• tOOr name.od ID numllf'f. 
• lhe It.ltl()O 11\("1 work ,\1. 
• your Iocdl poI,(C .ulhor,ty. 
• cl (jh.l('1l'~ Ad ... ,(P BurNu. 
• lhe I~."t POfoct Compl.l,ot\ 
(omm\llon. 
• tt.. [qudloty ."d HUffidll R'9ht\ 
Comrn\soon. or 
• d sotlC'tOl 
lilt poiKP ~""'" feedb.K~ on 
your CXI""'l'IKe conlacl your local 
poIKt aulhorlty 0' t~ke the SUM"! al 
www.apa.polke.uk/ policeitOPS 
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B.2: MPS Stop and search form (old) 
P ..... compIel. All _lion. in BLOCK CAPITALS 
Pl .... llck ._Iota bo.( •• , _ 
Stop 0 SlOP .nd Search 0- Un.tt-;nded Vehicle Search 0 
Directions to Leave. locality 0 
To be completed In 811 ca ••• 
Name 
Deswpllon 
DOle ol!>ollh 
Address 
Postcode SeIf-<lof~ ethnICIty· Off.cer~I"'ed elhnlClty 0 
SeIf-<leltned el!1nlClty No! 5"'to<l COde whe,. 50e not pro- [ill 
Dato· Start time nnl,;h ~mA· 
Place first stopped It.hOw ne.'-I ~J 
Police officers only· all searc.hes 
?tact searched !_ do" ........ ) 
Authonty for stop and soarch 
S 1 PACE 0 S23 Drug. 0 S 60 Weapons 0 
S .a(1, Torrens", 0 S .u(I) TenOfISlTl 0 S 44(2, Terronsm 0 
Othef{~.: 
GnxnIs '''' Match (t! S 60. S 43 '" S 44. detaIls of propeny found) 
1I"llltl. __ De"'llo, . 
VRM 
InjUry:clamage caused? Detail, 
. O',....r? 0 Passenger1 0 
Outcome U--._ ......  
pesos only · detentIon and/or search 
Was the power of det""uon used? 
Search after detenlioo lor dangerou .rticle~? 
SearoI11Of alcohol . 0 Search lOf tobacco: 0 
We. foroe used dUllng OOI80I""" ..... 'oh1 
(If 'Yu·. then • 'Use of Foroe' lorm mu .. be submItted) 
As a result of the sea'Ch. what was found? _ 
~;.~ Vu 0 No. 0 ~ 'Y8I stal re.son 
Directions to leove 0 Locality only 
LocatJOn exduded Irom 
Ves ONo 0 
Y86 ONo 0 
Yos ONo 0 
t,Aap and 'Nnnen St.4lOOlt1nQ n~~ glV;'lo O"~r? (not ~,oory) Ye. 0 No 0 
Requ.red to ".\Ie local ty I_at 'Y 0 With'" 15-30 mons C 
Withtn t hoOf 0 Other 0 Exduded lrom Ioca~ty I", up to ifS 
(not to e.ceed 48 hours) Iro<n the .tart lime 01 this record 
To be completed In all case. 
OfflC8f'(s) d~lall. 
• SlatJOn nome . ~ -~;;'tdad? Ves 0 No 0 11 No' '''''e reason 
Fot 0I11cer U •• Only 
ANPA Stop U Hot&pOt 0 PPO 0 Op me 
~ (Rank. COII.r"......,... namo and olgnaturel 
Supol'VlSOl'\' actoon' 
". wten: ,. .... (;.opf-nLlOW' ,--.. c.., (~ad' 1(8) 
Pit ... COfnp .... ALL section. In BLOCK CAPITALS 
PIo_ lick _oprlol. box(os} 
Stop 0 Stop and Se.reh 0 Unattend;dV;,;;cl. S.a'-;;h 0 
Directions to leave a Locality 0 
To be completed In all cases 
Name 
Descrtp\lOn . 
Dale of birth . 
Addfes .•.. __ .. 
.J • 1. Gender M le C Female 0 
... PO$lcode • 
Sell-del.ned IthnlO1y CD Ott.oer~hned ethniCIty· 0 
~..,..tined ethrtlary Not Stated' code where SDE nol prOllided. ffiIJ 
Dale / Start tome FIn,sh I.me 
Town and dlatncl 
ReaSONobJ8C\ 
Polite officers only .. 111 searches 
Place sea,cIled (~_, 
Authonty lor stop and ... rch 
S I PACE 0 S.23 Drug. 0 560 Weapons 0 
S .a(t ) Terronsm' 0 S 44(1) Te""""" . 0 5 .44 2) T,n'Of.sm 0 
O!her t_ r 
Grouncs 10< .. arch (11 S 60 S.3 or S« dalatlS 01 propeny found) 
... .................. _ ...... . 
InjutY/damage caUS<ld' 0... I. Outcome _ _ .,,_. 
pesos only . de tention and/or s~."ch 
Was the pawer of daten\lOn ulied? 
Search aher datentJOn 'or dangerous artd.,? 
Search 'or atoohot 0 Sea,ch 10< tobacco: 0 
Was IOICO used durong dalentJonllearch' 
(11 ·v .. •• then • 'U of FOtea' IOfm mu .. boo S<Jbmftted) 
As • r .. u~ 01 the .. arch whal "11 lound? 
- .... ~--- . 
Outcome. Arresled VU· 0 0 " Vea' lIale reason 
Directions to lelve I locllity only 
LocahOO e.Cluded I""" 
V··ONo·O 
Ve ONo 0 
Yes n NO·o 
, ..... .. • Uap Mnd.... en SIJI>POrI"'9 
onlormaJlOII gMn 10 ofI~ (not compuhlotY) Vu 0 No. 0 
RequHed to le •• , Iocatlly. Immecs leIy 0 Within 15-30 mons 0 
W Ihtn I hour 0 Other 0 Excluded from ro.;.Jrty !of up to hours 
(not to exceed 48 hours) from the etan lime ot thtS feoortf 
To be completed on all cues 
- S"'''''''~ 
Copy pmvtded? Ye. 0 No 0 "'No'. t I. r Ion 
166 WHfTI. , .... c..,., - 'f!UOW ,...,.... c.". ~tl·OIII 
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B.3: MPS Stop and search form (new) 
METROPOLITAN POlJCE SERVICE Form 509Ofx) 
Ftm n lilt' 
AJAge o 
StrchGrounds 
,-----,-----,-----
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8.4: BTP stop and search form 
BRITISH TRANSPORT POUCE FIS No. 
STOf'ISEAIICH RECORD Of PERSONMHICt£ R, f no 
laS1Name 
Add,,,,, 
OOS PlaceOfS,M 
DescrI!)t1OO 01 pet'IOfIlt~,che<f 
OOlnmo Upper 
Footwear 
Dlher 
P";C iOCOCt 
Pc;stcode 
Sec M:f" Te- _ 
H", 
lower 
Bwld 
If fthmc cleulficll'on f'IOt mled. reawn ell ed 1W'8yOP\.bhc Old SttulI\IOnO 
o.thnedC Couldr~ uno.l~and 0 Del",. 
if ENCOUHTlJl£DIITOP ONlY COMPlETE ••• aaow 
~ fF STOfI AND $£ARCH, COMPlm -.. " Inow 
A SEARCH RECORD 
TN AJlho'lfy I", 1"'1 IICO Ine surd' wn fplUst tI N t'I". ~ _PP'" 
,ThtuMCtIOl'l!; 01 !tlt r~I",Ai:1S Ir.""",.". ttdOfl t/leCCVf't 
51 C 5nO 5,'0 5lJSS= sooC 
5<l0 S",,,C 5",,0 
Oltw Pov-tf P use weot-,-
CIotI'l>ng remoVe<ll y" 0 
tfyH,hsttflms 
Intimate parts uposed 
The watth look place on 
Between 
v •• 0 
Oat. 
NoD 
11 tP11(.e1 
Ob,""I,).' Se.fln.· 51. Of> P, • .,...., r:::::::J G.,ng Equ,ppod 0 Drug,:::::::: 
W.,pon, 0 F"",,,,, =:J ",h., 0 Dell" 
V.hrele M,ldled? 
'IIh<1t dOl"'" 
YHO NoD 
"'~MocIfI'W 
V.hide .ntndld1 
Dltnlge ClUSed? 
v"O 
VOID 
No 0 tf No 'elY! notice 
NoD 
v .. C '00 
Arr.stt<fl VII 0 No 0 Custody Record No. 
Offtnce St., .. P'.P 0 GOing EqUIp: 0 Drug. 0 Wespons: 0 
f" .. ,,,,, 0 "'hI! 0 DOl .. " 
~ B ENCOUNTEIIISTOP ONLY RECORDED 'IOU HAlE 'OT BEEN SEAlICI<EO 
Reuon 
0u1COlN 
S ...... 
11 
VttllCi. pr.Stnll 
o.t. 
VnC NoD IncieJ(no: 
COMPlm IN All CASU 
OtrlCtflllopp.ng Q( sflrchlng 
_ 2' houro "od 
(pfltfl 
~._~ ~""S!"1OII~4C01.1'IP.'I __ ... ~.....-t"1 
SIgned. _ PRINT NAME. 
~~t1IOOIlf1 
Copy 01 ,,,ord .U!>pl'e<! 1:1''''' of It01U .. rth1 V .. O N. 0 If ~o. ,,""" 
", __ bD, 
NoD p",pNa.. 
No 0 Oomevod Ctutod .,.,. 0 No 0 
CqONoC=-=:J P!NSNo r ____ J...J 
DISPOSAl. 
o Ch.,ge 0 R.OO!1Od 0 Ball <713) CNFAlI.""mandfln.' 
r-==:::-J 
[ ==-:J 
L~ 
HO«T,'''''''' y"D NoD 
V!lIIS,_ ..... 0 NoD 
Wo<sal>It IIxtd I'fnally Issuod Yts 0 No 0 
s __ of brMllr rtQUIItd V. 0 No 0 
You IIt1 ,;g1it.g I ...... II1II 01'.,.....,., _~". boor. ,~J...s 
~ v.irtl?hl ~ ~l1ation tndlN! tt.. ~ .. oj tote. 
policy ' .... _ odt>nd to. 
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BRITISH TRANSPORT POUCE FlS No. 
STOP/SEARCH RECORD OF PERSONMHICl£ Rei no • 
First Namels) 
Poatcodt __ 
006 Place of Bonh .Sex. t.\f' Tel:... _.__ _ 
Oescnptlon of person stoppedJsearthed Hair. 
Clothing Upper: Lowet" 
Footwear 
Height: om., 
BUlkt 
PNC 10 Code _ __ ~lt defined ethnIC clasS/fatlon 
If ethnic ciullflcallon nOI stated, ruson: t:. lled !wlyDPubhc O,d 1I1uatlOnD 
Ilochned 0 Couldn~ unde",and 0 Det .. I. 
IF ENCOUNTEREOIITOP ONt.Y COMPUTE ~ •• _now 
r-t IF STOP ANO SEARCH. COMPlETE 'A' mow 
A SEARCH RECORD 
The AulnOftty fOI the atop.nd surt'h WH (pkla&t tI the bo. that IPttltf:JJ 
These sectIOnS Of rN releV.n! Acts .re lumlT'lIlsad on the ~11 
S,O snO S.,O S13980 5.600 
suO sumO SUI/IO 
Ott\er Powtt PtelMl spec;ily 
ao.hil"1l'omovfod' VH 0 
rf,(!J, bUlfems 
Intimate Plrts exposed V •• 0 
Th< ... reIl 100\ pi ... on: 0. .. _ 
ee~" 2" hour clod: and 
No 0 
NoD 
2( houncfod 
.c Iplaul 
0bjet11,lofSe.,dl:. Slolen p,openy:D Go"'9 Equipped. 0 Drug~O 
W._O FI","_ 0 Oth..- 0 DtIl'Ir _ 
Vehide searcned? 
VeNdt details: _ 
V .. 0 NoD 
tMlhCoAour~\1t!rl) 
Vehlcl •• nendf'dl 
o.mag. Clusedl 
VHO 
y .. D 
No 0 ~ No. "lVe not"" 
NoD 
tf vttt«PffIOn SNrehed prop4tl1y found? 
Oet .. !s;. 
V.sO NoD 
AmJ1ecf1 VH 0 No 0 CU5Iodv R.co,d No. 
OIftnc:o: . SlofIn PrOP' D GOinG Equip D D,ugs 0 We.pon. D 
F" .. ,,,,,, 0 Other D DeI,,1s 
8 ENCOUNTEIIISTOP ONLY RECORDED YOU HAIIt NOT BEEN SEAACHED 
Reuon: 
Outcome: Date:_ -----.I 
8etwMn ____ _ 24 hour tloUInd __ _ 
It __ 
Velucl. p, .. ,ntl VlsO NoD Indexno._ 
COMPlETE IN AU CAUS 
2. hours tloO 
(pIacel 
Officers stopping or searthing:. _ _"_ 
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B.6: Authorisation pro-forma 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
Authorisation to Stop and Search - 5.44 under the Terrorism Act 2000 
(To be confinned by the Secretary of State within 48 hours of time of authorisation) 
5.44 (1) Terrorism Act 2000 [ ] 
5.44 (2) Terrorism Act 2000 [ ] 
5.44 (1) & (2) Terrorism Act 2000 [ ] 
Nam. of Fore.: 
I 
Type of Authoril8tion applied for: 
I Oral I Written [ I [ I 
Authorisation to run until: 
I Time: I Date: 
Location wh.re DOwers to apply (please specify): 
Whole Force Area ( ] Map Attached I ) 
DeSignated Force Area ( ] Map Attached I ] 
Rea.on for exercising S.44 powere: 
Authorising Officers should only use the power In 'specific and exceptonal drcumstances' 
(Elease see Explanatory Notes for more detail). 
AuthoriSing Officer: 
AuthOrising Officers must hold substantive or temporary ACPO rank. Officel1 acting in ACPO 
ranks may not authorise the use of S.44 powers. 
Signalurt ..................................................... .. Time Signed ......••....•.•..•...•..•..•. 
Print Name/Rank .•..•.....•.....•.....•.•......•....•..•..•.. Date Signed ............................ . 
j'"'' ''''' C,,.... Md T •• ,,,,,,. N,mOor. 
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to TerrOrism ~ ACPO NPIA 2008 
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NOT PROTECTIVElY MARKED UNTIL COMPlETED 
8) Ongoing assessment of the terrorist threat: 
Authorising Officel1 should have some awareness of how the ongoing threat relates specifICally to 
this authorisation (see Explanatory Notes for more details). 
9) New Infonnation and/or Circumstances over period of authorisation: 
Information relating to recent events specific to the force that are relevant to this Authorisation (see 
Explanatory Notes for more details). 
10) The use of S."" of the Terrorilm Act 2000 rather than other powers of stop and lIarch. 
(sae Explanatory Notes for more details). 
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKfD Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism (I ACPO NPIA 2008 
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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED UNTIL COMPLETED 
11) Description of and reasons for geographical extent of time of authorisation: 
Authorising Officer should identify the geographical extent of the Authorisation and should outline the 
raasons why the powers are reauired In a Darticular area rsee Explanatory Notes for more details). 
12) Cetails of briefing and traInIng provided to officers using the powers: 
The force should demonstrate that all officers Involved in exercising Section 44 powers receive 
appropriate trainIng and briefing In the use of the legislation and understand limitations of these 
powers (see Explanatory Notes for more detailsl. 
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Procti~ Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to T~rorism ID ACPO NPIA 2008 
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NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED UNTIl COMPLETED 
13) Practical Implementation of powera: 
To include arrangements review procedures where applicable. and the type of operations that the 
power win support e.g. ANPR, anned patrols. road checks, security of vulnerable s~es. MANPADs ete 
see Explanatory Notes for more detail). 
14) Community Impact lullSlmlnt and Consultation: 
A Community Impact Assessment (CIA) should be completed by all forces prior to 8 5.44 
Authorisation being confirmed. The Authorising Officer should provide details (see Explanatory Notel 
for details). 
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Practke Advice on Stop and SeQfch 111 Relation to TerTori~m ~ ACPO NPI" 2008 
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Explanatory Notes to Authorisation to Stop and Search under S.44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
Point B Ongoing assessment of the terrorism threat 
Threat Assessments from Intemational Terrorism and Dissident Irish Republican Terrorism are provided 
by JTAC and Security Service. Assessments of the threat to various aspects of the UK infrastructure, 
such as aviation. transport. military establishments are available and if necessary should be sought 
A high state of alert may seem enough in itseff to justify an aulhorisaton of powers, ft is important to set 
out in \t.e detaillhe relation between the threat assessment and the decision to authorise. 
See section 3.1.6 of the NPtA Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Tenrorlsm. 
Point 9 New Information and/or circumstances over the I!eriod of the Authorisation 
Information relating to recent events thal are specific; 10 the forces' Authonsatlon nominated for S.44 
powers. Under this section an Authorising Officer should identify any current situations where terrorist 
activity may have increased and there is evidence to suggest this. 
See section 3.1.5 of the NPIA Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism. 
fl!l!!!..1Q The use of S.44 of the Tenrorism Act 2000 rather than other I!0wet! of stOI1 an~ search, 
Authorising officers should state the reasons for seeking to authortse 5.44 Terrorism M. 2000 powers 
and why other powers of stop and search are insufficienl 
See section 3.1.5 of the NPtA Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism. 
Point 11 DesCriQtion of and Reasons for Geogral1hical Extent of an Authorisatio!l 
A map identifying the geographical extent the powers will cover over the period of the Authorisation 
should be dearly defined. H an Authorising Officer is applying for S.44 powers across the whole force 
area, this should be simply stated on page 1 of the Aull1orisatlO!l Form. The Force should attach a map 
where necessary for the Minister to see clearly where the powers will apply and its boundaries. 
Intelligence relating to a particular region/area; vulnerable sites; transport netwof1(s and events such as a 
party conference are examples of when it might be necessary for a force to apply fOl 5.44 powers. 
Operational requirements such a planned terror arrest which dictate that the powers are necessary, is 
another example of when 5.44 can be sought. 
However, powers should only be authorised where they can be justified on the grounds of preventing aets 
of terrorism and under S.43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 'A constable may stop and search a person whom 
he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist... . .' would be a more appropriate use of legal powers. 
See section 3.1.4 of the NPIA Practice Advice on Stop and Search In Relation to Terrorism. 
Point 12 D~tai1~ Qf Briefing !n~ T@ining grovided to Officer using ~.44 Powe[J 
AuthOrising Officers should provide a detailed outiine of what training has been provided 10 officers 
involved in the use of 5.44 powers. AA officer may not be involved In day-to-day anti-terrorist police war!< 
where as other officers involved in the use of exercising 5.44 powers may be deployed in specific anti-
terrorist operations. This information should be routinely included and updated as when necessary. For 
guidance on briefing and !askmg off.cers, consult section 2.4 of the NPIA Practice Advice on Stop and 
Search in Relation 10 Terrorism. 
See section 2.4 of the NPIA Practlce Advice on Slop and Search In Relation to Terrorism. 
PQint 13 Practlcallml1lementation of Powet! I 
I 
Authorising Officers should provide details of how the powers will be implemented. This should inciude 
arrangements for review procedures where applicable, and the type of operations that the power wilt 
support e.g. ANPR, armed patrols, road checks, security of vulnerable sites. 
See section 2.3 of the NPIA Practice Advice on Slop and Search in Relation to Terrori\lm. 
Point 14 Community Iml1aet Assessment and Consultation 
Authorising Officers should provide details of the community impact assessment completed In with 
regards of the application. 
See section 1 and section 3.1.1 of the NPIA Practice Advice on Stop and Search In Relation to 
Terrorilm. 
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Practice Mvice on Stop and Search in Relation to Tenori5n1 Q ACPO NPIA 2008 
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8.5: Tests applied to data in MPS Stops Database l 
Field in Stops Data Quality tests applied 
database 
Person Name contains invalid characters (e.g. numerals, invalid 
Forename punctuation marks) 
Name is entered as 'Unknown' or 'N/A' or some variant 
Form indicates that person gave their name, but the field is 
blank or shown as 'N/N', 'REFUSED', 'ANONYMOUS' or 
some variant. 
Form indicates that person gave their name but only a single 
initial is entered. 
Person Surname Name contains invalid characters (e.g. numerals, invalid 
punctuation marks) 
Name is entered as 'Unknown' or 'N/A' or some variant 
Forename & Are the same 
Surname 
Age/DoB The Age entered is inconsistent with the DoB. 
DoB and Age are both blank 
DoB Year of Birth is pre 1900 
Is later than or the same as the Date of the Stop 
Not entered 
Age Age is <= 9 years 
Age is > 75 years 
Is recorded a 0 
Gender Is recorded as Unknown 
1 Source: Data Quality Manager. 
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Gender / Person The Person's gender is inconsistent with the Person's gender 
Forename e.g. Mary recorded as Male or Barry recorded as Female (we 
have list of names/genders that we are reasonably confident 
should agree). 
Self-Defined Is blank or not recorded (where the reason for it not being 
Ethnicity (SDE) recorded is given as one of the 'N' codes: 
NI - Where the officer's presence is urgently required 
elsewhere 
N2 - Situation involving public disorder 
N3 - When the person does not appear to understand what is 
required 
N4 - Where the person declines to define their ethnicity 
Is not recorded (i.e. is blank on the fonn - no reason for not 
recording the SDE is given) 
Ethnicity (lC Is recorded as 'Unknown' 
Code) 
SDE & ICCode Are inconsistent e.g. SDE indicates 'Black or Black British' 
and IC code indicates 'White Northern European' 
Vehicle Vehicle is stopped, but registration mark is not recorded (field 
Registration is blank) 
Mark 
Officer Surname Name contains invalid characters (e.g. numerals, invalid 
punctuation marks) 
Is blank 
Is entered as 'Not Known', 'Not Recorded' or some variant. 
Officer Warrant Is blank 
number 
Date of Search Is blank 
Is pre 1996 or is invalid 
Date of Stop (or Timeliness - entered onto the system between 7 & 21 days after 
Search) date of stop 
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Timeliness - entered onto the system more than 21 days after 
the date of the stop. 
Is blank 
Outcome/Subject Outcome is inconsistent with Subject of Search e.g. Only 
of Search Searched a vehicle, but outcome is shown as either Arrest, 
Verbal Warning, Advised (i.e. relevant to a person not a 
vehicle). 
Outcome is applicable to an adult only, but the Person stopped 
has an age of < 16 years - for Outcome eode 7 - 'Directed to 
leave alcohol related crime or disorder locality. 
Outcome Outcome indicates an arrest, but no arrest details given (e.g. 
reason for arrest). 
Reason for Is Counter-Terrorism 
Arrest 
Location of Is blank 
Search 
• 
